


GOV
DOC.

Building for Canadians

A History of the Department of
Public Works (1840 ~ 1960)

3 1761 11709348 4






3 1761 04131 7272

1532

CAI

PW

-79 B 71



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2023 with funding from
University of Toronto

A History of the Department of Public Works

1840-1960

By Douglas Owram, Ph. D.

A History of the Department
of Public Works
1840-1960

Building for Canadians

A History of the Department of
Public Works
1840-1960

By Douglas Owram, Ph. D.

Published by
Public Relations and Information Services



Public Works
Canada

Travaux publics
Canada

CONTENTS

<u>Chapter</u>		<u>Page</u>
	Preface	vii
1	The Background to 1840	1
2	The First Great Impulse, 1841-1846	11
3	Economic Change and New Horizons, 1846-1857	39
4	Of Structure and Authority, 1846-1867	69
5	The Projects of Confederation	89
6	An Era of Growth, the 1870s	113
7	The Langevin Years, 1880-1896	139
8	Years of Prosperity and Growth, 1896-1911	167
9	Economy in War and in Peace, 1911-1928	191
10	The Depression Decade, 1929-1939	221
11	War and Reconstruction, 1939-1950	249
12	Towards a New Department, 1946-1960	275
	Conclusion	305
	- Notes	307
	- List of Abbreviations	373
	- Bibliography	375
	- List of Illustrations	381

PREFACE

Public Works Canada is one of the oldest departments in the administrative history of the country. Among the numerous government departments and agencies of the present, only six, including Public Works, date back to Confederation.* Even before Canada was formed from the separate colonies of British North America, the direct antecedent of this department existed in the Board of Works of the Province of Canada. The history of Public Works thus covers an era of time spanning the very growth of Canada as a nation.

Public Works was one of the first departments created in the colonial period. When the first settlers arrived in New France, the geographical expanse of the new world provided a challenge. The ruggedness, the vast forests, the lakes, rivers and indeed the sheer size of the land meant that if European man was to develop complex commercial, social and settlement patterns he would have to act to alter his environment. The state as well as the individual had to play a role in this process, since the problems presented by North American geography were simply too vast for the individual.

This volume is an attempt to chronicle the past of the organization that has evolved into the present-day Department of Public Works. As background there is a brief review of the early efforts of governments and individuals to create a system of works in British North America. Designed primarily as a biography of an organization, however, this work really begins with the formation of the Board of Works for the Province of Canada, which marked the Government's first real attempt to bring public works under a central and permanent organization. The account ends in the early 1960s with the Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization, the Glassco Commission.

* The other departments are Agriculture, Finance, Justice, Secretary of State and the Privy Council.

The opening date of this history is therefore 1840, the year of the formation of the colonial Board of Works, rather than the seemingly more appropriate year 1867, because of the direct way in which the colonial Board determined the nature of the Department of Public Works. In structure, activities, practices and even personnel, the Department of Public Works (created in 1867) was a direct continuation of its provincial antecedent. If there is a concentration on what is now known as central Canada in the early chapters, it is because events there determined the nature of the early federal Department of Public Works. Only as other regions asserted their influence and political power was this to change.

The choice of a final date for this work was more difficult. Because the Department of Public Works is still very much in existence, no convenient terminal date exists as is usual with the biography of an individual. For two reasons, the early 1960s seemed justifiable as an arbitrary place to stop. In the first place, the Glassco Commission marked the formal recognition of a new role for the Department as the Government's agency for real property management. The implications of this major shift in priorities are still being worked out, and an attempt to bring the history forward to the present would have provided no more satisfactory an ending. Secondly, as most historians are acutely aware, the search for those elusive qualities of "perspective" and "objectivity" becomes increasingly difficult as one approaches the present. I have therefore - for reasons concerned with source material, tact, and an effort to arrive at honest conclusions - thought it best to leave the history of the last decade to some future historian.

As befits a biography, the approach to this work is chronological rather than thematic, although within this chronology certain themes have recurred. These main themes, falling into three general areas, provide the analytical framework for the volume.

First, a problem of mandate and jurisdiction has always existed in the Department of Public Works. The Department evolved considerably between the time when its main responsibility was the construction of the St. Lawrence canal system and the years after the Second World War, when it became primarily a "service department". Interwoven with this evolution is the question of relationships between the various federal government departments. Division of authority has always been a fluid and often controversial matter in the Canadian bureaucracy, and Public Works has experienced more than its share of headaches in this regard.

The second theme is one of structure and authority. The overall structure of the federal Government has obviously been important in determining the character and priorities of the Department. In the history of the Department, and of the Public Service generally, this theme is marked by three distinct eras: a period of assertion of political control over the Civil Service; an era of patronage and the efforts of men to control it; and in recent years, an attempt to develop a set of bodies and procedures that would allow responsibility to remain with elected officials without forcing Ministers to become bogged down in administration.

Subsidiary to this is the whole problem of the internal structure of the Department. That structure often determined whether or not the Department was able to carry out efficiently the priorities set for it in a specific historical era. In the strengths as in the weaknesses of this organization, much has been revealed over the years concerning the current health of the Department.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I have attempted to relate a story in the following pages. In this story, lively figures such as Hamilton Killaly and Hector-Louis Langevin would not allow themselves to be dominated by themes. They demanded and deserved attention for their own sake and for the impact they had on the Department. Similarly, important activities in Canadian history, such as the construction of the St. Lawrence canals, the Intercolonial Railway and the Parliament Buildings, merited study.

As a general overview of the history of the Department, this volume does not pretend to be a definitive work on the subject. Useful and more specialized case studies might be made, drawing from the wealth of material that exists in many areas. The problems created by geography, the economics of government involvement, the role of Public Works as an economic lever, and the history of patronage, to name a few topics, have only been touched upon and deserve a more comprehensive and thorough study. If this work brings to the attention of others the value of previously overlooked records of the Department, then it will have served some purpose.

Any major project quickly brings home to the historian how much the success of accomplishing his task depends on the help of others. Officials in the Department of Public Works took time from their busy schedules to assist me. Mr. K.M. Dibben, Executive Secretary of the Department, was always available, helpful and friendly while assisting this stranger to the federal Government to thread his way through a system that to the uninitiated, and perhaps also to many initiates, often seemed a maze. Mr. John MacDonald, the Deputy Minister, provided essential encouragement, support and advice on the project. Dr. Walter Baker, now of the Faculty of Management Studies at the University of Ottawa, originally conceived the idea of a history and provided support throughout. From these people and from many others in the Department I found consistent support and encouragement that allowed the work to be accomplished in a friendly and positive atmosphere.

I would also like to express my appreciation to the many people outside the Department who helped me with research and writing. The debts here are many and it would be impossible to list them all. Special mention should be given, however, to Professor J.M.S. Careless of the University of Toronto, who read the pre-Confederation chapters of this work and gave me a great deal of useful advice; and to Brian Hallett of the Public Archives of Canada, whose knowledge of the vast collection of departmental records was essential to the completion of my task.

This work was commissioned by the Department of Public Works, but from the beginning I was allowed the freedom to pursue my own course and reach my own conclusions. It is thus a genuine pleasure to say that this history, including any errors or omissions, is solely my responsibility.

Douglas R. Owsram
Ottawa, March 1973

CHAPTER 1

THE BACKGROUND

TO 1840

It was well over two centuries between the first establishment of a colony by Europeans in Canada and the creation of a permanent government agency for the administration of public works in the Province of Canada. From the time when Champlain's colonists arrived at Quebec in 1608, man had sought to alter the vast landscape of the new world to better suit his needs. Initially, however, the needs were rudimentary and the available resources limited. Only as New France, then Canada, developed and grew did new economic imperatives and greater demand for transportation facilities mean that the old system of private enterprise and ad hoc government projects was no longer sufficient. In order to understand the origins of the Canadian Board of Works in 1841 it is necessary to look briefly at the economic evolution and public works efforts, successful and unsuccessful, which preceded it.

The earliest European settlements in the future Province of Canada centred on the fertile valley of that natural highway, the St. Lawrence River. Throughout the existence of New France, most of the colony's population lived on property with easy access to the river. For all the territory that the French explored and claimed, the agricultural and manufacturing base of the colony of New France remained firmly in this narrow strip along the St. Lawrence.

Beyond this settled region a vast hinterland developed between 1608 to 1763. Stretching up the Great Lakes and to the prairies of the Far West, sweeping westward around the English colonies on the Atlantic seaboard and down the Mississippi River, this hinterland provided the real basis for the existence of New France. A dual mission, aptly described by one historian as "the garnering of furs and savage souls" had led the French to this hinterland, yet caused them to leave most of it in a wilderness state. (1) As long as the hinterland remained a missionary field or a resource market for the fur trade there was little reason to develop it. To the trappers and merchants involved in the trade, it seemed best to leave New France beyond Montreal in a natural state. The marvellous lake and river system of the

New World allowed easy access to the interior, and the portages and other obstacles were overcome without difficulty by trained men in light canoes. The improvement of the land would, if anything, be destructive to the fur trade. Clearing the forests and populating the land would destroy the home of the beaver. The fur trade depended on an untamed wilderness. (2)

By the end of the eighteenth century, however, the supremacy of the fur trade was threatened. A growing population, augmented by the influx of Loyalists both during and after the American Revolution, insisted that Canada should be more than a wilderness. These men were interested in farms, not furs. To them the wilderness was an enemy, and they felt that the forests should be cleared for crops and sold for lumber. By the time Upper and Lower Canada were created from the old state of Quebec in 1791, the demand for transformation of the land had increased.

The attitude of the first Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada, John Graves Simcoe, foreshadowed the changing plans for Canada. He intended to create a viable and prosperous alternative to the treasonous American colonies. Monarchy as a bulwark against republicanism, in either military or social terms, could not exist without settlers and settlements. Fur trading, in some respects a semi-nomadic activity, was not an ideal basis for such a society. "Neither then nor later", it has been said, "did Simcoe formulate policies in order to protect the interests of the fur trade: that trade played little part in his plans for Upper Canada, since it would hold back settlement and debase the morals of those who did come." (3) The people invited by Simcoe needed farms, and prosperous farms required a system of communication that went beyond Indian trails and canoe routes. Simcoe turned away from the fur trade and strongly advocated a policy of development.

Pleading the need for the facility of troop movement, Simcoe employed the military as a supplementary work force in the construction of two major roads. The first, running from Dundas to London, was to serve the intended political capital. The second ran from the growing town of York to Lake Simcoe. Undoubtedly, military transport was one purpose for the roads, but the process of opening up the wilderness was of equal importance. The long battle against the forest to improve the commerce of farmers and merchants had begun.

The permanent farming population of New France had made some improvements on the land. By 1763, there were already several roads linking the backwoods to the St. Lawrence River and running parallel to it, supplementing it as a route from Montreal to Quebec. (4) Here too, the demands for communication facilities increased as new settlers flowed into such areas as the Eastern Townships. In the new province of New Brunswick, and in the older but now smaller one of Nova Scotia, the rudimentary roads of earlier days now proved to be inadequate in the face of increased settlement, again largely a result of the influx of exiles from the American Revolution.

The system of road construction during this period, when not handled directly by the military, followed closely the pattern set in New France before the Conquest. All the colonies had some statutory labour requirement. Men residing within a specific area were expected to devote a certain number of days of the year to the construction or maintenance of roads and bridges in their district. (5) Supervision of construction - and in many instances the decision as to what needed repair - was the responsibility of a local commissioner appointed by the designated Justice of the Peace for the area.

The system was well-adapted to the needs of a small colony with few financial resources and no great schemes of growth, but it had great defects. Outside the main provincial lines, the decision as to what roads were required rested largely in local hands. The result was an uncoordinated and often parochial approach to road construction. Also, what of the areas where few settlers existed? Communications between settled areas were often non-existent simply because there was no local population to levy statutory labour requirements upon. Moreover, the lack of qualified supervision resulted almost invariably in roads that were cheaply made and of inferior quality. The system had worked for New France, but under the pressures of increased population it began to change.

A natural point of transition existed under the old system in the practice of commutation of statutory labour requirements. As citizens took the option of avoiding work through the payment of a sum of money, the governments found themselves with funds for road construction. To replace those who had not come out to work, the provinces often hired labourers to work on the roads. This practice was advantageous, since the funds could be used to employ much-needed professional and trained help for the more technical aspects of construction, such as bridges. As the demand for roads increased, the various legislatures were forced to go beyond the employment of commutation fees and fines and make direct grants for the construction of roads. The same process saw statutory labour (though still used) increasingly supplanted by tendered work. It is difficult to ascertain when contracts first overshadowed the older method; it would seem that by 1825 almost all but small local roads were built by the system of professional contract.

The methods of construction and finance altered, but for the most part roads were treated on an ad hoc basis under local supervision. In some provinces more specialized personnel took over some supervisory positions. In Upper Canada, for example, a Supervisor of Roads was appointed as early as 1810.(6) Most authority, however, continued to be delegated on a temporary and local basis. When it was decided to build a road or to let a major contract for repair, local commissioners were appointed. When construction was finished, so too was their task.

As representative government was established throughout British North America, the system became even more chaotic and complicated. Roads, always a first demand of a frontier economy, became an integral part of local patronage. A legislator was judged on his ability to direct roads to his area.(7) The practice was encouraged by the system that prevailed in the colonies of having money grants initiated in the Legislature by private members rather than through an Executive. In spite of the existence of overworked committees through which petitions and demands for roads were funnelled, the system militated against any consistent planning or standards of construction. As long as the Legislature was responsible for the introduction of appropriations, executive supervision was precluded. In New Brunswick this legislative initiation was retained much later than in the two Canadas, and as a result it was not until 1855 that the post of Commissioner of Public Works was created in that colony.(8)

There were some efforts at central planning. Various Governors seem to have played an often important role in initiating roads. Simcoe's efforts on behalf of Dundas and Yonge Streets is one example. Governor Walter

Patterson, who administered Prince Edward Island from 1770 to 1784, has been termed "an energetic road builder". (9) However energetic the efforts of a Governor, they could achieve only so much for road construction. Increasingly complex and varied duties of recalcitrant legislatures limited the effectiveness of a Governor's efforts in this respect. It was not until after the great reforms of the late 1830s that any part of British North America came under effective central authority for roads or other types of public works.

As merchants of both the older fur-trading generation and a new generation watched the transformation of the land in the early nineteenth century, a new scheme formed in their minds. Again they looked to the products of the land - wheat, timber and potash rather than beaver - and at the markets of Europe. As the idea of overseas trade emerged, it became obvious that the old system of communication was still to play a crucial role. The forces that had altered the land did not necessitate the rejection of the river. New and different demands were to be placed on the great transportation route but it was to remain necessary to the new trade.

Physical features seemed to destine the St. Lawrence to be the rightful carrier of the trade of Canada and the American Northwest; the hope of using these features gave rise to concept of a commercial empire along the St. Lawrence. Donald Creighton has shown the essential continuity of this vision from the days of the fur trade. (10) The political boundaries had been lost and after 1821 the St. Lawrence had lost the fur trade. But empire was not ceded. Looking to the granaries of the West a new empire was built from the same arguments. This "argument from geography", as it has been called, saw the great waterway as "a potential source not only of convenience, but of wealth to Canada". (11)

The vision was simple, but the technicalities were complex. As the merchants turned from furs to foodstuffs and timber, a whole series of economic regulations came into play. These were the regulations that lay at the base of the British Empire of the early nineteenth century. Basically, the merchants hoped to take advantage of Canada's position as a colony within the Empire. Ideally, this would have meant the unrestricted flow of goods from Canada to Britain with the rest of the world shut out by high protective tariffs or outright prohibition. The system in this way resembled the concept of a customs union (such as the Imperial Zollverein), which was to capture the imagination of many Canadians at a later time. There was one important difference: the merchants also desired the free entry of American goods into Canada. Thus it was hoped that the United States would ship the growing produce of the Northwest via the St. Lawrence, after which it would qualify for free entry into Britain. The strict application of the navigation laws to ensure the use of Canadian ships would complete the system. In this way it was hoped that Montreal would supplant New York as the major port of entry and exit in North America.

The demands of the merchants were never completely met, and from their point of view the system of regulations remained in various states of imperfection. Yet the idea persisted. Merchants and entrepreneurs continued their efforts to realize an Imperial system centred in the valley of the St. Lawrence which would give Canada its "rightful heritage". It was a design that, contrary to the opinion of continentalist Goldwin Smith, rested on geography rather than opposed it. (12)

A part of the shift in the basic strategy of the merchants arose from the realization that the magnificent waterway was not perfect. The system

had been sufficient for canoes with their light loads, but the bulkier ships needed for the new products would be blocked by a series of breaks in navigation located in two general areas. First, there was the rather spectacular obstacle of Niagara Falls, as the water from Lake Erie dropped to the level of Lake Ontario. The second was a series of rapids and shallows between Lake Ontario and Montreal. If the new empire was to come into being and the St. Lawrence fulfil its seeming destiny, navigation had to be improved and these obstacles overcome.

Thus canal building joined (and to some extent competed with) roads as a major concern of the young colonies. Once again, the absence of a central authority prevented the setting of priorities or an overall plan for construction. The first real step towards the improvement of the St. Lawrence was the decision of the Lower Canada Legislature in 1815 to make a survey of the Lachine Rapids near Montreal, with the intention of constructing a canal. In 1819 this was followed by the chartering of a company to construct the Lachine Canal. Construction and financial difficulties occurred, however, and in 1821 the Legislature was forced to step in and take over the work of the defaulting company. The reversion of this necessary work to the public marked the beginning of a pattern that was to become all too familiar in colonial Canada.

The canal, which opened in 1824, cost the sum of £109,000 and had locks 100 feet long, 20 feet wide and depth throughout of 5 feet. As a result of the reluctance to bear further costs, together with the growing acrimony between the English merchants entrenched in the Executive Council and the French-Canadian majority in the Assembly, the Lachine Canal, only a beginning on the necessary works, was to stand alone for many years to come.

As the canal was opened with appropriate ceremony, the final stages of construction had been reached on the Erie Canal several hundred miles away. DeWitt Clinton, the energetic Governor of New York, also believed in commercial progress. With the opening of the barge canal in 1825, New York made its contribution to the struggle for commercial supremacy, thus making further improvements to the St. Lawrence system more necessary than ever.

Another major canal project followed on the heels of the Lachine Canal. In 1826 the Imperial Government began construction of the Rideau Canal. This system, completed in 1832 at the cost of about one million pounds sterling, provided continuous navigation from Kingston on Lake Ontario to Montreal via the Rideau Canal to the Ottawa River and back down that river to its juncture with the St. Lawrence. The route was intentionally circuitous. Designed and supported as a military work, the canal gave a means of communication that could not be easily cut in a war. The factors that made it desirable as a military work, however, rendered it ineffective commercially: the Rideau Canal never played a really important role in the transportation of goods down the St. Lawrence.

The most dramatic effort of the period came in the attempt to bridge the difference in height between Lakes Ontario and Erie. In 1819 William Hamilton Merritt, a merchant of St. Catharines (Upper Canada), began to dwell on the possibilities of using a canal to give extra waterpower to his mill. Merritt's plans soon grew and plans for a shipping canal from Lake Ontario to the Welland River emerged, a system that would enable ships to travel between the two lakes. The Legislature of Upper Canada was

petitioned to build it, but conscious of military factors chose a much longer route for the survey. Not surprisingly, the result was that such a canal was impracticable.(13) Finally, in 1824, after several private surveys, the Welland Canal Company was granted a charter as a private company by the Legislature. George Keefer, a patriarchal figure of Thorold, was appointed its first president. Merritt, as a member of the company's board of directors and as the canal's general manager, remained its driving force.

In this instance, the private company had been created only after the Legislature and the British Government had refused to take on the project themselves. Even this was possible only because of the unrealistically optimistic estimates as to the cost of construction.(14) The inevitable working out of events, however, forced the Government to take a greater and greater financial interest in the project despite its earlier wish to remain uninvolved.

The events that followed the granting of the charter were an indication of both the imperative necessity of completing the St. Lawrence system and the increasingly difficult position of Canadian merchants who wished to compete with New York. In the immediate sense the same factors were of help to the Welland Canal Company. When capital from Canada and England failed to fulfil the requirements of the company, Merritt turned to the New York market. In these circles there were some who realized that this canal, standing alone, would be of more benefit to the New York system than to that of the St. Lawrence. The construction of the Oswego feeder canal, completed in 1828, meant that the Welland Canal would merely shorten the time required to ship goods from the Midwest to New York. These factors convinced J.B. Yates, a New York lottery manager, that the Welland Canal was worthwhile investment. The resulting subscription was the first of many from the American state that the canal was designed to challenge.

In spite of the generous support of New York backers, the Welland Canal Company remained short of funds. Within two years from the grant of the charter, the company had run out of private sources and was forced to turn to the Government. As had been the case with the Lachine Canal, a private company had found it impossible to continue the work unaided. Changes in plans, obstacles in construction and the reluctance of the private market to buy stock forced the Legislature to lend £25,000 to the company in 1826. Once the precedent had been set the company continued to turn to the Government. There was really little choice on either side. The company, having underestimated the costs with alarming regularity, had nowhere else to go. The Government, on the other hand, once its £25,000 was committed, had to make the harsh choice of continuing to support the project indefinitely or of letting the work and investment come to nothing.

Crucial to the involvement of the Government had been Merritt's success in convincing members of the Family Compact that the canal was worth their support.(15) Their influence, combined with the support of the commercially-minded in the Assembly, meant that requested funds would be forthcoming. By 1826, Merritt reported that of £169,000 subscribed, £50,000 had come from Upper Canada and another £25,000 from Lower Canada.(16) And within a short time, Upper Canada granted the Welland Canal Company another £50,000. Certainly there is some validity in the comment that by 1827 the "Welland Canal Company was already degenerating into a privately-controlled institution for the disbursement of public

funds". (17) From the end of 1826 the company's strategy really rested on the belief that the Government could not afford to let it collapse.

The financial involvement of the Government led inexorably to governmental control. But, as had not been the case with the Lachine Canal in Lower Canada, it came gradually not so much as the result of opposition from the company - which would have been only too happy to see the Government buy out the project on favourable terms - but as a result of the reluctance of the Government to saddle itself with the project. In 1834, as a rider to another £50,000 grant, the Government obtained the right to appoint three of the seven directors as the first step towards protection of its investment and control of the Welland Canal Company.

The idea of public ownership received a boost in 1836 when the company stated its willingness to be bought out by the Government. The Government replied with a halfway measure. In 1837, previous governmental loans and grants were converted into stock, making the Government by far the biggest shareholder. At the same time the board of directors was reduced to five, three of whom the Government still appointed. "This act", economist-historian Hugh Aitken observes, "therefore marked the end of private control". (18) The Government had gone a long way towards total control but had not taken the final step of buying out private shareholders. The fact was that problems in finance were not exclusive to the Welland Canal Company. By 1837 the Government simply could not afford the purchase price.

The experience of the Welland Canal Company reveals a great deal about the dangers of such a major undertaking for a young colony. The company directors had proceeded with construction believing that it could be done cheaply and within the optimistic estimates. They had also believed that the revenues from the canal would more than pay the interest and dividends on capital expenditures and the cost of upkeep. In addition, the canal was regarded as an asset to the country not only as a source of profit but as part of a system that would pull trade from the United States to Canada.

As for the first point, the economic nature of construction had probably been of greatest importance to those men who began the canal. Changes in plans, and engineering problems such as the 1828 slide in the deep cut, continually revised costs upward. The Government had become committed to the project in the belief that a limited amount of support would suffice. As the several revisions of the charter indicate, they were badly (though not intentionally) deceived by the estimates of the board of directors. The Government was sucked into a vortex of financial responsibility from which it became increasingly impossible to escape. In 1834 the Reformer Peter Perry asked in exasperation, "Is all subservient to this great Moloch?" (19) By 1837 the Government had some £454,000 worth of stock, more than three-quarters of the total. It was a burden the struggling colonial Government could ill afford.

The belief that upon completion a profit large enough to cover the investment would exist proved equally illusory. When, in 1830, it was found that the canal had not been successful in capturing the American trade, the board pushed to complete the canal through to Lake Erie rather than continue to use the Welland River. Completed in 1833, this extension helped to some extent, but the revenues still did not cover the increased debt charges and operating costs. One of the problems arose from the original

"cheap" construction of the canal - the use of wooden locks and temporary works led to abnormally high costs of repair. By 1836 it became apparent that as long as excessive operating costs persisted the canal would never reap a profit. A pessimistic 1837 report stated that "the Canal can only be maintained at an average annual loss of £12,000," and went on to pose the question that had hovered in the background for so long as to whether "it may be wise to let the canal go to decay?" (20) The Government had, however, invested too much in the canal to accept that conclusion.

Finally, the belief that the canal had the potential to greatly benefit the whole colony persisted in spite of the other difficulties. The 1836 Report of the directors of the Welland Canal Company pressed this point in defence of the project, which had come under attack from radical Reformers, such as William Lyon Mackenzie:

This work has been so much abused, and so misrepresented, that the public cannot fully appreciate its usefulness or importance. It has contributed to the prosperity of all parts of the Province; and has increased the value of property, added to the expenditure of capital, to the erection of machinery, has opened hidden treasures. (21)

The third point, even when it was argued by the more moderate, that the Welland Canal would not realize its full potential until the rest of the works on the St. Lawrence were completed, had at least not been disproved.

The canal was, in fact, still strongly supported by the originators of the project. Merritt, with obvious bias, wrote at the bottom of the 1837 Report that the suggestion to let the canal go to ruin "would be as justifiable on public grounds as suicide in a private individual". (22) The Legislature and the Executive evidently agreed. In May 1839, a bill passed the Legislature to buy out the private shareholders. The Government had long ago become the major supporter of the canal and on the basis of the public good, it now prepared to take steps to help it realize what was believed to be its full potential. (23) Money, a continual problem throughout, was to delay events for some time.

One of the main objectives to the division of Canada in 1791 had been the question of finances. As Lower Canada possessed the ports of entry, it also possessed the tariff revenues, the main source of funds for the Government of the day. The agreement of 1796, which gave Upper Canada a fixed portion of the revenue, lasted for only two years. From then on there were continual difficulties, which reached a low point in the years 1819 to 1821 when Upper Canada received nothing at all. Over the years various attempts were made to solve the problem. The merchants of Montreal, seeking to escape from a French-Canadian popular majority, sought union. The Upper Canadians, who had no desire to bring the racial conflict on themselves, found some comfort in such proposals as the one propounded by Merritt before a committee of the British Parliament to annex Montreal to Upper Canada. "We think", Merritt argued in 1827, "that by possessing a sea-port, we would improve the interior: make it an object for individuals to invest money, create business, produce an entire change, and place ourselves in as full as good a situation as our neighbours." (24) Neither Merritt nor the merchants of Montreal had their proposals realized at this time.

Britain did, in 1822, bring before Parliament a bill in two parts. The whole bill would have provided for the working out of trade and fiscal

arrangements and the union of the two Canadas. The union bill was allowed to lapse, but the Canada Trade Act, which made provisions to ensure that one-fifth of the total revenue would go to Upper Canada, was passed. The amount was not generous, but it did mean that a frugal government could live within its means.

The Government of Upper Canada, however, was anything but frugal and it was the Welland Canal on which it so extravagantly used its meagre resources. Gradually the investment soaked up the Province's credit. As bond issues and debentures were issued to raise the necessary money for the canal under increasingly rigorous terms, the revenue of Upper Canada was increasingly taken up with the payment of its own debt. The economic depression of 1837 along with the rebellions and resultant uncertainty ended Canadian chances of any further favourable loans. By 1839 Sir George Arthur, Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada, wrote to his superior: "The public debt of this Province ... involves an expenditure in interest nearly equal to the whole revenues of the colony." (25) The Province of Upper Canada was on the verge of bankruptcy.

In the aftermath of the 1837 rebellions in the two Canadas, much hung in the balance. Lord Durham's arrival and the probability that his recommendations would bring about a major restructuring of the two provinces meant that for the time being the colonial politicians and merchants could only wait and while away the time in attempts to influence the English earl. Among matters to be decided were the future course of development and the whole strategy of public works inspired by the St. Lawrence. If the effort to develop the St. Lawrence was to continue and the other necessary public works were to be started, provision would have to be made in terms of not only organization but also finance.

Donald Creighton regards the major result of the Durham mission - the union of the two Canadas - as a victory for the merchants. (26) The attitude of colonial Governors at this time, when so much rested in their hands, was of the utmost significance in determining Canadian development. Durham, soon after his arrival in Canada, recognized the importance of public works on the Canadian scene. "It appears to me probable", he wrote to the Colonial Secretary, "that a demand of a yet more urgent and extensive nature may be made on the provincial government for the continuance and maintenance of public works either uncompleted or going to ruin for want of timely repairs." (27) One month later, Durham revealed his conversion to the vision of Merritt and others interested in canals. A trip to Niagara brought home to the Governor the prosperity of Buffalo just across the border. Writing to Colonial Secretary Glenelg, he said that

all these advantages might be ours by the judicious application of not a large expenditure. The Welland Canal which commences at the Grand River on Lake Erie, and strikes the Lake Ontario a few miles west of Fort George has great advantages over the Erie Canal ... If this Canal was completed ... and the St. Lawrence, the water communication by the Lakes, the Rideau Canal and the St. Lawrence to the sea by Montreal and Quebec, would be complete, and all the immense trade which now flows from the West by Buffalo, the Lockport and Grand Canals to New York, would pass through the Provinces and enrich all the towns and districts through which it was carried. (28)

The potential of the St. Lawrence had captured Durham's imagination as it had the imagination of so many before. More than that, Durham drew a connection between public works and his mission of restoring peace and tranquillity to British North America. Continuing his dispatch to Glenelg, he said that he felt strongly on the question "both as a means of restoring tranquillity to the Canadas, and of blessing the North American Provinces with a degree of prosperity which has never yet been afforded them". (29) Durham's final position was stated in his famous report. By that time the debt of Upper Canada, created by its efforts to improve the St. Lawrence, had become almost praiseworthy. Also, he considered that the inability of the Province to complete the improvements was connected directly to the discontent in the Province. "It may well be believed that such a state of things is not borne without repining by some of the most enterprising and loyal people of the Province." (30) The strong belief in the commercial empire remained intact at this crucial juncture in Canadian history.

This part of the Durham Report also seemed to have strong support in official British circles. Such support was undoubtedly aided by people like Lieutenant-Governor Sir George Arthur, who wrote of Durham's dispatch of July 16, 1838, "I most heartily concur." (31) There was cause for optimism among those interested in the canals when it was announced that the two provinces were to be united. The British Government seemed disposed to favour a policy that would facilitate development. Further evidence was given by the first appointment made by the British Government to carry out its new policy. Charles Poulett Thomson, who was to be the first Governor of the united Canadas, was a former president of the English Board of Trade and Member of Parliament for the industrial centre of Manchester. He was definitely a businessman's Governor. The principle had been adopted and it was time to move from theory to practice; but organization and funds were now necessary before Canada could embark on its first coordinated program of public works.

CHAPTER 2

THE FIRST GREAT IMPULSE

1841-1846

The months between the arrival of Charles Poulett Thomson and the opening of the first Legislature of the united Canadas were characterized by stop-gap measures and impatient waiting. Thomson, like Durham, supported the proposition that the development of the colony with extensive public works was essential to the prosperity and well-being of the inhabitants. He was supported in this belief by many of those political figures closest to the Government and probably by the great majority of the populace. At the same time, however, the two Canadas were in a desperate position and helpless to begin their own great plan of action. (1)

The basic prerequisite for action was money. The financial condition of the colony, even with the debt of Upper Canada about to be spread between the two old colonies, allowed for no major undertakings. It was a frustrating period, since a great many works demanded immediate attention. Merritt estimated that the Welland Canal, built in haste and always short of money, needed the renewal of eight locks immediately and another nine within the year. Yet when he wrote to Executive Councillor R.B. Sullivan, the best the latter could do was to commiserate with the St. Catharines entrepreneur. Sullivan agreed that "the waste of money in preserving the canal in a palpable state is the natural result of there being no means of carrying out the plan of placing the work in a permanent and efficient state". The Government, however, was as powerless as Merritt to stop this wastage. "I fear," continued Sullivan, "no degree of energy on the part of the Directors will enable them to proceed with the work, unless the Governor-General can procure a guarantee from the Home Government." Everything depended on Imperial support and the best that Sullivan could do was assure his support for the project and advise Merritt to be "patient and watchful". (2) Merritt's predicament was the predicament of the Province. No longer was it a matter of convincing the Legislature to bail out the finances of the Welland Canal Company. Merritt had been only too successful at that and now, largely as a result of the canal, the Government itself had few resources.

Caught between financial penury and the urgent requirements of the works, which demanded a continued outlay of money, the new Governor-in-Chief attempted to steer a middle course. He continued to press the Imperial Government for support, warning, "That assistance of the mother country is indispensable to enable Canada either to support its present burthens, or advance in that career which may render them light thereafter." This, in spite of the fact that he realized that "nearly the whole debt of Upper Canada, therefore consists in the sum expended in principle and interest upon the two great canals (the Welland and the uncompleted Cornwall) and some other works of general utility". (3) Thomson felt that the problems of the Province were the result of too little rather than too much being spent in this area. With this attitude, Thomson had no intention of letting existing public works go to ruin. Partly to provide for those works that demanded immediate attention and partly to lay the organizational groundwork for the future, he set about reorganizing the young Board of Works of Lower Canada.

In 1838 the merchants of Montreal, dominant in the Special Council, which ruled the colony in the aftermath of the rebellions, fulfilled a long-standing wish for increased attention to public works in Lower Canada. Long balked by the hostility of the Legislature, they took advantage of the abnormal situation and created a Board of Works for the Province. Needless to say, the Board did not see much activity in those troubled times. Nevertheless, its existence did give Thomson the base from which he acted upon his arrival in Canada. Early in 1840, he dismissed the lawyers and merchants on the Board and appointed Hamilton Hartly Killaly, a 39-year-old engineer with experience on the Irish Board of Works, to the position of Chairman. Using the vague powers that existed, the Governor-in-Chief then extended the Board's jurisdiction to the Upper Province. (4)

The organizational structure was being laid for the great expansion that it was hoped Canada would see in the near future. For the present, however, it was the first task of the Board to attempt to preserve those works in existence and under construction while keeping expenses to a minimum. By May 1840, Killaly and Thomson had cut the Province's expenditure on public works to £36,000, of which £15,000 was designed for the Welland Canal. (5) In June, the Executive Council of Upper Canada decided that this was the best that could be done under the circumstances. Urging the importance of the Welland Canal, the Council nevertheless decided to "concur in the opinion of the Receiver General so far as to advise the obtaining of an advance from Provincial Banks in preference to the forced sale of debentures". (6) Even with the Provinces and the debts united, it was questionable whether the bonds of Canada could be sold at any sort of favourable rate. It was with relief that Governor Sir George Arthur could write to Thomson two weeks later to report that a loan of £40,000 had been arranged with the Bank of Upper Canada and that in the distribution of the money he had "adopted in each case the recommendations of Mr. Killaly's report". (7) Obviously, if public works could take such a high priority at a time of financial stringency, they were to be of great importance in future years.

The logical connection made by Durham was still held to be true. If the colonies were to remain loyal to Britain, efforts would have to be made to keep the people content and to make the connection to Britain seem advantageous. In the spirit of the times this meant material aid, aid to

relieve Canada of its burden of debt and to allow it to embark on a program of development that would make the nation prosperous. Since it was believed that, at least insofar as the English-speaking population was concerned, economic problems had been a prime factor in creating rebellion, it followed that with prosperity discontent would disappear. Thus in May 1841, when Thomson (now Lord Sydenham) received word that "the Queen's Government coincide in your views of the expediency of making such an arrangement as may employ the credit of this country for the benefit of the finances of Canada", the implications went far beyond the simple restoration and expansion of public works. (8)

In June 1841, the first Legislative Assembly of Canada since the Union prepared to open. Killaly had spent a good deal of time and effort to transform Kingston into a capital of sorts and had more or less succeeded. The fact that the Legislature met in a redecorated hospital must not have seemed important when Sydenham began his Speech from the Throne. Of matters commanding attention in the Legislature, Sydenham stated that "first in importance is the adoption of measures for developing the resources of the Provinces, by well considered and extensive public works". He continued by asserting that "the rapid settlement of the country, the value of every man's property within it, the advancement of his future fortunes are deeply affected by this question". Only then, using Russell's statement to maximum political advantage, did he announce that the Imperial Government intended to guarantee a loan for one and one-half million pounds sterling to reduce the burden of Canada's debt. (9)

The enthusiastic reaction to his address indicates the popularity of public works in Canada. The Legislative Assembly, in the reply to the Speech from the Throne revealed its pleasure in the measures that had been announced:

We concur with Your Excellency in the opinion that the improvement of the navigation from the shores of Lake Erie and Lake Huron to the ocean, is a work requiring great outlay of money, but promising commensurate returns ... and we learn with gratitude and pleasure, that Your Excellency has received the authority of Her Majesty's Government to state, that they are prepared to afford their assistance towards this important undertaking. (10)

Not only did the legislators announce in this statement that the commercial element dominated but they also expressed their belief that there was an intimate connection between the prosperity that would "inevitably" come from these works and their "belief that peace and tranquillity will be happily established in the province". (11) The British Colonist remarked, "It is obvious that the great majority, if not, indeed, every member in the House, will be prepared to cooperate frankly with the government in perfecting the necessary measures for effecting the great objects in view". (12) Parts of the Durham Report had already been rejected by the British Government and other parts were shortly to fail in the face of popular resistance. In the area of public works, however, the colonists were to make a determined effort throughout the decade to implement at least one portion of the Report. It was now up to the Government of Canada to take action to reach this elusive and popular goal.

There was one necessary step to be taken before good intentions could be turned into positive action. The Board of Works, operating under the

dubious authority of the Special Council of Lower Canada, had to be organized and confirmed for Canada as a whole. On July 6, 1841, the bill to establish the Board of Works was brought into the House. Generally there was strong support for the bill. It passed first reading by a vote of 27 to 7, but the opposition that did exist was interesting. On July 20 Allan MacNab, the head of the "Tory" Party, challenged Killaly on the structure of the Board. His major fear seems to have been the degree of independence granted to the Chief Engineer and his assistants. Killaly, who was the Member for the District of London, scoffed at his fears, pointing out, "A system of deputies is absolutely required, but that the directing engineer is responsible for all that is done." And besides, he argued, "Appropriations can only be made in the House in all cases and it is for it to see that these appropriations are well applied." (13) In the light of later events, Killaly's defence was not at all convincing. Variations of MacNab's attack on departmental structure were aired in the House. In a period when the colony was just beginning to be able to expect the Legislature to have any control over departments, there was a great fear of irresponsibility, and not without reason.

One other suggestion mentioned in the House was William Hamilton Merritt's criticism of Clause XV of the Act. This clause stated that "no contract shall be entered into ... unless it shall appear that the work can be completed according to the intentions of the legislature, for the sum appropriated for it". (14) Merritt's experience on the Welland Canal made him dubious that such a ruling could be adhered to. However, the clause illustrated one of the reasons why the Assembly wanted a central Board of Works. Merritt, who had at times come under criticism for his management of the canal, was not likely to convince the Legislature that no control was better than dubious control. And whereas, in the words of the British Colonist "Mr. Killaly did not appear to take this as a compliment to the professional ability of his engineers", events were to make it obvious that Merritt's scepticism was well-founded. (15)

Structure and responsibility thus emerged as the main issues in the bill presented to the Legislature. In principle, however, the Board was considered essential. Killaly's answers at least quieted any doubts that may have continued to exist. The Act was passed by the Assembly on July 25, 1841, and on August 17 "An Act to Repeal the Ordinances mentioned and to establish a Board of Works in this Province" was given assent by Sydenham. He had no hesitation in signing the bill, which, despite criticism, had not been amended. He was shortly to refer to "the establishment of a board of works with ample powers" as one of his greatest accomplishments in Canada. (16) An organized and powerful body now existed to develop the colony and the commercial empire.

The phrase "ample powers", which Sydenham used to describe the Board of Works, was an apt one. The Board replaced all the local commissioners who had been the cause of so much complaint and vested public works in a body not dissimilar to the present-day Crown corporation. The Act stated that the Board "shall generally have all the powers which bodies politic and corporate have by law". (17) The term "public works" had a very general application in this Act. The Board corresponded roughly to a combined Department of Transport, Public Works, Fisheries, and through the Trinity Boards of Montreal and Quebec, a Harbours Board. By default, as much as anything else, the Board was responsible not only for construction

and development of works supported by the Government, but for the maintenance of the government establishment itself. This came to include such items as the handling of the removal of the seat of government during the period of rotating capitals and the provision of facilities for government departments.

In the area of development the Board attempted to restrict itself to projects of a national as opposed to a local nature. Part of Sydenham's overall plan for the reorganization of the Canadian Government had been to end the dominance of local patronage and disparate grants by the Assembly by taking into the hands of the Executive the initiation of appropriations. At the same time, to fill the gap at the local level, he had attempted to strengthen the system of municipal government. Though a great improvement from earlier days, these steps were only partially successful in removing local works from national government. Local governments just did not have the money or the will to initiate much-needed improvements. The Government remained responsive to public pressure and on many occasions over the next few years the Board of Works was to find itself in charge of projects of a purely local nature.

At the same time it must be emphasized that both the maintenance of the government establishment and the local works were a far from major part of the Board's activities. They were secondary, and particularly in the case of government maintenance, were handled in an ad hoc manner at the periphery of public works.

The main thrust of the Board was in the direction that everyone intended it to be - towards the development of the economy. The Board was to be the agent for fulfilling the dream of a commercial empire along the St. Lawrence. Armed with power and money, the Board was expected to develop Canada's natural waterways, thus assuring for the colony the dominant position in the carrying trade that many felt nature had pre-ordained. The London Journal of Commerce, reflecting the support that existed in the Imperial capital for the scheme, offered the rationale behind the efforts of the Board. "The great wants of Canada", maintained the paper, "are capital and labour." At the time, however, the Board had trouble in obtaining either, and for the same reason:

The capitalist does not invest his money in Canada, because the Province is wanting in those elementary improvements which distinguish a civilized country from a less civilized one: labour emigrates from Canada to the United States, because the Province is deficient in means of employing it. The development of the great resources of Canada is wholly dependent on the accomplishment of public works of more than the ordinary magnitude. (18)

The "great resources", not the least of which was the waterway, had always existed. The primary disadvantage of Canada was "want of compactness" and this disadvantage could be overcome only "by increased facilities of intercourse". (19) This was to be the main task of the first Board of Works, and it put the Board at the centre of Canadian development strategy.

Killaly's schedule of proposed expenditures over a five-year period gives further evidence on this point. The works, as set out in a memorandum of August 12, 1841, were divided into three classes. The first class consisted of "national works" such as the canal system. The second class consisted of works of "inland communication", for the most part roads and

bridges. The third category was listed as "roads underway", a fairly small and self-explanatory division. The total expenditure in the years 1841 to 1846 as set out by the schedule was £1,739,537. The dominance of navigation improvements is clearly shown by a breakdown of the total: £1,418,182 was earmarked for the first class of works, £212,000 for the second and £109,355 for the third. As Killaly himself commented in his report to the Governor General, "It will be perceived that the necessity of opening fully our water communications to the Ocean, with a view to develop (sic) the resources of our country and increasing its Commerce and Revenue, is considered indispensable, and forms the basis of the proposed appropriations." (20)

The schedule was presented to the Legislature on August 20, 1841. S.B. Harrison, the Provincial Secretary, moved for the adoption of funds for the completion of the works and for the Government to raise money for that purpose. There were, however, problems. The loan guarantee of the British Government had not yet resulted in the raising of the money for the Province. Harrison, acting cautiously, decided that until such time as the finances of the Province improved, only part of the works could be begun. His schedule thus differed from Killaly's in one important respect. The expenditure for the completion of the St. Lawrence section of the works, some £850,000, was to wait. The rider to the motion, that "as soon as a loan of not less than £500,000 can be negotiated and obtained by this Province, from any private Company or Companies, at a reduced rate of interest, the improvement of the navigation of the River St. Lawrence should also be undertaken and completed", did little to calm the anger of William Hamilton Merritt. (21) He immediately attacked Harrison's motion. It seemed, he argued, as if the old days of indifference to public works had returned. Once again, the United States was cited as an example of the sort of policy the Government should be following. To those who looked to a glorious future and who had gambled so much on it, the financial caution of the Provincial Secretary seemed to be a treasonable attempt to prevent Canada from achieving its rightful destiny. Merritt warned that if the Government did not alter the schedule he would bring in an amendment to do so.

Merritt's attack opened up a hornet's nest. The British Colonist, on the same day that it carried Merritt's criticisms, warned that not everyone was pleased with the emphasis that gave so much attention to the canals and so little to the other needs of the colony. It then went on to quote a speech by R.B. Sullivan, the man who had promised Merritt support for the Welland Canal, on the plight of the backwoods settler:

They lived in a country without practicable roads at a distance from society and civilization. They took their young and rising families into the woods, with all the sanguine hopes that a short time would realize to them all the happiness of ease and retirement in a new and fertile country. But, from want of works, and other internal communications, and from want of an increasing neighbouring population, they found themselves shut up in the gloomy prison of the external forest, excluded from the means of education for their families, from the consolation of public worship, from the blessings of civilized society. But they could not escape. (22)

Sullivan's speech summed up the thoughts of those who felt that the excessive attention paid to canals by people like Merritt drew away needed expenditure from the development of roads. The objections stated by the British Colonist were aired in the Legislature when Merritt's amendment came up for debate on the first of September. Francis Hincks, reflecting the manner in which public works issues crossed party lines, opposed both his leader Robert Baldwin and Merritt arguing that "as a representative of an agricultural population, he would contend that the internal communication should be improved, so as to enable our farmers to get their produce to market with as little cost as possible". (23) The debate brought other interests forward. Malcolm Cameron and George Moffat attempted to get further funds shifted to the Ottawa region for the development of the timber trade. (24) Captain Elmer Steele argued that "the great military roads north and west" were essential not only for military security but for the purpose of settlement. (25) Against the wishes of the Government, the Merritt-Baldwin resolution passed, though only with the help of the Speaker's deciding vote. The next date the attempt to set a precise figure to the resolution calling for immediate expenditure on the St. Lawrence resulted, "after a great deal of confusion", in £315,700 being voted for St. Lawrence improvements. (26) The Board of Works now had the necessary funds.

The debate in the Legislature is instructive. The positions taken reflected the climate of opinion in the colony and were to arise as issues in the future. They did not, however, indicate any strong opposition to the principle involved in improving the St. Lawrence. The objections were not against the principle or even the sums of money to be spent, but simply against the total dominance that the scheme had achieved over other essential works required in the frontier society. Francis Hincks's comment that "enormous as the outlay was, none of the improvements had been considered unnecessary - on the contrary, some hon. members had even proposed to extend them" accurately reflects the aggressive manner in which the Assembly approached public works. (27)

It should also be remembered that the attacks in the Legislature were not directed at the schedule as set out by Killaly. The trouble arose when Harrison attempted to set aside some of the planned expenditures. Even those who felt that road development was being ignored did not object to the emphasis or the philosophy set out in Killaly's schedule, but they did fear that the Merritt-Baldwin amendment would delay the expenditures set aside for roads, bridges and timber slides. Divisions existed, as the debates in the Legislature show, but the general philosophy of development was accepted and the Board of Works began the decade with overwhelming support from the politicians and public.

The staff of the newly created Board of Works, had they had the time or the desire for contemplation in the fall of 1841, must have felt a great deal of responsibility resting on their shoulders. For the first time in Canadian history a coordinated effort with large, if never entirely sufficient, funds was being made to construct the needed public works. The organization of the first Board of Works and the nature of those who worked for it were to be of great importance in determining the manner in which these projects were carried out.

The formal decision-making body consisted of the members of the Board of Directors of the Board of Public Works. Of these, only the

Chairman was a salaried official. The others were unpaid political figures, usually members of the Executive Council. The first Board included Dominick Daly, S.B. Harrison and John Davidson. The Chairman, of course, was Hamilton Killaly. In theory, the Board of Directors represented the legal entity of the Board of Works. (28) Another clause in the act, however, centralized power even further. It stated that the signature of the Chairman of the Board "shall be held to be acts of the corporation" and have the force of law. (29)

The 1841 Act also provided for a salaried Secretary as an assistant to the Chairman. His was potentially an extremely powerful role. Given the responsibility for the accounts and expenditure of the Board, the Secretary was not only a sort of general manager but also an internal auditor and treasurer. In addition, he was secretary to and present at all meetings of the Board. His position at Headquarters gave him a knowledge of the administration rivalled only by the Chairman. This combination of position and knowledge gave Thomas Begley, the first Secretary to the Board, a very powerful role, at least potentially so.

The staff at Headquarters was completed with a clerk and a messenger or two. (30) It was in the field, the "outside service", that most of the staff of the Board of Works existed. At this stage the department was obviously most concerned with the development of specific projects. Resident engineers, supervisors, draughtsmen and labourers made for a fluctuating and far-flung group. Each project or area was under the direction of a regional engineer, responsible directly to the Chief Engineer. (a position also filled by Killaly) A great deal depended on these regional engineers. Killaly and Samuel Keefer, the man who acted as his assistant in engineering matters, were nothing if not energetic. But in a colony as large as Canada, with communication in a rudimentary state it was imperative that these resident engineers make most of the day-to-day decisions on their own. Such decisions, often involving physical changes in projects, were not easily reversible. Their expertise and sense of responsibility to the mandate of the Board were absolutely crucial if the Board of Works was to function well.

The nature and control of decision-making within the department was especially important in the colonial period. As has been ably demonstrated, it was only by slowly building order out of chaos that systematic external and financial controls were imposed on the Civil Service. (31) In 1841, there was no Auditor General, no Treasury Board or any of the other bodies that today act as regulators on government expenditure. Even the politicians had at best loose control over the departments. Responsible Government had not yet arrived and the Executive was much more under the command of the Governor than of the Legislature - chairmen and members of the Board, for instance, were removable at the discretion of the Governor. That this did not correspond to the continued support of the Legislature in the strict sense is reflected by Killaly's later decision to resign his seat and yet remain as Chairman of the Board of Works. The Governor did not act simply on the wishes of the Executive Council.

Obviously a great deal depended on the man who presided over this disparate, powerful and expensive body. Hamilton Killaly was of Irish origin, having come to Canada in 1836. This man, who was to dominate the Board of Works for the next twenty years, was an eccentric even in the frontier terms of Canada. A large, extroverted man, Killaly often dressed in "tight satin breeches and patent leather dancing pumps, his upper man

bearing a gaudy outdoors shirt bared at the throat, exposing a hairy chest, the ensemble topped by a hat so dilapidated that it looked ... as if he had tumbled into the mud of a nearby ditch returning from an Irish fair". (32) An Irishman who shared the colonial prejudice against the Irish, he also delighted in dramatic behaviour regardless of whether his audience consisted of workmen on the canals or Executive Councillors. This was the man who shaped the Board of Works in the early 1840s. Project engineers enjoyed the independence of distance, but - contrary to what was the case in later periods - their power, in terms of policy and long-term decisions, depended solely on their ability to convince Killaly.

In the fall of 1841, then, these men turned their attention to the great works of the Province. One of their tasks was to drive roads through otherwise impassable miles of forest. There had been criticism of the lack of money directed to this area of public works in the Legislature. Roads were of great importance to a colony beginning to branch out from the shores of the lakes and rivers and settling the wilderness. Whatever these rivers and lakes might do for the trade of the nation, they were no longer satisfactory as the sole means of communication.

The roads listed in Killaly's schedule and the sums appropriated by the Legislature were restricted to those works considered of national importance. Local works were supposedly the problem of local authorities. The definition of a national road and the problem of where it should go obviously had no set answers. Two factors seem to have been considered in the decision. First there was the military factor. Roads that connected sections of the colony in such a way as to facilitate the movement of troops to strategic points tended to be included. The second factor was the somewhat controversial use of personal judgement to decide what roads - in the light of their bearing on opening up important areas - could be considered economically beneficial to the Province as a whole. Every village and district felt that a road in their area would ensure the prosperity of the Province, and incidentally their own.

In the category of military works such projects as the Chaleur Bay road were considered to be entitled to £15,000 to "moderately improve about 50 miles, now all but impassable". (33) Under the second category can be included such colonization works as the Gosford Road, winding from Quebec City through to Sherbrooke. New concentrations of population and the potential for future settlement made such a local road seem worthy of national support. Largest of all, and considered to combine the two prerequisites was the "Main Provincial Road". This road, with parts of it in various states of existence, had £111,000 allotted to it under various subheadings and took up most of the original road grant. (34) It was intended to link Quebec City and points in between, to Sarnia and provide a means of transportation between all the major points in the Province, whether for troops or civilians. A grant of £30,000 to finish the "Main Northern Road" from Toronto to Penetanguishene on Georgian Bay completed the list.

One of the great problems of road works is their open-ended nature. During this period canal construction was clearly limited to the St. Lawrence and there were only so many canals needed. Such was not the case with roads. The Board of Works found itself under pressure from the beginning to alter its plans for road improvements. In the middle of September 1841, just as the Assembly thought itself finished with the

appropriations of the Board of Works, Francis Hincks brought in an amendment calling for the immediate construction of several roads in the Western District. Hincks's resolution failed but the Government did agree to grant additional funds for a road not included in Killaly's original schedule - the Hamilton to Port Dover plank road. (35) The same amendment saw funds granted for a military road from L'Orignal on the Ottawa River to the St. Lawrence.

Even such amendments as these, however, did not completely mollify the inhabitants of western Canada. The Hamilton Journal and Express complained, with regard to the rejection of Hincks's amendment, "The people of the Western Districts have received a deep injury by the factious and narrow-minded view of those individuals, whose conduct has deprived them, for the present, of the means of completing their roads." (36) The story was the same in several areas, in spite of the Board of Works' good offices, from those who felt that their Districts deserved the support of the colonial Government. In early 1842, Hamilton Killaly had to resist a petition from his own constituency. The citizens of St. Thomas protested against the decision not to build a road from London to Port Stanley through, naturally, St. Thomas. (37) Such pressures on the Board of Works continued throughout the years. Municipal governments were either extremely reluctant to take the burden of road construction on themselves, or else incapable of doing so.

The expansion in the number of roads to be built resulted in other changes. In the original grant £30,000 had been designated for the completion of the road from Toronto to Georgian Bay. The Board of Works, pressed in other areas, delayed the beginning of serious work on this project. The understandable result was mounting pressure from Toronto. On October 4, 1841, the Toronto Board of Trade sent a memorial to Killaly urging him to begin construction immediately. (38) A few days earlier in Assembly, Isaac Buchanan, a Hamilton businessman, had also urged the Board to take action. Killaly did agree to begin a survey of the route, but this seems to be all that happened. By September 1, 1843, the total amount spent on the road was £179 1s. 3d., much to the disgust of the residents of the Home District.

The work done on roads during this period was essentially a compromise. Bitterness had been engendered in the western part of Canada by the way in which the Assembly and the Executive had ignored the needs of that section. A district just in the process of settlement was not convinced by the arguments of Robert Baldwin that Canada East should obtain the lion's share of the expenditure for having taken up the burden of the debt of Upper Canada, or Merritt's argument that an improved St. Lawrence benefited everyone. (39) The main provincial road did cut through the centre of the area, but the original decision to concentrate on it was not enough. In response to pressure, the Government and the Board of Works did add to the list of roads, although these were not nearly all that had been requested.

Evidence indicates that although Hamilton Killaly came from a western area, he was completely caught up in the strategy dictated by the presence of the St. Lawrence. He and his engineers carried out this major activity of the Board with enthusiasm and drive. It was to be nearly eight years before the connections between Lake Erie and the ocean were complete, but from the day the appropriations were passed this was the main focus of activity for the Board of Works. And within the framework of

this grand project, to use the words of Killaly, "The Welland Canal unquestionably stands foremost." (40) This great work of circumventing Niagara Falls had been for several years past, and was for several years to come, regarded as the keystone of the system.

By 1841 the Welland Canal was suffering the effects of its economical construction and want of funds for upkeep. Only a major overhaul would ever give it the opportunity to reach what was believed to be its full potential. The canal had been under the Board of Works for some time. At first the control had been ambiguous, divided between the Board of Works and the Board of Directors of the Welland Canal. By the spring of 1841, however, it could be stated that "the President of the Board of Works and Councillor is now dictator of the position". (41) The final steps in the takeover were begun as soon as the Legislature met. Even before the Legislature created the Board of Works, it passed a law, dated July 5, 1841, to provide for the purchase of stock of the private shareholders. Then, two months later, it committed the largest single portion of the funds for public works, about £450,000, to the overhaul and enlargement of the work. By December 1, 1841, the Kingston Chronicle could announce that the contracts had been let for the canal. Even those who had complained of the need for more attention to roads were gratified: "The most sanguine expectations are entertained, that the Welland and St. Lawrence Canals, when finished ... will be the leading route for the transportation of produce, not only of Canada but of the western portion of the United States." (42) The Welland Canal was in this period a symbol of Canada's hopes and aspirations. The Board of Works accepted the symbol and became its guardian. It was to be thirty years before another symbol (the Canadian Pacific Railway) arose to replace it.

The Welland Canal was more than a symbol of those involved in public works. It was one of the first - and certainly one of the most complex - public works undertaken to date. As such, the Welland Canal, like the Erie Canal in New York, was a hub around which engineering activity in Canada revolved. Professionals were drawn to the great project between the two lakes. This is understandable if one realizes the limited opportunities for engineers in Canada before 1840. A man looking for employment on public works would naturally have approached Merritt. This, combined with the small number of engineers involved in this sort of work in Canada, tended to give an almost cliquish aura to those actively involved in public works in the 1840s.

Central to this series of interconnections were the former and newly-appointed heads of the Welland Canal, William Hamilton Merritt and Hamilton Killaly. Killaly's first job in Canada had been as a surveyor of the Welland Canal in 1836. (43) Over the next few years it was natural that the common interest of these two men, in public works in general and in the Welland Canal in particular, should draw them closer together. In the period between 1839 and 1840, before Killaly assumed the duties of head of the Board of Works, he spent a great deal of time with Merritt inspecting the canal and preparing for the government takeover. It was also natural that a league should develop between them as a result of their mutual support of canal development. Killaly's belief in Canada's destiny and in the economic strategy necessary to attain that destiny corresponded to that of the St. Catharines entrepreneur. "I have read over your resolutions (on trade)," Killaly wrote to Merritt as early in 1839, "in which the principles of

all of which I fully concur." (44) By the spring of 1841 Killaly was corresponding regularly with Merritt, keeping him informed of events in government circles. He also took steps to ensure that the man who had put so much time into the Welland Canal would still have some control over its fate: "My idea is that the Comms... (Commissioners) ought to be left aside - an Engineer (Civil) appointed by the Government, one resident management Commissioner in charge, and to act as a medium of communication with the Board of Works." Killaly felt that the one Commissioner should be Merritt. "No man," he reasoned, "is so qualified as to have the management as yourself." (45) For the next three years Killaly continued his efforts to have Merritt appointed to some sort of supervisory position on the Welland. (46) That he eventually succeeded in the face of strong opposition indicates the degree to which he felt Merritt would be of help to him, not only in managing the Welland Canal, but also in politics.

The alliance was a connection of two similar spirits as much as a matter of self-interest. Both men were determined, almost to the extent of being blinded to other considerations, to complete the St. Lawrence system. It should be noted, for instance, that throughout the decade Merritt was a strong supporter of energetic action by the Board of Works. His attack on Harrison's schedule was not an attack on Killaly or on the Board of Works. The criticism was directed at an Executive who decided that some of the works on the St. Lawrence could wait. Although there is no written evidence for this, Killaly's attitude as time went on suggests that he was probably pleased with the Merritt amendment. It is certain that on other occasions Killaly did use the spokesman for the St. Lawrence system to attack those who criticized the development strategy that they both supported. When a newspaper criticized the efforts to complete the St. Lawrence works, Killaly wrote Merritt warning that "it weighs much with many, you ought to take the subject up - it is altogether against your doctrine". (47)

Beyond the common goal it is even possible to see these two men as having the same reasons for pursuing that goal. Hugh Aitken has said of Merritt that although

Merritt often spoke as if profits and revenue were important to him, his behaviour suggests that they were, in his eyes, more symbols of achievement - evidences of the fundamental correctness of his so-called visionary designs - than ends in themselves ... it was not the value of the stock so much as the canal itself as a physical entity and political symbol which counted (emphasis added) - the progress of construction, the number of ships which had passed through, whether the canal was just another piece of political jobbery or. (as its protagonists claimed) truly a work of great national benefit. (48)

In many ways this description could be applied to Killaly. An engineer, Killaly, like the businessman Merritt, had become entranced with the physical entity of a canal system that would link the Great Lakes to the ocean. It had become more than a matter of economics. The grand design of the commercial empire of the St. Lawrence had become an end in itself. These two men were kindred spirits and their imagination had been caught by the same vision.

Merritt and Killaly were only the central figures of a series of interconnections between those who were interested in public works in Canada. George Keefer, Merritt's partner in the Welland Canal Company and the man who had turned the first sod on the project, had two of his fifteen offspring go into the service of the Board of Works. Samuel Keefer was to be with Public Works for twenty-three years. From 1841 on, he acted as Killaly's right-hand man, and often, with the Chairman frequently occupied with administrative problems, as Chief Engineer. Thomas C. Keefer, Samuel's younger brother and a schoolmate of Merritt's son Jedediah, joined the Board in 1841 as supervisor of the Ottawa District. He was to remain with the department until 1848 and to serve on occasion thereafter. Both the Keefers had obtained training on the Welland Canal and had probably met Killaly there. Both remained close friends of the Merritt family.

Other instances can also be provided. It was natural for a young engineer searching for employment in Canada to turn to Merritt. Thus, when Casimir Stanislaus Gzowski decided to try his fortunes in Canada, he first obtained a letter of introduction. It was Merritt who received the letter from his employer P.H.V. Harnot, who recommended Gzowski as a "a gentleman highly esteemed here, who has been engaged for a number of years as draftsman on our public works". (49) Gzowski, whether with the help of Merritt or not, soon found work with the new major employer of engineers, the Board of Works. (50) He remained with the Board, operating from Toronto until 1848 after which he began an illustrious career as a railroad engineer. Thus it was that during the period of the first Board of Works most of the professionals who worked for the department were familiar with each other and with William Hamilton Merritt.

Perhaps the most serious by-product of such a close-knit engineering fraternity was the absence of qualified dissent, for (and this was not the case in the period after Confederation) the engineers and other supporters of the canal system tended to close ranks in the face of questions or criticisms from politicians or public. Those who questioned the actions of the Board were immediately cast in the position of outsiders. It was only as the years passed and an independent engineering establishment grew up, largely fostered by the railways, that a group developed to whom politicians could appeal for qualified and independent opinions. Such a service in early years might have saved the colony a great deal of money and trouble.

The Welland Canal may have been the keystone but the other canals of the St. Lawrence were an integral part of the larger design. The Cornwall, the Lachine and other canals were either begun or improved in the process of gaining a 9-foot depth from Lake Erie to the ocean. Also begun were improvements on a number of internal harbours and navigational aids on the St. Lawrence; and, for the powerful and important timber trade, slides and booms and other facilities were developed to enable the lumber to reach market. Obviously, the headquarters staff of four (increased to twelve by 1846), the outside service, the various contractors and up to 6,000 labourers were to have their hands full. (51)

As the Board of Works settled down to work, it seems to have commanded a great deal of interest and support. Most major reports released by the Board were reprinted by a good number of newspapers, often completely filling these small colonial publications. The activities of the Board seemed to promise all sorts of benefits to the colony. The British

Colonist commented, as the works began, that the "public improvements in the Province, which have been authorized by Parliament present a large and extensive field for the employment of industrious labourers". (52) And although it worried about the availability of this labour, the editorial concluded that these works would not only provide the much-needed transportation facilities, but would attract immigrants to Canada. In other words, they would fulfil the requirements set out for Canada's advancement by the London Journal of Commerce in 1841. (53)

The activity, and the circulation of money, provided a welcome relief after years of half-hearted projects and near-bankruptcy. Even the Americans seemed to take notice. A speech by Governor Seward of New York was taken by some optimistic Canadians as an admission that the Erie Canal, the bane of all those interested in the St. Lawrence, had met its match. (54) No doubt the United States was not yet ready to fill in the "great ditch" but the spirit of optimism indicated a definite change over the frustrations of the 1830s.

Hamilton Killaly also came in for his share of attention and support. Never really interested in politics unless politics was involved with public works, he seemed able to avoid identification with any political faction or party. In many ways this political head of the department seemed already to be adopting the role of public servant, above politics and political hatred. He was not immune to these, as subsequent events were to indicate, but in the first years of the Board's existence he received support from the press and politicians which was not connected to their political views. In March 1842, with public works affecting the prosperity of the Province and before squabbles arose to pull Killaly back into the arena of political controversy, the grateful inhabitants of his home town gave him a testimonial dinner. The London Inquirer, in announcing the dinner, gave its opinion that "no individual more truly deserves such a compliment at the hands of his constituency - he has throughout his parliamentary career sustained the expectations which were entertained of him". (55) The dinner, attended by seventy people, was a most flattering affair. Numerous toasts were drunk by the guests to Killaly, the Board of Works, the locale of London, and especially to the works in the Western District. The British Colonist remarked that there was "no better proof of the high estimation in which the Hon. H.H. Killaly, President of the Board of Works, and M.P. for London, is held by his constituents, than the kind reception he has met, not only from his supporters, but from his former opponents". (56) As the first great construction season opened for the Board of Works, the Irish engineer must indeed have felt that he and the Board had the approval of the people in the effort to develop the colony.

The spirit was not to last. By the nature of the times and by the very fact that public works were so essential to the colony, problems and controversies were bounded to arise. It was in the 1842-43 Session of the Assembly that criticism of the activities of the Board first arose. The attack came quickly on a number of fronts. On September 17, McLean, seconded by Neilson, supported a petition claiming that the £15,000 appropriated for the L'Original-St. Lawrence road had been improperly spent. Francis Hincks challenged this, stating that the only change from the grant was in the route of the road. McLean's reply raised a fundamental question concerning the relationship of the Board to the Legislature. "The petitioners did not mean corrupt misapplication", he commented, "but what they

complained of was, that the money was not applied to its legitimate purpose." (57) To McLean the important point was not whether the action of the Board had been well-intentioned, or even right, but whether it had the power to alter appropriations granted to it for a specific purpose by the Legislature.

Two days later another criticism was levelled at the Board, this time due to a more significant alteration of the plans presented at the time of the appropriation. The Beauharnois Canal, a project with an estimated cost of £235,000, had been shifted from the north to the south bank of the St. Lawrence. This offended not only the Legislature but the military, who preferred to see the work across the river from the American border and thus less accessible in time of invasion. (58) Suspicion was mounting. Two weeks later, Captain Elmer Steele and a Mr. Hale called for a suspension of work on the Gosford Road until such time as it could be ascertained whether "the views of the Legislature had been carried into effect". (59)

Nothing seems to have come of the motion on the Gosford Road. On the other two issues, however, the critics pressed their attack. On October 8, when Killaly was in the House for the first time since the criticism had begun, McLean and others challenged the Chairman of the Board of Works. In the words of a newspaper correspondent, "Very warm language took place between the gentlemen on each side." (60) After the debate had continued for a while Killaly rose to defend his decisions. His reply was significant. The criticism was treated as a matter of detail, similar to the petitions of those who had called for roads. The principle was lost as he defended the practical aspects of the change of route of the L'Original Road. Beginning by remarking that if the Board of Works was "composed of angels, they could not please the country in the present state of affairs," Killaly pointed out the technical reasoning behind the change of route and then turned on his attackers, stating that "he had some complaints certainly from Mr. McLean, on the route adopted, but he confessed not without some suspicion, knowing that the honourable gentleman was deeply interested in the other line". (61) Killaly ably deflected the attack by changing it from a question of principle to a question of technical soundness versus self-interest and patronage.

Killaly was equally successful when it came to the Beauharnois charges. These had earlier been referred to a select committee chaired by George Moffatt. The committee, which reported to the House on October 12 ran into the problem mentioned earlier - a lack of qualified independent judgement. In the face of contradictory evidence the committee did not feel qualified to judge the wisdom of the change of route. In the end it would only state that "from the very contradictory statements of various practical engineers they were quite unable to come to any satisfactory conclusion on the subject". (62) Once again the criticism had been deflected from principle to practicality, and this in spite of Moffatt's earlier statement that the "Board certainly had no right to make laws for itself" and that whether or not it had done so would form the basis of the investigation. (63) In the end, however, the investigation had turned to practicalities and on this basis there was no strong reason for censure. But that was not the end of the issue. The House and the Executive were to remain troubled as to the nature of the proper relation between the Board of Works and the elected officials. Many years passed before the relationship was firmly established.

If anything, these incidents, although they began to move Killaly from his position above the fray, further strengthened the autonomy of the Board of Works. The Legislature and a committee of the Legislature had accepted the Board's right to change plans and alter routes set out in appropriations in the name of technical soundness. The Board had, to a greater degree than had been intended, entered into the realm of policy-making, and become more independent of the Legislature.

Killaly, always more interested in public works than in politics, definitely aspired to an independent role. There seems also to have been support for the concept of a President of the Board of Works who remained above politics. The London Inquirer termed the whole series of attacks "a plot by the MacNab party" to play partisan politics. It defended the right of the Board to go against political and public pressure in its decisions on public works. (64) Others supported Killaly's desire to remain in control of public works while avoiding politics. As early as November 1842 the Montreal Gazette had suggested, in the wake of the entry of both Robert Baldwin and Louis LaFontaine into the Executive Council - a move that it opposed - that Killaly dissociate himself from this group and thus be "left free to give his undivided attention to the duties of his department". (65) Killaly, however, did not oppose Responsible Government and had no intention of resigning his seat and embarrassing the efforts of Sir Charles Bagot. Rumours continued their rounds, reviving as various instances warranted. In September 1843, when Harrison resigned over the decision of the Government to remove the capital from Kingston to Montreal, it was said in the disowned city that even Killaly would follow suit. (66)

Hamilton Killaly did eventually resign his seat in the Executive Council and in the Assembly. When Governor Metcalfe refused to accept the demands of those in the Council for Responsible Government, the entire Executive, with the exception of Dominick Daly, left office. Killaly, having resigned his seat in the Executive Council, decided to make a break with politics. In his letter of resignation to the electors of London he sent down two reasons for the decision. Significantly, he first explained, "Having found by experience that my professional duties were of such an onerous nature as to require my attention to be undividedly devoted to them I had for some time contemplated resigning to you." The immediate crisis he simply found "a fitting time to do so, having within the last few days considered myself bound (by the principles on which I conceive I was elected by you) to adhere to my late colleagues in the tender of the resignation of our Offices of the head of the Government". (67) With such a statement coming from the man who had accepted office under the authority of a Special Council and who had no trouble working with Sydenham, one has to conclude that the opposition to Metcalfe was indeed simply a convenient time to leave a political career to which he had never really been committed.

It certainly cannot be thought that Killaly's resignation stemmed from a belief that he had lost the confidence of the public. For in spite of the problems revealed by the criticism in the Legislature, Killaly and the Board in 1843 still had strong support for their position and accomplishments. The British Colonist, reviewing events to the end of 1842, had high praise for the work done to date:

It is to the credit of the Government that the internal improvements of the country are rapidly progressing; and

whatever may be the opposition to the officials composing the administration, there can be no doubt that their efforts to promote the advancement of the various public works are creditable to them, and likely to prove advantageous to the country. (68)

Opposition papers, even though they probably supported public works, probably doubted that this was reason enough to keep the Executive Council in office.

There is, in fact, evidence that public works policy was popular enough to be used by the Government to impress the public and create support. When Metcalfe carried his cause to the electorate in 1844, the slogan used was "loyal men and liberal measures". The Governor and his supporters obviously felt that the record of practical improvements could act as a powerful counterweight to appeals based on political theory. The belief that this would be effective was really a natural derivation from the approaches of Durham and Sydenham. It had been hoped that the energetic pursuit of public works in Canada, with the aid of the Imperial Government, would create a prosperous and loyal colony. Metcalfe was attempting to apply this aim in a very specific way.

The very fact that this program, still under the direction of Killaly, could be used by the man who had been the immediate cause for Killaly's resignation, indicates that the attitude of the Chairman of the Board of Works was non-partisan. The situation was noted by the commentators of the period and many accepted what was probably the case. As the Kingston Chronicle theorized, the resignation was more the result of a desire to avoid politics that it was reflective of a particular point of view. (69)

The works themselves seemed to be proceeding well. Some were being completed and the benefits were being felt by the public. Killaly travelled from place to place ceremoniously opening these improvements, pleasant occasions that, of course, boosted the public relations image of the Board. Progress was being made and there seemed little amiss. In the fall of 1843, the last of the major St. Lawrence canals was begun when Samuel Keefer travelled to Montreal to sign the contracts for the Lachine Canal. (70) Begun earlier, these canals were by all accounts making excellent progress.

The Board of Works could thus confidently report to Council, as the second full year of activity drew to a close, that the appropriations "are likely to turn out ample and sufficient, not only for the creditable construction of the various works as originally designated, but also to cover the cost of such improvements as have from time to time suggested themselves during their progress". (71) In the light of this statement, the Board seemed vindicated in its assumption of policy-making powers and in the alteration of plans after the appropriation had been granted. Such was certainly the reaction of many. The Montreal Courier termed the Annual Report for 1843 "most satisfactory" and concluded that it bore "internal evidence of having been drawn up with no view of having thrown dust in the eyes of the people". (72) The Kingston Chronicle printed the Report in its entirety, accompanying it with an editorial:

The Report has received the universal approbation of the Press of all shades of politics and no person can read it without admiration of the utility of the Board when compared with the system which formerly prevailed in Canada. The establishment of the Board of Works is unquestionably the greatest reform which has taken place in the country for many years. (73)

The Kingston Chronicle also had specific praise for Killaly: "Long may its President continue to direct the construction of works which will remain an imperishable honour to his name and a credit to the county." (74)

To say that the Board of Works was proceeding well in the accomplishment of its task is not to say that there were not problems to be overcome. On the site of the works themselves during this period, there was a growing problem caused by the sometimes unscrupulous actions of contractors and the presence of thousands of volatile workers. In August 1842, riots broke out on both the Welland and Beauharnois canals. On the Beauharnois, troops had to be sent to restore peace and at least one man was killed as a result. (75)

Merritt, referring generally to the problems on all the sites but speaking particularly of the Welland disturbances, blamed the trouble on the suspension of works throughout the United States and the consequent influx of labourers to Canada. "As early as the 1st of July," he reported, "it became apparent that far greater numbers had assembled than could be employed on the work." With this mass of unemployed and discontented men present, all that was needed to begin trouble was the long-standing feud between "Connaught men and Corkians". (76) The Montreal Courier, commenting on the Beauharnois had an even simpler answer. To this paper the disturbances were "the almost inevitable consequence of bringing together a body of hot-headed and unruly spirits". (77)

Although rivalries emanating from Ireland were to some degree responsible for trouble on the canals, economic conditions, unemployment, poor wages, and long hours also contributed to the unrest. Most serious of all was the tendency of contractors to take advantage of an excess labour supply and a disorganized work force to cheat the labourers. In its report of September 27, 1843, the Board of Works saw "the treatment of labourers by contractors" as one of the major difficulties with existing contracts. The Board especially complained of the system of "trick payment - a system, however much to be reprobated when abused is extremely difficult to be legislated on, and is, in many cases rather to be controlled than to be wholly put down". (78) The Board, however it might try to guarantee that the contractors at least pay the workers honestly, did not at this time consider there was any obligation to go beyond that measure in an effort to protect the workers. The same report argued, in good Adam Smith terminology, "that the price of labour should be allowed to be regulated solely by the ordinary principles of supply and demand, and that any official mischief with it would be productive of much mischief". (79) Obviously the worker could hope for only limited support from the Board of Works.

The troubles of 1842 were only a prelude to the construction season of 1843. In spite of the efforts of Walter Shanly, the resident engineer on the Beauharnois, to confiscate as many guns as possible, serious riots broke out there in early June. A strike against the contractors and an appeal to the Board of Works brought tragedy. The societal wisdom of the age viewed strikes as conspiracies and as subversive to law. According to contemporary accounts, this particular strike began on June 1 with the aim of having the work removed from the contractors and put directly under the Board of Works. It was not to succeed and rumours of impending violence brought troops to the canal.

The orders were to put down the strike, force the men back to work and arrest the ringleaders. The public was frightened by the concept of

organized resistance. The Montreal Herald said, in justification of the harsh action, "These riots appear to have been no sudden ebullition of feeling, but to have been carefully planned." (80) On Monday, June 12, matters came to a head when the strikers, after threatening some of the contractors, came face to face with soldiers of the 71st and 74th Regiments from Montreal under the command of Colonel Cathcart. The mob, disorderly and angry, approached the troops. The troops were then formed up and the Riot Act was read. When the labourers did not disperse, the infantry opened fire. As men fell and panic broke out, the cavalry was ordered in and dispersed the crowd with their sabres. The rioters, armed (if at all) with nothing more than sticks, fled. (81) The first reports listed twenty to thirty dead. More reliable reports cut those figures in half, but the toll was still all too high.

Testimony varied as to whether or not the action of the troops was justified. The Roman Catholic priest who had possessed the difficult task of ministering to the workers called it murder. (82) Others claimed that the mob, said to number over a thousand, was in an ugly mood and that the lives of the troops were in danger. Although there were undoubtedly angry mutterings in the tents and shanties of the labourers, the press and officials sided with the soldiers in taking an action that was, after all, not unusual for the times. Certainly there seems to have been no printed criticism of the troops. The Montreal Herald, in an incredible semantic exercise, turned the fact that the mob was unarmed into justification for the actions of the troops. According to this paper, it was "in order to lull suspicion, to be able to approach as near as possible for the accomplishment of their diabolical purpose" that "they came armed with sticks only". (83) Whatever the final verdict on the events of the day, it must be concluded that the Beauharnois riot was an all too-tragic indication of the discontent and disorder that existed on the sites of the public works of the period.

The June Beauharnois riot was perhaps the worst but it was certainly not the last of the labour disturbances on public works in the 1840s. In July, trouble nearly broke out on the Beauharnois Canal project again, partly as a result of the impetuous Killaly, who no doubt had in his mind that the disturbances were the result of planned agitation, organized by evil-oriented troublemakers. Given the character and beliefs of Killaly, it was natural that on spotting a suspected man by the name of Caffrey on the line of the Canal, he should order the man arrested - natural, but not very prudent. Violence threatened when the magistrate attempted to arrest Caffrey and the workers tried to rescue him. Killaly, always the man of action, galloped down the canal and brought up a detachment of dragoons. It was of no avail, for by the time they arrived Caffrey had been spirited away. Killaly had to be content with giving a lecture to the workers, warning them that the Government would deal harshly with any further disturbances. (84)

There were a good many other disturbances. Riots on the Welland Canal in the autumn resulted in the stationing there of a regiment of troops. In the spring of 1844, further strikes and disorders were reported on the Welland and in the autumn, troops made a lightning raid along the line of the Lachine in a search for weapons. (85) Public opinion finally caused the Legislature to take action. In February 1845, the Receiver General brought down a toughly-worded message accompanied by reports on the various outrages, and called for a special law giving extraordinary powers to officials to control the disorders. The result was the passage by the Legislature on February 13 of a "Bill for the Better Preservation of Peace in

the Vicinity of Public Works". (86) This bill gave to local magistrates, upon declaration that the act was in force at a particular site, the power to close liquor outlets, confiscate firearms and remove from the site any man suspected of encouraging disorder. (87) This act and its successors were to be used a good many times in the years that followed.

Another troublesome, though less serious addition to the problems of the Board, was the removal of the Government from Kingston in the summer of 1844. The decision had sparked speculation that Killaly would resign rather than let the fair charms of Kingston be jilted. Killaly did not however, resign, and largely under the supervision of Begley, the Board of Works handled plans for the shipment of the numerous records, furniture, civil servants and their belongings, while at the other end Killaly sought accommodation for the Government in Montreal. The organization of the move was a tedious and complex process. The Board had to try to arrange things so that the Government could continue to function as smoothly as possible, and at the same time make at least an attempt to please all those who found their new quarters too big, too small, too remote or too central.

One of the things that aroused the most comment was the allowance given to civil servants and politicians for their removal. The Kingston Chronicle carried a story of one civil servant who, taking advantage of the Government's assumption of costs, packed half a cord of firewood. The value of the wood, some 3 shillings sixpence, was far exceeded by the shipping cost of shipping, £1. 9s. 9d. As the Chronicle commented, the offender "was well rapped over the knuckles by the Board of Works". (88) Such events and little scandals even inspired some hopeful poet to put the removal in verse:

Pack - Pack - Pack -
Everything - large and small -
We can't cram too much in the sack,
For - Government pays for all. (89)

In spite of the various problems the removal was accomplished by the late autumn. The Board of Works had accomplished the task well under difficult conditions. It was a responsibility with which they were to become increasingly familiar over the next twenty years.

At the same time that the Board was involved in the removal, there were signs that it was running into increasing trouble. The autumn of 1843 had seen the renewal of attacks on the Board by a minority of the Legislature. Moffatt, the earlier Chairman of the Commission on the Beauharnois Canal, charged the Board with being a "political engine" and using funds "without the consent of Parliament", and specifically condemned it for its refusal to press for the road from Toronto to Lake Huron. (90) At the end of 1843, the Board was quite able to withstand criticism, as the praise for the year-end report indicates, but the attacks continued on through 1844. The lack of attention to roads became a powerful issue among Canadian politicians. During the election of that year, charges and countercharges flew. It is not clear which party stood on which side of every issue, but the debate did not augur well for the Board's supposed position above politics. (91)

Further complications were created by the fulfilment in July 1844 of a long-standing desire of Killaly's, when he was able to convince the Council that, in light of the removal to Montreal, someone was needed to keep an eye on the western works. (92) The man appointed was, of course, William

Hamilton Merritt, whose election later in the year was challenged on the grounds that he was an employee of the Department. Early in 1845, the Committee on Merritt's election reported in his favour, deciding that as he had not actually drawn any of his salary, he was not really an employee. There were, however, harsh criticisms from the press. The British Colonist commented, "Their decision has occasioned universal surprise to all those who believed themselves acquainted with the particulars of the case." (93) The Montreal Herald, which had often strongly supported the Board of Works, was even more direct: "The case is altogether a very rich one, and strongly characteristic, not only of Mr. Baldwin's very peculiar 'honesty' but also of the very great ENGINEERING powers of Mr. Killaly and the officers of the Board of Works." (94)

These incidents and comments seem to indicate that the Board of Works was gradually losing its bipartisan character and becoming more and more dependent on the support of the members of the Responsible Government Party of Baldwin and LaFontaine. Killaly's support of such Responsible Government advocates as Merritt and his refusal to listen to W.B. Robinson and others who demanded greater expenditure and more haste on roads, especially in the Toronto area, were cutting away at the Board's previous broad base of support. (95) The British Colonist, an opponent of Baldwin, had always been a supporter of the Board of Works. At the same time, it had continually urged greater haste on the Toronto area roads. When the 1844 Annual Report listed only £687 as having been spent for that year on the Main North Road running out of Toronto, the Colonist became much more bitter: "The Home and Simcoe Districts ought to be particularly thankful for the expenditure of a few hundred pounds on the main north road, out of a million and a half sterling! We would recommend that Mr. Robinson M.P.P. for Simcoe, to look into this." (96)

Politics were henceforth to be an important part of the Board of Works. The accession of Robinson to the position of Inspector General, ironically only after Merritt refused the position, brought an avowed enemy of the Board's policy to the Executive Council. Killaly bitterly commented to Merritt, "You have heard, of course of Wm. B. Robinson being appointed Inspector General!!!!" (97) Killaly was beginning to feel the reverse side of avoiding politics. He could no longer be sure that the Government, to which he was responsible as the head of a department, would stand by him. An opposition was developing, if not to the commercial empire itself, at least to those who were charged with its development.

The fall from favour of the first Board of Works was not primarily due to politics. The year from the summer of 1845 through June 1846 brought to the surface problems of serious financial mismanagement in the Board of Works and a number of serious flaws in the structure of the financial management of the Government.

The first indication of financial trouble came in July 1845. The Deputy Inspector General ordered that the payment of warrants for work done on the Welland Canal be stopped. Although the Board of Works had spent only £239,000 as of the previous year, it had spent the entire £450,000 appropriated for the Canal. (98) The stoppage precipitated a crisis. The works were far from finished, and the payments to the contractors - and as a result by the contractors to their potentially violent workers - were in arrears. The Board of Works could only petition the Executive Council for additional funds. "I have the Honour to Report," wrote Begley on July 30,

1845, "that the Appropriations made by the Act 4&5 Vict. Chapter 28, for the Welland Canal, having been expended, it becomes necessary that some provision should be made for the payment of the work now going forward, in completing the contracts which have been entered into by the Board." (99) The Board got the money, but the question of how it had miscalculated to that extent was still to be answered.

Perhaps a clue as to what went wrong can be found in Killaly's optimistic 1843 Report. At that time he had assured the colony that "ample funds" existed not only for the completion of the original works but also for "such improvements in their details as have suggested themselves from time to time (emphasis added)". (100) The result of the investigations into the route of the Beauharnois Canal and the line of the L'Orignal road had previously given the Board a mandate to alter the specific application of the original appropriations in the name of engineering soundness. Gradually, it would seem, this policy became even more broadly defined. General developmental strategy, the designing of a work to best fulfil economic requirements, became a part of the policy-making and the functioning of the Board and Executive, independent of Parliament. As early as 1843, the Board was pressed by Killaly to adopt the principle of making Lake Erie the summit level of the reconstructed Welland Canal. (101) When Begley appealed to the Executive for additional funds, he pointed to this change as instrumental in increasing the cost of the work. (102)

There were other factors that had tended to increase costs. In June 1844 Merritt sent Killaly a "Private and Confidential" letter warning him that the contractors on the work were in serious financial trouble and that there was some danger that they would quit the work. (103) The eventual result was a "certain bonus" to the contractors. (104) The Board and the Executive joined in deviating from the original tenders in order to assure the rapid completion of the work. In doing so they also set a precedent that was to be troublesome in future years, that of payment by need instead of by contract. The Welland was simply the first of a number of problems that were to plague the Board over the next year.

The system of arrangements for disbursement of government funds that the Board of Works had at this time was extremely loose and depended on a number of informal agreements. With the beginning of trouble in the Board of Works, pressure was put on the whole system. In an effort to overcome the delays imposed by distance, the practice for remitting payment at this time was for the resident engineer to issue certificates to the contractor stating the payment to which he was entitled. The banks accepted these certificates, paying cash for them and then applying to the Board of Works for a refund. Late in the summer of 1845, however, the Port Dover Road, like the Welland Canal, had exceeded its appropriations. The Board of Works, sensitive to this increasing problem, refused to pay a certificate on the road held by the powerful Bank of Montreal until an investigation had been completed. The bank, which had had no involvement in the work, felt that a breach of trust had been committed. (105)

When the Board refused to respond to repeated applications for payment, the bank retaliated. On September the head cashier wrote to Killaly that owing to the delays "to which this Bank has been subjected ... I have been under the necessity of instructing the Agents of this Institution to refuse cashing such estimates as hitherto". (106) The result was a breakdown in the very necessary informal system of payment. The issue was to

drag on for some months before it was finally cleared up. An attempt by the Government at retaliation made the affair even more untidy, for it put the press on the trail when it was announced that the Bank would no longer receive government deposits. (107) The resulting publication of all the correspondence between the bank and the Board of Works brought to the public the financial problems of the Board of Works. The whole fiasco reveals the complete lack of a satisfactory system for payment on the part of the Government of that era.

At the same time as the quarrel with the bank was going on, other appropriations began to run out, again with the works unfinished. (108) The Government was no longer willing to stand unreservedly behind the Board and was becoming increasingly nervous. On September 5, 1845, the administration accepted the long-standing request of the Opposition for a Commission of Inquiry into the affairs of the Board. Throughout the autumn the Executive Council itself became increasingly critical of the Board of Works. When the Board petitioned for additional funds for the Trent River works in November 1845, the Council demanded an explanation of the need for these funds:

Before the Committee of Council can recommend the appropriation prayed for, they think it should be fully explained when and under what direction and authority the outlay exceeding the appropriation took place, and whether the contract for the present year did or did not exceed the amount appropriated by Parliament last session, and by whose direction and authority, if so, such Contracts were entered into. (109)

The report returned by the Board of Works was far from satisfactory. The Council was forced "for the protection of the public credit" to forward the requested money. It stated however, that in doing so, it was "at a loss to reconcile the amount now prayed with the report made by the Board of Works on the 20th of October last, stating that £1,385. 17s. 9d. would be required to complete the works on the Trent". (110) Clearly a great deal had gone wrong with the plans of 1841.

The "First Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Board of Works" was released on March 28, 1846. The 9-page report condemned the Board of Works, noting that "all the public works that have been completed and laid before the Commissioners, have, with few exceptions, exceeded their appropriations". (111) The 1846 Annual Report amply verified this statement. The Welland Canal had gone some £50,000 over the sum appropriated for it. The Beauharnois Canal was £10,000 over and the cost of slides and booms on the Ottawa had exceeded the appropriation by £6,000. (112)

The Commission of Inquiry criticized the Board on the old question of its right to alter appropriation expenditures without the consent of Parliament. It was especially critical of the Board's failure to fulfil another requirement. Section 15 of the 1841 Act, the Commission reminded the House, had required "that the commencement of any public work was strictly prohibited, until it was satisfactorily ascertained that the expenditure could be kept within the limit of the appropriations". Obviously Section 15 had not been adhered to, for "it will be seen that every public work, therein enumerated in the original schedule has been commenced while the Commissioners have looked in vain for those preparatory steps ...

which alone would have ensured a knowledge of the cost to be incurred". (113) The conclusion was a scathing attack on the structure and management of the Board of Works:

Armed with immense power - and acting as though irresponsible in its operations - it plunged into heavy engagements with contractors ... without any regards to the wholesome checks imposed by legislative enactment, and with no preparation to meet the results which were sure to follow so total a disregard of every rule laid down for its guidance. (114)

The indictment was total and the Commission called for an overhaul of the structure of the Board and for the appointment of a board of audit to keep a running check on its expenditures.

Killaly had earlier attempted to reply to at least a part of the charge made by the Commission of Inquiry:

I would here take the liberty of remarking that during the execution of such works every man knows that unforeseen difficulties will arise, whereby additional work is rendered absolutely unavoidable, and which at once must be undertaken ... the estimates must therefore be considered as approximating ones; and taking into account the very great difficulties to be encountered in the construction of the works ... it is only to be wondered at how closely they will approximate to the final expenditure. (115)

Essentially Killaly was using the same rationale that had prompted Merritt, at the time of the introduction of the bill, to argue against the presence of Section 15. The Legislature did not accept Merritt's arguments then, and neither the Legislature nor the Commission of Inquiry accepted them when they were used by Killaly in 1846.

The unforeseen expenses were undoubtedly a complicating factor, but Killaly's response leaves several criticisms unanswered. If he realized that it was almost impossible to make accurate estimates, then why did he confidently state on several occasions that the expenditure would not exceed the appropriation? This is an especially damaging point in light of the Board's seeming recklessness in altering plans. Such alterations, many of which went far beyond simple necessity, could not help but cost more. Section 15, the Commission believed, implied that if the Board was uncertain, it should have waited until probable costs could be clarified. This was certainly not the practice. Nor does Killaly's explanation even attempt to answer the questions raised in the Executive Council about the expenditure of funds without prior approval.

A number of other factors had combined to put the Board of Works in this unenviable position. First, between 1841 and 1846, Killaly had been able to gain almost absolute control over the Board of Works. As has been indicated, the act that created the Board of Works gave the Chairman great power, his signature being sufficient to bind the department legally. Moreover Killaly took the utmost advantage of his combined position as the powerful administrative head of the Board as Chairman, and technical head as Chief Engineer, to enhance his independence from the beginning. The Commission noted that in his combined office, Killaly the Chairman often acted on the advice of Killaly the Chief Engineer without bothering to set down his reasons or evidence. The result was that "the records of the Office

are lamentably deficient in documentary evidence of the greatest importance" and that there was no check such as could have been imposed by give and take between these two important posts. (116)

The potential checks that existed on Killaly's actions, even after the Legislature had granted the Board a wide degree of latitude, also failed to act as a restraint. The decision-making body of the Board of Works was theoretically the Board of Directors, but as the records of the Board indicate, Killaly prevailed. The Board felt incompetent to act without the advice of the Chairman and Chief Engineer. Such phrases as "the Board under these circumstances determined that until the opinion of Mr. Killaly was fully ascertained that no action should be taken in the matter" were commonplace during Killaly's various tours around the province. (117) Even more indicative were the long periods during which the Board met infrequently, or not at all: for instance there were only two meetings recorded in the six months between August 1843 and January 1844. (118) During the hearings by the Parliamentary Committee on the Beauharnois Canal, Begley testified that "the Board have no daily meetings, the President sometimes being absent for a month". John Davidson, a Board member, revealed that he felt the Board was only a formality and that he had not even bothered to look at the Act of 1841: "If I had been called upon to take an active part in business, I should have studied the Act; but never having done so I know nothing of its province." (119) Thus, in spite of the political power wielded by many members of the Board, their relationship to the operation of the Board of Works, if it existed at all, was simply that of a rubber stamp.

One other possible source to which the Government might have looked for a check on the activities of Killaly was the position of Secretary. The act had given him wide powers as an internal auditor and all accounts had to be approved by him before they could be issued. Thomas Begley, a hard-working but unimaginative Upper Canadian made it clear, however, that he would take no responsibility for policy. As doubts grew in his own mind as to the ground on which the Board stood, he used a specific overpayment to clarify what he considered to be his responsibility.

Being apprehensive that the portion of the letter referred to might, if remaining unexplained by me, at some future period be construed into an acknowledgement, that I am the Officer of the Board, who not only keeps the accounts, but sanctions or approves of amounts payable to whom the Board may be indebted. (120)

He went on to disavow any such responsibility. It was perhaps impossible for an employee of the Board under the direction of the Chairman, not to authorize accounts ordered by the Chairman and the Board. Nevertheless, in an era before any other system of financial controls existed, somebody had to take the responsibility. Begley's attitude towards his position both permanently weakened the powers of the Secretary and left the Department without anybody to ensure that disbursements were in line with appropriations.

Given these factors, perhaps only the Executive Council had the ability and power to act as a check on the Board. The Council, however, was really only beginning to function as a "Cabinet". It still consisted of men holding individual offices knit together only loosely through the person of the Governor General. It was not until the emergence of party government and the consequent development of the concept of a "prime

ministership" through the party head that the Council could really act as a coordinating body. (121) Given these conditions and constant reassurances from the Board of Works that things were going as planned, the Council really had no choice but to accept its word, at least until it became obvious that nothing was going as planned.

This combination of factors left the leadership of the Board of Works pretty much in the hands of Killaly. He was, by all accounts, a good engineer and even by some standards a good administrator. Able to command loyalty and respect, he could handle a variety of tasks at once and showed the ability to fit the response to the situation. Nevertheless, in other ways Killaly failed as Chairman of the Board and as chief administrator. Opinionated and volatile, once caught up in a project he was unable to let other considerations hamper the overriding need to complete the job successfully. This showed in his belief in the necessity of the rapid and efficient completion of the canals of the St. Lawrence. He did not accept the constraints on his position and refused to see the importance of a Legislature he had left and an Executive Council he rarely attended. For him, as for Merritt, the important thing was the completion of the work.

Killaly's concept of his prime function as Chairman of the Board of Works is well revealed by his involvement, along with Merritt and some of the Department's engineers, in effective changes in the Welland Canal. The attempt to make Lake Erie the summit level of the canal and the widening of a lock at Thorold were only two of the many expensive changes that occurred after the appropriations had been granted. The question of the lock at Thorold developed in June 1844 when Thomas Keefer had written Merritt in support of the idea. Keefer, a native of that village, admitted, "I am subject to the charge of placing myself in opposition to my employees, and the imputation of being governed by self-interest". Arguing, however, that "this improvement is not confined to the village or its immediate neighbourhood, but will extend itself over the whole district and province", he asked Merritt to use his influence. (122)

If, as the letter implies, Killaly originally opposed the lock, he obviously remained open to persuasion. By early 1846, at a time when the department was under investigation and when the funds for the Welland Canal had been overexpended, he still pressed the Council to accept the change. Finally, on January 24, 1846, he could write to Merritt, "You will be glad to learn that at the eleventh hour the work of enlargement is ordered under any circumstances - the Executive have at last agreed to advance the sum not to exceed £2,500." The next sentence in the letter reveals much about his attitude towards the unimportance of cost when compared to the great works. "I was truly sick at the whole business," he continued, "the benefit was admitted but the question ... as to whether they would advance the paltry sum or not was about to deprive the country of this." (123) As was the case with the criticisms of 1842, Killaly was not able to see that there was a principle involved in the "paltry sum". His personality was not at all suited to a position that, in the absence of effective restraints, demanded an unremitting sense of responsibility not only to the works themselves, but to the financial and legal constraints that had made these works possible in the first place.

These factors, which allowed those who were interested in the works to ride roughshod over all else, had led to the Commission of Inquiry's harsh criticism of a department that, a little over two years before, had been so

highly praised in Canada. When Parliament opened, towards the end of March, William Cayley stood up to face the sardonic cheers of the Opposition "to confess that they had spent more than they had authority to do" and that "he was now prepared to state how it happened that the large advances had been made to the Board of Works". This was the Executive Council defending itself for its part in an expenditure of money that would require post facto requests for funds to the Legislature. But Cayley had the Report of the Commission of Inquiry and with it was able to shift the blame to the Board of Works. With the same argument used by the Council when it had advanced money for the Trent works, Cayley argued that the "moment those works were begun the faith of the country was pledged for the payment of the whole sum". (124) Cayley drew no immediate conclusion from his own speech. Perhaps he did not have to, for the conclusion was obvious enough. On May 5, 1846, he brought in a bill that drastically altered the structure of the Board of Works. A young colonial government had begun to formulate the necessary lines of authority for a responsible and efficient Civil Service.

CHAPTER 3

ECONOMIC CHANGE AND NEW HORIZONS

1846-1857

Important though the Commission of Inquiry was, its consequences on the course of public works in Canada were overshadowed by other and more sweeping events. Government departments, like governments, are not immune to events that occur around them. Circumstances over which the Board of Works and Canada had no control were to be the major determinants of the course of Canadian economic development over the next few years.

It is one of the ironies of Canadian history that, as the great canal system that so many had put their faith in neared completion, the premises on which that system had been built were shattered by events in Great Britain and the United States. In the 1820s and 1830s Upper Canada had mortgaged itself in the belief that the American West could be made a tributary to the Canadian commercial system. For both economic and political reasons, their belief had captured Durham's imagination, convinced the British Government and led to the great canal construction boom of the 1840s. Then in 1846, with the Beauharnois Canal open and the Lachine, Welland and other canals nearing completion, a series of events occurred that threatened to undermine the vitality of the commercial empire along the St. Lawrence, and in the eyes of some people make the whole concept of the British Empire meaningless.

In January 1846, British Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel announced that his government had become convinced of the necessity to abolish the Corn Laws. His intention of spreading the repeal over three years to soften the impact was small comfort and even that was removed when famine followed the failure of the potato crop in Ireland. The implications for Canada were enormous. Not only the whole canal system, but the entire commerce of Canada seemed threatened. The Governor General's deep concern was echoed by an even more anxious Executive Council, and soon after rumours of the impending change reached Canada, he wrote to the Colonial Office seeking reassurance and reminding the British Government of Canada's stake in the issue. "The improvement of the internal

communications by water," Lord Cathcart reminded the Colonial Secretary, "was undertaken on the strength of the advantage of exporting to England our surplus wheat and flour by Quebec." Appealing to British self-interest, he reminded England that "should no such advantage exist, the means of the Province to pay principal and interest on the debt guaranteed by England, would be diminished, and the general prosperity of the Province so materially affected as to reduce its revenue derived from commerce". (1)

Cathcart's communication was the first worried reaction of a colony where, as Creighton put it, "The commercial system, the Canadian canals and the Canadian debt were so closely connected that they were indistinguishable." (2) Even as the first Board of Works underwent reorganization and the last of the one and one-half million pounds sterling was being swallowed up by the giant works under way, the first great impulse of public works now seemed to be deprived of its foundation. Over the next decade politicians, the civil servants of the Board of Public Works, and British North Americans generally were forced in different ways to cope with the problems raised by the events of 1846.

When the United States completed the Erie Canal in 1825, it became apparent that New York had every intention of competing for the trade of the West. The Canadians asserted that two conditions were necessary to give the colony the commercial supremacy that was its due.

First, by allowing American grain into Canada cheaply and then by obtaining preferential or free entry into Britain for all grain coming from Canada, Canada would possess a decided tariff advantage which would encourage Americans to use the St. Lawrence route. When in 1843 Britain agreed to admit all "Canadian" grain at one shilling per quarter in return for Canada's levy of (it was hoped) a nominal three shillings per quarter duty on American grain, the colony got its coveted preference. On the other side of the ledger, Canadian forwarders seemed assured of the traffic in Canadian grain by the cumbersome American system that forced Canadians to pay duties for transporting goods through the United States, even if they were intended for re-export.

Second, the essence of canal construction in the 1840s had been to provide a cheap, efficient transportation system through Canadian waters, and it was necessary to preserve its effective operation in the face of any rival system. For all the talk of natural trade routes and providential designs, it is noteworthy that the commercial empire rested on the belief that British protection would ensure the best and most profitable use of a large number of expensively constructed canals.

In the middle 1840s, however, Britain and the United States destroyed the preferential position that Canada had put so much hope on. First came the American Drawback Acts, which allowed Canadians to obtain a refund of duties if their goods were re-exported. These were also applied to British goods headed for Canada via the New York route. When to the American Drawback Acts were added the repeal of the British Corn Laws, it meant that only the efficiency of the St. Lawrence would determine in what direction the grain was shipped. The Canadian forwarder might condemn the disloyalty of a system that did not encourage the maintenance of the British connection and revile those who would look to the United States for commercial outlets; but the Canadian farmer did not find that patriotism coincided so neatly with his self-interest.

As the British Colonist observed, henceforth "...comparative cheapness of transport charges and duties must regulate the route by which the produce of western Canada shall be exported to market". (3) Lurking in the background was the fear that the St. Lawrence route would not be able to meet the test. With the combined effects of the Drawback Acts and the end of British protection in mind, Cathcart warned that it was possible that "the larger portion of the exports of Upper Canada would find its way through the canals of the State of New York, instead of those of Canada, rendering the St. Lawrence Canals comparatively useless". (4)

It was in this atmosphere of transition and crisis that the reorganized Board of Works first came into being. The bill, introduced by Cayley as a result of the Commission of Inquiry and the Government's own discomfiture, passed through the Assembly with only token opposition. On June 9, 1846, "An Act to Amend the Law Constituting the Board of Works" was signed into law by Cathcart. (5) Under the new Act the title "Board of Works", reflective of earlier corporate status, became an anomaly. In fact, one of the main reasons for the Act had been the desire to remove the independence that the corporate status gave the Board. This anomalous condition was to be reflected over the next several years in the nomenclature of Public Works. While officially a "Board of Works", it was commonly referred to as a "Department". It was a confusion that reflected certain contradictions in the new structure of the organization and which would cause difficulties at a later date.

Perhaps the most important change was the replacement of the non-political head of the Board, which Killaly had become, with a system of joint control under a Chief Commissioner and an Assistant Commissioner. The act made it clear that these Commissioners were expected, but not required, to sit as members in either the Legislative Assembly or the Legislative Council. (6) It was a conscious attempt to bring the leadership of one of the colony's most important governing bodies back into political hands.

The creation of the dual commissionership was also a result of the politics of the age. It mirrored the growing tendency towards duality between the two sections of a constitutionally-united colony. The positions were expected to be filled by one member from each of Canada East and Canada West. This procedure was scrupulously followed throughout the life of the Act. The relationship between the two Commissioners was left undefined, the only concrete difference being that it was expected that the Chief Commissioner would sit in the Executive Council while the Assistant Commissioner would not. This, combined with the nomenclature, perhaps indicated that the Chief Commissioner's word would be final. As part of the trend towards duality, however, an 1847 amending Act was passed that, except for the position of the Chief Commissioner on the Executive Council, specifically made the positions of the two Commissioners equal, one being able to sign for the Department in the absence of the other. (7) Here politics contravened sound administrative practice: serious friction resulted from this dual leadership. In fact, over the next few years even that remnant of a difference between the two leaders was often lost. For the sake of political balance, or as a result of holding more than one ministerial post, the Assistant Commissioner often sat in the Executive Council and wielded as much political power as the Chief Commissioner, if not more.

Other clauses in the 1846 Act also worked towards remedying the flaws in the first Board of Works. Clause VIII pointedly specified that, although the Commissioners were in charge of expenditure of the Department, "nothing in this Act shall be construed as giving authority to said Commissioners to cause expenditure on any work not previously sanctioned by the Legislature". (8) Another section attempted to end the previous wild miscalculations of the Board and contractors by requiring that a detailed schedule of costs and plans be submitted by anyone intending to apply for contracts under the Board. (9)

Many of the sections of the bill were important in removing the abuses that had previously existed. At the same time it has to be remembered that a good many of the complaints against the old Board were the result of that body's inability to abide by the clauses of the original Act. Thus, although the 1846 Act took several steps towards bringing the Board under the control of the Legislature, it could not solve all the problems that had existed. In a sense this was inevitable. No single act can work in a vacuum and as long as the financial and auditing functions of the Government remained ill-defined, problems were bound to, and did, arise.

Equally important to the formal alteration of the Board of Works structure was the change in personnel. Hamilton Killaly, as Robert Baldwin later charged in the Legislature, was not actually dismissed. Rather, said Baldwin, "Last Session the Government passed a bill in which the head of the Department was designated 'Chief Commissioner of Public Works' instead of Chairman as heretofore etc. Suddenly one fine morning Mr. Killaly finds himself not put out of office - but with his office knocked out from under him!" (10) Whatever the interpretation, the upshot was that Killaly was no longer in charge of the Board of Works. In his place the Government appointed William Benjamin Robinson, brother of the Chief Justice of Canada and a member of that old family which had for many years been so closely identified with the Family Compact. To some the appointment indicated a general swing on the part of the Government towards the older conservative group that had fallen out of favour in the wake of Lord Durham's Report. (11) It was certainly an appointment of a different political complexion than that of Killaly, who, if he had any political leanings at all, tended towards the reform cause. It indicated that the Government wanted to ensure that the head of the Board of Works was an integral part of their policy and party.

There are also signs that Robinson's appointment to the position reflected more than a political drift to the right. Robinson, it will be remembered, had long been a critic of Killaly, and as member for the backwoods agricultural constituency of Simcoe, a critic of the concentration of the Board of Works on canals at the expense of the other needs of the country. Certainly (and not surprisingly), in his campaign for re-election he promised that areas like Simcoe would receive more attention with himself as Chief Commissioner of Public Works. Not unnaturally, the Opposition press was sceptical about these promises:

Why if all the 'good roads' that have been promised by the Tories to the different constituencies had been constructed every inch of the country would be macadamized so as not to leave space for a blade of grass to grow.... It is lamentable to see a constituency of freemen swallowing down the gilded pill of hypocrisy, and selling their liberty for a trumpeted promise of good roads. (12)

"Trumpery" or not, the monopoly of attention canals had received at the expense of roads had been an issue since the creation of the Board of Works. In a constituency like Simcoe, where canals were meaningless if the goods could not be transported to water, it was an issue on which a politician would receive a sympathetic hearing. Robinson was re-elected without opposition.

The appointment of a Conservative, the Member from Simcoe and the man who had for some time been a critic of the Chairman of the Board of Works, did not bode well for Hamilton Killaly's future in the Department. Even before the bill had come into effect, Thomas Begley suggested to the Executive Council that Samuel Keefer should be appointed to the position of Superintendent of the Welland Canal and that "Killaly's time I consider could be employed to a very great advantage upon the St. Lawrence Canals." (13) Begley's suggestion as to the appointment of Keefer was followed. His recommendation on Killaly was not. Killaly's complaint that "in the organization of the Department under this bill, he (Killaly tended to refer to himself in the third person) was the only person omitted" seems to have had some justification. (14) When, after a short period at the remote post of Sault Ste. Marie, Killaly applied for further work, Robinson replied that "due to the position recently occupied by Mr. Killaly, in relation to the Public Works of this Province, I can really think of no employment to offer him worthy of his attention". (15) Hamilton Killaly was disowned by the Department. In spite of the disfavour that had overtaken Killaly, the Board of Works had not seen the last of this energetic engineer who had played such a major part in its creation.

The first action of the new Department was not, as might be expected, retrenchment and caution. On the contrary, the events that loomed on the horizon indicated to the Government that speed rather than caution was necessary. The argument for this course was consistent with the opinion expressed by the British Colonist that "cost" would determine the success of the system. With the impending removal of the protective tariffs and the presence of the Drawback Acts, Canada, if it was to continue to carry its share of the trade, would have to bring the canal system of the St. Lawrence up to a maximum state of efficiency; undue delay might lead to loss of the trade forever.

In aid of the completion of the system, the Governor General, in his prorogation speech of June 1846, announced to the Assembly his support of a further loan granted for the continuation of public works. (16) The only problem was where the Government would raise the loan. Famine in Britain, the abolition of the Corn Laws and the general state of economic flux did not augur well for Canadian success. Nevertheless, within a few weeks, Inspector General Cayley was on his way to England to see what could be done by way of a request from Cathcart to the British Government for a further guarantee of a loan of £250,000. (17) But this was not 1841. The British Government perhaps felt that it had already given a fair share to Canada and that an extra £250,000 would not solve the problems of the Province. There was also some evidence of a belief, implicit in the economic revolution of the nation, that the colonies would have to fend for themselves. The threat of disloyalty and separation, though still forceful, was not as potent as it had been in the different psychological climate of Durham's era. Britain refused to extend the guarantee.

Under these circumstances, it was with some surprise that the British Colonist could state that Cayley had been successful in England. The result

of the mission, it felt, "would be advantageous to the country, provided the funds are applied with prudent care, to works of general public utility". (18) Unfortunately there was a certain amount of wishful thinking in the report of the British Colonist. Cayley, it was true, had obtained the money in Britain. Unfortunately, the funds had to be accepted in the form of a short-term advance from the Bank of England because the usual sources of supply had dried up. The Baring Brothers, for example, had firmly stated that there was no market for Canadian debentures. Canada got its funds, but there were clear signs that unless things changed it would get no more. (19)

Whatever the implications for the future, the construction of the canals could continue and strengthen the hope that with their completion the financial troubles of Canada would be at an end. Work proceeded quickly throughout the autumn. By December the Galops Canal was opened and the mail steamer Gildersleeve, en route to Kingston, had the honour of being the first ship to pass through. It was expected that the other smaller canals would be opened in the spring or early summer of 1847. Even the giant Lachine, the last of the canals to be begun, was well under way; several locks had been finished and preparations were being made for the completion of the entrance sections. The Montreal Gazette noted with pleasure that "both above and below this city, we believe, the most active and energetic efforts are being made by the department of Public Works, not merely to complete the great chain of communication with the Lakes, which is hereafter, we trust, to be the leading instrument of prosperity of the Province, but to afford those lesser facilities essential to developing the resources of the Province". (20) But the question that was on everyone's mind still remained: would the canals fulfil Canada's expectations?

A great deal of faith was put in the efficiency of the system as it would stand when completed. In 1847 the Commissioners of Public Works noted the large difference of \$4.80 per ton in favour of the route from Lake Erie to Montreal as opposed to the Buffalo-Albany route. (21) The Montreal Herald, looking at the trade of the American West, concluded that there was a significant difference in the cost of transport between the Erie and St. Lawrence routes, in favour (of course) of the latter. Such figures seemed to buttress Canadian hopes for the attraction of American commerce. At the same time, these statistics could be, and were, disputed. The Toronto Examiner concluded that the figures quoted in the Herald distorted costs and that the advantage of the St. Lawrence route was slight. (22)

The real problem, however, was not with the comparative merits of the two inland systems. The St. Lawrence did hold an absolute advantage here, whether greater or smaller. The trouble came in the position of Montreal, the harbour at the end of the St. Lawrence system, relative to New York. From Montreal the shipper faced a long, slow and tricky navigation down the St. Lawrence before he reached the open sea. New York, ice-free, faced the ocean, and a ship proceeding from there could immediately set sail at full speed for the markets of Europe. Pilotage costs, insurance rates and harbour dues, higher on the St. Lawrence than at New York, reflected the dangers of the river and added to the disabilities of the Canadian route. (23) Thus, any meaningful comparison had to include the total costs of the two routes from the inland lakes to England. On these terms it became much less certain which had the advantage. If the canal system of the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence was to be successful, it

would have to achieve enough superiority over the Erie to surmount the advantage of New York over Montreal.

It was for these reasons that the abolition of Canadian preferences in Britain seemed likely to affect the colony's prosperity severely. In the atmosphere of the late 1840s, uncertainty led to the promulgation of dozens of schemes to improve the commercial system of Canada. Perhaps the only thing that emerged clearly at first was that if Britain were to change its commercial relationships with the colony, the trade policies of that colony would also have to be adjusted. It also followed that if one part of the British system was altered, then the other parts would no longer function according to their original purpose; not all, however, were prepared to accept the end of the old system.

Perhaps those who had the most direct stake in the St. Lawrence trade were the merchants and forwarders of Montreal. To the farmers of the West it mattered little which route they used to get the grain to market, so long as the price was good when it arrived. To these merchants, however, their own future and the future of Montreal were tied directly to the amount of shipping that came to their port. It was thus natural, as Creighton has shown, that they should fight most bitterly for the retention of the British system of protection. The merchants were shocked in April 1846 when they learned in a roundabout way that their fears were confirmed. In response to a Montreal Board of Trade request for permission to repeal the three shilling duty on American wheat entering Canada - the token duty that stood in the way of the ideal system - the Colonial Secretary replied with the right answer in their terms, but for the wrong reason. In a tone of frightening disinterest he stated that, with the repeal of the Corn Laws, the duty would be "an exclusively provincial question". (24) In this indirect manner the Montrealers learned that Britain no longer cared about the Canadian trade system, since the entire network was about to be abolished. The Toronto Examiner saw the significance of the statement when it concluded that it could be taken as "the coup de grace, the death dealer to the colonial protective system as far as our grain and flour trade is concerned". (25) The Montreal Board of Trade had petitioned for the removal of an imperfection in the system and learned in reply that the system was to be torn down completely.

The Montreal merchants did not give up easily. For the next three years they continued to press for a return to the old system that had so benefited them and seemed at the time of its abolition so close to perfection. With a distortion of past events that came from pressure and anxiety, the Montreal Gazette could even use the British loan of 1841 as a reason for Britain's obligation to continue the protective system:

We have been at immense expense in building the canals to secure the trade of the West. We have been induced in this policy by England; but no sooner have we completed the works than England renders them useless, by adapting regulations of trade which transfer the whole business expected upon them, to the ports of the United States. (26)

It was the end of an era and the merchants were the ones to suffer. Although petitions flowed from Montreal to the Canadian Government and on to England with regularity, they were of no avail. When, for example, the Montreal Board of Trade - in the hope that something of the preferential position of the colony could be maintained - petitioned for the retention of a

fixed duty on grain, Colonial Secretary Grey replied that such an action "would have been entirely inconsistent with the principle of that commercial policy which Parliament has deliberately decided on adopting". (27) Britain, contrary to the hopes and efforts of those concerned in Montreal, would not change her policy. The struggle to adopt it had been too long and too hard for any last-minute changes to be considered. The Montreal merchants had had their own struggle for a goal and the frustration of this effort in the late 1840s led to the bitter, if temporary, repudiation of the entire British connection and the signing of the Annexation Manifesto of 1849.

If Britain would not return to the trade policy of the era just ended, however, she might be persuaded to go forward. And if Canada could match this with a trade system of its own, designed for the new situation, prosperity might yet be salvaged. Thus could be summed up the logic of another attempt to meet the changing situation. This logic, popular mainly among Reformers in Canada West, looked to the abolition of the entire protective system and the development of a new set of commercial relations with the United States. One of its foremost proponents was William Hamilton Merritt. "The only course open for us," he argued, "is to remove all restrictions on commerce. By pursuing a proper course, we would get full compensation for the protection withdrawn." (28) Later, as a member of the Government, Merritt was to attempt to secure reciprocity with the United States and to put his ideas into effect. And although from 1848 to 1850 various bills came before the American Congress, none were passed. Reciprocity, Merritt's answer to the commercial revolution, was not achieved until 1854. Not all Canadians who accepted the end of the British protective system were supporters of reciprocity. Nevertheless, the idea propounded by Merritt had a strong appeal in a colony that one historian correctly described as "having no aspirations after commercial self-sufficiency and only desired reciprocal arrangements with some larger and more mature community". (29)

Another suggested solution was the opening of the St. Lawrence to the navigation of American ships. In terms of the overall commercial system, it had previously seemed sensible that only British shipping should be allowed on the river. Now, however, if the British were not going to protect Canada's market, there seemed to no reason for Canada to protect British shipping. As the Toronto Globe put it, "The change of the British Corn Laws has rendered it necessary to take off every restriction on the transit of American produce through that channel, in order to draw to that route some part of the valuable transit trade which would otherwise be monopolized by the American Atlantic ports." (30) As with reciprocity, this was a controversial issue. Even those who supported reciprocity could argue that free navigation of the St. Lawrence should be given only as part of a larger trade package. It was a valid point, and as later reciprocity negotiations were to show, free navigation was one of Canada's stronger bargaining points.

Necessary to, but not the same as, free navigation of the St. Lawrence, was the repeal of the Navigation Laws. These British laws, dating from the seventeenth century, had been considered the cornerstone of the British mercantile system. But the system was being dismantled and Canadians argued that the cornerstone was no longer needed. The Kingston Herald, arguing that the monopoly of trade to British ships cost some three shillings per barrel of flour and significantly aided the predominance of New York, called for repeal:

... for no one can imagine that our farmers will consent to lose 3s. per barrel in order to put that sum into the pockets of British ship-owners. Thus the latter will as effectually lose that trade as if the navigation laws were repealed, with this difference, however, that Canadian forwarders will also lose the transport of that produce, and Canadian ports the transshipment. (31)

The repeal of the Navigation Laws was much less controversial than such matters as reciprocity and free navigation of the St. Lawrence. In fact repeal became, for some, a panacea for the problems that were besetting the colony as a result of the changes in the British commercial system. Throughout the late 1840s the pressure increased as Canadians insisted that the British Government, having begun the swing to unrestricted trade, should open the ports of the Empire to ships of all nations. The Toronto Board of Trade early called for repeal and one by one the cities of the Province fell into line. Even the Tory strongholds of Montreal and Hamilton, gradually and reluctantly accepted the fact that the British would not return. In December 1848, some 3,000 people crowded into Bonsecours market in Montreal to support Reformers like A.N. Morin, businessmen like George Moffat, and a future Commissioner of Public Works, John Young, in a call for repeal. (32) The British Government eventually responded to these appeals for consistency from the colony and to the pressure at home. This ancient set of laws, more than any other symbolic of the British mercantile system, was repealed.

Amid the debate of the late 1840s one cannot help but notice a significant group among the Reformers of Canada who retained a very positive hope for the future of Canada. Creighton, looking at the Montreal merchants, has referred to a group out adrift, where members were embittered and vicious over what they considered to be the death blow to the prosperity of the colony. Creighton seems correct in his view of the merchants and there is no doubt that the late 1840s were years of commercial distress in Canada. At the same time, this Reform opinion group, seemingly stronger in Canada West, continued to believe in the system of the St. Lawrence, if not as an empire at least as a great commercial artery. And with their belief in the St. Lawrence went a faith in the prosperous future of Canada. "We believe," stated the Globe, "it (free trade) will prove a blessing to the Province, by arousing an energy and enterprise among the people which could never have risen under the old, withering system of colonial protection." (33) The Examiner, at the height of the depression, stated that "the repeal of the Navigation Laws will go into operation at the precise time when the circumstances of Canada will render an unfettered trade of greatest importance to her. The trade of the West has reached a point of astonishing greatness, and our canal communications are now such as to enable us to enter as competitors for that trade." The St. Lawrence and the canals, with or without British protection, were seen as having a promising future. "With our excellent canals, and with the St. Lawrence free to the vessels of all nations," continued the Examiner, "we want nothing but enterprise and prudent management to ensure our fair share of the transit trade of the West." (34)

Thus, as the Department of Works put the final touches on a project that had begun eight years before, it did so in an atmosphere of depression and change, but not in a mood of complete despair. If at one end of the

system merchants flirted with annexation, there was at the other end a man with an equal stake in the system who was able to predict with confidence that when the canals were completed, Montreal would have "a natural advantage possessed by no other port in the world". (35) The depression and the abolition of the protective system did not lead to the commercial ruin of Canada nor end the interest of Canadians in the St. Lawrence.

At a time when the Department of Works and the Canadian Government seemed burdened enough with the problems of canals, trade and finance, another event created additional problems. In 1847 Canada experienced the effects of the Irish famine that had led to the immediate abolition of the Corn Laws. Canada was accustomed to, and indeed welcomed, immigration, for immigrants were essential to the growth of the colony. Even the poor, in limited numbers, were regarded as useful: after all, they had provided the labour to build the great canal system. But the colony was totally unprepared for the flood of humanity that arrived on its shores during the navigation season of that year. Some 109,680 people, most of them close to starvation, many diseased and all indigent, landed in British North America. (36)

No government department was specifically charged with overall responsibility for immigration, and as was often the case, Public Works had to shoulder most of it. The Department went about its task energetically, erecting numerous buildings at places like Grosse Ile, the immigrant station off Quebec. Robinson, responding to questions in the House early in the summer, felt able to comment that there was "no great distress for want of shelter". (37)

It was not the fault of the Department, for shelter alone could not prevent the misery of the immigrants, but at the height of the influx there certainly was much distress. By the week ending August 7, 2,446 people were in the hospital at Grosse Ile. In contrast to a fortunate 170 who had been released during the week, another 196 had died having seen no more of Canada than the wretched quarantine camp of the land to which they had been driven by the spectre of starvation. (38) At times it seemed all the Department could do to provide room for the dead, much less the living. On June 8, the Chief Commissioner was called from the House of Assembly by the mayor of Montreal and was requested to find a spot to bury seven nameless people who had died at the immigrant shed in that city. "I immediately gave orders," Robinson later reported, "to have them interred by some of the labourers, in the ground near the immigrant shed." (39) This tragic incident was but one of the many occasioned by an unprecedented influx of immigrants. In Canada it strengthened an already existing prejudice against pauper immigration and until the British Government generously accepted the bill presented by Canada, threatened to become one more costly burden to be borne by a financially-weak government.

In the midst of the emergency of 1847, however, the push to complete the canals was not forgotten. In his Speech from the Throne of that year, the Governor General continued to urge "all practical extension and development to the trade and productive capacities of the Province". (40) By autumn the last of the canals in the chain was near enough completion to be reopened. The Lachine Canal was again in use and communication was established between Montreal and Lake Erie.

As had been the case in the 1830s the very factors that increased the demands on the Government, and in this case specifically on the

Department, hindered it in answering these demands. Economic changes and immigration, among other things, led to a depression. The rapid completion of the canals, the construction of roads, and the improvement of facilities for commerce generally were anxiously called for by politicians and public. The newly-elected Reform government was pledged to continue the development of public works, and by accepting free trade, to set out clearly once again the future path of Canadian development. At the same time there were problems. "It is a matter of regret," editorialized the Globe shortly after the election, "that in her (Canada's) financial and commercial relations there is much of the very opposite character from the cheering results of the election which clouds the prospects of the current year." (41) The times were not ripe for great progress. Economics defied ideals.

In fact the economic situation very much restricted the options of the Government. On taking office, the Baldwin-LaFontaine administration found itself at the head of a penniless government. As was often the case, much of the problem could be attributed to the expenditure on public works. The government paper, the Examiner, commenting on an emergency bill to provide for a debenture issue of £125,000 to keep the works in operation, placed the blame on the "singular mismanagement" of the previous administration. "Not the least extraordinary feature of the financial recklessness of the late Government," asserted the paper, "is the fact that the Commissioners of Public Works had taken upon themselves to enter into contracts involving an expenditure of more than £100,000 beyond the appropriation voted by Parliament." (42) These charges imply that perhaps one should not overemphasize the difference in the management of the Board of Works after 1846.

At the time of the reorganization of the Department the Government had inherited as one of its primary goals the control of departmental expenditure by the Legislature. At the same time the hurried efforts to finish the canals and provide shelter for the immigrants compelled the Commissioners and Executive Council to take matters into their own hands. The reorganized Department also failed to find a solution to many of the problems that had plagued the Board under Killaly. When the Council had pressed Robinson for accurate estimates for work to be done on the Cornwall Canal, he replied in a tone reminiscent of the man he had replaced:

With reference to your letter of the 21st inst. requesting by command of His Excellency in Council, that the Commissioners will procure an accurate instead of an approximating estimate of work done on the Cornwall Canal ... I am directed to state for the information of His Excellency that for work of the nature of that referred to, it is not possible to make any other than an approximating estimate previous to commencing work. (43)

Whatever the intention of the new Commissioners, they were faced with the same practical problems that had been a part of engineering works in the Province from the time of the chartering of the Lachine Canal Company in 1818.

The difficulty of the Province with finances, however, went far beyond any expenditures of the previous year. The real root of the problem was that by 1847 the Province had spent £1,542,198 on public works since the Union. (44) And as Creighton has pointed out, the expenditure on canals and

the financial solvency of the colony were closely intertwined. (45) Already in a financially precarious state in 1846, the Province was pushed to the brink of bankruptcy when, concomitant with the depression, the revenue from both Public Works and Customs decreased. Tolls and customs revenues were pretty well the only source of revenue for the heavily-indebted Province. It is thus understandable that when the total worth of imports via the St. Lawrence fell from the 1846 figure of £4,780,817 to £4,488,940 in 1847, and exports from £2,777,648 in 1845 to a low of £1,749,167 in 1848, the revenues of the Colony were severely affected. (46) The Welland Canal, for instance, saw revenues drop nearly 60 per cent between 1846 and 1848, and the St. Lawrence Canals 40 per cent from 1847 to 1848. (47) And although overexpenditure on the part of the previous administration may have aggravated matters, the financial crisis of the Province was a part of Canada's whole heavily-mortgaged history and the economic state of the world.

The position of the new government was far from enviable. Francis Hincks, the able Inspector General, had to face not only the problem of future funding but ghosts from the past as well. Shortly after the new administration was sworn into office, the Bank of England wrote, noting that on the advance Cayley had received in 1846, supposedly for nine months, nothing had been remitted "either from the repayment of the advance referred to, or for the interest which has accrued thereon". (48) To vote on new loan of £125,000 in these circumstances was one thing; to actually get one's hands on the cash quite another. In July the Globe was forced to admit that "owing to the present depressed state of the money market" the Government "have entirely failed in their efforts to raise the sum of money voted during the last Session of Parliament". (49) The result was a government so short of funds that civil servants were in part paid not in cash but in debentures, redeemable only at a discount. (50)

The full impact of the depression had finally hit the colony. The spring of 1848 saw increased use of the phrase that "in the present state of the finances of the Province the Commissioners are not prepared to recommend the expenditure of public money thereon" in reply to those who petitioned for public works. (51) One of the first duties of the new Commissioners of Public Works, Colonel E.P. Taché and Malcolm Cameron, was to suspend as many of the works as possible.

In the last half of 1848 and in 1849, a certain word and the concept behind it began to gain increased popularity: retrenchment. This desire to deal with economic difficulties through a reduction of government expenditures reflected a natural and almost unavoidable feeling that the government had overextended itself. Soon, however, it became an emotive rallying-cry for all those weary of financial instability and suspicious of those who had allowed that instability to develop. All expenditures, from the Governor General's salary through to work on the Welland Canal became suspect. Each party charged the other with ignoring the sound tenets of the policy of economy. The Globe, announcing the suspension of certain works, accused the Tories of wasteful political expenditure: "The late Government, with the hope of creating a little popularity, entered ruthlessly on the execution of works without making any provision for the means of payment, and the consequence is, that operations must cease for a time." (52)

The Montreal Gazette had a slightly different interpretation, arguing that "the late Administration have kept their friends on short commons,

applied the surplus revenue to the prosecution of the works and restricted the use of debentures to the smallest possible limit". On the other hand, the Reformers had attempted "to build up political strength on the growing debt of the Province". (53)

For the two political parties of the day to appropriate the popular byword was not unexpected nor, considering the course of the two governments, did either have any really scandalous behaviour to hold over the other. More of a threat to the stability of the political scene was the gradually coalescing Clear Grit movement of western Canada. The breaking away of these radical Reformers from the main body of the party over several issues and their attachment to the slogan of retrenchment gave a new political force to the world. It soon gained a new adherent for the dissident group and cost the Government an Executive Councillor.

Malcolm Cameron, the Assistant Commissioner of Public Works, was an extremely popular political figure. The creation of the dual commissionership had implied that the respective Commissioners from each of the two sections of Canada would specifically apply themselves to the problems of their own section. In this, Cameron, a representative of the hinterland west of Toronto, had been successful. Paying close personal attention to those matters that affected his area, he left to Taché the larger matters of policy and those considerations connected with Canada East. A political tour in July 1849 further ensured Cameron's hold on this section of Canada. Passing through Toronto on July 4, he went on to Hamilton and, in the company of George Brown, the powerful editor the Globe, and Joseph Cauchon, the young M.L.A. for Montmorency, continued his tour with a series of public dinners at Brantford, Amherstburg and Port Sarnia. It was a triumphal tour and, though nominally in support of the Governor-General in the wake of Tory demands for his recall, the tour also gave Cameron a clear indication of his personal popularity in the West. (54) In November he again became the centre of popular adulation, this time in Toronto, when he was able to take credit for the improvement of the main Toronto roads. Then, with the praise of Toronto still fresh in his mind, Malcolm Cameron resigned as Assistant Commissioner.

The government papers, unsure of the reason for his resignation, expressed their sincere regret that "one of the most useful and popular public men in the Province" should be leaving the Ministry. (55) Several weeks of bickering over the significance of Cameron's move between the Globe and the Examiner, the latter fast becoming a Clear Grit organ, and the eventual release by Cameron of his reasons for the resignation were to dull somewhat the praise of the Globe.

Cameron's reasons, when released in a letter to the Examiner, were not exactly comforting to a government already worried by the new opposition forces. The whole affair seems to have begun with a conversation between Cameron and Robert Baldwin in the former's home in Toronto. Baldwin, with various Cabinet changes in the air had requested Cameron's opinion. The patrician leader of the party first outlined in some detail his views on the subject of Cabinet positions and retrenchment. According to his own account, Cameron was not pleased with Baldwin's plans and did not hesitate to say so. With an eye to retrenchment, he gave a counterproposal stating that "the Presidency of the Council should be abolished and likewise the office of Assistant Commissioner of Public Works, and I thought Mr. Merritt should be in that Department". (56) A member of the Executive

Council had demanded that his own office be abolished! It may have been courageous to appraise one's own worth so harshly, but Cameron's proposal was not altogether altruistic. As part of the Cabinet shuffle, Cameron seems to have expected to receive either the Commissionership of Crown Lands or, failing the appointment of Merritt, a position as the one and only Commissioner of Public Works.

Baldwin disagreed with a good many of Cameron's suggestions, but possibly because he was anxious to placate this powerful politician, seemed to imply that when Taché left the Department, Cameron would act as the sole Commissioner, retaining his old post while the position of Chief Commissioner was to be left vacant. But whatever his original intention had been, Baldwin found it impossible to do this, and in Council near the end of November, he offered Cameron the position of Chief Commissioner of Public Works. And there was to be an Assistant Commissioner. Before the angry Cameron could reply, the party leader insisted that he think about it. It was futile and at the next meeting when the matter was raised again, Cameron replied brusquely, "I have no thinking to do, having thought it over months ago." The Council continued to insist that two Commissioners were necessary and Malcolm Cameron resigned and joined the ranks of the Clear Grit movement. (57)

It was a spectacular gesture, especially after the controversy in the press resulted in full publicity for Cameron's letter. The suggested abolition of a high government position, coming from the man who had an intimate knowledge of the post, was a potent political suggestion indeed. Cameron stood as a representative of the people opposed to the superficial lip service he felt the Government was giving to retrenchment. The Examiner charged that "Mr. Cameron's was the only department in which any considerable reductions were made." (58) It was a statement widely believed throughout the whole Clear Grit constituency. Cameron's power was revealed when, entering actively into the campaign, he had the satisfaction of seeing John Wetenhall, the man named to replace him, defeated when he stood for re-election.

The whole matter was eventually aired before what might be termed the "retrenchment committee", a Select Committee of the House of Assembly "to Enquire into the Public Income and expenditure of the Province". This bipartisan committee, which sat through July 1850, included Cameron, former Inspector-General Cayley, Merritt, and the rising Conservative from Kingston, John A. Macdonald. Cameron laid his suggestions before the committee, urging that they be recommended to the Assembly, but a series of witnesses with as much knowledge of the Department as the former Assistant Commissioner disagreed. Taché testified on July 31, "I am decidedly of the opinion that it is impossible for the Department of Public Works to dispense with an Assistant or second Commissioner, especially if the Chief Commissioner should continue to be a member of the administration." He also replied specifically to the accusation made by Cameron that the Secretary did all the work. A part of his reply, arguing that the presence of the Commissioners was essential to the control of Public Works, revealed that the Government, whatever the political complexion, had accepted the fact that there were serious flaws in the original Board of Works. "It would not be expedient," he concluded, "to again place Public Works under the exclusive direction of engineers." (59) The political heads, both of them, were essential.

Any chance Cameron may have had of swinging the Opposition members of the committee behind him were doomed three days later when W.B. Robinson testified before the committee. The Tory supported the Reformer in his condemnation of Cameron's proposals as unrealistic and his agreement with the need for an Assistant Commissioner. The same day Cameron's resolution was brought to a vote and defeated nine to four. Malcolm Cameron's proposal had been laid to rest.

If retrenchment reflected the political climate of the day and the problems of a destitute government, it nevertheless resulted in some useful proposals and changes. Public Works, as was earlier shown, had never intended to become involved to any extent in construction that was not of a national character. Municipalities and districts had been expected to take over from the Government all works of an exclusively local nature. In spite of good intentions, however, the Department had through the 1840s become involved by default in various local works, especially roads. The trend towards economy at the end of the decade led the Government to take steps to rationalize the functions of Public Works in at least some of these areas.

Local roads, obviously neither a provincial nor a local matter, continually ran into problems of jurisdiction and administration. Those major roads that began in Toronto and ran out into the countryside of the Home District provide an excellent example of the confusion that existed. The city and the district had never been satisfied with the Government's handling of these roads and in 1847 the question of tolls again made them a volatile issue. In March 1847 the Examiner seized on the numerous complaints against the tolls on Yonge Street and used them to attack Robinson, charging him with setting up an illegal number of toll booths to cheat the residents of the area. (60) The Government's position was further weakened when Robinson replied, not by denying that the booths were illegal but by stating that he and the Department had no responsibility for them. The Examiner was not satisfied, stating that the Commissioner of Customs, who Robinson had said was responsible for tolls, was only "a cat's paw and must do as he is bid". It concluded that the "Board of Works must be deemed the culpable party, and we must look to the Governor-General for redress." (61) A few days later the Government reduced the tolls. (62)

The toll question was only a symptom of the chaotic management of the road system. Whether it had ended up constructing and repairing the roads or not, the Department did not consider them to be properly within its jurisdiction. Things were further complicated in the case of the Toronto area roads by the fact that three governments were involved: Toronto, the Home District, and the Province. There seemed to be a good amount of common sense in the statement by Reformer James Price in the House that "the Government should finish these roads and hand them over to the District Councils free of charge. It would relieve the Board of Works of much trouble and the roads would be better managed". (63) When the Reform government came into power, it followed at least a modified version of Price's suggestion. To test the potential revenue of toll gates the main roads around Toronto were leased in May of 1848. Shortly after that it was decided to prepare for the transfer to local authorities of all but the national roads.

Before the transfer could take place, a question arose that indicated the degree of confusion existing in the area of roads. For several months papers of all political opinions had been complaining of the horrible state of

the roads within the city limits. These, it was assumed, did not belong in the same group as district roads, which were, at least to date, the responsibility of the Department of Public Works. At the same time the City Council was not at all sure that it did in fact own the roads. When questioned, the Department stated that in 1847 the roads within the city boundary had been turned over to municipal authorities, something the City Council seemed unaware of. The immediate question, of course, was who was responsible for the repair of these dilapidated roads. As the buck passing continued, the Examiner declared in exasperation that "neither the City Corporation nor the Provincial Government seems to own it!" (64) The problem was finally resolved when Public Works decided to take a pragmatic approach rather than stand by the letter of the law. An arrangement was worked out whereby the Department would supply the men and materials for repairs and the city pay half the costs. (65) By the middle of November the Globe announced with pleasure that the arrangement was "no sooner completed than Mr. Cameron set 120 men to work in good earnest". (66) When the repairs were made, the road was once again turned over to the city.

These incidents clearly reveal that the roads, once completed, were suffering by being the unwanted child of the Province. The provision for their construction had originally allowed for their transfer to municipal or district authorities, and in 1850 the Government wisely determined to divest itself on these works. But legislation had to be introduced to remove one problem that existed. Since under the previous legislation municipal and district governments were the only agencies allowed to purchase, they would frequently offer to buy only at prices far below the estimated value of the works. In an attempt to remedy this, a bill was introduced in 1850 allowing the sale of the roads not only to local governments but also to private companies. It was controversial decision to allow something as essential as roads to be turned over to possibly unscrupulous private contractors. Robinson led strong opposition in the House to the bill, but it passed and the way was prepared for the sale of these works. (67)

The passage of the Act was only the beginning of the controversy. Later in the summer the British Colonist uncovered "the most nefarious job that has ever been perpetrated, even by the present corrupt Government". (68) This job was the supposed sale of Yonge Street, Dundas Street and Kingston Road to a private company (said to have connections with the Government) for £75,000. The Globe, seeming to act as an official voice for the Government, stated in reply that the arrangements had been made only after the District Council had refused to meet the £75,000 upset price set by the Government. The Globe's comment indicated the thoughts of the Government in allowing the provision for private sale in the first place. "The Home District Council," it commented, "were evidently in expectation of screwing a good bargain out of the Government, under the impression that private parties would not compete." (69) In spite of this defence the Government decided to retract the sale and begin all over again. Having learned from the experience, the District Council offered £75,000 only to have the Government accept, change its mind and put the roads up for auction on October 15. Over the formal protest of the Home District Council, the Toronto roads were sold for £75,000 to a private company. (70)

Incidents such as this hardened the determination of Public Works and the Government to persevere in their decision to rid themselves of local roads. At the same time as the Toronto roads were put up for sale, other roads in the areas of Hamilton, Kingston, London and (a little later) Canada East were auctioned off. To a government short of funds, the £189,700 received from the sale of the roads and the release from responsibility for upkeep expenses that had always exceeded revenue must have been welcome.

In spite of the controversy over the 1850 Act and the squabble over the sale of the Toronto roads, the Government always did favour sale to local governments. The Act had been passed simply to give the Province leverage with tight-fisted districts and municipalities. A few months after the initial auction, for instance, the town of Chatham was outbid by a private company for the construction of a local bridge. In this case, however, there were extenuating circumstances, as the report of the Department indicates: "The Town Council makes their tender on the principle that they will not levy any toll on foot passengers, that they will not levy tolls exceeding half their present rates on carriages, horses, cattle, etc., and that but once a day." The Government did not seek to maximize revenue at the expense of the public. What they did object to was the attempt by local governments to gain a work cheaply by being the only bidder. In this case the report stated that "it is more desirable that the work should be under the control of the municipality than private individuals". (71) The bridge was sold to Chatham.

The principle of favouring communities over companies was followed once again in Canada East. In one case Public Works sold some bridges at a nominal figure to Hector Pacaud, the mayor of the County of Champlain. The only trouble was that the Department had sold these works at the low price under the impression that Pacaud was "autorisé par la dite Municipalite de faire l'acquisition des dits ponts". It turned out, however, that Pacaud "a cessé depuis longtemps d'être maire du dit Comté". (72) The Department took the bridges back from the protesting Pacaud.

Once the Government had made the decision to relieve the Department of roads, it did not turn back. The policy was begun mainly because of the need for retrenchment. Even after the need for retrenchment no longer applied, however, there were good reasons for continuing with the transfer of roads and bridges. When the roads that could demand good prices were sold and the municipalities that could be induced to buy at any price had done so, the Department recommended that the remainder be sold at a "nominal price" to anyone willing to take them. (73) As for those few roads of a local character that eventually remained in the Government's hands, abandonment was the final solution.

The decision to rid itself of roads and, later, other local works was a wise one on the part of the Government. In terms of function it had never been intended that the Department of Public Works would become responsible for local projects. Rather it had stepped in when the new and poor communities had proven themselves unable to provide the works necessary for the further growth of the local community. By the end of the decade, with the districts and municipalities much stronger, the essential services could be better handled at a local level. When the Government divested itself of all but the truly national works, it removed both a source of

contention and a financial burden on the Province's resources. As the Globe said upon the announcement of the sale of the Toronto roads, "We congratulate the country on the relief which the Provincial Exchequer has obtained by the sale of part of the unproductive public works." (74) The paper estimated the saving from the sale of the Toronto roads alone to be some £18,000 a year. This was one area where, in terms of rationalization of both function and economy, retrenchment led to a much-needed change.

There were other and more surprising things done in the name of retrenchment. One of the first tasks of Taché after assuming office had been the suspension of all unnecessary work. It was thus not surprising that the Chief Commissioner should head west to inspect the Welland Canal and other western works before making his decision as to what should be suspended. What was surprising was that in his company, as technical adviser, was Hamilton Hartley Killaly. His presence was not unnoticed. In Montreal the Conservative Courier, addressing itself to Inspector-General Hincks, asked whether "Killaly has been taken into the service of the Government? We are curious to know." The Pilot, Kincks's paper, replied with the curtest possible, "yes". This in turn led the Montreal Gazette to ask "In what capacity?" (75) It was certainly a pertinent and interesting question. The man who had been dismissed in ignominy two years before seemed once again to stand high in official circles. Taché and Killaly spent several days towards the end of June examining the various works in the area of the Welland Canal. And while the questioning as to Killaly's function intensified, the former Chairman of the Board of Works enjoyed his return to those works with which he had previously been so closely connected. On July 7 Taché returned to Toronto on his way back to Montreal. Killaly remained in St. Catharines.

Hamilton Killaly's position as an adviser to Taché on the suspension of the works was as much a sign of the different attitude of the Reform government to him as it was of the need for technical advice. Killaly, after all, had resigned his seat on the Executive Council in favour of Responsible Government. And it had been a Tory government that had fired him. There is every indication that the Reform Party, containing such people as Merritt, were not nearly so hostile to the former Chairman of the Board as were the Tories. But, as Taché's testimony before the Select Committee of 1850 indicates, this is not to say that they were unaware of the faults of the former Board. In fact the Reformers, though not unfriendly, were quite wary of Killaly. The Globe, supporting his appointment as an adviser to Taché, defended him only in the most roundabout way:

One would imagine that Mr. Killaly had been appointed to a permanent office, to fulfill the duties of which required the most consummate ability, instead of, as is actually the case, being temporarily employed in a duty which any engineer of experience and average talent, who was disinterested, would have performed as well as he. (76)

One might say that the Globe had defended the appointment rather than the individual.

Whatever skittishness government supporters revealed, Killaly was back to stay. Whether he had convinced Taché of his ability during their trip in June or whether this had always been intended, Killaly was soon appointed to the position of Supervisor of the Welland Canal, the most important post in the "outside service". (77) The appointment was part of a

general shift in staff. Samuel Keefer, who had been appointed to the position in 1846, returned to Headquarters as Chief Engineer. C.S. Gzowski, previously in charge of all western works except the Welland, was "let go", Killaly assuming his duties without extra salary.

The Opposition was far from happy with this shuffle. When the House opened in January, Colonel Price charged the Government with "ruining Mr. Gzowski to make room for Mr. Killaly". But the House could not foresee that Gzowski was about to begin a career during which he would make his fortune in railway construction. The Government, both within the House and outside, replied to these charges by using retrenchment as a justification for the appointment. Robert Baldwin, replying to Price, stated that Killaly had been "sent to manage the works in the West, and this had been done for the purpose of reducing the expenditure of the Government - no great sin he thought". (78) It was the same answer that Killaly gave to those who criticized the appointment when he wrote the St. Catharines Journal. Referring to himself in the third person he concluded that "the appointment of Mr. Killaly, so far from being a source of additional expense to the country, is part of a system of general retrenchment and reduction, adopted by the present government by which a saving of many thousands of pounds a year has been effected in salaries alone". (79)

The shuffle could be termed retrenchment in that it combined the position of Superintendent of the Welland Canal with that of Western Works. It does not, however, explain the particular appointment of Killaly to that position. And although it was a prerequisite, the appointment cannot be explained solely in terms of the change of government. Killaly, though on relatively better terms with the Reformers than with the Tories, was hardly in complete favour. The Globe editorial in July could not have been called effusive, and Killaly's letter to the St. Catharines Journal had come after that government paper had demanded that "Mr. Killaly's competency and works should be vindicated to the community, or else he should be dismissed." (80) Killaly himself, writing to Merritt during his tenure as Superintendent of the Welland Canal, complained of suspicion against him in the Department. (81) Nor does this complaint seem to have been without foundation. While Killaly was Superintendent, Taché wrote to Merritt:

My object in addressing you today is in regard to the Welland Canal. As Mr. Killaly has not been put in possession of the estimates made by Mr. Keefer under your surveillance I now deem it necessary that it should be transmitted to him and shall do so without delay ... Under no pretext whatever can any more work be undertaken without the proper authority; and pray impress on Mr. Killaly's mind the necessity of strictly adhering by contracts already passed. (82)

There is evidence that William Hamilton Merritt played an important part in Killaly's return. In the spring of 1848, as the change in administration approached, Merritt and Killaly conversed and corresponded on the question of the future organization of the Civil Service and especially of the Department of Public Works. The ideal system, as they envisaged it, would have Merritt as Chief Commissioner, the position of Assistant Commissioner and Secretary combined, and a Chief Engineer to act as technical adviser and project manager. Killaly offered his services for the latter position stating that "there is no one under whom I would rather work". (83) Merritt

still had faith in Killaly, and his position as his "guardian" in the summer of 1848 implies that here was one voice at least in favour of giving the former Chairman of the Board another opportunity. Whether such was the case or not, Taché seems to have been convinced in June that Killaly was able to handle the position of Superintendent of the Welland Canal, if only he could be kept under control. The chance was taken and Killaly plunged with his accustomed energy into the task of overseeing the largest public work in Canada.

Killaly, in concert with Merritt, had been able to convince the economy-minded Government that the Welland Canal was not one of the works that should be suspended. Dredging at the entrances and the improvement of various sections continued at the fullest possible speed under the new Superintendent. Most important, permission was given to begin the new cut, which would give a uniform depth throughout the line of the canal. In March 1849, while the rest of the country saw idle works and unemployed men, the St. Catharines Journal could report that "we are pleased to see the activity which prevails on the Canal, in the completion of the public works under the direction of the Hon. Mr. Killaly". If the Journal had had any earlier doubts about Killaly, it had forgotten them under the much-needed stimulus of construction activity. "If superior abilities and untiring exertions will accomplish this purpose it will be done under the management of the present superintendent of the Canal." (84)

Hamilton Killaly was in an equivocal position while Superintendent of the Welland Canal. In one sense, he had been restored to the centre of activity and given another opportunity to build a career with Public Works. At the same time his position was not completely acceptable to him. From Chairman of the Board he had become a local superintendent, albeit an important one. And if he had supporters in St. Catharines, he had - or at least thought he had - enemies at the central office. For instance, there seems to have been a considerable degree of professional tension between Killaly and Samuel Keefer who, formerly his assistant, was now his immediate superior. (85) Both men had a long association with the Department and had been directly connected with the Welland Canal, but neither seemed willing to allow the other credit for any ability in engineering matters. Perhaps they realized that they were dealing with their prime competition in engineering matters in the Department.

The controversy centred around the work under way on the Welland Canal. In the capacity of Superintendent, Keefer had made several recommendations as to the best method of completing the work and as Chief Engineer he continued to be involved with the project. Killaly summed up his attitude when he said to Merritt that "I differ from Keefer as much as can be..." (86) The disagreement began politely, but the tension between the two men mounted throughout 1849 and 1850. (87) Killaly's dissatisfaction was increased by his fear that people like Begley resented him and thus deliberately hindered him in this work. In spite of all that the appointment to the Welland Canal indicated, Killaly still felt himself to be a quasi-outcast in the Department.

Writing to John Strachan on April 9, 1850, William Hamilton Merritt noted that "I have this day accepted the office of Chief Commissioner" of Public Works. (88) The man who had been the most involved with the early canals of Canada had been given formal charge of them. The choice of Merritt was a popular one. For some time people of all political connections

had regarded him as the father of the system. As far back as 1847 the conservative Montreal Gazette had suggested that on the completion of the canals a businessman be appointed to manage them. "Among these", it continued, "no one has devoted more attention to the subject of canal communication than Mr. Hamilton Merritt." (89) This bipartisan support still existed at the time of his appointment. The St. Catharines Journal did not miss the opportunity to reprint the favourable opinion of the Tory paper Niagara Chronicle: "Mr. Merritt - individualizing him, and speaking without reference to the party with which he has been associated - is in our estimation the best-qualified politician in Canada for the office to which he has been appointed." (90)

There was one person who had reason to be especially pleased with Merritt's appointment. If Killaly felt that he was kept under a cloud by the Department, he also had every reason to feel that Merritt's appointment as Chief Commissioner would have the effect of removing the cloud. In any event, Killaly had evidently been treating Merritt as his de facto employer for some months past. Throughout early 1850, as work on the new cut progressed, it was to Merritt that Killaly addressed his complaints about the contractors, the weather and anything else that impeded his work. (91) Now, in April 1850, the system that Killaly and Merritt had discussed in 1848 seemed to be one step closer to reality.

When under the pressure to complete the work another controversy broke out with Keefer, Killaly did not hesitate to unburden himself to Merritt. "No man's less disposed," he stated, "obstinately to defend his views professional or otherwise, or more ready to change them when convinced - I therefore never had or could have any angry feeling with Keefer for entertaining or arguing different views from mine." He felt, however, that Keefer had gone beyond the bounds of professional disagreement, adding that "I confess I have on some occasions latterly felt aggrieved when such expressions of his on expenses or proportions (illegible) as 'very absurd', 'nonsensical', 'useless', etc. have been reported to me by parties in whom I must place confidence." Whatever his personal views, Merritt realized that as Chief Commissioner he could not tolerate such internal bickering if the Department was to function smoothly. He urged Killaly, and no doubt Keefer, to calm down. Killaly responded with the promise "to forget the past and judge only from what I find in the future". (92) The differences did not disappear but overt hostility did. Hamilton Killaly found his recommendations received more favourable responses at Headquarters, and the Department was now able to function without its two top engineers being engrossed in a personal feud.

Merritt's appointment also coincided with the beginning of Canada's economic recovery from the malaise that had affected the country since the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. The Tories of Montreal, having vented their wrath on the Parliament Buildings and in the Annexation Manifesto, began to moderate their stand as prosperity returned. To their surprise Canada and its connection with Britain had survived the drastic shift in Imperial policy. Most encouraging of all for those connected with the Government must have been Francis Hincks's success in 1850 in obtaining a loan in England. (93) The crisis had passed and the colony began to turn its attention to new commercial ventures. It was perhaps indicative of the continuity of the commercial impulse that the new spirit of the 1850s should

be promptly expressed in a celebration to mark the completion of a work begun in the spirit of the early 1840s.

In May 1850, with the new cut of the Welland Canal nearing completion, it was announced that a party from the Legislature intended to be on hand for the opening of the new works. (94) Efforts were redoubled on the site to ensure that the work would be in a suitable state for the distinguished visitors. It was reported that "Killaly has exerted himself to the utmost of his superior abilities and constant attention has been given to the completion of the work during his superintendency." (95)

The occasion provided the opportunity for an impressive statement reflecting the attitude of the period. (96) The party, which included some of the leading Members of Parliament and the Governor General, left Toronto at the early hour of 7:00 A.M. on Friday June 7. As the steamer Chief Justice Robinson crossed the lake, the warm sunny weather gave ample evidence that summer was fast approaching. It was a holiday atmosphere and, as seems to have been the case on occasions of this sort, politics were left behind as men of both parties took time off to celebrate another step in the completion of the system for which they had all striven. It was both natural and understandable that the most excited and outgoing of all was reported to be William Hamilton Merritt. In due time the steamer reached the Lake Ontario end of the canal, and the various activities began. Through a maze of receptions and speeches, they party worked its way during the day up the line of the canal. Appropriately enough, the highlight of the day took place at Merrittville. A dinner for 300 guests preceded the major round of speeches and toasts.

The speeches revealed two interesting points. First, in succession, French-Canadian politicians, such as A.N. Morin, the Speaker of the House, and Louis LaFontaine, co-head of the Reform Party, repudiated their former opposition to the canal system. In doing so, they reflected the new spirit that had developed among French-Canadian politicians in the 1840s - one that accepted the philosophy of commercial development and the spirit of the empire of the St. Lawrence. When Louis-Joseph Papineau, on his return to the Assembly in 1848, had attempted to stir the embers of the previous decade's troubles, he found himself rejected by his former followers. That they no longer shared his scepticism of the St. Lawrence canals was well illustrated in the speeches at Merrittville. (97)

Effusive praise of William Hamilton Merritt was also prevalent. He was praised not only by the politicians of his own party but by members of the Opposition. W.B. Robinson referred to his own connection with the canal and complimented its founder for his unceasing efforts on its behalf. He also read a letter from his famous brother, John Beverley Robinson, expressing the support he still felt for the canal that he had aided back in the 1830s. Then former Inspector General Cayley, the man who had so often had to search for funds to keep the canal open, joined the procession stating that "if England could boast of her Brunel and France of her Départ, Canada could boast of her Merritt". (98) Hamilton Killaly, a distinguished guest as Superintendent of the Canal, must have heartily applauded the sentiments of those who had four years earlier dismissed him from office. The whole event symbolized the way in which, despite all the problems, the concept of the canal system had captured the Canadian mind. Moreover, it epitomized the passing of the gravest crisis the system had ever faced. And although the canal was never to fulfil all expectations, the politicians and

the public of Canada were again united in their belief in Canada's future commercial greatness.

While the goodwill shown on this occasion may have been largely due to the enthusiasm of the country towards the St. Lawrence system, it succeeded in providing only a temporary respite from the acrimony of politics. Even the celebrity of the hour, William Hamilton Merritt, was not immune; within two months he had caused discord not only between parties but within his own domain. He had always been concerned with the seeming inability of Canada's commercial system to compete favourably with that of New York, and he was constantly looking for ways to change the situation. A project had been forming in his mind even before he took the position of Chief Commissioner. In April he and Killaly had discussed yet another scheme for the reorganization of the Department, one that called for the abolition of not only the position of Secretary but the entire Department of Public Works. Most of the functions of management would be turned over to the Inspector-General, while the actual construction would remain the responsibility of a Committee of Works. Hamilton Killaly, still bitter and suspicious of the Department, referred to Merritt's scheme as "fraught with importance". Dismissing Begley as a "head messenger", he agreed with Merritt that much of the staff could be dispensed with and the work done by an ex-officio board. (99) In many past projects where Killaly and Merritt had worked together they had succeeded. The St. Lawrence canals were complete, and both Killaly and Merritt held important positions with regard to their future management. In this scheme, however, they were not to receive a sympathetic hearing.

When Merritt released his plan in the summer of 1850, it met with ridicule from within as well as from without the party of which he was an Executive Councillor. The Toronto Globe was especially vicious:

Mr. Merritt seems to have but one idea - the State of New York. The Empire State and its statesmen are the objects of his most fervent admiration - his grand exemplars - his models of perfection - the themes of midnight dreams and his daylight speeches - in short, Mr. Merritt's hobby. The State of New York has no Board of Works therefore Canada should have no Board of Works. The State of New York has a sinking fund therefore Canada should have a sinking fund.

The paper concluded that the proposal contained a "thousand absurdities" and that it should command the attention of no one. (100)

Merritt's proposal went before the same committee that had also dealt with Malcolm Cameron's. He met with the same defeat, (101) and after the Government refused to consider his plan for reorganization, as Chief Commissioner he had no choice but to resign. When he finally resigned in December, the Globe commented that "this step has been anticipated for some time". (102) Merritt, once again a private member, was to continue as he had always done in the past, to support as an individual the development of public works in Canada.

The resignation of Merritt presented the Government with a real problem. The imperatives of the dual commissionership demanded that the next Chief Commissioner be from Canada East. Since the resignation of Cameron and the defeat of Wetenhall, however, the Government could not be certain that a Member from Canada West appointed to the position of Assistant Commissioner could win an election. The public sensed what was

probably the case, that the position of Assistant Commissioner had become moribund. Ironically, after the Government had rejected the organizational suggestions of Cameron and Merritt they came up with one of their own. True, this was not a legal one, for the forms of the Department remained the same, yet it was no less significant. In February, Joseph Bourret was moved from Assistant to Chief Commissioner. Shortly after that the political position of Assistant Commissioner was handed to Hamilton Killaly.

Those Reformers who had been so doubtful about his appointment to aid Taché back in 1848 now supported the return of Killaly against all opposition. Denying that his appointment reflected what was probably the case - a fear on the part of the Government of the consequences of a by-election - the *Globe* interpreted it as an effort to "improve the machinery of the Works Department". (103) The *St. Catharines Journal* also vehemently denied any weakness on the part of the Government. In addition it gave an interpretation of the Assistant Commissioner's position which, although it stretched the intention of the 1846 and 1847 Acts, did accurately reflect what was to be future practice:

As to any violation of Responsible Government in the transaction, it is all moonshine. The heads of the departments must, of course, have a seat in one of the Houses; but the subordinates are expected to be practical men, who, instead of wasting their time, which the public pay for, in listening to debates, are supposed to be attending the duties of the department. We have said before, that this appointment is a good one; and we now say, that no other as good could be made by this or any other administration. (104)

There was only one error in the editorial of the *Journal*. By the 1847 Act, with the exception of the Chief Commissioner's seat in the Executive Council, the Assistant Commissioner was equal in power to the Chief. Killaly was not a "subordinate". As the *Montreal Transcript* put it, Killaly returned "in a non-political character, which it is well known he always desired". (105) Returned to the centre of power, he was left free, as he had been between 1843 and 1846, of the "nuisance" of politics. At the same time the position he held, designed for a political representative in a quasi-federal system, gave him a great deal of power. This power, when combined with the personality of Killaly, soon made him once again a decisive figure in the operations of the Department.

By the turn of the decade Canada faced a new era of development. And with the canal system completed in its basic form, new types of development began to attract attention. Whereas the 1840s had been the era of canals, that of the 1850s was to be an era of railways. The passage of the Railway Loan Guarantee Act in 1849 began a period of railway construction that was to make the money spent on canals seem insignificant. (106) There was, however, an important difference. Under pressure from the Imperial Government, which had learned something from the Canadian experience even if the exuberant Canadian politicians had not, Canada did not become involved in the public construction of railways nor, immediately, in direct grants to private railway firms. "Thus the principle of state ownership which had been followed in the case of canals was abandoned from the outset so far as railways were concerned." (107) To put the matter in perspective, however, one must remember the slow, reluctant

involvement of the Upper Canada Government in the private Welland Canal Company. In the beginning the colony had also attempted to avoid public construction of the canals.

Nor does the refusal of the Government to undertake public construction during this period mean that it was not involved. On the contrary, the Loan Guarantee Act, the requests for charters and the problem of land rights led to a considerable involvement. And although direct grants were not at first given, the loan guarantees meant that Canada's credit was almost as much involved with railways as it had been with canals. And with railways, as had never been the case with canals, private profits became confused in the minds of politicians with public policy. The famous statement by Allan MacNab that "my politics are railways" has its place in reflecting the spirit of the age.

Because railroads remained privately-controlled, Public Works was not in this period directly involved with them. Nevertheless the Department did become a clearing-house for the Government in matters of engineering approval and policy. As early as 1847 the St. Lawrence and Atlantic Railroad went to the Department to gain approval for its plans for a bridge over the St. Lawrence. (108) With the beginning of large-scale construction after 1850, the number of requests to the Department grew apace. There is also some indication that the scope of Public Works expanded beyond purely technical matters to such things as opinions on the worth of individual railways. When, for instance, a petition was presented to the Government for a charter to construct a railroad from Lake Ontario to Lake Huron the matter was referred to the Department for comment. On the basis of need for the line, the Department returned a negative report. (109) By 1853 this indirect responsibility of the Department was important enough for Chief Commissioner Chabot to recommend that Killaly be sent to England "for the purpose of making a general examination of the works of several first-class railways in that Kingdom". (110) The permission was given.

Railways affected Public Works in another way. Gzowski, dismissed in 1848, was but one of the many engineers who turned from Public Works to railway construction. When Samuel Keefer resigned as Chief Engineer it proved difficult to find an engineer capable of adequately filling his position. Warning of "la grande demande d'Ingénieurs dans la Province et aux États Unis et les hauts prix que des compagnies de Chemins de fer accordent," Chabot recommended that if John Page, the designated replacement for Keefer, was to be induced to accept this position his salary would have to be £750 a year: an increase of £150 over Keefer's salary and only £50 less than that of the Chief Commissioner. (111)

To a certain extent the functions of the Department diversified and changed in the 1850s as a result of the completion of the St. Lawrence system and, partly as a result of the newly acquired fascination with railways, canals lost their former dominant position over the other activities of the Department. In 1846, for instance, of the total expenditure on public works since the Union, some 75 per cent had been on canals, with only a little over one per cent spent on public buildings. By the year 1856 approximately 20 per cent of the expenditure of Public Works went on buildings or related activities. (112)

This is not to say that canals and navigation on the St. Lawrence did not continue to be important. Repairs, improvements and new projects received both attention and money from the Department throughout the

1850s. One project, supplementary to the St. Lawrence, received special attention in the late 1840s and early 1850s. In 1848, as the Montreal merchants cast about for ways to improve their seemingly sorry lot, the concept of a canal from Lake Champlain to the St. Lawrence gained popularity. The theory of those who supported this Caughnawaga Canal and the question was hotly debated - was that such a canal would attract goods that would previously have gone down the Oswego feeder of the Erie, but that it would not siphon off goods intended for England via the St. Lawrence. (113) It was also hoped that much of the New England area could be made a hinterland of Montreal rather than of New York or Boston. In July 1849 a large meeting at Troy, New York, seemed to confirm the hopes of Montrealers that much of New England would ship goods via such a canal. (114) A few days later an impressive Canadian meeting resolved to work with their American counterpart towards achieving the canal. The presence of Tache, the Chief Commissioner of the Department, and John Young, a future one, gives some indication of the support for the project. (115) It was thus no surprise when the Government agreed to survey the route for the projected canal.

Merritt, always an energetic supporter of any scheme to develop the St. Lawrence, threw his weight behind the concept of the canal during his short stay in office. Thomas Keefer was brought back to the Department temporarily to make a full-scale report on both the technical and commercial aspects of the project. In spite of Merritt's own conclusion that the opening of navigation between the lake and the river was feasible, nothing was done immediately. In 1852 he was still actively promoting the project, this time from the outside, arguing that the "construction of the Canal has become a national object," and pointing out that both he and John Young had supported it. (116) The fear that the canal would act as a siphon still had a hold on the minds of many, and for many years the Government contented itself with surveys and debates on this controversial route.

Some projects were launched more quickly. In 1850 dredging recommenced in Lake St. Peter above Montreal, a work suspended in 1846 and the subject of a bitter debate through 1846-1847. (117) Other projects such as the Sault Ste. Marie Canal were set aside. Killaly's argument that the population and traffic did not justify the project carried the day, in spite of the support for the project from people like Merritt. (118) It was to be nearly the end of the century before Canada completed the canal system dictated by geography and brought the most distant of the Great Lakes into the communication chain.

It is thus not so much that canals were ignored during this period; rather, as the colony grew and towns and cities increased in size, the demand for public buildings began to increase. Nowhere was there a more desperate need for the construction of buildings than at the centre of government. From the time of the Union, the Government had not had adequate facilities in terms of office space, departmental quarters and legislative chambers. At first this problem (which among other things led to the removal from Kingston to Montreal) was lost under the imperative demand on the Board of Works for attention to the canals. As this project neared completion, however, the Department pledged increased attention to the question of government buildings:

The Public Departments, notwithstanding the very heavy rents to which the Province is subjected, are most incon-

veniently and insufficiently accommodated. To meet the cost of substituting suitable buildings in lieu of those now in use ... various projects have been devised, some of which are highly deserving of consideration. (119)

The problem of obtaining suitable quarters for the Government was aggravated in this period by the practice of rotating capitals. When the Government had moved to Montreal in 1843, it had intended the move to be permanent. In 1849, however, with the Legislature meeting in Bonsecours market guarded by troops and with the Parliament Buildings a pile of rubble after a mob had burnt it to the ground, the decision was made to leave Montreal forever. (120) Beyond that decision, however, it was very difficult to go. Each section had its claims on the Capital and the voting block to support those claims. The only way that any decision could be reached was for the Government to propose a system of rotating capitals. It had been decided that at regular intervals the Government of Canada would pack up its politicians, civil servants and records and alternate between Toronto and Quebec. From the first move to Toronto in the autumn of 1849, through the final move to Ottawa in 1865, it fell to Public Works, as it had in 1843, to make the arrangements. As long as the Government was unable to decide on a permanent place of residence, it was impossible for the Department to make arrangements for truly adequate and economic government buildings.

The series of rotations were expensive and time-consuming. The move of 1855 from Quebec to Toronto for instance, cost the Government some £43,223 exclusive of repair of buildings. (121) It also wasted a good deal of time of the Department of Public Works and the Government as a whole. Long memorandums and wrangling over the removal allowances led to exasperating months and bad relations between departments. (122) And while the Government was away from one of its two capitals, the Department had to provide for the maintenance of the empty and useless buildings on the vacated site.

Not only buildings for the sitting of the Government required the attention of Public Works during these years. As the years went by, other types of public buildings came into demand. The shift in the emphasis of the Department was indicated by the somewhat negative evidence that, increasingly during the 1850s, problems with contractors and expenditure had to do with not only canals but public buildings as well. The Montreal Customs House, the Quebec Court House and other buildings ran into trouble as contractors exceeded appropriations. (123) There were also an increasing number of post offices dotting the land as a result of the transfer of the Post Office Department from the authority of the Imperial Government, and of the exertions of Public Works. These many and varied projects are important as reflections of the growth of the colony. In a country moving beyond the frontier stage of development, the term "public works" began as much to mean the provision of services expected in a civilized and developed society as it did the opening of new land and the provision of means for development.

Thus, although the St. Lawrence remained important throughout the 1850s, it ceased to monopolize public interest. Perhaps more striking than the actual shift of money and resources to other projects was the psychological change that took place in the thinking of the Department and those interested in the St. Lawrence. The capture of the trade of the West for the Canadian trade route was not the clear-cut and powerful symbol that it once

was. What then had happened to the reaffirmation of 1850? At that time, as Canada had emerged from the economic depression, it had been argued that the "prospect dawning on the horizon seems of the most cheering character". (124) That year had witnessed Elgin proroguing Parliament in phrases reminiscent of the early 1840s. "Nature has bestowed its own products and those of other countries, and their extension and development is an object of primary importance to its welfare." (125) That year also the colony had been warned that although it had survived the events of the previous years, the battle for commercial supremacy was not yet over. The Toronto Globe warned that "it is very apparent that a fierce battle for the carrying trade of the far west is about to be waged between Canada and New York. Our neighbours are wide awake to the crisis that is approaching and will not lose the race if they can help it". Nor was the Globe ready to rest on existing facilities. Calling for the Caughnawaga Canal, the improvement of river navigation and the expansion of railroads, the Globe concluded on a optimistic note: "The country is prosperous and quiet, the national credit is high and the public mind is more than ordinarily alive to the importance of these works. We are contending for a great prize." (126)

And yet as the 1850s went by, the great commercial topic of the 1840s, the potential of the St. Lawrence, receded more and more into the background. Partly, of course, the fever of the St. Lawrence system was replaced by a mania for steel, but this does not provide the whole answer. Rather, it would seem that Canadians began gradually to realize that the dream of commercial supremacy could not come true. They were not completely defeated in 1846 and, in fact, they never did admit complete defeat. But the figures that came in year after year indicated that there was only the most agonizingly slow growth of traffic on the Welland and St. Lawrence canals. It gradually became apparent that the canals would never pay their real cost, the interest on the capital put into them. (127) Optimism did not turn to pessimism, it just faded. As one historian phrased it: "They still talked about the great river of Canada and laid plans for the future but the ardor and excitement of the forties and early fifties were gone. One might almost say that Canada had become resigned to a secondary role of the St. Lawrence as a transportation route for the American West." (128) After millions of dollars had been spent and while the Province found itself more than once at the edge of bankruptcy, the lucrative trade of the American Midwest continued to remain as elusive as ever. And during the 1850s, Canadians began to realize just how elusive it was.

Yet as one dream died a slow death, another began to form. By 1856 a new "West" began to capture the mind of Canada. This was the "Great North West", that vast region ruled by the Hudson's Bay Company. As the Toronto Globe, the Select Committee on the Hudson's Bay Company, and the articles of A.R. Roche in the Montreal Gazette began to arouse the interest of Canada in the potential of this region, so too did they arouse those involved in commerce. The Government began to respond to public pressure and in 1857 declared that there was strong sentiment that the land stretching to the Pacific was Canada's by right of prior French claim. (129) It was dubious logic but the spirit behind it was irresistible.

The Government also began to take more concrete action towards the realization of this new expansionist impulse. S.J. Dawson, an engineer and brother of a noted expansionist, was appointed by the Department to head

an exploration of the wilderness between Lake Superior and the Red River. (130) Dawson's team was part of a larger group sent out from Canada that year under George Gladman and Henry Youle Hind to explore the region that attention had recently been attracted to. The party both reflected and promoted the growing interest of Canada in the Northwest.

Most important to the Department were the reports of Dawson. He concentrated on the difficult region that would have to be crossed if Canada was to enter the Northwest. And, as the agency for the development of communication, the Department was aware that it would be expected to provide a means of communication across the hundreds of miles of forests and lakes that came between the Great Lakes and the Prairies. If there was any question about whether the project was worthwhile, Dawson certainly had no doubts. In his February 1859 report he called for the development of a combination road and steamer route. He felt that there were various reasons to justify such a route but "the most important consideration is, that by opening this route a vast extent of fertile land would be thrown open to colonization". (131) Canada and Public Works were to hear a great deal more of Dawson and the route from the Red River and Lake Superior.

As attention turned westward, the Government began to explore the possibility of new shortcuts from the St. Lawrence to the Far West. Partly as a result of this exploratory activity, Chief Commissioner Lemieux decided to appoint Walter Shanly as the man possessing the requisite "integrity and energy" to head a survey of the area between the Ottawa River and Georgian Bay. (132) It was hoped that the survey would lead to the discovery of a practical route to the Northwest that would shortcut the long navigation through Lakes Ontario and Erie. It was Shanly's purpose to determine "the practicability and probable cost of effecting a continuous water communication from Montreal to Lake Huron". (133)


Of course, the real ends of this line of communication were neither Lake Huron nor Montreal but the Northwest and Europe. Canada was eyeing the new hinterland as a potentially vital enlargement of its trade capacity with the St. Lawrence as its major centre. Though not yet fully developed, the idea can be seen emerging through the editorials, speeches and actions of the Government and Public Works in 1857. It was a variation on both the St. Lawrence theme and the concept of Canada's manifest destiny. The potential trade of the Northwest became a substitute and a more completely national vision of the future of the St. Lawrence route. A great many prophetic and aggressive statements were uttered as the mood caught hold. Not the least of these was the outlook of Walter Shanly as he looked to the future of the region he was exploring. And just as the intention of the survey had gone far beyond central Canada, so too did Shanly's thoughts:

That a Railway will one day be pushed up through the heart of the Ottawa Valley, I look on as scarcely problematical; and I feel equally convinced that such a line will be but the first step in the construction of a great Continental railway, eventually, if no natural obstacle exists to arrest its progress, to sweep around the North Shore of Lake Superior, and penetrate the fine plains said to exist along the valley of the Saskatchewan. (134)

And with such a railway Canada might yet assert the supremacy for which it had struggled so long. "The day must not be far distant," Shanly continued, "when the political bearings may aid the advancement of such a project.

The balance of power on this side of the Atlantic will ever hold its seat in the North, using the term not as in the United States, in contradistinction to the South, but in the real cold North - north of the Great Lakes, and when to the westward of them, north of the 49th parallel". (135)

Over the next years Canada was to make a concerted effort to realize Shanly's prediction. As had been the case with the commercial empire of the St. Lawrence, the concept of the Northwest empire was seen both as the nation's destiny and as its assurance of greatness. Public Works had contributed to the effort to consolidate the empire of the St. Lawrence; and the allure of the Northwest was now to prove as strong as the original vision had been.




William Hamilton Merritt, builder of the Welland Canal



Lord Sydenham, Charles Edward Poulett Thomson, Baron,
Governor in Chief of Canada, 1839 - 1841



Samuel Keefer, first Chief Engineer of Public Works



Parliament Buildings under construction, seen from the East Block



The Right Honourable Alexander Mackenzie, Prime Minister of Canada,
1873 - 1878



Sir Sanford Fleming (map in hand) with Intercolonial Railway Survey Staff



Construction on the Intercolonial Railway



Tunnel at Morrissey Rock, International Railway

CHAPTER 4

OF STRUCTURE AND AUTHORITY

1846-1867

For all its progress, growth, and assertion of political rights, Canada in the 1840s and 1850s was still a none-too-sophisticated colony. As the fight for Responsible Government went on, new ground had to be broken in all areas of administration and government. There were questions concerning the relationship of the Government to political partisanship, the Civil Service to the Government, and the forms of government within the bureaucratic structure - these were subordinate to, but as crucial as, the blanket concept of Responsible Government. And all were questions that, as the political independence of Canada increased, found few precedents in the Canadian past. Canada was a developing society, and as it had to grow socially and commercially, so too did it have to develop the forms of government that would run this society.

To say that there were few precedents in Canadian history for institutions and intragovernmental relationships is not to say the existing precedents were unimportant. This colony of the British Empire founded the broad framework of its institutions on the forms of government in Great Britain. The whole concept of Parliament, represented by a responsible ministry and a Governor who after 1848 filled much the same role in internal matters as the Queen in England, reflected the British heritage. There were also influences and precedents drawn from the United States. The belief that there should be no state church, the demand for an elected Legislative Council, and much of the platform of the 1837 radicals, and later of the Clear Grits and the Rouges, showed American influence. Thus there were many precedents that constituted influential and perhaps determining factors in Canadian governmental development. At the same time, a society will also respond to its own unique and historical forces. As every admirer of foreign precedent from John Graves Simcoe on has discovered, a society has to build its own institutional framework, no matter what its model.

This was the essential position of the Canadian Government and Civil Service at the time when Responsible Government was achieved. Major

improvements had been instituted, especially since the time of Durham's investigation. Sydenham had implemented the concepts of executive initiative and departmental government, and the early years of the Union had seen the growth of a bureaucracy. Yet the structure and lines of authority of the Civil Service, the division of the departments and their relation to the politicians were only slowly worked out. The absence of crucial auditing and estimating functions caused real problems in the 1840s. In the period between 1846 and 1867 the Department of Public Works, like the whole Civil Service, went through profound changes as the young colony attempted to define the relations between various governmental activities.

One of the earliest problems - and the most persistent faced by Public Works - was the question of jurisdiction. The Department had originally been conceived primarily as a construction agency for the communication network of the Province. Almost immediately, as an extension of the responsibilities of construction agent for the Government, it found the provision of government buildings added to its charge. It was a natural extension, but the various removals, leasing and maintenance of buildings meant that the problems of housing the Government led the Department far beyond the realm of construction. The other and related question for the construction agency was the question of management. Someone had to be responsible for the management of the new canals and buildings. The Board of Works, already charged with the repairs for works such as canals, seemed in many ways the natural agents for the administration of those works that they had built.

Other departments also had a stake in many of the projects of Public Works. Roads, for instance, seem to have been partly under the control of Public Works, partly under the control of the Inspector General and partly under the Department of Customs. Such a split jurisdiction was likely to, and often did, lead to confusion and the evasion of responsibility. When Robinson wrote denying his responsibility for tolls on Young Street and when the Examiner refused to accept the fact that it was a problem for the Department of Customs, the dangers of such a split jurisdiction were well indicated. The confusion was not only apparent but real. At the time of the controversy over the Toronto roads, for instance, the Inspector General, responsible for the appointment of toll collectors, had to reply on the knowledge of the local superintendent of Public Works, Gzowski, to obtain a toll collector in that area. (1) Throughout this period, moreover, decisions as to the placement of toll booths were approved by both departments. On the other hand, when it was decided to lease the toll rights to private companies, the responsibility was split between the Department of the Inspector General and the Department of Customs. (2)

The same confusion existed when it came to canals. In early 1846, as the first canals were completed, Killaly wrote to the Governor General requesting that a decision be made on the matter of administration. Would they continue to remain under the control of the Board of Works or, as revenue producers, would they be transferred to the Department of the Inspector General? "I would take the liberty of remarking," wrote Killaly, "that a full and explicit understanding should be had as to what department is charged with the care and management of the canals." (3)

The attitude of Public Works towards the growing field of property administration seems to have been ambiguous. In the eyes of its employees the Board of Works had been created for the development of the great works

of the Province. These were canals, major roads and later, railroads. In these areas, where both construction and upkeep were considered by the Department to be a major part of its activities, every effort was made to retain as much control as possible. The Department was especially adamant when it came to canals. Killaly's memorandum to the Governor General went on to assert the Department's concern in all matters connected with canals. Such interest is understandable for both psychological and functional reasons. The Department had put its greatest effort into the construction of the canals and they would continue to be its major responsibility for some years to come as repairs and improvements continued to be necessary. This was the prime area of responsibility for Public Works and its reason for existence. Thus, the Board was naturally loath to lose control of such an important area. In terms of function, a major cost to the Board was the upkeep of the canals, and the revenue from them was credited to it. It was also natural that Public Works should be concerned that the canals were administered in such a way as to control revenues and minimize expenses. Thus, by what was both a logical and a personally desired extension of responsibility, the construction agency of the Government took on the administration of canals. It was not long before by-laws on the speed of vehicles, damages, and other regulations for traffic on the canals originated for the most part from within the Board of Works. (4)

The Department of Public Works, in this fight for the control of the canals, often found itself in conflict with other departments, especially the Departments of the Inspector General and Customs. The reaction of the Department when others attempted to "infringe" on this area reflects the jealousy with which it protected its major charge. In 1850 Merritt complained that "it would seem that the 'control' of finished works, as well with regard to tolls and officers ... was to have been assigned to this Department; but the works are not virtually under the control of the Commissioners, except for purposes of repairs". (5) Such general conflicts over jurisdiction led to specific frictions. In 1847, for instance, the Inspector General requested that a lockmaster vacate a house so that a Customs officer might occupy it. The Department replied by requesting that the Inspector General "be so good as to convey His Excellency's command" and thus appealed to the Executive Council as a whole. (6) The specific incident was trivial, but such trivia, often repeated, can create friction, a secretive attitude, and hostility between departments.

Other activities, such as those connected with government buildings, were considered as secondary by Public Works. In these areas the Department was usually more than willing to turn over the management function to someone else. But there was no set method for doing so and only gradually, as cases arose, did a set of precedents give guidelines for the future. One of the unwanted responsibilities of the Department was the maintenance of lighthouses. Initially it would seem that not only the repairs but also the provisioning of lighthouses seem to have come under the Board of Works. As early as 1846 Begley complained that "it being the opinion of the Commissioners that the system of the two departments interfering in the same duty will be highly injudicious and will create much confusion in the accounts, I am to request that you will be pleased to draw His Excellency's attention to the Acts 3 William 4th Chap. 94". (7) Had His Excellency's attention been drawn to the Act he would have found that it was the responsibility of the Inspector General to provide for lighthouse

maintenance. As was often the case, however, nothing was done and not until Confederation did the Department divest itself of this unwanted chore.

In general, Public Works seems to have felt that where it continued to take a major responsibility for the upkeep of the work and where this work was in the area that might be called its "major concern", it should have primacy in controlling it. In other words, the Department did not regard itself as a service department, but rather as the developer of a system on which would be based the economy of Canada. With this outlook Public Works resisted departments such as the Inspector General and Customs in their attempts to impinge on vital areas. On the other hand, in other areas Public Works remained uninterested in management. This often led to a shortsighted policy in its relation to other government properties. Public Works might by default retain some responsibility for the maintenance of government buildings but it did not then develop any definition of its area of responsibility or method of exercising it.

The question of property management and departmental jurisdiction was one internal to the Government. This was not so with the problem of politics and the Civil Service. Sydenham, and all the Governors before the advent of Responsible Government, had aspired to a non-partisan administration. The Government would be selected from the leaders of various groups in Parliament, regardless of party. This approach and its philosophy were reflected in the first Board of Works. Hamilton Killaly received his appointment not as the member of a party but as the man who seemed most likely to be able to give competent leadership to the Department. Likewise the Board of Works, with its corporate status and autonomous position, reflected a desire to escape from partisanship. As has been indicated, Killaly, no admirer of politics, completely approved of the process. The assumption that the activities of the Board could be divorced from politics was shown when he resigned his seat on the Executive Council as part of the protest against the policies of the Governor and yet retained his position as Chairman of the Board of Works.

The Sydenham system, as it was called, was unworkable, this part no less than the rest. In fact the non-partisan position of the administration of the Board of Works fell before the formal acceptance of party government. The removal of Killaly and his replacement by Robinson, by a Government that still maintained it was non-partisan, reflected both political reality and the realization that an independent Board of Works could not be entrusted to carry out the policy set by a particular administration. Hodgetts presents the thesis that the Civil Service achieved Responsible Government before the politicians did. The replacement of Killaly by Robinson can be seen as a case in point. (8)

The collapse of the non-partisan practice for the administration of departments really reflected the collapse of the non-partisanship of the administration and the inability of the Governor to fill the role Sydenham had originally intended. By the time that Responsible Government had become an accomplished fact the question of political control of the Civil Service was accepted in theory if not in practice. More controversial was the extension of this political control to the partisan use of patronage. The Reformers had contended that control of patronage was part and parcel of Responsible Government. It was on this point that Metcalfe had taken his stand, arguing that the placement of public servants had to be the prerogative of the Governor both for the sake of the Governor's position and

for the sake of the public welfare. And it was this controversy that led in 1843 to the resignation of the Cabinet, including Killaly. (9)

That Hamilton Killaly should resign on this question seems strange at first. Throughout his career he had regularly discouraged patronage. Representations involving patronage by politicians, no matter how powerful, inevitably led to some excuse on the part of the Chairman of the Board as to why the persons who had been recommended could not be appointed. On at least one occasion Killaly openly rejected the whole principle. Writing to Henry Smith, a Member of the Legislature, he explained that he had turned down Smith's request for a position for a supporter on the grounds that "patronage in the appointment of a single individual on any work is what I most studiously want to avoid". (10) When one realizes how strongly opposed Killaly was to political control of any kind, his resistance to patronage is readily understood. This resistance, however, clearly reinforces the view that his and the Cabinet's resignation was over the question of patronage as a symbol of Responsible Government rather than over the actual right to place friends in the Civil Service.

Symbol or not, the victory of the Reform Party under Baldwin and LaFontaine in 1848 reopened the whole question of patronage and the relationship of the Civil Service to partisan politics. The recent transition from the Sydenham approach made the whole question ill-defined and controversial. Within a decade the colony had listened to numerous suggestions ranging from the most rigorous adherence to non-partisanship in the Civil Service through the "Jacksonian system" of the United States, which implied to the public the rotation of the entire Civil Service in response to the administration of the day. In such a framework everything and anything could be irregular. No precedent or practice had developed that allowed politicians or public to demarcate the line between the valid use of political control and, in the phrase of the age, "jobbery". A debate began on the subject from the day the Reformers won the election. It only cooled down over the years as the practice of successive administrations led to a vague sense of what separated the politically acceptable from the scandalous.

One of the great cries of the Government party while in office had been that the Baldwin-LaFontaine struggle for Responsible Government was really a fight for control of patronage in the most selfish sense. When the Reform government was elected, newspaper proprietors who supported its purposes immediately set out to prove that patronage had been a major part of the previous administration. The Toronto Examiner charged that "during the former Baldwin-LaFontaine Administration the public works on the Ottawa were completed and the necessary officers to manage the timber slides and a superintendent were appointed. No sooner, however, did the Tories get in power than every officer was discharged". (11) The most flagrant example was described in a letter from a Niagara Reformer to the editor of the Globe. It referred to a job situation on the Welland Canal, asserting that of the seventeen officers on the canal only one, S.D. Woodruff, was a Reformer:

In all seventeen officers, containing sixteen of the highest water Tories, besides Lock and bridge tenders, and other Superintendents not enclosed in this list. It appears monstrous that a continuation of this system should be tolerated for a single hour. Please bring this communication under the notice of Mr. Cameron. (12)

These charges against the former Government seem to have been both an attempt to refute the criticism of the Reform Party and a preparation for the removal of partisan officers. At the same time there was resistance among Reformers to the dismissal of civil service officers for political reasons, even when exercised by their own party. The St. Catharines Journal, itself a Reform paper and often the voice of Merritt, defended the staff of the Welland Canal. "The list and salaries we believe are nearly correct," argued the paper, "but the 'no work' and political assertions are too far astray to believe that one so well-informed should blunder in the latter." It went on to repudiate the concept of wholesale dismissals:

Of course it is desirable that the Assistant Commissioner should decide whether any of them can be dispensed with; but it is ridiculous to suppose that political principles recommended the employment of any one of them. Such policy is very rare in this district, and the inhabitants are the last to countenance any sacrifice of efficiency for such an object. (13)

There were, of course, hirings and firing as a result of the 1848 election. There are indications that Gzowski's dismissal, though related to the reorganization that opened the way to bring in Killaly, was also partly the result of Gzowski's Tory leanings. In addition, as the Department cut back in order to economize in that depression year, important figures such as Thomas Keefer, also a Conservative, were dismissed. (14) At the same time it seems to have been decided that the Jacksonian system would not be introduced into Canada. In those crucial months the Reformers accepted the fact that the Conservatives, although they had favoured their own supporters, had not made it impossible for a man of opposite convictions to obtain a high position. A precedent had already been set to some extent and the Reformers continued it. There would be no wholesale rotation of office and the Civil Service of Canada would not be expected to be a political duplicate of the party in power. (15)

This is not to say that a few dismissals represented the total patronage of the party in power. There was definite use of patronage through the 1840s and 1850s and gradually, an accepted practice followed by both parties seems to have developed. Whereas men were not often fired for their political beliefs, it was accepted that new posts that came up, especially those of a minor nature, would be reserved for the party faithful. Such positions were in some cases "make-work", or overpaid for the responsibilities they entailed. In the fall of 1851, for instance, Begley wrote to Bourret concerning the bill of a M. Gingras for £85. 12s. 6d. for acting as "guardian" of the public buildings in Quebec: "Mr. Rubridge states that there was an express understanding that he was to receive for that service, such remuneration as you should decide upon." It was also known that he had been hired on the order of Bourret personally. Now, however, the bill had come in and the Department considered it "extravagant". (16) There is no indication as to whether Gingras got the full amount, but the point is he would not have had the position at all had it not been for the Chief Commissioner.

Patronage thus became an integral part of partisan government. Only when it seriously hindered the efficiency of a department did it become really controversial. The informal "guidelines" that developed allowed for patronage appointment without much criticism from Opposition or press.

On the other hand, blatantly political dismissals were more controversial and much more likely to draw fire.

Another common practice was the nomination of Members of the Legislature for positions of a temporary nature in their home constituencies. (17) This system grew directly out of the pre-1840 practice that had the local Member act as initiator and guardian of public works in his area and was a practical method of finding the best people within an area to handle a project. Gradually the practice became a part of the patronage function as only Members of the government party were requested to nominate people. Approval of the practice was never absolute in this period but at some point during the political strife of the middle 1850s, it appeared to become more the exception than the rule, at least in Public Works, to consult those Members sitting for Opposition parties.

While it was not condemned too harshly, patronage was still isolated from open debate in terms of public opinion. Consequently, although neither the Opposition nor the press would bother to attack its normal use, it was still a subject that no party wished to promote, discuss or defend publicly. It can be argued that once the Jacksonian precedent of openly defending the system as part of democracy had been rejected, the whole concept of patronage took on somewhat shady overtones in Canadian political life. In other words, the ideal of a non-partisan Civil Service conflicted with the well-established practice of patronage. The new principle having been accepted, various attempts were made to root out the old practice.

In March 1857 Robert Spence, the Postmaster General in the Taché-Macdonald ministry, introduced an act to regulate the Civil Service. Patterned after British practice, this Act, which became law on June 10, 1857, attempted to enforce the principle of entry into the Civil Service on merit rather than political opinion. The Act created a "Board of Examiners" whose function it was to "to examine all Candidates who may present themselves in accordance with the regulations of the Board and such other regulations and restrictions as may be provided under this Act". (18) Clause XXX specifically stated that no clerk, a category that covered most of the non-technical ranks in the Civil Service, could be appointed unless he passed the exams, but an exception was made for temporary staff. That last exception, however, provided a large loophole. A great number of temporary and extra clerks appear to have been appointed in the next few years. Even more crucial was the fact that no government was strictly prepared to enforce the Act. When in 1864 Parliament called for a list of staff from every department, specifically mentioning those who qualified under the 1857 Act, Public Works sent back a list of twenty-six men at Headquarters. Only three of the men on the list possessed the certificate of qualification! A truly enforceable and enforced qualification system was not to exist until over half a century later.

Governments over these years recognized that a certain amount of political patronage was the price of the rejection of the Sydenham principle of a non-partisan administration. At the same time the decision not to rotate the Civil Service with changes of government and the voluntary restraint on the extent of patronage laid the foundations for - and at least established the principle of - a non-partisan public service. The same years also saw a renewed attempt to confirm what had supposedly been decided in 1846 - the establishment of the political representative as the effective head of the Department.

The post of Assistant Commissioner had been created as a result of the dualism that had crept into United Canada. Each head of the Department was assisted by a man from the opposite section of the Province. This system reflected both the general weakness of the Union and a specific failure of Killaly's Board of Works. Shortly after the passage of the 1846 Act, the Quebec Gazette noted that "the chief expenditure for improvements have been within the limits of the late Province of Upper Canada, which had already created a large debt of public and local improvements before the union, which debt was placed on the consolidated revenue of the united Provinces". (19)

The charge had some weight behind it. In spite of the 1841 amendment by Baldwin, which supposedly gave additional work to Canada East, the largest part of the expenditure of the Board of Works in the first half of the 1840s went to the area west of the Ottawa. The 1847 Return of the Department listed £820,172 as having been spent in Canada East since the Union as against £1,475,844 for Canada West. And the only way that the Department had been able to give figures even that close was to include in the account of Canada East all the expenditures on the St. Lawrence canals, even though a good many of them were in Canada West. (20) During an investigation into the dredging operations on Lake St. Peter, Killaly admitted his own lack of attention to the area below Montreal. Assistant Commissioner Casgrain noted, "Mr. Killaly is pleased to admit with much candour that the interior part of the Province has heretofore been much neglected. While Chairman of the late Board he only visited it once, that was in the summer of 1845, and once in 1846 after the change took place in the Department." (21) Such an imbalance can be partly explained by the monopoly of attention that the canals had received, especially from Killaly, and partly by the fact that the opening up of Canada West had been a very recent development. Moreover, the West was expanding very rapidly and was consequently more in need of public works. Nevertheless Canada East, especially that area to the east of Montreal, had a valid grievance. The creation of the dual commissionership had been in part an effort to meet this complaint.

After 1846, attention to Canada East certainly increased. One of Robinson's first acts as Chief Commissioner was to make a tour of the old Province and form an understanding of its public works requirements, something Killaly had always left in the hands of regional engineers. It was Casgrain, however, who had the main responsibility for ensuring that the needs of the section were met. As with Malcolm Cameron later, the Assistant Commissioner was expected to look after his own section whereas the Chief Commissioner, though responsible for both, concentrated on his. Under this system Canada East, especially that much-neglected area below Montreal, began to receive greater attention. The 1847 Annual Report argued that "no county in this Province is more in want, or more deserving of improvement than the County of Saguenay". (22) When Taché took over from Casgrain as the Commissioner responsible for Canada East, he continued to take special interest in the works around the Saguenay. (23) Works on the St. Maurice and in the towns and cities of Canada East reflected the new importance of that area in the plans of the Department of Public Works after 1846.

When in 1851 Hamilton Killaly turned the position of Assistant Commissioner into a permanent one, the principle of having the two

Commissioners from alternate sections was not abandoned. Thus all the Chief Commissioners between Merritt's resignation and Confederation were from Canada East. This was the result of the continuation of the former practice, the desire to redress the balance in the works between the two sections and, not to be discounted, the power of the voting bloc of French-Canadian Reformers, and later the Bleus, in Canadian politics. More significant than this dominance of Canada East was the intrusion of the principle of regional rights on Cabinet positions. Eight of the twelve Commissioners between 1851 and 1867 came from Quebec City or its hinterland.

The principle of dual representation had resulted not only in the creation of the dual commissionership but also, in 1847, in their being made effectively equal. The problem, of course, was what the St. Catharines Journal had missed in 1851. Hamilton Killaly, had been appointed not to a subordinate post but to a political one as joint head of the Department. There were bound to be problems with this relationship. The principle that although a permanent head may have control over day-to-day actions of a department he must nevertheless remain responsible to and under the authority of the elected representative, was in direct contradiction to the situation in Public Works after 1851. The Assistant and Chief Commissioner were responsible jointly to the Executive Council for the actions of the Department. Sooner or later it was inevitable that friction would arise between the permanent head of the Department and the Chief Commissioner.

The problem of the Board of Works during this period was to a greater or lesser extent the problem of the entire Civil Service. The nature of politics in the 1850s tended to weaken the power of the political head and in turn hand it over to the permanent heads. Shifting coalitions, deadlocked ministries and loose party coalitions resulted in a rapid turnover of the members of the Executive Council.* Such a situation allowed permanent officials to "rest easy on their oars, quietly bobbing up and down in a bureaucratic back-wash, or they could pull themselves into positions of power and influence which even the strongest political heads would not dare to assail". (24) Hamilton Killaly, who one doubts had ever "rested easy on his oars," soon asserted his power in the Department. This was hastened by the weakness, or lack of interest, of Bourret in the Department. This Chief Commissioner who, with Killaly just back and finding his feet in the new structure, had the best chance of convincing the Assistant Commissioner to accept orders, seems to have preferred the comfort of his home in Montreal to a regular appearance at Headquarters. Within a few months Hamilton Killaly had indeed become a joint head of the Department.

What must have been most worrisome to those in power who remembered the first Board of Works was the recurrence of similar problems on a lesser scale in the 1850s. With increasing frequency there came the post facto requests for money, indicating the Legislature's lack of control over the Department. Also disturbing was the similarity in the excuses of Public Works. When the Provincial Secretary, nervous about overexpenditure on the Bobcaygeon Dam, asked Thomas Begley for reasons, the latter replied

* Between 1851 and 1867 only three Chief Commissioners held office for more than two years and only one, J.C. Chapais, for more than three years.

that the "carrying on of these works was attended with unusual difficulty and expense". (25) In the eyes of the Executive Council the expression "unusual" was becoming far too common. Until political control was asserted over the Department there remained the possibility of another fiasco like that of 1846.

John Langton, the man who had the unenviable task of attempting to bring order out of chaos in government expenditures, found it difficult even to discover under whose authority expenditure was approved and processed in the Department. His commentary, a capsule portrait of the personalities in the Department at the time, illustrates the frustrations of the man responsible for bringing order to the expenditure of Public Works:

Lemieux (the Chief Commissioner) receives you with the greatest suavity (and he really is very pleasant man), he asserts to the justness of everything you say, but he does not profess to know anything about details and refers you to Killaly (the Assistant Commissioner). Killaly is also a most agreeable man, he is quite shocked at the irregularity in the department but he is only an engineer, he never meddles with anything, also he knows no more about accounts than he does of politics and refers you to Mr. Begley (the Secretary). Mr. Begley is not an agreeable man, his situation is a very unpleasant one, he is only a servant, he writes letters as he is instructed and if he is instructed to send accounts he will do so, but he is only a servant and you must speak to Mr. Lemieux or Killaly. (26)

Before there could be any attempt to correct the financial laxity of the Department, questions of both authority and responsibility had to be resolved. The fact that the initial clash on this question came over a trivial matter indicates the frustration that a good many Chief Commissioners must have felt with the structure of the Department. The first open controversy was triggered by the carelessness of a man who had long ago decided that he had no desire for greater power, Thomas Begley. When there was a delay of several days in the mailing of a letter the Executive Council asked for an explanation. In reply Chief Commissioner Charles Alleyn wrote a report that blamed not only Begley for his carelessness but the entire system of authority within the Department. Killaly, recognizing the larger issue at stake, gave an equally sweeping counter-report, defended Begley and went on to give his own interpretation as to the structure of the Board of Works:

The other point in your report affecting the working of the Department which drew my attention, is that in which you address your opinion of the absolute necessity for a change being made in the Act, by which the Chief Commissioner would really be constituted such in fact as well as in name. By the Act as it now stands there is no Departmental superiority whatever in the position of one Commissioner over another ... and no collision in consequence has, from that period occurred by which the business of the Department has in the least degree been obstructed, or the public interests injuriously affected. (27)

Killaly's opinion carried the day. Begley was retained and there was no change in the status of the Commissioners. It was, however, becoming more and more obvious that this situation could not be allowed to continue.

The 1857 Civil Service Act had formally recognized the principle of a permanent head of the Department, subordinate to a political head. (28) Hamilton Killaly was really the permanent head in a political position. This was recognized by the same Act that, in naming the positions considered as the permanent heads of each Department, specified that for the Board of Works it was the Secretary. (29) As long as the contradiction inherent in Killaly's position persisted, controversy was bound to arise. It was not long before another clash occurred and in this case it was proven that the Assistant Commissioner was not unassailable. Within six months L.V. Sicotte successfully renewed the charges made by Alleyn.

On October 29, 1858, the Executive Council, on the recommendation of the Chief Commissioner of Public Works, dismissed Thomas Begley, the veteran of seventeen years of service, on the grounds that he was "utterly incapable for the duties assigned to him". (30) Killaly wrote bitterly to an aging Merritt that Begley had been "most cruelly treated". He recounted that the Secretary had attempted to find on what charges he had been dismissed only to have Sicotte answer, "None whatever." Begley persisted, asking the grounds for the dismissal, to which Sicotte replied, "Total incompetency!" Killaly, who felt with some reason that he knew the Secretary better than did the Chief Commissioner, refused to see the grounds as any other than pure fabrication. "My dear sir, you know well that for the last six months since Sicotte came in we are literally doing nothing ... Everyone of the former Commissioners have given him (Begley) highly complimentary testimony in which they held him." (31)

To a certain extent Killaly's bitterness reflected the fact that, considering his personality, Begley was the perfect assistant. A man who regarded himself as "only a servant" fitted well into Killaly's distaste for those who would tie down action with bureaucratic regulation. On the other hand, there was a certain justification for Killaly's bitterness. Begley seems to have been a scapegoat, a means through which the general structure of Public Works and the authority of Hamilton Killaly could be attacked. Begley's appointment, shortly after his dismissal, to take charge of the removal of the Parliament to Quebec, "believing that his experience will enable him to execute it with economy and efficiency", and the fact that, for one excuse or another, he was kept on salary for over three years indicates that by no means everybody in the Government felt him to be totally incompetent and deserving of dismissal. (32)

The tenor of the memorandum from Sicotte to the Council, the one that led to Begley's removal, further indicates that the Secretary had been used as a pawn. Only a few lines dealt directly with the position of Begley. Most of it was concerned with the structure of the Department and the positions of "Chief and Assistant Commissioner, who have cojoint and equal authority". To Sicotte it was clear that "the organization of the Department is vicious, and will either retard the action of the department, where expedition is in every instance of great advantage and in most cases of urgent necessity, or either allow action by one of the Commissioners uncontrolled by the other contrary to law and leaving the responsibility upon neither of the Commissioners". He concluded, for very different reasons than had Malcolm Cameron in 1848, that "the office of Assistant Commissioner, as it is now constituted, ought to be abolished". (33) The cynical use of Begley as a pawn does not detract from the force of Sicotte's argument. The whole trend of events since the organization of the Board of Works had

led to the realization of the imperative necessity for political control. Sicotte's memorandum led to the institution of that control.

Early in 1859 the Government followed up the implications of the Sicotte-Killaly controversy and passed "An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Several Acts Respecting the Public Works." (34) This Act replaced the Assistant Commissioner with a Deputy Commissioner who had the "powers and duties" of a permanent head of a Department as outlined in the 1857 Civil Service Act. (35) And, as was the case in 1846, a legal alteration was followed by an informal one. Hamilton Killaly was removed from his non-existent position and made Superintendent of Western Works and Inspector of Railways at a comfortable salary. Symbolic of the fact that Killaly had been defeated in the controversy was the appointment to the new office. Samuel Keefer, Killaly's great engineering rival became the first Deputy Commissioner of the Department at a salary of four thousand dollars* per annum. (36)

The controversy begun with Alleyn and Killaly, ended by Sicotte, and resolved by the Act of 1859, marked a fundamental change in the relation of the Department to the Government as a whole. It was really the working out of a political control that, from the time of the first Commission of Inquiry, had been judged as an essential relationship. Previously the top civil servants in the Department had been relatively independent of the political forces of the day. Not only had they run the day-to-day operations of the Department but they had often overstepped their bounds, altering policies and expenditures theoretically under the control of the political heads of the nation. And although it could be argued that such changes were often the result of needs perceived by the technically competent engineers, it could also be argued that in at least an equal number of cases expensive and unauthorized projects had been initiated without regard for the responsibility of the Legislature in financial matters.

The reorganization of 1859 began the swing of the pendulum away from excessive independence on the part of permanent staff to a high degree of political control. This swing was a necessary part in redefining the relationship of Public Works to the administration of the day. Not all the problems were solved by this alteration of authority and structure, however. In the future such problems would still exist, but they had a very different set of variables. No longer was the politician to leave the Department under the control of a single powerful and permanent representative who acted not only as chief administrator, but as a policy maker and agent for the public trust.

Aiding the subordination of the single department to the administration as a whole, and the permanent staff to the political head, were a number of improvements in the government system of appropriations and audit. Previously, such a lack of controls frustrated many of the attempts

* As of January 1, 1858 the government required that all accounts be given in dollars and cents. No exact conversion between dollars and pounds sterling is possible, but a value of slightly under \$5.00 for the pound gives an approximate conversion. See Adam Shortt, "Currency and Banking, 1840-1867", in Adam Shortt and Arthur Doughty (eds.), Canada and its Provinces, Vol. 5, pp. 261-291.

to control expenditure. The only response that the governments of the 1840s had had to such chronic offenders as Public Works was an increasingly complex system of disbursement. In 1850 Merritt complained that in its effort to watch expenditures the Government had set up a ridiculous system. He listed fourteen steps that were necessary before a bill presented by a contractor to the Department could be paid. (37) Further burdens had been put on the Government by the decision to set up a committee of the Executive Council specifically to check the accounts of the Board of Works. (38) The fault of Public Works, however, was at least in part the fault of the entire system - a system that did not budget for the future. Gradually, in the later 1850s and early 1860s, steps were taken to rectify this.

In the summer of 1858, as the controversy over the position of Assistant Commissioner continued in the Department of Public Works, the Inspector General ruled that henceforth all departments would be obliged to submit their estimated needs for the coming year. (39) Gradually an organized system of approval before expenditure or even appropriation was being developed. These changes arose from an increasing need for controls and were effected through the combined energies of A.T. Galt at the Cabinet level, and John Langton in the Civil Service. Perhaps the most significant single change was the passage in 1864 of the Audit act. This Act required that supplies be voted by the Legislature for a future period. No more, at least in law, would a department be able to spend money that it had not received and then turn to the Government, to sanction an expenditure that it had not foreseen.

For all these reasons the Department began finally to be subordinate to political control. In the first years after 1859, however, political control did not achieve the intended results. The acceptance of patronage as a legitimate means of political power and the extremely murky political situation in this period, as well as the newness of the power, led a good many politicians to forego their right to exercise their powers of policy-making for the public good and concentrate on party warfare. This tendency was aggravated by the weakness of the permanent staff. Indeed, Samuel Keefer, a public employee of some seniority, carefully avoided political matters, even when they infringed on the supposed goals of the administration and on the efficiency of the Department, until he could no longer do so. The ultimate result of this trend was the formation of two distinct and often contradictory streams of action within the Department. The Chief Commissioner, in whom the power now clearly rested, concentrated almost exclusively on matters of patronage and party politics. J.C. Chapais, the Chief Commissioner from 1864 to 1867, left a well-recorded study of the way in which the political head of the Department carved out his own jurisdiction.

Chapais (who, it must be emphasized, serves only as an example) seems to have spent most of his time as Chief Commissioner on the problems of the Matapedia Road. Here a contest for control of this important work soon devolved into political warfare. Chapais, the member for Kamouraska, saw the Matapedia as his own political backyard. It is thus not surprising that he paid a great deal of attention to the problem. The whole question was one of patronage; and to listen to his supplicants, a good part of this could be laid at the feet of the former administration. "Vous savez", wrote one disgruntled Conservative, "que j'ai été victime du Gouvernement (J.S.) Macdonald et Sicotte pour la seule raison que je

n'appartenais pas à ce parti." (40) To ignore valid or even possibly valid complaints of this nature would have been suicidal in the political climate of the day. As much as a result of the age as through any fault of his own, Chapais joined the political war over the Matapedia road. Political accusations flew back and forth, each side accusing the other of subverting the public good for partisan reasons. To be fair to Chapais, he had no conscious intention of hurting the public, as his decision to send G.F. Baillarge to investigate indicates. (41) At the same time, if he and his party were to be successful, he had to be doubly certain that the Rouges did not benefit unduly from any arrangements for the work. And however much it might be possible to excuse the individual actions of the Chief Commissioner, the unpleasant fact remains that the goal behind the arrangements of the road had been altered from making the most beneficial arrangements for the country to make the most beneficial arrangements for the country fit in with the party good.

Patronage and political ends increasingly dictated policy. All administrations had people who wrote in the vein of T. Ancel complaining that they were a "victime comme tant d'autres des vengeances des Gouvernements qui vous ont precede". And if the applicant was new he would write via the member he thought most likely to listen. (42) There was also a great deal of pressure on the Commissioner of the day not only to fill posts with the politically faithful but to set departmental policy to aid the party or party members. To ignore requests by government members for works in their area was to invite their wrath:

The course that you have seen fit to pursue towards me in reference to both the Hamilton and Port Dover Road and the Port Dover Harbour is certain to do me harm politically. Now what I want you to do is write me an official letter that in consequence of my representations and the report of Mr. Woodruff an item will be placed in the estimates at the next session for the repair of the Port Dover Harbour and that the works will be proceeded with in the spring. (43)

The political pressures for public works had always existed but they mounted tremendously in the last years before Confederation. In many ways the era developed similarities to the local constituency policy that had reigned before the Union. The various pressures on the Commissioner passed on to a set of weak subordinates, made it difficult to develop a logical policy of either staffing or public works development.

It is difficult to make any generalizations on the over-all effect of this policy on the efficiency of the Department as a public agent. Certainly one man of the time voiced his criticisms. Shortly after the Macdonald-Sicotte Government entered office, Thomas D'Arcy McGee, the President of the Council, was given the task of investigating the structure of the Civil Service. McGee was quite critical of Public Works, arguing that "there is, in fact, no department of our Government under which a one-man power may be so fully exercised as in Public Works". He went on to argue that "the will of the Commissioner is for the time being the law of all the office and officers included in the Department". (44) McGee's comment was equally applicable to any period from 1859 to 1867.

McGee was not criticizing the legislation that gave the political representative control of the Department. This had been accepted. Rather,

he was attacking an attitude that had grown out of the system. For political control to be effective it must involve close consultation with the permanent and expert members of the staff. McGee also felt that the Commissioner and the staff together must be able to confirm the goal of the Department for the public good as defined within the broad policy set out by the administration. This was not the case. Rather each section seems to have gone its own way. The political head remained concerned primarily with those matters of partisan politics that impinged on the activities of the Department while the permanent staff, unable or unwilling to overcome the hurdles of politics, attempted to carry out the technical details of projects, without the interest or aid of the Commissioner, and without the power to give direction to works. In short, there seems to have been no coordination and a certain degree of sloppiness in the attitude towards public works. The permanent staff was unwilling to take on any responsibility and the Commissioner was uninterested, except so far as there might be political connotations. These factors were to result in a major scandal in the Department.

After years of rotating governments, it was finally decided that Canada should have a permanent capital. In 1857 the Canadian Parliament sent an Address to the Queen praying that she make the decision for the split and factious colonists. Her Majesty, no doubt aided by Sir Edmund Head, the Governor General, chose a small and somewhat crude lumber town on the Ottawa River. After further infighting, Parliament accepted the Queen's choice of Ottawa and it was left to the Department of Public Works to provide suitable buildings for the future capital of Canada. This was by far the largest construction of buildings that the Department had overseen, and it brought to the surface all the weaknesses of Public Works in this period.

On May 7, 1859, Public Works announced a competition, open to all qualified architects, for the parliamentary and departmental buildings that were to be constructed. For the next few weeks architects perused the maps at departmental Headquarters or wandered around the ordinance property, which so impressively dominated the city and overlooked both the Ottawa River and Rideau Canal. There was only one restriction so far as Public Works was concerned. The Parliament Buildings proper were not to exceed \$300,000 and the two departmental buildings were not to cost more than \$240,000 each. When Public Works awarded the competition to Thomas Fuller for the Parliament Buildings and to the firm of Stent and Laver for the departmental buildings, it made its first decision on the project and its first mistake. The plans were completely unrealistic for the price limits set by the Government.

After the architects had been chosen, tenders were let for the construction of the imposing "Civil Gothic" edifices that the plans called for. Thomas McGreevy of Quebec City obtained the contract for the Parliament Buildings, and Jones, Haycock and Company that for the departmental buildings. By the fall of 1859 a train of events had been set in motion that would result in increasing embarrassment to both the Department and the Government for several years. In spite of the confident statements of the administration, it became obvious as time passed that the only thing connected with the buildings that seemed to be showing any sign of progress was the expenditure of the Department. In 1861 M.L.A. Isidore

Thibaudeau made one of many motions requesting an investigation into the construction of the Parliament Buildings:

In 1857 this House voted the sum of \$900,000 for the erection of Public Buildings at Ottawa. That more than \$600,000 have already been expended, and it is nevertheless apparent that but little progress has been made with the buildings; That this House, in view of the above circumstances, deems it to be its duty to declare that when a certain amount has been appropriated by the Legislature for a particular purpose it is imperative to see that the amount expended does not exceed that placed at its disposal for such a purpose. (45)

The wording, practically, a vote of no confidence in the administration ensured the defeat of the motion. At the same time it was apparent that the sentiment against the project and the demand for an investigation would continue to grow.

In light of the opposition in Parliament and the Reform Party pledges during the 1862 election, it is not surprising that one of the first acts of the Macdonald-Sicotte government, after taking over from the Conservatives, was the institution of an investigation into the Ottawa project. The facts brought out by the resulting Commission, which sat through the summer of 1863, revealed errors of judgement or intent at practically every stage of the project. And the conclusions gave some credence to Killaly's objection to Alleyn's report in 1858, when he had warned that if Alleyn had his way the Assistant Commissioner would be but a "chief clerk, who would take no responsibility". (46) They equally indicated that there was some truth in D'Arcy McGee's criticism of the "one-man power".

Possibly the Department erred from the very beginning when it decided to ignore Governor General Head's warning to reject "any design which would probably exceed the prescribed cost". (47) With this decision to begin a project that was likely to exceed appropriation, the pattern had been set. The only reason that the project could begin at all was that firms like McGreevy's were willing to tender for it. Thomas Fuller, the architect for the Parliament Buildings, and one of the few exonerated by the Commission, stated that in conversation with departmental officials at the time "we all agreed that the work was taken at from 30 to 40 per cent below its value". (48) And it was reasonably clear, at least to Fuller and the Commission, that no contractor as experienced as McGreevy could have been so far wrong in his estimates.

Other things besides this suspicious offer clouded the McGreevy contract. His tender provided no itemized schedule of prices, something demanded by the 1859 Public Works Act. In spite of this he was awarded the contract over another firm, which, with a schedule, had tied in the tender. It would seem that McGreevy made his money not from the terms of the contract but from what he could charge for "extra and additional" work. This provided for work not set out as part of the contract but later found either necessary or desirable. McGreevy made the most of this loophole. Two sets of prices were set up, one for regular work and the other for "extra and additional". The differences were enormous. Rock excavation, for instance, nearly quadrupled in cost when it was "extra or additional". Here the contractor was aided by Keefer. As McGreevy had had no schedule, Fuller and Keefer had drawn one up, estimating the actual cost and then, to

fit the contract, subtracting 30 per cent on each item. However, as Fuller put it before the Committee "on the face of the schedule attached to Mr. McGreevy's contract, they were applicable to extra work as well as contract work, but I was informed by Mr. Keefer that it was a mistake". Keefer further told the architect "not to regard this schedule as applicable to extra or additional work". (49) It was by this combination of circumstances that McGreevy was able to achieve the seemingly irreconcilable ends of obtaining the contract by tender and then making profit.

Other problems developed. It was soon discovered that the plans had not made provision for heating. Ottawa winters being less than tropical, it was decided that this was a mistake and foundations already laid had to be altered at considerable cost. Questioned about this, Samuel Keefer could only reply that, had they waited for this to be included, the buildings would not have been begun until the summer of 1860. It would perhaps have been a reasonable wait but then very little to date had been done reasonably. The "patronage" appointment of a Clerk of the Works by John Rose, the Chief Commissioner, further aggravated matters. McGreevy was quite willing to take advantage of this man's laxness and soon added considerably to the cost by unnecessary work. The Parliament Buildings were well on their way to becoming a first-class scandal.

When the Department began to react to the problems that developed as an inevitable result of earlier mistakes, it took an impulsive and erratic course. The first investigation seems to have been towards the end of 1860 when John Page, the Chief Engineer, was sent to Ottawa. By the time he arrived, however, winter had set in and, since the works were still at the foundation stage and all was covered by snow, he was able to tell little. Next autumn the new Commissioner, Joseph Cauchon, brought Hamilton Killaly from his comfortable exile to investigate, but just about the time Killaly arrived in Ottawa, Cauchon suspended the works. The appropriation had been exhausted.

Cauchon's course was the most questionable of all. He took office only in June 1861 and within three months had accepted without question the warrants of the contractors to the tune of \$158,000. It should thus have been no surprise to him when the appropriations were quickly depleted. The Commission concluded that "he had without necessity exhausted the appropriation, and immediately assigned this circumstance as good reason for suspending the works". The problems and errors were numerous. The Commissioner, meeting with contradictory reports and unrecorded orders, could only conclude that something was indeed wrong and that this went beyond the bounds of honest error:

Everything appears fair, open, just but behind all is found a clandestine agreement that these schedules shall not be applied to extra or additional work, which no one avows as his act, but which has been carried into effect unjustly as regarded the other tenderers, and unjustly as regarded the public interests, as the event has shown. (50)

When things go as completely wrong as they did in the construction of the Parliament Buildings it is very difficult and dangerous to attempt to unravel the events and assign reasons or blame. Too many decisions seemed to be verbal, too many people gave contradictory testimony and too many had a share in the blame. The Commission, after wading through the events, was especially hard on Samuel Keefer. By his own admission he had known

there were a good many defects in the plans, yet he went ahead with the works. Consequently, his refusal to listen to the warning of the Governor General about the suitability of the plans and his part in allowing McGreevy to set up a two-price schedule certainly laid him open to blame.

There were other criticisms as well. The laxity of the Clerk of the Works and the criterion used for his appointment, the sloppiness of Stent and Laver as architects, and the way in which Killaly carried out his investigation in the fall of 1861 were seen as contributing factors. Also, there seems to have been a crucial lack of coordination between the political and deputy head of the Department. Cauchon, for instance, stated before the Commission, "When I had come into the Department I did not consult Mr. Keefer the Deputy Commissioner for I had no confidence in him." (51) Thus a man who had just arrived on the scene of a complex and technical situation did not bother to confer with his chief adviser, the person who should have been able to provide the background and technical expertise.

From these facts it is tempting to come to the conclusion that the Department had simply run once again into its age-old problem of irresponsibility to Parliament's mandate. This is certainly the conclusion of Hodgetts who wrote, "From the viewpoint of the administrative historian the affair of the Ottawa Buildings epitomized the failure of the Public Works Department to solve the two basic problems which have formed the theme of the foregoing analysis: overexpenditure and the conflict between the layman and the technician." (52) Nor can Hodgett's statement be quarreled with: there was overexpenditure, several hundred thousand dollars' worth of it, and as the statement by Cauchon clearly indicated, conflict did exist between the layman and technician.

Although the scandal had aspects reflective of the earlier history of the Department, it was in many ways quite different. In previous cases the problem had been that the permanent staff had ignored the political head or, as was the case before 1846, Parliament. In this instance the political heads were very much present and very much a part of the failure of the project. The Commission stated that it "was certain whoever made the agreement with McGreevy" with regard to the schedule, "it was carried out with the knowledge of both the Honourable Commissioner and the Deputy". Rose could also be cited for his appointment of the Clerk of the Works, on what was admitted to be a patronage basis and the consequent problems of supervision. Nor was Cauchon, with his distribution of money to the contractors in such a precipitous fashion, to be exonerated. In fact his action, while it may reflect a clash between the layman and technician, also represents something of recent origin - the danger of the "one-man power".

Every event connected to the construction of the buildings seems to lead to the conclusion that, from the time McGreevy got the contract through the vast outlay of funds by Cauchon, the permanent officials were lax and the political heads were quite possibly corrupt. Thomas McGreevy, the man who escaped most lightly from the investigation, and who was, incidentally, a powerful force in Cauchon's area of Quebec, seems to have been greatly favoured throughout by the Government. And, as events several years later were to show, he was not averse to swinging his political power and his pocketbook in the direction of his own construction firm.

With the acceptance of this possibility, the scandal over the Parliament Buildings can be interpreted more as a confluence of the new forces on the Department than of the old. To the laxity of Keefer and the

others involved must be added the lack of communication between officials and the ability of the Commissioner to act on his own. The Department had for the first time been charged not only with irresponsibility but with corruption. It was indicative of a new era, an era when a supposedly apolitical Civil Service was put under heavy pressure by the demands of politics. The presence of Samuel Keefer added to the problem: trained in the days of the Board of Works and under the rule of Hamilton Killaly, he neither understood nor was able to work with these new forces. By the time of Confederation the Government had paid out \$1,419,355 and the work was not complete. Most ironic of all, the McGreevy firm was still on the job.

The investigation cost Samuel Keefer his job. One of the last acts of the Macdonald-Sicotte government was to remove the Deputy Commissioner. As Chief Commissioner Maurice Laframboise put it, "from his knowledge he must say that Mr. Keefer does not fulfil the duties of his office to his satisfaction". (53) Nor was Keefer given the honourable exile that had been the fate of Killaly. His appointment as Railway Inspector was revoked at the same time as he was fired as Deputy Commissioner. The position was then offered to John Page, who perhaps noting the fate of those who had preceded him, refused. The 37-year-old Toussaint Trudeau, the man who had replaced Begley as Secretary in 1859, was then appointed Deputy Commissioner. (54)

Samuel Keefer's dismissal marked the exit of the last of the old guard who had dominated Public Works since its inception. Killaly, recently dismissed from his position in the West, was living in semi-retirement in Toronto. Begley had finally been removed from the Government payroll and was to die within a few years, still embittered by the treatment he had received at the hands of the Government. William Hamilton Merritt had died in his hometown, St. Catharines, a few years before. In their place, as the Province of Canada contemplated Confederation, was a new and able team. People like Toussaint Trudeau, John Page and others not yet heard from, men who both accepted political control and understood the problems inherent in it, were to lead the Department into the new and greater responsibilities of the years following Confederation.

CHAPTER 5

THE PROJECTS OF CONFEDERATION

On July 1, 1867, the British North America Act came into effect. The three former colonies - Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick - now became four provinces known collectively as the Dominion of Canada. This constitutional alteration had effects in all areas of government, not the least of which was the Department of Public Works. The three colonies, each with its own demands and needs, each in a different state of development and with little connection to the others, were to place great new demands for public works on the Department.

The differing characteristics of these former colonies and their isolation from each other were recognized by the politicians involved. A.T. Galt, Canada's financial wizard, had admitted in 1865 that "inter-colonial trade has been indeed of the most insignificant character". (1) And although Galt was hopeful for the future, opponents of Confederation were not. They argued instead that the products of the two areas* were most easily marketable not to each other but to the United States. (2) The economic and fiscal problems that existed at the time of Confederation were to have a major effect on the course of the Department of Public Works in the coming years. Without inferring that these were the only forces behind Confederation, it is worthwhile to look at the state of this new nation in brief terms, and specifically at the fiscal and developmental questions inherent in the Confederation project. These were the forces that the new Government and the Department's employees had to face in planning their future policies.

The Province of Canada, divided in 1867 into its older geographical areas and named Ontario and Quebec, dominated the new nation. With a population of 2,648,000, it was by far the largest of the colonies; it was also the wealthiest. Industrial diversification, though still in its early stages, had

* i.e. the maritime Provinces and the Province of Canada.

begun and was adding to the previous sources of wealth - timber and wheat. Railways, like the Grand Trunk running from Rivière-du-Loup to Sarnia, testified to the development that had taken place in the last two decades. The Province of Canada was in the 1860s an ambitious and expansionist colony. Some 4,122,141 tons of goods cleared outward from its inland ports in 1867. Powerful metropolitan centres like Toronto and Montreal were experiencing the effects of growth and their entrepreneurs were casting about in search of new hinterlands to capture and new markets to exploit. (3) At the governmental level the Province of Canada, for all its problems, was to set the tone of Confederation. Its Civil Service, political parties and parliamentary organization had reached a relatively sophisticated level by 1867. Municipal organization, first introduced there by Sydenham, was much more advanced than in the Maritimes and was to form the basis for future organization. (4) Confident of its hegemony, assertive in its commerce, and most beleaguered in its constitutional and political arenas, the Province of Canada was the prime mover behind Confederation.

Nova Scotia, with its face to the sea, had a greater commercial connection with the ports of Europe and New England than with Canada. Creighton has accurately described the colony as one of "sailors, fishermen and small traders". (5) Fishing - comprising almost 40 per cent of the colony's total exports - was the dominant economic resource of this colony of 364,000 people. (6) Mines such as those in the Cobequid range were pointed to as signs of the future, but the Province had nevertheless achieved neither the industrial base nor the diversification of Canada. Yet although the colony would cede Canada dominance in terms of wealth and population, it would not do so in terms of moral climate and loyalty to the mother country. Canada was seen as "americanized", a colony infamous for its rebellions of 1837, its political squabbles and scandals. If Nova Scotia had ambitions beyond the confines of the colony, they were directed at Britain and at various schemes of a closer Imperial connection. To join their future with this strange and distant colony and thereby make more remote the ties to Britain was distasteful to a good many Nova Scotians. The Halifax Morning Chronicle, Nova Scotia's most powerful newspaper, greeted Dominion Day with the black edging of mourning. (7)

New Brunswick, the third colony in the new Dominion, was dominated both physically and economically by its vast forests. Lumber provided its main export and set its political tone. The population of 271,000 centred on the rivers of the colony and the whole was dominated by the city of St. John. Also the outlook of New Brunswick was influenced by the legacy left by the founders of the colony. Created as a refuge for Loyalists after the American Revolution, New Brunswick retained some of the flavour of this conservative group with its own claims of loyalty to Empire and moral superiority. Municipal government was almost non-existent, and political parties more a collection of loose groupings than sophisticated organizations or representatives of ideological differences. With lumber as the main export of New Brunswick, it is not surprising that there were doubts that this province and Canada would ever develop a mutually beneficial trade. Their economies seemed competitive rather than complementary and, like Nova Scotia, New Brunswick looked to Europe and New England, not to Canada.

Among the various forces behind Confederation there were, however, certain things common to all the colonies. Finances and debt had not disappeared as a problem in British North America. Canada and the other colonies had departed from the laissez-faire attitude common to governments of the age to develop much-needed transportation facilities. Between 1790 and 1867, the Province of Canada alone had spent \$39,945,000 on public works. (8) Loan guarantees and other support was extended to private railroad companies in addition to this. The total expenditure came to \$60,210,600 - a huge sum for such a small colony. (9) And although Canada provided the most dramatic example of expenditure on public works, Nova Scotia, with 145 miles of railway from Halifax to Truro, and New Brunswick with its St.-John-to-Shediac line, had also burdened the provincial revenues for the sake of development of public works.

Such heavy expenditures had, as in the 1830s, pushed colonial finances to a precarious state. The 1857 depression had revealed the overextension of many railway lines and the London money market was, in 1866, still wary of Canadian credit. Equally important, debt charges in all three provinces were draining a high percentage of provincial revenue and inhibiting further development. In Canada some 31 per cent of government expenditure went to meet debt charges, in New Brunswick the figure was 29 per cent and in Nova Scotia 18 per cent. (10) As one financial historian has noted, "About 40 per cent of the expenditure and about three quarters of the debt of the British North American colonies to Confederation" had been incurred in the construction of transportation works. (11) Both New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were in the position of desiring but not being able to afford further railway development. Canada, tied to the St. Lawrence system on which so much had been staked and to a vast railway system, was equally in need of funds.

The development of transportation facilities had played a major part in burdening the three colonies with a total net debt of \$91,169,000. (12) Confederation was in part an attempt to meet the problems imposed by limited capital and revenue bases and by the large debt that existed in the three colonies.* And - among the factors that had contributed to the formation of the particular financial situation the colonies faced in 1867 - "expenditures on canals and borrowings to finance private railway companies therefore exerted a greater influence than any other single factor on government finance prior to Confederation". (13)

If one side of the coin was the formerly acquired financial burden, the other was the desire to continue to expand facilities in the future. Insofar as fiscal and developmental factors were an influence in Confederation the positive would seem to have been more important than the negative. W.L. Morton has noted that from 1857 on the Province of Canada felt a need "to extend eastward to a winter port not in American hands and westward to new areas of trade and settlement". Walter Shanly, the former engineer for the Department of Public Works, set out the challenge for Canada during

* The connection between debt and interest in Confederation is well indicated by the example of Prince Edward Island, which, debt-free and uninterested in Confederation in 1867, soon yielded to the temptations of the railway age, burdened itself in debt and entered Confederation in 1873.

the debates on Confederation. Canada has a great destiny, Shanly argued, "but we cannot fulfill our destiny - or the destiny of this country rather - by standing still in the market place; by, as one honourable member has suggested, doing nothing to improve our natural highways or creating artificial ones, trusting to fortune or to Providence for the development of our resources". (14) The filling of the good farmland of Canada, the attempt of the canals and railways to capture the trade of the United States, and the commercial ambitions of Toronto and Montreal, all indicated the pattern of Canadian expansionist ambitions. Clause 69 of the Address to the Queen that originated in the Quebec Conference and was eventually passed by the Canadian Parliament referred specifically to this expansion: "The communication with the North-Western Territory, and the improvements required for the development of the Trade of the Great West with the seaboard, are regarded by this conference as subjects of highest importance." (15)

Alexander Mackenzie, the rising Reform member of the coalition government and a future Prime Minister, saw a close connection between the canals of the St. Lawrence and the future of the hinterland of central Canada. "I think it is absolutely necessary for the prosperity of the colony", he argued, "that our canal connection with the upper lakes should be perfected as early as possible". (16) Galt, in the same set of debates, gave an optimistic vision of the future prosperity of the Dominion and of the trade that would develop between the central and eastern sections. Reviewing the facts on the West and the St. Lawrence, he commented that "we may well look forward to our future with hopeful anticipation of seeing the realization, not of what we hitherto thought would be the commerce of Canada, great as that may become, but to the possession of Atlantic ports, which we shall help to build up to a position equal to that of the chief cities of the American Union". (17) Connection with the East would balance expansion to the West to create a more prosperous Canada. For their part the Maritimes, or at least those Maritimers who supported Confederation, looked to a broader financial base to allow them further development, to connection with the markets of central Canada, and a stronger government to further their interests abroad.

While emphasizing the fact that these were not the only forces, and perhaps not even the major ones, pushing British North America towards Confederation, one is nevertheless struck by a certain resemblance of this situation to the events in 1840 surrounding the Union of the Canadas. Financial pressures, the result of heavy expenditure on public works, once again created problems for the colonies. At the same time the demands continued to be strong for further development and for the expansion of facilities to ensure the continued growth of the colonies. As a result, heavy expenditure could be predicted for the future. In both cases a political alteration, the amalgamation of previously separate colonies to give a more viable financial base, provided a solution. The events of 1840 led to the creation of the Board of Works to meet the increased demands for construction of canals, roads and other facilities. Confederation paved the way for a series of new projects, which placed new duties and pressures on the Department of Public Works.

By 1867 the Department of Public Works of the Province of Canada had gone a long way in the development of set practices and structures of responsibility and authority. The 1859 reforms had resulted in the assertion of political control over the Department and a much clearer line of command. The Audit Act of 1864 and other measures external to the

department itself had provided a better if not perfect system of expenditure and accounting. The events surrounding the construction of the Parliament Buildings had completed a changeover in staff that had been under way since the late 1850s. Toussaint Trudeau, the Deputy Minister, and John Page, the Chief Engineer, headed the permanent staff of a department that had been dedicated for a quarter of a century to one general goal. Chapais, in the last Annual Report before the Department undertook a new set of duties, summarized this previous strategy of development:

It is evident that those who designed the Public Works of Canada, besides desiring to provide for the immediate wants of the country, had also in view the prospects of the western trade, and carried their plans out on such a scale as in their estimation, would be commensurate with its requirements, fully confident that whatever might be the energy and ingenuity displayed by our neighbours in their artificial contrivances, the natural advantages possessed by the St. Lawrence would, in the end, assert its superiority. (18)

The belief in the St. Lawrence as a transportation route had certainly dominated the thinking of those responsible for public works over the last decades. On the basis of this belief the Department had overseen the expenditure of millions of dollars to improve the facilities of the Province of Canada. Although \$12,739,783.89 had been spent on canals alone between 1840 and 1867, (19) it would be misleading to see canals as the only work of the Department. The passage of time had brought other needs of the colony to the attention of the Government. The St. Lawrence strategy dominated the thinking of the Department but it was not its only concern. Overall, the Department of Public Works had expended \$30,099,616.48 on various projects between the Union and Confederation. A breakdown of the figures gives not only some idea of the relative importance of the different works but an idea of the source of the large Canadian debt in 1867.

Expenditure on Public Works 1840-1867 (20)

	\$	%
St. Lawrence navigation	12,739,783.89	42.3
Other canal systems	1,520,093.21	5.0
Navigable rivers	28,354.33	.1
Harbours and piers	1,702,724.59	5.7
Lighthouses, beacons and buoys	1,002,780.42	3.3
Trinity Board lighthouses	112,635.17	.4
Slides, dams, piers and booms	1,261,510.00	4.2
Roads	3,834,508.66	12.7
Bridges	560,285.08	1.9
Public buildings	7,031,157.23	23.4
Provincial vessels	305,784.40	1.0

In all these areas and in new ones, the new Dominion of Canada would continue to expand facilities to aid the development of the country. Public Works would continue to prove the exception to the rule of laissez-faire government throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century.

Under the new Dominion it was deliberately provided that federal control of public works should be broadly defined. Schedule 3 of the British North America Act provided that the great majority of public works in

existence - canals, roads of a national nature, railroad holdings and other works - should become the property of the general government. (21) Local works would go to the provincial governments and thus relieve the Department of a burden that, as indicated by the experience of roads in the 1840s, it had no desire to assume. On the other hand, as John A. Macdonald explained, "it is provided that all lines of steam or other ships, railways, canals and other works, connecting any two or more of the provinces together or extending beyond the limits of any province, shall belong to the General Government". Moreover, and extremely important, any work within a province, considered to be of national importance, would become the property of the federal Government as well. "For instance," continued Macdonald, "the Welland Canal, though lying wholly within one section, and the St. Lawrence Canals in two only, may be properly considered national works, and for the benefit of the whole federation." (22) Thus federal control over future major development projects was assured, and the new Dominion's Department of Public Works came into existence with considerable assets. The decision to make the federal Department paramount was consistent with the belief that the Dominion, as opposed to the provinces, should be the dominant power in the new nation. The position of Public Works in Canada was thus set in contrast to the state-based position of works in the United States.

The Act creating a Department of Public Works for the new Dominion of Canada was given assent on December 21, 1867. Its basic model was the 1859 Act of the Province of Canada for the same department. (23) The internal structure remained basically the same with a Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary and Chief Engineer specifically defined by the Act. It also provided for such other officers "as may be necessary" for the business of the Department. To minimize dislocation as a result of the constitutional changes, it was also provided in the act that any contracts undertaken by Departments of Public Works in Canada or Boards of Works in Nova Scotia or New Brunswick would remain in force. (24) The nature of the act indicates that in terms of general structure the Province of Canada seemed satisfied with its existing act and that the provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were willing to accept that structure.

The similarity of the 1867 Act to the one of 1859, combined with the decision to retain most of the assets of the old provincial department for the federal Government meant that there was less of an alteration in the makeup of the Department than might have been expected from Confederation. The personnel of the new Dominion department fortified this characteristic. With Toussaint Trudeau as Deputy Minister, John Page as Chief Engineer and Frederick Braun as Secretary, the two new provinces seem at first to have had little impact on the Department of Public Works. There was more or less a direct line from the Department in the Province of Canada to its counterpart in the new Dominion.

There were, however, some changes. The creation of a Department of Marine and Fisheries to deal with the greatly increased problems of water transport, coastal trade and fishing removed certain functions from Public Works. The care and management of lighthouses, for instance, a duty that Public Works had long wished to transfer, was put under this new department. A later Order-in-Council also transferred to Marine and Fisheries the responsibility for all lighthouse construction under \$10,000. (25) This transfer of authority, trivial in itself, was a significant precedent. Until

Confederation, the Department of Public Works had been responsible for all government construction. Now, without much thought for rational jurisdiction or implications for the future, this authority was being divided. Public Works, still focused on the great transportation works, was not concerned with this small impingement. Nevertheless the transfer of lighthouse construction was an alteration of their mandate and a confusion of it, a confusion that became apparent only in later years.

A second change in the 1867 Act was the increased attention paid to the service function of the Department. As has been indicated, Public Works saw itself as a transportation agency responsible for those works connected directly to the Canadian economy. The responsibility for the construction and maintenance of public buildings had simply fallen to the Department because there was no other suitable government agency. In the 1867 Act, however, it was provided that "all public works and buildings hereafter constructed or completed at the expense of Canada shall, unless otherwise specified by law, be under the control of the Department and subject to the provisions of this Act," (26) and further provided that "maintenance and repair" of said public works would likewise remain the responsibility of the Department. (27) Thus some *de jure* recognition and some definition was given to a practice extant in the Province of Canada from the time that Hamilton Killaly had taken the responsibility for transforming the Kingston hospital into a legislature in 1841.

In spite of the changes that brought increased recognition of the service functions of the Department, transportation development remained its major responsibility in 1867. The increased territory for which the Department was responsible simply added to the demands placed on it, without ending the belief that it could play a major role so that Canada would, "under the impulse of the new political organization, soon attain the position to which she is entitled". (28) There was thus a strong legacy from the old provincial department in terms of mission and orientation as well as in structure and personnel.

Confederation itself determined one immediate project that would be handled by the Department of Public Works. Section 145 of the British North America Act gave the Maritimes assurance that one of their demands would be met:

Inasmuch as the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have joined in a declaration that the construction of the Intercolonial Railway is essential to the Confederation of the Union of British North America, and to the assent thereto of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and have consequently agreed that Provision should be made for its immediate construction by the Government of Canada: Therefore, in order to give effect to that agreement, it shall be the duty of the Government of Canada to provide for the commencement within six months after the Union, of a railway connecting the river St. Lawrence with the City of Halifax in Nova Scotia. (29)

As the language of the clause makes clear, the provision for the construction of the Intercolonial Railway was the particular demand of the Maritimes on Confederation. The insistence of these provinces that this agreement be inserted in a constitutional act, over the objections of Macdonald, is also significant. The insistence reveals the distrust with

which the Maritimes viewed Canada on this question, a distrust springing from 1862 when Canada reneged on a similar agreement. (30)

In Nova Scotia and New Brunswick then, the Intercolonial was a central feature of the public works development and an essential feature of Confederation. In Canada, with the investment in the St. Lawrence and access to an ice-free port through Portland, Maine, there was much less commercial enthusiasm. Many felt that Canadian development strategy should focus either on the canals or on the Northwest. The Intercolonial, however, was recognized as a part of Confederation and even those who remained dubious about its value accepted it as such. George Brown, admitting that "the Intercolonial has not, I apprehend, any considerable merit" as a commercial enterprise, nevertheless argued that "as a work of defence it has, however, many advocates". Most important to Brown was the fact that "if the union of the provinces is to go on, it is an absolute necessity; and as the price of union, were there no other argument in its favour, I heartily go for it". (31) Walter Shanly, for all his interest in development of the St. Lawrence and other projects, had even greater doubts about the commercial viability of the Intercolonial. He warned that "it offers no material for a flattering prospectus; we could not invite it to the attention of European capitalists as presenting an eligible investment for their surplus funds. But for the establishing of those intimate social and commercial relations indispensable to political unity between ourselves and the sister provinces, the railway is a necessity". (32) The views of Brown and Shanly probably reflected the majority opinion of Canada. The Intercolonial would be built for the sake of Confederation and not for the traffic it might bear.

With the construction of the railway the Government of Canada would break from its former policy of not becoming involved in the construction of railways. Of course, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick had no such precedent and a part of the Intercolonial system would come from the railways already built by those colonies. (33) In taking this monumental step, the Department of Public Works was assuming obligations for a single project that would cost more than all the canals constructed to date. It was a sign of both the desire for Confederation and the optimism of the politicians of the Province of Canada that they would accept such an enormous task.

In actual fact, work on the surveys for the Intercolonial had been proceeding for some time. The Canadian Government, having prevented any possibility of beginning immediate construction in 1862, did agree to appoint and pay for a survey of the proposed routes. This token gesture to the Maritimes resulted in the appointment in the summer of 1863 of Sandford Fleming by the Canadian Government, with the understanding that the Maritimes and Imperial governments would also submit representatives. Fleming was, however, acceptable to all; one by one, the governments named him as their engineer as well. The Duke of Newcastle, the Colonial Secretary, wrote that as a result of the combined appointments, "much delay has been avoided" and "I am quite ready to avail myself of his services as the representative of the Imperial Government". (34) Thus by the fall of 1863 at least something had been salvaged of the earlier project for an Intercolonial Railroad. Not the least of the positive points in the situation was the person appointed to the position of Chief Surveyor, who would later become the railroad's Chief Engineer.

Sandford Fleming, a Scot who had immigrated some twenty years before, was to prove Canada's most famous engineer of the nineteenth century. Energetic, capable and ambitious, he was interested in all scientific questions, had been instrumental in the formation of the Canadian Institute of Toronto and had worked as both a surveyor and engineer on the Northern Railroad from Toronto to Collingwood. (35) Future years would see him become the advocate of Standard time and knighted for his scientific efforts. Fleming was also an ardent supporter of the British connection and has been termed a "servant of the dream of the All-Red Route", a concept that would have developed an around-the-world Imperial transportation and telegraph system. (36) A railway like the Intercolonial thus had the ardent support of Fleming, who could always see it as another step in the connection of the parts of the Empire. The combination of ability and zeal was a happy one and the governments involved never seem to have regretted the appointment.

With the appointment finalized, Fleming spent the winter of 1863-64 traversing the wilderness areas of New Brunswick on exploratory surveys. There were essentially three major routes to be considered. The general route was determined through Nova Scotia and to the completed New Brunswick line at Shediac. From that point on there were several possibilities. First, there was what was known as the Frontier Route. This would have followed a line from the St. John end of the New Brunswick railway more or less parallel to the international boundary. Second was the Central Route, which was actually a series of possibilities. As the name implies, the general characteristic of these routes was a line through the centre of New Brunswick, probably passing through Fredericton. The third possibility was the Northern or Chaleur Bay Route. Rather than use directly the constructed portion of the New Brunswick railway, this line would continue from Shediac in a line parallel to the North Shore of New Brunswick, touching the ocean at Chaleur Bay, continuing to the St. Lawrence and then running parallel to that river to Rivière-du-Loup where connection could be made with the Grand Trunk. (37) As was always the case with railway lines, many interests were involved and each could give reasons for the construction of their particular choice. The relative commercial positions of St. John and Halifax, various inland settlements in New Brunswick and numerous political fortunes rested on the route chosen.

By 1865, Fleming had his own favourite route. His report of February 9, 1865, argued for the Chaleur Bay Route. He argued that from the point of view of defence, this line, far removed from the American border, was the best. With the American Civil War just coming to an end and bad relations having arisen between Britain and the United States from such events as the Trent incident, defence was an important consideration. The British Government had experienced the problem of intercolonial communication when it had transported troops overland from New Brunswick to Canada in 1862. It had been made acutely aware of the fact that difficulty of communication between the Maritimes and Canada in the winter months made for a very vulnerable spot in British North American defences. Since it was hoped that the British Government would help to pay for the Intercolonial and since the British could justify paying for the railroad only as a defence project, this was an important factor.

Fleming probably attached more weight to the other arguments in favour of the Northern Route. The Intercolonial, he felt, would survive not

on local but on through traffic. This, of course, fitted in well with his concept of an Imperial communication system, and the Northern Route was most suited for such traffic. Also, a potential ocean port at Chaleur Bay could cut down considerably the distance from the factories of England to the markets of Canada. (38) Fleming's position was clear, but such an important matter went far beyond technical questions, as Fleming's own report indicated, and would be decided not by the Chief Engineer but by his political superiors.

It was against this background that the Intercolonial became a part of the Confederation of British North America in 1867. The subject had been long talked about, had engendered bitterness between colonies and met numerous delays. However, by 1867 the exploratory surveys were more or less completed and it was now a question of obtaining authorization for the railroad and permission to begin location of the line. As Confederation approached, things began to move quickly. In April 1867 the British Government passed the essential loan guarantee and as in 1840 underwrote the Canadian expansion that was a part of the political alteration. This act provided for a loan guarantee of three million pounds sterling and gave the as yet non-existent Canadian Government the financial means necessary to begin construction. (39) The route remained a problem, however, and the political wrangles were far from over. In July 1867 one of the first actions of the new Dominion Government was to give Fleming permission to begin location of the line in the less controversial area between Rivière-du-Loup and Truro, where the Intercolonial would join the Nova Scotian railway system at Amherst. (40)

A third major step was taken towards the end of the year when Canada passed an enabling Act for the Intercolonial, setting out the format for its construction. The structure of authority was complex. Fearing the potential political disputes of such a work, by far the largest undertaken to date, the Government inserted another layer of authority between itself and the Chief Engineer. The Act provided that rather than be directly under the Minister of Public Works, construction would be supervised by four Commissioners appointed by the Governor-in-Council. (41) These commissioners, as yet unnamed, would have responsibility for management and supervision of the railway "until completed" and would have, with one exception, hiring and firing powers over the staff. (42) The exception was the Chief Engineer, who would also be appointed by the Governor-in-Council. (43)

Although the purpose of the Act was fairly clear, there were several ambiguities. The first and most obvious of these were that both the Intercolonial Railway Commission and the Chief Engineer derived their authority directly from the Government. Thus, although the Commissioners might be nominally superior to Fleming in terms of the Act, the engineer, who was responsible for the state of construction and had his professional reputation at stake, had a strong claim to independence. Second, the relation of the Commissioners to the Department of Public Works was vague. In early 1868, during a supply debate, the new Minister of Public Works, William McDougall, disagreed with Reform M.P. Luther Holton, who saw the Department as having no place in the construction of the railroad. "Even as regarding the Intercolonial Railway," said the Minister, "the Commissioner for that work would have to act under the control of the department." (44) Yet the records of the early years of the construction of the railroad indicate that Public Works, when it dealt at all with the

Intercolonial, gave the Commissioners great freedom to form and implement policy. The Commissioners themselves seemed inclined to appeal to the Prime Minister or to the Cabinet as a whole rather than accept the authority of the particular Minister of Public Works. The ambiguities of the Act were to cause numerous problems and conflicts over the next few years. In the end it is questionable whether the creation of a Board of Commissioners was a benefit or a detriment to the smooth construction of the Intercolonial.

Throughout the spring of 1868, debate continued on the question of the route for the railway. Finally, in July 1868 Fleming's position was adopted and the Chaleur Bay Route selected. The presence in England of Charles Tupper, Fleming's main political ally, and of Fleming himself, may have allowed them to discreetly remind the British Government of its interest in the issue. (45) Certainly the Colonial Secretary "received with much satisfaction a telegraphic message from the Governor General, by which it appears the Bay of Chaleurs line has been selected by the Canadian Government". (46) As Sandford Fleming crossed the Atlantic on his way back to Canada towards the end of July, he must have felt that at last things would begin to move quickly.

There was one more delay, however. The Commissioners of the Intercolonial had not yet been appointed and until they were, tenders could not be put out and contracts let. With the location of the line proceeding quickly, Fleming was understandably anxious to begin work. Through the late summer and autumn he spent a good deal of time in Ottawa, where he conferred with McDougall and Macdonald on the problems of the line. On these visits he never missed an opportunity to urge the quick appointment of the Commissioners or, failing this, a pro tem Commissioner, which would have allowed him to proceed to actual construction. (47) Finally, in December 1868, the actual appointments were made. Aquila Walsh was named Chairman and the contingent was completed with E.B. Chandler of New Brunswick, Charles Brydges, formerly of the Grand Trunk, and after a short while, A.W. McLelan of Nova Scotia. By February 1869 tenders were out and by April several contracts for grading and bridging had been let. (48) The construction of the Intercolonial was finally under way. Fleming, however, had already learned that the appointment of the Commissioners had far from ended his problems.

To understand the controversies of the following years it is necessary to remember that Fleming's main interest was the successful completion of the railway. He knew that he, more than any other individual, was responsible for the Intercolonial and that his reputation rested on the quality of the railway he constructed; and he was unwilling to let political or engineering decisions made from the outside compromise his position. When, for instance, the Government planned to buy out a line from Painsec to Amherst that the New Brunswick Government had already begun, Fleming objected vehemently. Estimating that the Intercolonial could be completed for \$20 million if efficiently located and constructed, he complained that the New Brunswick portion under construction was neither.

If, however, the line be twisted and warped from the best position to serve local interests it will not be possible to form any reliable estimate of what the expenditure will ultimately come to. It appears necessary that I should allude to this in expressing at your request an opinion as to

the sufficiency of the appropriation ... because between Moncton and Amherst the line advocated by the local authorities and adopted by a contracting firm is not only less favourable in an engineering point of view but it is actually from 21 to 35 per cent longer than the line which ought to be constructed. (49)

At the same time Fleming was not unrealistic or inflexible in the world of politics. He knew how to work with politicians and was, for instance, amenable to patronage. Writing to Peter Mitchell, the Minister of Marine and Fisheries, he noted, "You can imagine that I have been pretty well pressed to find positions for such lads as you write about; for some weeks back Dr. Tupper and Mr. Archibald had many friends whom they wished to oblige and I have more now than I really need, although I shall endeavour to make them useful in some way." (50) Fleming was neither a Thomas Begley nor a Samuel Keefer. He did not refuse to accept authority or responsibility when his superiors began to advocate things that he opposed. On the other hand, he was aware of the need for compromise and political realism. If the integrity of the line was not at stake, then he accepted without qualms such political dictates as patronage in minor positions. When, however, he felt that the efficiency of the railroad was being affected he stated his position. In some cases, such as the Moncton-Amherst line, he lost: the New Brunswick contract was bought out for \$894,000; (51) in others, he won.

The long-awaited first meeting between the Commissioners and the Chief Engineer finally took place in St. John on December 29 and 30, 1868. The two sides soon found themselves in disagreement on issues that were to be points of contention for several years. The first problem was over the method of contracting. The Commissioners supported, and had the authority to impose, a lump-sum form of contract. The contractor would tender for a section at a lump sum and benefit if there was less work than had been thought, although he would be hurt if there was more. Fleming, who was most aware of the knowledge on which the estimates had been based, felt that the figures were too rough for such a method and argued for a piecework format. This would have set a price per unit of digging, masonry work or whatever and allowed the contractor to claim on that basis, so that the work could proceed with less uncertainty for the contractors. Conversely, it would have made it more difficult for the Government to retain control over the final cost.

Shortly after the first meetings both sides took their case to the Prime Minister. Fleming argued that the varying terrain and the wild nature of much of the country made it impossible to estimate accurately the total cost or exact nature of the work to be done on a section. To base the contracts on the assumption that an accurate estimate was possible was simply to open the gate for future trouble. Also - perhaps remembering the unhappy experience of the Department with the same type of contract as the ones let for the Parliament Buildings - Fleming emphasized that "it leaves no room for extras, because all work done is done at rates fixed by contract, and is paid for at the prices agreed upon". (52) The Commissioners, of course, had their own point of view and were equally adept at pressing their case. (53) The Commissioners, in this case, carried their point of view, and the contracts were let on a lump-sum basis. As Fleming's biographer points out, however, the failure of five of the first seven

contracts let, and that within twelve months, indicated that perhaps Fleming had a more realistic understanding of the situation. (54)

The inability of the contractors to live up to the terms of their agreement for construction was a major problem throughout the construction of the Intercolonial. The nature of the country traversed, the magnitude of the project and the troubles inherent in the nature of the contracts themselves all helped to create these problems. The wide variance in the value of tender submissions revealed the uncertainty with which the contractors approached the Intercolonial. Contract tenders for the first section, for instance, ranged between \$175,000 and \$700,000, and the others were not much different. (55)

Once construction was under way contractors were often kept afloat only by the most generous interpretations of their work. Fleming, writing to fellow-engineer C.S. Ross in 1869, warned that "the contractors complain that all previous certificates were insufficient to pay for the expenditure made by them on each respective contract". (56) The letter was not unusual and generally the Commissioners, Fleming and the Government worked together not to keep payments to contractors down, but to be generous to the contractors to prevent them from defaulting. By 1873 Fleming estimated that, on the basis of work actually done, the contractors had been overpaid by more than \$980,000. (57) Even this generosity did not prevent failures and in the end, of the twenty-three contracts let between Riviere-du-Loup and Truro, only four were completed by the original contractors at the original prices. Nine contracts had to be completed by day-labour directly under Fleming. It is a testimony to the skill of the engineer that the railway was completed, in spite of all the problems, for \$21,569,136.79, only 7 per cent above Fleming's original estimate. (58)

The other major disagreement that arose at that first meeting between Fleming and the Commissioners was whether bridges should be built of iron or wood. Fleming, looking for permanence argued for the former, while the Commissioners, in the interests of cheaper construction, argued for the latter. In this dispute the Chief Engineer was on strong ground. Bridges were very much a technical question, and even given economy as a primary goal Fleming could argue that cheaper maintenance would eventually more than make up for the additional initial cost. However, the Commissioners were not willing to concede the point and the dispute began to move through the same channels as the one on contracts. Writing to T.C. Clarke in August 1869, Fleming complained, "I have tried my best to convince them that iron is in the long run cheaper than wood, but if I have made any impression it is not sufficient to change their determination to have all bridges large and small of wood." (59) What is more, the Government seemed inclined to continue to support the decision of the Commissioners and on July 7, 1870, it was again stated by Cabinet that wooden bridges should be used. (60)

Fleming's main opponent in this conflict seems to have been Brydges who, with his railroad experience, could justly claim to be able to make as good a judgement as the Chief Engineer on the matter. As the dispute continued, however, with Fleming seemingly gaining little ground, Brydges pushed his case too far. Submitting a memorandum in September 1870, the Commissioner stated that there was no danger that wooden bridges would catch fire and that no case could be made for iron bridges on such a basis. Fleming did not miss the opportunity that Brydges gave him and replied by

citing two very recent instances where wooden bridges on the Grand Trunk Railroad had in fact been destroyed by fire. (61) This exchange seems to have turned the tide in Fleming's favour. In January 1871 Fleming was given permission to construct all bridges over 60 feet of iron. (62) In May of the same year the size was reduced to 20 feet. In this case the Chief Engineer won the day and all but three bridges on the Intercolonial were eventually built of iron.

For all the problems and disputes, trouble with contracts and contractors, the Intercolonial made steady progress. At the end of 1870 the section between the New Brunswick border and Amherst was opened. (63) Other sections soon followed. In November 1872 with the assumption of more of the Nova Scotia lines and the New Brunswick line there was a rail connection between Saint John and Halifax. By the end of 1873 Fleming could write that the "Intercolonial Railway is now approaching completion." (64) In fact, problems in the New Brunswick district delayed the final opening until July 1, 1876. Sanford Fleming, by then immersed in a new and even greater project, the Canadian Pacific Railway, must still have allowed himself a moment's pride when, on July 6 of that year, the first train from Halifax arrived at Quebec City.

With the completion of the Intercolonial, the Government owned and was responsible for the operation of several hundred miles of railways. In the planning stages there had been some talk of turning the lines over to a private company for operation. A beginning was made in this direction in 1872 when the Rivière-du-Loup to Trois-Pistoles section of the Intercolonial was put under the Grand Trunk. Certainly there was a great deal of apprehension in both political parties when it came to the concept of a government-operated railway. In December 1867, while the Intercolonial bill was under discussion in Parliament, a present and a future Minister of Public Works came close to agreement on this question. Alexander Mackenzie argued that "the proper mode of dealing with these works (railways) was to get rid of them altogether". William McDougall did not disagree but felt that "it would be necessary for the Government to retain possession of the railways until the Intercolonial was built and the whole chain of communication completed" and that "it would then be time enough to decide what course to take with respect to them". He then added his personal opinion that "working railways was not a function of government under ordinary circumstances". (65)

Had McDougall thought about it, he would have realized that in terms of government as defined at the time, a good many of the public works of Canada were not a proper "function of government". The same factors and needs that had determined that the St. Lawrence system would be built and operated publicly also determined that the Intercolonial would remain so. Alexander Mackenzie was Prime Minister when the Intercolonial was finished, but at the end of his administration it was as much government-owned and operated as ever.

The simple fact was, as George Brown had stated back in 1865, that the Intercolonial had been built for political reasons and not for profit. It could not then and it could not in 1876 attract private capital. Canada had needed the Intercolonial and yet the Intercolonial was not a viable project financially. Thus, once again private enterprise gave way to public works. Such a conclusion does not, however, imply that the Intercolonial was a wasted expenditure. The railway had been built for political reasons and

must be judged on those grounds. Sandford Fleming, the man who had been most connected with it, summed up the purpose of the railway from his point of view. "The Intercolonial Railway," he said, "owes its existence to the Dominion, although it may be said that neither could have been consummated without the other." Using this as his basis, Fleming judged the Intercolonial a success:

It is the railway which brings the Maritimes into connection with central Canada. At each extremity of the wilderness ... were found separate communities, each with sentiment that all had interests in common ... yet all were denied means of intercommunication, and were unable to unite for a common purpose. There is no longer an unpenetrated wilderness to bar the hopes of realizing all the profits of union. (66)

His final official sentence about the railway with which he had been connected with for twelve years reveals the character of the man who was in his own way always as much a politician as an engineer. "On this day July 1, 1876", Fleming concluded, "may be chronicled the full consummation of the union of the British Provinces in North America." (67)

The Quebec Resolutions and the Confederation debates revealed that the political heads of Canada were looking not only to a greater connection between the established colonies but also at expansion westward into the territories controlled by the Hudson's Bay Company. These lands, the subject of rising interest in British North America from 1857 on, were seen by Canadians as the natural direction for growth and as their lands by right. The Canadian people had been thwarted in 1857 by a lack of commitment, by the claims of the Hudson's Bay Company and by political circumstances in their attempt to acquire these lands. After Confederation they again approached the whole question, determined that this time they would succeed.

In this nearly empty land Canada hoped to recreate the granary of the American Midwest and produce the goods that would be carried to market by the canals and railroads of Canada. The difference was that this hinterland would be under Canadian control, and thus a trade would be more easily directed and the staple as well as the carrying trade added to Canadian wealth. Behind all of this was an extremely optimistic view of the potential of the Northwest. The efforts of Henry Youle Hind, the Toronto Globe and other publicizers of the area, had created in the decade 1857-67 a popular image of the Northwest. Even in distant Halifax the British Colonist, Tupper's organ, could talk of "soil so fertile that wheat is raised year after year on the same land and yields fifty to sixty bushels to an acre". (68) This was the new destiny that a good many Canadians pictured for their young nation, a destiny of prosperity based on these plains, a destiny that demanded expansion to be achieved.

The reality, however, was a long way from the ideal. Red River, the only agricultural settlement of any size between Lake Superior and the Rockies, was populated by less than 10,000 people, a good many of whom were not at all interested in joining Canada's destiny. As with Nova Scotia, there was a certain fear of the energetic and at times intolerant and avaricious nature of Ontario's aims. There was also the fact of distance. From the time of the merger between the Hudson's Bay Company and the Northwest Company in 1821, transportation had not been directed through

Canada. Hudson's Bay itself had been the major port for most of the period. Later, with the growth of Minnesota and the expansion of American settlement towards the border, settlers, traders, and eventually even the Hudson's Bay Company itself shifted trade routes to take advantage of the fast and economic route over American territory. (69) A good many Canadians, particularly John A. Macdonald, saw in the ambitions of Minnesota a danger to the destiny of Canada. Action had to be taken to forestall further American encroachment on the West and to assert Canada's presence.

On the diplomatic front the Canadian presence was asserted with the start of the negotiations for Confederation. As Clause 69 of the Quebec Conference shows, Canada made it clear that part of its constitutional alteration was an intention to annex the Northwest. On a more basic level moves were made to establish communication with that territory. A concerted drive to shift the trade routes of the Northwest and the Red River settlement from a north-south to an east-west axis had begun with the explorations of S.J. Dawson back in 1859; accelerated by Confederation, it did not really end until the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway.

In spite of the fact that the movement for the joining of the Northwest to Canada seemed to be making little headway, the Government in May 1868 granted Dawson \$2,000 to allow him to continue his exploratory surveys of the wilderness between Lake Superior and Red River. (70) To understand this haste for action on the Dawson Route, as it became known, this road and water transport system has to be viewed in its early years as not so much a transportation facility as a political tactic. It was an attempt to create a sentiment that would both facilitate the transfer of the Northwest to Canada and encourage a Canadian presence and Canadian-financed employment in the territory. William McDougall, the Minister of Public Works, had a background rivalled perhaps only by George Brown as a proponent of western expansion. From his position in the Cabinet and at the head of the Department of Public Works he was to use his influence to hasten the expansion process.

The place where McDougall could best apply this influence was on the Dawson Route and he consistently urged its rapid construction. Moreover, McDougall staffed the road party with people of a like view. Charles Mair, the poet and a member of the Canada First party, went West as much to spread the message of the Northwest to Ontario as to act as paymaster for the road crew. (71) J.S. Dennis and J.A. Snow, Dominion surveyor and chief assistant to Dawson respectively, were comfortable in the company of the annexationist "Canadian" party in Red River. The presence of these men (as well as the presence of a sizeable Canadian payroll) helped to assert the new Dominion's influence in the Red River settlement. S.J. Dawson, the head of the party, was not specifically a McDougall appointment, but he was of a like mind. Dawson saw the power of the road as an expansionist gambit and in a memorandum dated, symbolically enough, July 1, 1867, had argued for the immediate construction of the road for that reason:

Another consideration not to be lost sight of is that if an energetic commencement were made at the eastern end of the route, the people of Red River would, themselves, in all probability, set to work on the section nearest them. They would, I believe, have done so long ago had they seen an earnest beginning made. (72)

Dawson's statement, which assumed the sentiments of the "Canadian" party to be those of the whole settlement was naive, but it did reflect the perspective of those expansionists who saw the road as a force for promoting pro-Canadian trends in Red River.

McDougall himself was far from reticent in expressing his views on Canada's position in the Northwest. Like Dawson he saw the Hudson's Bay Company as an anachronistic monopoly from which he assumed that the people resident in the Northwest would be glad to escape. As such he had little sympathy with the position of the British Government as they tried to reconcile the claims of the Hudson's Bay Company and Canada. The same Order-in-Council that granted \$2,000 for a continuation of the exploratory surveys made clear that the small amount was not the result of any hesitation on the part of the Canadian Government, but, in terminology unusual for the Privy Council, a result of the "extraordinary conditions in favour of the Hudson's Bay Company with which it is now proposed by His Grace the Duke of Buckingham to clog the transfer". (73) To McDougall the small amount of the appropriation was the fault of the attitude of the British Government, for which he had little sympathy.

McDougall was not the only one unhappy with the inability to proceed more quickly. Dawson, who was working under a somewhat unusual allocation of money from the grant for colonization roads of the old Province of Canada, had spent the spring of 1868 at the Lakehead preparing for major survey work. In the summer, when he sent in his energetic plans, McDougall had to pencil a note on the back of them to Frederick Braun, the Secretary of Public Works, warning him to make clear to Dawson the state of funding and the consequent need to conserve money. At the same time he encouraged the surveyor by commenting that "probably the work will be resumed early next spring with all possible vigour". (74) In the meantime Dawson did what he could to prepare for the time when construction could begin and to push for a rapid decision on the project.

In fact Dawson did not have to wait until the spring of 1869. In September 1868 McDougall proposed to Council that funds be increased for the project. He also set out the nature of the intended route. When completed, the Dawson Route would consist of a combination of water and land transport from Fort William through the harsh wilderness until it emerged on the prairie. From Thunder Bay a road would be constructed for some distance. There would then be a series of what was described as "broken navigation" stretches - boat trips and portages across the numerous lakes of the area. Once the Northwest Angle was reached it was again planned to use a road from there to the settlement at Red River. The Council agreed with McDougall's recommendation and as a beginning authorized a \$15,000 expenditure to continue the work. (75) This decision set the precedent and from that period on, government funds continued to come in larger sums; this enabled the beginning of actual construction. The focus of the effort for communication with the Northwest shifted from government offices in Ottawa to the wilderness west of Lake Superior.

The Dawson Route was essentially a recreation of the old Nor'Wester fur trail through to the Prairies. But whereas the fur traders had been experienced men travelling in light canoes, this route was planned for families and bulk transport. It would be a major struggle to make the route viable as an alternative to the American route through Minnesota. The fact that it traversed some of the roughest terrain in Canada only added to the

magnitude of the task. Men and supplies had to be brought in from the Lakehead or Red River, and the central areas of the route became major problems in terms of supply. Before construction of rest houses, portage trails and other facilities could even begin, great expense and effort was required simply to bring labour to the scene of the work.

The cost of working in the wilderness was accentuated by the fact that the same exhausting process had to be gone through each year. On the eastern end of the route, if the men were not out to the Lakehead and on ships by the first of November, there was the danger that they would be caught by an early freezing of the lake and trapped in the small town of Fort William. Even more miserable a result, and a possibly fatal one, was the danger that they would be trapped in a desolate way-station somewhere between Fort William and Lake of the Woods. In 1873, for instance, when the Dawson Route was kept open beyond its normal date in order to take the newly-created Northwest Mounted Police force through to Red River, Dawson reported that the Mounted Police had gotten through, but that over one hundred workers on the route had been frozen in. "It is with extreme regret," he wrote, "that I have to report so untoward an event." In this case he hoped to be able "to extricate the men from their perilous position, but it will be attended with great cost". Further, if they reached Fort William "too late for the last steamer, they will have to be maintained here for the winter". (76)

On the other end of the route, where J.A. Snow worked to construct a road from the Red River to the Northwest Angle, there was at least a refuge at Red River. On the other hand, this section had its own problems. Cut off from Canada, the Snow party had to depend on Red River for labour and supplies. In both cases the settlement often proved unsatisfactory. Famine in 1869 left Red River without enough to feed itself much less provision work parties for the road. As a result, Snow was forced to turn to the United States and, at great expense, import his food. (77) More of a problem was the labour force. Snow and his group were viewed by many as interlopers in the Northwest, and the suspicions that were to culminate in the Red River rebellion of 1870 often showed themselves in the form of disagreements between Snow and his workers. These problems, no doubt coupled with the backbreaking work and low wages, resulted in a strike in October 1869 during which Snow was literally forced to pay the wages demanded. Snow, with a definite Canadian bias, and realizing that the force of law in the Northwest as exercised by the Hudson's Bay Company had broken down, saw only one solution:

There has been a great deal of excitement here among the Canadian halfbreed population backed up by certain influential parties who are opposed to everything Canadian. The Indians are also somewhat troublesome. The sooner Canada has a force here of two or three hundred men the better. (78)

Ironically, given Snow's interpretation, one of the men fired for the incident was not a halfbreed but Thomas Scott, who would later achieve the dubious distinction of being executed by Louis Riel.

In spite of all the problems, the Dawson Route had begun to take shape by the time Canada actually acquired the Northwest. By the summer of 1869 Dawson could report that work was under way at full speed at both ends of the route. The Government in turn was no longer hesitant to

commit the funds to allow the work to proceed. (79) The 1869 construction season saw an expenditure of some \$60,000 on the road. (80)

It has been argued that the Dawson Route was, in its initial stages, as much a symbolic assertion of Canadian intention vis-a-vis the Northwest and of a Canadian presence there as it was a transportation route. In the spring of 1870, in the wake of the transfer of the Northwest to Canada and the resultant resistance at Red River, one event brought the old function and the new function of the route together - the transportation of troops from Canada to Red River. In April 1870 the Privy Council decided that troops had to be sent to make Canadian authority felt in the Northwest. At the same time, the inability of the soldiers to take the normal civilian route through the United States meant that the Dawson Route was to have its first large body of travellers. Thus, in the final assertion of Canada's right to the Northwest, the route had its first use as a mass transportation system.

Crises, of course, do not wait for the timely completion of facilities, and the Dawson Route was not yet really in a state to handle such a massive movement of people. The Government recognized this and granted \$57,207 to the Department of Militia and Defence to spend in its own right to make the route usable. (81) The Department of Public Works and the Dawson Route thus got unexpected aid from an outside department. On the site of the work Dawson had, from the outbreak of the troubles, been in contact with Headquarters on the question of preparing the road for the possibility of just such a movement of troops in the spring. (82) While Snow and Mair took leave of the none-too-friendly surroundings of Red River, and the former Minister of Public Works saw his reputation ruined while he sat in Pembina unable to take his new posting as Governor of the Northwest Territories, Dawson and the new Minister, Hector-Louis Langevin, set things in motion. During the actual movement of troops over the route there seems to have been close cooperation between Dawson and the officers in command. With the army deciding to put men to work on the route at the advantageous rate of a shilling per day, Public Works even gained from the whole affair. (83)

If there was cooperation in the field there was bickering at Ottawa. Both the involved departments were extremely jealous of their accounts and carefully avoided spending a penny that could be attributed to the other department. Trudeau repeatedly warned that "Mr. Dawson must not pay for any military works or operations with any monies obtained from the Department." (84) It eventually took a committee consisting of Langton, Trudeau and Lieutenant-Colonel Wiley to straighten things out. (85) The confusion was probably unavoidable. This hurt not the departments involved but the individuals who had to wait for payment while it was decided who was responsible for their accounts. A letter to Langevin pleading the cause of various voyageurs who were as yet unpaid was directed to the Minister of Militia as the person "to whom it concerns", indicating that Public Works was not ready to accept the account. (86) In the meantime the voyageurs went unpaid.

In the end, whatever the complaints or internal problems, the movement of a large body of troops over a road not yet ready to receive them was a major success. The very fact that the troops could be moved at all was testimony to the progress that had been made in restoring the line of communication between the Northwest and Canada, entirely through

Canadian territory. Perhaps Dawson can be forgiven for patting himself on the back when he concluded that "if the expedition is crowned with success, as it unquestionably is, it is in no small measure due to the arrangement made under the direction of the Department of Public Works". (87)

With the need to move troops over the route and the consequent acceleration of construction, the Dawson Route began to move towards its second and more practical function. In early 1871 a subcommittee of the Privy Council, after considering the reports of Dawson on the state of the route, decided that it could be opened for travel for the coming season. (88) Dawson, writing in the spring of the same year, noted that although the road was not yet complete he felt that it was suitable for travel. A road suitable for wagons and horses stretched 45 miles from Thunder Bay. The weakest link in the chain was the section of 310 miles between the end of that road and the Northwest Angle. This was the portion of the route made up of a series of lakes and portages. From the Northwest Angle to Fort Garry, a road of 95 miles again allowed for relatively easy progress. (89) It was far from ideal transportation, but great progress had been made and there had never been any illusions that, given the nature of the route, it could be made perfectly comfortable. Accordingly, in the spring of 1871, the Dawson Route was opened to civilian traffic.

After years of publicity, the new territories of the West were open to settlement and accessible by an all-Canadian route. Immediately after the announcement reached the press that the route would be opened, queries, such as the one from T.P. Waller, flowed into the Department: "Please to inform me if I can get through to Fort Williams at Collingwood or if where as I wish to go to Fort Williams. And to say whether there is mechanics wanted such as carpenters and machinests and mill rights as there is some wantin to go from here." (90)

Yet for all the applications from organized groups or individuals, literate or illiterate, the results were disappointing. By August it was painfully apparent that "but very few emigrants are coming forward, only one having arrived by the Chicora now in port". As a result Dawson had no choice but to recommend that the work force on the route be cut back while keeping enough men on duty "to admit of emigrants being sent forward should they make their appearance". (91) At the end of the 1871 season Dawson had to report that only 136 immigrants had made use of a route that had cost the Government \$88,670 to maintain the transportation services alone for that year. (92) The degree of disappointment that those interested must have felt is indicated by the fact that the route, as set up at the beginning of the season, had been prepared for 1,500 travellers a month. (93)

Part of the reason for the failure of the route, a failure that more or less persisted, was the difficulty of moving transport over it. In spite of the efforts of Dawson, and they were considerable, the trip was still an arduous one. Even the Reverend George Grant, an ardent nationalist and a man who enjoyed the novelty of the experiences of such a route, had to comment after his trip over it in 1872 that "for ordinary travel, or for emigrants to go west, the Dawson road, as it now exists, is far from satisfactory". (94) The route presented restrictions and problems that deterred the traveller who as a result either stayed home or took the older American route. Such restrictions as the one in 1871 that prohibited prospective settlers from taking horses with them over the route were obvious drawbacks. Dawson attributed a great deal to this restriction and made an attempt to construct

a number of decked barges on which horses could be carried. (95) Such improvements could not, however, overcome the problems presented by the nature of the terrain through which the route went. The land itself prevented the route from ever really competing with its American counterpart. Freight in bulk could not travel over the route in the early seasons of operation, and in spite of constant pressure from the public it was not until the summer of 1873 that provision was made to allow it to do so. (96)

One other factor that deterred the movement of people over the Dawson Route and migration to the West generally seems to have been the lack of a well-organized government system of supplying information to the prospective immigrant. At this time there were agents in various foreign countries, hired either by the steamship lines or the Department of Agriculture, to spread information on Canada. Whether or not they were effective is open to question. Evidently little provision had been made for advising an immigrant on details concerning the logistics of movement to the West after his arrival in Canada, the likelihood of finding suitable land or employment there, or on the various problems of land grants and related matters. (97)

From the time the Dawson Route opened, the Department of Public Works was besieged by prospective immigrants. Justifiably enough the Department did not regard itself as a travel agency, and its invariable response to any enquiry was to send a copy of the advertisement that it had inserted in various newspapers. (98) As the prospective immigrant was most likely aware of the Department's connection with the route through the same advertisement it may be wondered whether such a response was particularly useful. Although the Department of Agriculture had information on land settlement, it was not much better at providing the immigrant with an over-all picture. For one thing, Agriculture knew little of the Dawson Route and the provisions that would have to be made for transport. In fact, Department of Agriculture pamphlets often recommended the American route to prospective immigrants at the same time that Public Works supported the Dawson Route! It can be argued that in this case the Government failed to meet a very real need - a need that, if met, would have encouraged a greater use of the Dawson Route.

Early in 1873 a T.B. Marshall declared himself "Manager and Guide" of the "Red River Immigration Company" and then proceeded to write to the Department for information. Dawson, who had earlier fired Marshall, suggested that the Department give him no encouragement and none was given. Like all the others, Marshall received only the printed advertisement, (99) but the point is that Marshall had enclosed with his request a number of replies from people who had seen his own advertisement in the papers in Toronto. The fact that people had so eagerly responded to Marshall's advertisements indicates the demand that existed for knowledgeable help from people interested in moving west. Had the Government made an organized attempt, say in a joint project between the Department of Agriculture, the Interior, and Public Works, to provide comprehensive information, it might have met with a very good response.

However much an efficient counselling and information agency might have encouraged the use of the Dawson Route, it must be said that the basic problem was the nature of the route itself. The three hundred miles of "broken navigation" between the end of the road from Thunder Bay and the Northwest Angle could not be made suitable for mass transport and heavy

luggage: there were too many trans-shipments and portages. By 1876, after several years that saw only a trickle of immigrant traffic, Alexander Mackenzie reported to Parliament that "it was perfectly useless to attempt to keep it open in its present state, as a means of transporting passengers and freight". (100) Instead, the route on which so much time and money had been spent would be reduced to a mail route with only a small establishment.

Was the Dawson Route, then, a failure from the beginning? George Grant, after his trip over it in the company of Sandford Fleming, the new Chief Engineer of the Canadian Pacific Railway, raised this basic question:

The question then, is simply whether or not it is wise to do this, at an expenditure of some millions on a road the greater part of which runs along the boundary line, after the Dominion has already decided to build a direct line of railway to the Northwest ... The road is composed of fifteen or twenty pieces; is it any wonder if these often do not fit, especially as there cannot be unity of understanding and of plan, for there is no telegraph. (101)

The Dawson Route never did match the cheapness and efficiency of the well-travelled route through the United States. In this sense it was a failure. But if one sees it as a prelude and a temporary substitute for the future railway, then it makes some sense. Admittedly, the Dawson Route never became a standard route for immigrants and certainly not for bulk freight, but - as the Conservatives objected in 1876 when Mackenzie cut back on funds - it did provide an all-Canadian route to Canadian territory. It seems fair to say that, in the year before the coming of the railway the Dawson Route was necessary, without implying that it was sufficient.

The Intercolonial Railway and the Dawson Route were both responses to the Confederation of British North America. In a way, they were the particular tasks that the Department of Public Works performed in fulfilling the expectations that led to Confederation. Canada had taken on a new form, one that included the Atlantic ports, and the Intercolonial had served to bring the Maritimes and central Canada into closer connection. At a more mundane level, the Intercolonial had also provided an integrative function for engineers and others into the Civil Service, an institution that in 1867 closely reflected its colonial antecedent. In a way even the patronage that beleaguered Fleming served a useful function by providing one of the few points of access for the Maritime politicians to a long-accepted practice. The rise to prominence of such people as Collingwood Schreiber and Henry F. Perley in these years also indicates the gradual infiltration of the old public service of Canada.

The movement of Confederation had included a drive to new western lands. The drive culminated in 1870 with the annexation of the lands under the control of the Hudson's Bay Company. It is an interesting footnote to Canadian history that part of the British funds supplied for the Intercolonial were used by the Canadian Government to pay off the Hudson's Bay Company. The Dawson Route, for all its faults, had driven a primitive trail through the Northwest. Equally important had been the function it played in asserting a Canadian presence in the crucial years between 1867 and 1870. Whether the effect was positive or negative can be debated, but it is evident that a stronger Canadian influence was felt in Red River, and Canadian money and Canadian employment demonstrated the coming change in the economy of the colony.

With the entry of the Province of Manitoba into Confederation, the Department of Public Works found itself with a new area of responsibility. Manitoba was a growing frontier region and as such had great demands for services and facilities. Alexander Mackenzie commented to the Lieutenant-Governor of that province, "I have observed that your subjects in Manitoba seem always disposed to advice in a direction that will lead to a heavy expenditure in the Province." (102) As had been the case a few decades before with the western part of Canada West, Manitoba felt that it needed and deserved a great deal of attention from the Department.

With each rapid step the new Dominion took in its expansion across the continent, the Department of Public Works took on new responsibilities. Prince Edward Island had succumbed to the temptations of the railway age, gone bankrupt in the process, and in 1873 entered Confederation as a way out of its predicament. The Government, in order to bring the Island into Confederation, had taken over and accepted as finished a railway that was only partly complete and would never pay its way in terms of operating costs, much less the interest on the debt it had incurred. (103)

Even with its railway, however, Prince Edward Island was a relatively small area and, which was easily added to the responsibilities of the Department of Public Works through the addition of a district office. The truly major commitment had been made two years earlier when British Columbia, that "sea of mountains", entered Confederation. Vast forests, rapid and treacherous rivers and especially those mountain ranges made this new and largely undeveloped province a great additional responsibility for Public Works.

The impression should not be left that British Columbia was still in a completely wild state. The rush of miners in the wake of gold discoveries meant that from 1858 on, Governor James Douglas and his successors made attempts to provide access to the rugged interior of the country. In part this was carried out by the Royal Engineers sent over by the Imperial Government. The use of the military and the justification of many of the projects on military grounds thus provides a parallel to the Upper Canadian works begun by Simcoe. In addition to these engineers (under the opinionated Colonel R.C. Moody) Governor Douglas used civilian help. Men like Walter Moberly and Edgar Dewdney, who would later make their name in Canadian history, played an important part in the early development of the colony.

By far the most ambitious project of these optimistic years was the Cariboo Road. The large gold strikes in the region of the same name made it imperative that steps be taken to provide access to the mining camps, both for the miners and for the authority of the Government. Using a combination of military and civilian parties, Douglas began efforts to build through some of the roughest terrain on the continent. From comments he made at the end of the 1862 construction season, it would seem that the Governor felt he had been successful:

Jackass mountain. 'The Cleft'. The Great Slides. The Rocky Bridges and other passes of ominous fame, so notorious in the history of the country have lost their terrors. They now exist in name only being rendered alike safe and pleasant by the broad and graceful windings of the Queen's Highway. (104)

Less courageous travellers often disputed the Governor's statement about the absence of terror on the winding mountain road, but this did not change the fact that a great deal had been accomplished.

This and the other works accomplished in the hectic years of the gold rush were only a beginning. As the rush, and consequently the revenues, slowed down, so too did the Colony's ability to undertake further improvements. After 1863, with British Columbia now separate from Vancouver Island, very few major works were begun. Joseph Trutch, a man reputed to be "a thorough business man and an honest one too", was appointed Commissioner of Lands and Works, but he could do only what circumstances permitted. In the 1860s that was not a great deal. It must have been with some relief that Trutch saw the Dominion Government bring its resources to bear on the rugged province in 1871.

Most important, in terms of the federal Government's responsibilities, was the momentous, even frightening commitment that had been made as a part of the annexation of British Columbia. The Canadian Government had agreed to link that Pacific province with the rest of the nation. The British Columbian delegates had come east in search of a promise from the Canadian Government that it would begin construction of a wagon road and telegraph line to the western colony should it enter Confederation. Canada had responded with the promise of a transcontinental railroad. The Governor of the province could not contain his amazement at the result when he wrote "and the Railway! Credat Judeas! is guaranteed without a reservation!" (105) Before the magnitude of this task all else shrank into relative insignificance. It was hoped that the Canadian Pacific - even though the Intercolonial had failed to do so - could attract private capital. Nevertheless, it was to fall to the Department of Public Works to initiate the project, locate the line and act as administrator. In the spring of 1871 the Government turned to a man who seemingly had his hands more than full already, Sandford Fleming, and offered him the job of surveying the route. Fleming, who had long been interested in the scheme, accepted, with the comment "I must not shrink from the work." (106)

Thus the flurry of activity that had marked the entry of the Department of Public Works into the new Dominion showed no signs of diminishing. The Intercolonial Railway and the Dawson Route were the first demands placed on the Department by Confederation but - with a transcontinental nation as its domain - they were certainly not the last. The continued activity of the 1870s was to have a profound effect on the organization and structure of the Department.

CHAPTER 6

AN ERA OF GROWTH

THE 1870s

The new projects of Confederation did not lead to a complete shift in the development strategy of the Government nor did they end the involvement of the Department of Public Works in the building of canals. Within two or three years of Confederation, the pressure began to mount on the Government to improve the outdated St. Lawrence system to ensure that the potential products of the Northwest would have a route to the sea. With the Intercolonial under construction and the Northwest now in the hands of Canada, the Government turned its attention to this problem and on March 23, 1870, Macdonald announced that a Royal Commission would be appointed to investigate the whole problem of canals in Canada. (1)

The proposition brought an immediate response from the Members of the House. People like Thomas Merritt, carrying on his father's tradition, had for some time urged the Government to take action and were pleased with the decision. Walter Shanly, picking up on the original theme of canal development, argued that the St. Lawrence system was even more useful as a means of attracting American commerce than as a route from the Canadian Northwest. This, of course, did not alter his support for a vigorous canal policy, and he concluded that while "the Government always opposed a canal policy on the ground that they could not afford it," he himself felt that "the country could not afford to do without it". (2)

Macdonald left no doubt that Shanly's belief in American commerce was anachronistic. To the Prime Minister, the St. Lawrence was a part of the western expansion that had taken place and, in fact, he tied the proposed canal expansion to Clause 69 of the Quebec Conference. He further disagreed with Shanly, arguing that "following the settlement of Rupert's Land and the Great North West, there would be a necessity, with reference to Canadian trade alone, and without reference to the trade of the United States, or any portion of it, certainly for enlarging the Welland Canal, and perhaps the St. Lawrence Canals, and that within a very short period". (3)

There was a certain familiarity about the debate. For all the talk of the Northwest the scheme still rested on the belief in a providential future

for the St. Lawrence. Alexander Mackenzie, leading the Opposition, agreed with the general thesis when he argued that "if we intend to keep our position on this Continent we must give our attention to this very important matter". (4) As had been the case in the early 1840s, opposition came not over the goal or even the general strategy, but over the particular approach of the Government. Mackenzie objected to a Royal Commission with the sarcastic comment that it was "better to put the whole Government of the country under Commission at once and be done with it". (5) Thus, although Macdonald and the Conservatives had run into opposition on the appointment of the Royal Commission and some, like Shanly, disagreed on the source of the eventual traffic for the canals, the belief that there would be traffic and that the canals were in need of enlargement was accepted.

Two points were held in common: First, that the canals in their present condition were outmoded and incapable of handling the ships that were now common on the Lakes; and second, that although the St. Lawrence canals had never been completely successful they were important enough to preserve as a viable system. The whole debate supports the contention of Donald Creighton that the St. Lawrence system's "alteration would entail further heavy expenditures; its failure could not be contemplated". (6) The Royal Commission was appointed not so much to determine whether the canals were worth further expenditure as to determine what the necessary expenditure would be.

The Commission was not actually appointed until November 16, 1870. Shipping magnate Hugh Allan was Chairman and Samuel Keefer Secretary. The next months were spent looking over the shipping records, investigating the actual physical state of the canals, and interviewing or requesting information from interested parties, such as Isaac Buchanan and Thomas Merritt. (7) From the numerous suggestions, proposals and counterproposals, a pattern began to emerge.

In spite of all the statements by Macdonald and others that the St. Lawrence could be considered a project of national interest, members from the Maritimes - with their own regional claims - were dubious that money spent on central Canada would ever do them much good. Charles Burpee was a consistent advocate of this point of view in the Commons. Arguing that the Intercolonial was not the Maritime's only claim on Canadian public works, he called for construction of the Baie Verte Canal. (8) This canal would cut across the isthmus joining Nova Scotia to New Brunswick and allow direct shipping on a much shorter line from the St. Lawrence to the Bay of Fundy and especially St. John. As a result, the Canal Commission, as it was known, found itself concerned not only with the St. Lawrence system but also with the demands of the Maritimes for their own canal works, a type of development that had received little attention from them before Confederation.

There was a second area of interest in addition to the St. Lawrence. From the time of the Rideau Canal the plan for a more direct route to the West had occasionally been advocated. The usual route proposed was along the Ottawa River and through the old chain of lakes and rivers that had served as a route to Georgian Bay from the days of Champlain. Walter Shanly's 1859 expedition and others had been oriented in this direction, and important members of the Opposition, such as Alexander Mackenzie, supported it. During the Confederation Debates he had urged the further development of a connection with the Northwest via a canal route "up the

Ottawa, because that would be giving a great backbone to the country". (9) Mackenzie was not alone in supporting such a route, of course, and the Commission had to add this system to others under its consideration.

When the report of the Commission was released it contained something for everyone. The Baie Verte canal, the development of the Ottawa and the St. Lawrence systems, all were seen as worthwhile projects. (10) The Commission was explicitly expansionist in its outlook and, citing memorials from the Toronto and Hamilton Boards of Trade, argued that this was the outlook of the nation. "These words," said the Commission, "give expression, briefly but emphatically, to the aspirations of the people of the Dominion, East and West, to stimulate trade between the different sections, and in that way create a feeling of mutual interest which will very materially strengthen the political ties which unite Quebec and Ontario to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick." (11) As with the Intercolonial, national unity was seen as a goal in itself, but - as had not been the case with the Intercolonial - national unity in this case was complementary to commercial aspirations in central Canada. From national goals the Commission proceeded to an equally optimistic view of the effect on commerce.

The Commission certainly provided that the vision of the empire of the St. Lawrence was far from dead:

It only requires an energetic effort on the part of the Dominion to make the St. Lawrence the great highway between the Sea and the West to the very base of the Rocky Mountains. Into our hands must come, sooner or later, the carriage of the great bulk of the produce required by Great Britain. (12)

The old dream was once again expressed in a new form and in spite of all the disappointments of the past, with greater optimism than ever before. The Commission brought out a good many points to support its optimism. It was said that with expansion the rates of freight to Montreal would drop as much as 15 per cent and that the United States, once it saw the expanded Canadian canal system, would be willing to give Canada better trade terms for access to the St. Lawrence. Once again Canada was asked to gamble, this time an amount estimated at \$19,170,000, on the future of the St. Lawrence as a transportation route.

There was a lone dissenter from the Commission's report. George Laidlaw, with an eye to finance and a less optimistic view of the potential trade, saw both the Baie Verte and Ottawa improvements as unnecessary. He did feel, however, that less extensive improvements were necessary on the Welland and St. Lawrence canals. If Laidlaw's plans were accepted the amount of the gamble would be reduced to about \$5 million. (13) The sorry record of the Culbute locks on the Ottawa and the squabble that was to develop over the Baie Verte Canal indicates that there was much to be said for Laidlaw's dissent.

Controversy did not end - it rarely has - with the report of the Royal Commission. The Government, or rather the two governments that came into office during the controversy, still had to face technical and policy problems. Although policy still continued to be debated in the House off and on in the months after the report of the Commission, the Government was really waiting for a comment from the Department of Public Works on the logistics and cost questions. The Commission had pointed the way and it was now left to the Department to see if the path was feasible.

Most controversial of all the questions the Department had to deal with was the Baie Verte Canal. The canal had actually been under consideration for some time, and in 1870 G.F. Baillarge had been ordered to report on the likely cost and possible problems of such a project. (14) Basing this work on an older survey of the province of New Brunswick, but going beyond it, Baillarge was still in the process of drawing up his comments when Samuel Keefer, with a special report to the Commission, called for the construction of the canal. The Keefer report was instrumental in swinging the Commission behind the canal. Thus, as of spring 1871, there were two major reports. They varied considerably and it was to be left to the Chief Engineer of the Department, John Page, to make the final judgement on which was the more accurate.

Later indications are that had Page turned his attention to the reports at this stage, the Baie Verte concept would have died an early death and saved both the Government and Page from considerable embarrassment. Overburdened with other work, however, the Chief Engineer failed to take action. Someone in the Department, presumably Langevin, decided to turn the Baillarge report over to Keefer and Gzowski, who had also been on the Royal Commission, for their opinion. (15) Not surprisingly, the Keefer-Gzowski report supported the original arguments of the Canal Commission. By the time Page turned his attention to the project, it had received a certain degree of credibility and attracted public attention. The general assumption was that the canal would be built.

The whole project received a shock when Page disagreed vehemently on the question of the Baie Verte Canal and in doing so was none too kind to Samuel Keefer: "It is only fair, therefore, to conclude that he (Keefer) did not know of their (various problems) existence, rather than that he knew and failed to communicate the information, especially as it is mentioned in the specification submitted by him." (16) He then went on to attack the \$5,137,000 cost estimate made by Keefer, arguing that \$7,100,000 was more realistic. For these and other reasons Page concluded that the Baie Verte would be a much more difficult and expensive project than Keefer had estimated.

The controversy between the two engineers was bitter and personal. Keefer charged Page with incompetence, and Page challenged the originality of Keefer's ideas, saying that they had originated in an 1843 plan, which, although it had been abandoned, "scarcely leaves it open for another person thirty years afterward to claim its paternity". (17) As in the Killaly-Keefer controversy over the Welland Canal in the late 1840s, the engineering disagreement led to or perhaps reflected a strong personal antipathy.

Technical debate spilled over into the political arena. The Government, possibly misled by the early reports on the project, indicated that it was willing to consider the Baie Verte when, at the opening of the 1872 session, the Speech from the Throne asked for Parliament's serious consideration of "the expediency of providing a direct water communication between the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Bay of Fundy". (18) The disputes developing between the engineers delayed matters and it was not long before the Opposition and Members from New Brunswick began to press for action. (19) In part, responsibility for the spread of the controversy has to be laid at the door of Page. Had he taken the time to study the crucial report when it first appeared, the Government would not have made statements that implied acceptance of the recommendations of the Com-

mission. Page, however, could with some validity plead the excuse of overwork. As Langevin later commented to Macdonald, "Had he had time he would not have blundered." (20)

With new arguments swirling about, the Government avoided taking action, without officially changing its position. The Government changed hands but the administration's position on the canal did not. In 1875 the debate was still going on, with Charles Tupper, by then in Opposition and a strong advocate of the canal, urging the Liberals to action with the comment that "all the interests of the country with one voice demanded this work". Samuel Macdonell, the Liberal Member for Inverness, disagreed, pointing to the differences of opinion between Page and Keefer. "Mr. Page's report," he pointed out, "abounded with expressions as to the impracticability and inutility of this work, and he condemned in the strongest terms the plans of Mr. Keefer, while Mr. Keefer, on the other hand, condemned Mr. Page's plans." In the face of such confusion, he queried, was it not the duty of the House to pause before spending money on a canal where there would seem to be no certainty as to either its cost or its utility as a trade route? (21) The increasingly unenthusiastic attitude of the Government was summed up by Mackenzie who warned that "he had the most serious doubts as to the practicability of the work". (22) The Liberals began to back off from even the tentative commitment that the Conservatives had made towards constructing the canal so heartily recommended by the Royal Commission.

The Baie Verte Canal was never constructed. Like the Prince Edward Island causeway it has at various times throughout history cropped up as evidence of a regional grievance or as an election promise without ever being seriously considered. Perhaps the only time it ever came close to being constructed was in the period immediately after the Royal Commission recommended it. At that time the Dominion was optimistic enough and still strongly enough committed to canals to have begun such a project. But with the engineers unable to agree and the two successive governments becoming increasingly wary of what gave every indication of becoming a white elephant, the project was never developed. In 1875 the perennial appropriation of \$100,000 towards the project, which had never been touched, was reduced to \$20,000. It was later quietly dropped completely. (23)

The other main area of contention was over the question of the St. Lawrence enlargement itself. In this case it was not a question of whether the improvements should be carried out but to what extent. Enlargement was crucial if the system was to remain viable but with cost as a very real consideration, there were two trains of thought. First there were those who felt that the Government's finances would permit only a basic expansion. Second, there were those who, like the members of the Canal Commission, felt that Canada had a growing trade and a prosperous future and that a large-scale effort, put into effect immediately, would simply save further work and expense in the future.

The Government had been concerned with the matter before the appointment of the Canal Commission and as early as August 1870 had ordered Page to investigate the cost and technical problems of enlargement. He was to consider three alternatives: locks 200 feet long, 45 feet wide and with a depth of 10-1/2 feet; locks with a length of 300 feet with a 12-foot depth and the same width. (24) If, as one has to assume, the Government at the time was seriously considering the lesser proposals, they were quickly

dropped after the enthusiastic report of the Canal Commission. In the 1872 Speech from the Throne, Lord Lisgar stated that the "rapid increase in the trade of Canada and the importance of competing for, and accommodating the commerce of the Great West render it necessary that transport by water should be cheapened and facilitated". (25) Later in the Session Langevin outlined in more specific terms the Government's commitment to enlargement calling for a 12-foot depth. Those who were strongly behind the St. Lawrence seemed to have won a victory. In the light of later events it is important to emphasize that they did regard it as such, the only opposition to Langevin coming from those who felt that a 10-foot depth would have been adequate. (26)

The demands of those enthusiastic on the question of the St. Lawrence soon escalated, however, and where the Conservatives had found themselves expansionists, the Mackenzie government, with the same program, was vilified as too cautious. The new basic demand voiced after 1873 was for a 14-foot depth throughout the St. Lawrence. The problem was greater than digging the canals another two feet down, for such a depth would have required considerable dredging in the St. Lawrence river itself. As has often been the case with canal questions, the lines of support crossed party lines. Such administration stalwarts as Luther Holton called for the 14-foot depth. (27) Men like Holton and Merritt, with an extremely optimistic view of Canada's trade prospects, felt that any money spent on canals would be recouped in a very short period of time. Mackenzie and the Government, worried about the day-to-day matters of finance, took a less idealistic view of any investment in canals.

Other factors complicated the whole issue. In 1874 the Liberals, true to their election platform, had sent George Brown to the United States to investigate the possibility of a new reciprocity treaty. In the course of the negotiations the right of the United States to free use of the Canadian canal system had become a prime bargaining point. The complicating factor arose when the Americans asked for a guaranteed 14-foot depth throughout the system. Mackenzie wrote to Brown, with no doubt sincere report, "I fear it is impossible to obtain fourteen feet in canals." (28) Brown had to tell the Americans that 12 feet would be all that could be guaranteed and in so doing severely weakened Canada's bargaining position. (29) In the end, of course, the whole set of talks came to nothing.

The continued pressure for greater depth of the canal at the very time the Government was pushing for a 12-foot depth clearly reflects the view of those most interested in canals. T.R. Merritt, supporting the cause his father had sponsored a generation earlier, was one of the many who agitated constantly for better and better canals. The Liberal government felt the pressure and by 1876 had conceded, at least in principle, the desirability of a 14-foot depth. The fact that the concession was made in response to a question from a member of the Government party indicates the sort of pressure that was brought to bear on Mackenzie:

With regard to the River St. Lawrence, as I pointed out last year, it will take a little over one and a half million dollars to ensure twelve feet of navigable water at the points where shoals are to be found in the bed; it would require a very much larger sum - perhaps three times that amount - to obtain fourteen feet in the river proper ... I can only say that everything is being done therefore with a view to

ultimately securing fourteen feet of water as the standard depth, but we will have twelve feet available at a much earlier period. (30)

It was a significant modification of the original policy as set out by Langevin in 1872 and reiterated by the Mackenzie government when it came into power. Fourteen feet was eventually obtained, though not during the lifetime of the Liberal government, and not until after the Department of Public Works had ceased to be responsible for canals.

The controversies over the Baie Verte Canal and the depth of the St. Lawrence canals indicate that although there seems to have been a general belief in the canal system, there were still tensions within the parameters of the general belief. The Baie Verte, not really connected to the central concept of the St. Lawrence system, was gradually abandoned as the doubts as to its worth grew. On the other hand, in the case of the St. Lawrence, the Government adopted a course of enlargement only to find itself facing new demands. The Baie Verte was never built and the Ottawa system never became more than a few isolated locks, but a major effort was made to improve the St. Lawrence. By 1879 the \$8,907,754 spent on the Welland Canal alone indicated that, for all the new responsibilities in the area of railroads and the pressure for canal development in new regions, the Department of Public Works and the Canadian Government were still very much involved in the original strategy of developing the St. Lawrence. (31)

The St. Lawrence canal enlargement, combined with the Intercolonial and the Dawson Route and of course the increased territory that the Department had to cover after Confederation, led to a tremendous growth in the activities of Public Works. In 1866 total expenditure of the Department of Public Works of the Province of Canada had been \$979,308; in 1873, the total was \$4,354,106.76. (32) Such growth, which was to continue through the decade, had its effects on the structure and personnel of the Department. Its staff seems to have been undergoing almost continuous change in the 1870s, and had certainly grown a great deal from its counterpart in the 1840s. In 1870 the Engineering Branch officially consisted of a Chief Engineer, one assistant and seven lesser assistants who were graded as clerks. The Headquarters staff, independent of those appointed to the Engineering Branch, was declared at the same time to consist of a Deputy Minister, a Secretary, ten clerks of various grades and three messengers. (33)

Even this newly enlarged staff was acknowledged to be insufficient to handle all the new areas of responsibility. One area that received early attention was that connected with the construction of public buildings. At first Trudeau had felt that the Department could do without an architect and, if occasion warranted, a temporary one would suffice. (34) This was in line with previous practice but was rapidly becoming impractical. Already there had been charges in Parliament that Page was overloaded with work and could not, therefore, properly oversee all the activities he was responsible for. In 1868 Luther Holton had made the point that "no man was more esteemed than Mr. Page, but it was quite impossible that he should at one time have been performing the duties of architect, engineer and superintendent". (35)

The Government eventually relented under the pressure. No doubt the fiasco of the Baie Verte Canal, directly attributable to overwork on the part of the Chief Engineer, added to that pressure. Thomas Scott was appointed

as the first permanent architect of the Department and in February 1872 it was ordered that Scott and his successors would be termed "Chief Architect of Public Works". (36) The appointment of Scott marked the beginning of a separate architectural section in the Department. It also relieved John Page of a large amount of his workload and allowed him to concentrate on the engineering projects for which he was best suited. This need to divide the responsibility at the top was simply a reflection of the every-increasing demands placed on the headquarters staff in this period. The growth of this staff from eleven in 1870 to thirty only five years later is indicative of the rate of change in the Department and the constant need for additional help in carrying out its new responsibilities. (37)

The impression that the most dramatic growth was at Headquarters would be incorrect. On the contrary, the great projects of the period were the hub of the activity and the place where the greatest changes took place. In the period before Confederation only the Superintendent of the Welland Canal in the outside service could be said to have a top-ranking position. Even in the periods of earlier major projects, such as the construction of the canals in the 1840s or the Parliament Buildings in the 1860s, direction of the projects had remained firmly at headquarters and by the same token, so too had power. The Dawson Route, the Intercolonial and the Canadian Pacific survey brought to the Department a new type of engineer. Men like Sandford Fleming had a great deal of prestige and, as with all on-site engineers, a great deal of power independent of the central office. Fleming, appointed by the Government directly, was not a servant of either Toussaint Trudeau or of John Page, though formally in the employ of the Department. The controversies in which Fleming was involved were not resolved by a note from the head office. Fleming's acting superiors tended to be either the Minister himself, the Intercolonial Commissioners or the Cabinet, and he was willing to fight any one of them if he felt strongly about a point.

The exact nature of authority and responsibility in such a relationship becomes more a matter of individual character and precedent than of legislation. Fleming, throughout much of his tenure as Chief Engineer of the Intercolonial, was involved in a general struggle, not just for iron bridges or a certain type of contracting, but for a degree of independence that he felt necessary to ensure that the railway would be constructed successfully. This general struggle revolved around the question of staffing, an area directly related to the engineer's position. The very existence of the controversy adds weight to the argument that in this case power was determined only in the broadest sense by legislation, for according to the Intercolonial Act there was no doubt that the Commissioners had sole power in that area.

Fleming was not long in finding that acceptance of the clause of the Intercolonial Act that gave the Commissioners staffing power interfered with his ability to carry on his work and to supervise the construction of the railroad for which he was responsible under the same act. He wrote to one of the District Engineers that "the Commissioners have made a number of new appointments but I fear without much regard to the competency of the parties". He realized that if trouble arose on the railway he would be the first to be blamed and although he had been willing to accept patronage to some extent, he now feared for the efficiency of the whole project. "You know well," he continued, "that while it may be of less importance on the surveys it is of primary importance to have the right man in the right place

on construction." (38) Fleming was not going to accept the dictates of his nominal superiors quietly. He had too much at stake.

When the disagreeable appointments continued, Fleming made his grievance known to the Commissioners, commenting, "I am, compelled to say that I do not concur in appointments and changes recently made. I hold if the Chief Engineer has any responsibility he alone should conduct Engineering and he should have reasonable confidence in everyone under him on whom he must rely." (39) The last sentence summarizes excellently Fleming's position throughout the conflict. The whole issue was symbolic, revolving around the principle of the position of the engineer. Sandford Fleming, placed in charge of the largest public work undertaken in British North America to date, had no intention of conceding that his position was simply that of a subordinate acting under orders.

As his struggles over other details have shown, he was not unwilling to take his case to higher authorities, the Minister or the Prime Minister. On the other hand, he was willing, if necessary, to fight the decisions of these people as well. When Fleming and the Commissioners disagreed over the acceptance of some certificates of payment for work done by the contractors, Macdonald wrote to Fleming in an irritated tone: "I have been thinking over the matter of certificates and I should rather for the sake of peace all around, that we should hear no more of it." (40) That was fine for the Prime Minister to whom the Intercolonial was but one of many pressing matters, but to the Chief Engineer it definitely was not. In polite but firm terms he let the Prime Minister know his position both on the question of contract certificates and his position on the Intercolonial in general:

Your note of the 19th has put me in a dilemma. I had previously made up my mind as to what I should do in the matter and if anything could induce me to change it it is a sincere desire to meet your wishes. During the whole course of my career I have never until now been dictated as to the manner in which my certificates should be made up, or the amount which I should certify as due contractors and as a rule I have met with no interference whatever, even as to the form of certificate. Engineers in my position or standing are usually left to their own judgement in all these matters and I have never heard of an Engineer consenting to put his name to improper certificates without bringing, in most cases, disaster and in all cases discredit on himself in the end. (41)

Once Fleming had made the decision that he was not going to abdicate his power, he was in a strong enough position that his political battles could be fought on more or less equal terms with his superiors. A man with powerful political allies, Fleming was able to cultivate, make use of and resist politicians. (42) In the end he won the battle of principle with the Commissioners. In a letter to Aquila Walsh, Fleming referred to "conversations with Sir John A. Macdonald, Mr. Langevin and other Ministers" and with this support went on to virtually dictate the terms of surrender. Arguing that "the Chief Engineer, under the Statute is held responsible for the efficient superintendence of all works connected under the authority of the Intercolonial Railway," Fleming went on to demand that "hereafter Members of the staff shall not be appointed or removed without the concurrence of the Chief Engineer." (43) The Commissioners, under heavy

pressure from the convinced Ministers, accepted the arrangement. One clause of the Act had been thrown out to make another more effective. The Chief Engineer had successfully overcome the resistance of his superiors.

The degree of power, the access to superiors, and the independence that Fleming eventually gained from both the Commissioners and from Headquarters was something new in the history of the Department. Even Hamilton Killaly had had quite explicit controls put on him while he was superintendent of the Welland Canal - controls that he complained about, though in detail rather than in principle. Neither the Intercolonial nor Fleming, probably the most extreme example, were unique in this regard. S.J. Dawson did not have all the independence of Fleming because he did not have equal prestige, but he was able on several occasions to assert his rights as Superintendent over the first thoughts of his superiors. Collingwood Schreiber, Fleming's successor on the Intercolonial, was also able to enjoy a fair degree of independence, no doubt because of the battles fought by his predecessor. In the meantime Fleming, in charge of the Canadian Pacific, more than ever tended to deal directly with Cabinet-level politicians rather than the permanent civil servants of the Department of Public Works. More particularly in the controversial area of staffing, Fleming had insisted on, and obtained, the right to ensure that the professionals he hired would be characterized by "high integrity and skill" rather than political affiliation. (44)

There were several factors that encouraged this growth of power among the regional engineers. First, the very geography of the country: the Dawson Route, the Intercolonial and the Canadian Pacific surveys were carried out a long way from Ottawa. The size of the nation not only set the goals of the Department of Public Works but also worked to force "an extensive physical decentralization of the major operating tasks of the public departments". (45) Second, as has been implied, the large size and important nature of the projects under discussion meant that major policy decisions, and some of lesser importance, were determined not by the officials of the Department but by the Minister directly or the Cabinet as a whole. The railways and the Dawson Route were common topics of discussion in Parliament, and the Government was very much aware that any decision it made or any mistake the supervisor of the project made, was likely to come up for discussion. Under such circumstances it was not surprising that the political heads of the nation were determined to remain aware of events. One other factor not to be underrated in giving the regional engineers their independence was their tremendous competence. They were the only ones capable of really judging what was needed in their particular area, and the politicians often (though not always) decided that the best way to ensure the success of the project was to take the advice of the man directly responsible for it.

The growth of power in the regions did not leave the centre powerless. Rather there was an accretion of power there as well, though of a particular kind - political power. The counterpart of the importance of the project that put power in the hands of the regional engineers was a consciousness on the part of the Ministers, in the period after Confederation, that they had better keep an eye on the activities of the Department. William McDougall, Hector Langevin and Alexander Mackenzie all had a great impact on Public Works and each was to orient the Department in the particular direction that he felt necessary.

Hector Langevin succeeded McDougall when the latter had been appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the Northwest Territories. Langevin was a man with a very different background from his predecessor. McDougall had, in fact, been a bit of an anomaly in the Cabinet. One of those who joined the Government in 1864 when the Brown-Macdonald coalition had been formed, this former Clear Grit did not leave the party when his leader did and was subsequently read out of the Reform Party. His interest had been in the West for some time and his career as Minister of Public Works was directed towards that interest. His Protestant background and Canada West Reform contrasted sharply with that of Langevin. Langevin was a Bleu from Canada East, the descendant of the LaFontaine group of the 1840s. Langevin had studied law under former Speaker of the House Morin, had strong church connections and was the top Conservative in Quebec after Cartier. As effective head of the Quebec City region of the Province, as well as former mayor of that city, he followed in the pre-Confederation tradition of having the Minister of Public Works chosen from that area. (46)

Langevin recognized that he held an extremely sensitive portfolio but he also knew that it had a great deal of power for partisan ends. The right project directed to the right locality could mean an election victory, and a friendly staff and appointments of the right political hue could give the party clout and keep its adherents happy. There consequently continued a system of patronage reminiscent of, though not identical to, the system in the years before Confederation. In understanding Langevin's position it is also necessary to realize that John A. Macdonald was the undisputed leader of the party, that he too was interested in political control and that the general tenor of Langevin's administration must be seen at least in part in a Langevin-Macdonald extent. "I am told that there is an attempt being made to remove John Harney, slide master at Arnprior," wrote Macdonald to Trudeau on one occasion. "Please let me know, and before any action is taken with regard to him I would like to talk to you about it." (47)

Neither Langevin nor Macdonald attempted to run all details of the day-to-day operations of the Department. The Prime Minister, who was often barely in touch with his own Department of Justice, was frequently forced to admit his lack of knowledge of the details of Public Works in the face of challenges voiced by men like Mackenzie. (48) Langevin did keep up to date with the situation in the Department, but in general trusted the permanent staff and, except in politically sensitive cases, allowed his public servants some freedom of action.

At the same time, both men were interested in having a "friendly staff", which, with its own political sensibilities, could be trusted not to embarrass the Government. The removal of S.D. Woodruff, Superintendent of the Welland Canal, reveals the mixture of politics and public interest that concerned both men. Woodruff, who had had his politics revealed as far back as 1848 in a letter to the Toronto Globe, seems first to have run into trouble over an article in the Toronto Telegraph in the fall of 1871. When asked to report on this attack he commented offhandedly that "the refutation will not require much effort". (49) It was not so much the validity of the charges, that made them dangerous as their source - J.C. Rykert, a local Conservative Member of Parliament. And Rykert was just one of many local Conservatives in the area who were beginning to demand that Woodruff be dismissed. Macdonald could not help but be aware of the pressure as numerous demands flowed in. In reply to one such demand

he said, "As to the charges reflecting on Mr. Woodruff's honesty I cannot speak. He is a Grit and deserves no favour at my hands." At the same time he warned that he would not tolerate a baseless party vendetta and that "he must, however, get every justice". (50) The pressure did not come to an end and the charges became a problem to the Government. There was just enough basis for them that Macdonald could allow Woodruff to be dismissed. A. Brunel was sent to the Welland Canal office as Woodruff's replacement and shortly afterward informed Langevin that "Mr. Woodruff takes the change good naturely (sic)." (51) The man who had been in charge of the most important canal in Canada for eighteen years had been dismissed. There is little doubt that Woodruff did not receive any "favour" from Macdonald and that the charges against him took on a much more serious aspect as a result of their political origins.

The willingness of Langevin to leave the details of the Department to the permanent staff and the heavy weight given politics in the decisions of Macdonald and Langevin does not mean that the Minister was merely a cynical spoilsman. Unlike some of his pre-Confederation counterparts, Langevin had - in addition to his political concerns - a touch of the ethos that had always been present in the Board, and later in the Department of Public Works. As a man who, like many of his peers, had come to accept and work for the whole idea of public works in the 1840s and 1850s, the Minister had learned to appreciate both the political and developmental power of the projects that the Department was concerned with. He understood the economy and was concerned with Canada's future.

Langevin's interest was set out most clearly in his 1872 speech outlining the Government's policy on canal development. Quoting various trade statistics, he argued that canal enlargement would "revolutionize trade". He continued by referring to W.H. Merritt's dream of canal development. The improvements, Langevin said, would "make the St. Lawrence what the father of one of his hon. colleagues had said it was destined to be - the great highway of this continent". (52) The Minister had his finger not only on the patronage system but also on the pulse of the economic aspirations of Canada.

The power that had devolved to the regional engineers was thus to some extent balanced by an accretion of power at the political centre. In the chaotic politics of the 1850s and early 1860s, there was a breakdown in the relations between the political and permanent levels in the Department. After Confederation the relations can be seen more as an interplay between powerful permanent figures and their political heads. There were no more figures like Hamilton Killaly who could ignore the political heads. Correspondingly, there was no Minister who could simply decide, as had Cauchon, that he would act without consulting the permanent officials in the Department. Perhaps the best example of this interplay between politicians and public servants came in the planning for the enlargement of the Welland Canal.

As has generally been the case with St. Lawrence Canal strategy the Welland was seen by the Royal Commission as the mainspring of the whole system:

The first step, therefore, in the improvement of the Inland navigation of the Dominion is the enlargement of the Welland Canal, the great link of commercial intercourse, not only with the prosperous Western country of the United

States - whose progress as we have seen, is already so great; but with the vast territory belonging to the Dominion which must ere long be peopled with thousands, and teem like the Western States, with the evidence of an irrepressible industry and activity. On improving the Welland, we take the step pointed out to us by the unerring finger of progress. (53)

Unfortunately the "unerring finger of progress" did not specify either a definite route for the enlarged canal or a plan of construction. The result was a series of proposals and counterproposals that delayed the beginning of construction until 1873.

Before the sitting of the Canal Commission, John Page had been ordered to investigate the problem and the possible need for alterations on the Welland as a part of the study he had carried out on canals. (54) The release of the Canal Commission report simply gave the Chief Engineer a larger scope for his investigation. It had been apparent from the beginning that any significant enlargement would have to include an alteration in the route of part of the canal. This potential change opened the field for a whole host of proposals as to the proper route.

Two radical departures from the existing route were presented for consideration by outside parties. First, in May 1872, a company named the Ontario and Erie Ship Canal Company presented its concept of a new Welland Canal. This company, headed by Angus Morrison and backed by Hamilton Killaly and Walter Shanly, offered to build a canal from Niagara to Thorold where it would connect with the old line of the Welland. Killaly provided most of the technical expertise in the proposal and his covering letter reflected the bitterness of a man who felt himself passed by. Attacking the Canal Commission with the comment that in their report "I cannot find one new idea," the former Chairman of the Board of Public Works pressed for the "lateral cut" favoured by the company. (55)

The other major alternative presented was a plan by John Grenville, known appropriately enough as the Grenville Plan. It had the support of the St. Catharines Board of Trade and such engineering notables as Thomas Keefer. This plan would also have left the old canal line at Thorold but rather than cut across to Niagara, would have taken a new route down the escarpment and rejoined the original line near St. Catharines. (56) There was one other route discussed in 1872, though in less detailed terms. T.C. Street, a Conservative Member of Parliament, called for an entirely new canal, beginning at Niagara-on-the-Lake and emerging above the falls at Chippewa. As John Page and Thomas Munro worked together to develop what they felt to be the most viable plan, they were not unaware of those outside the Department who did not hesitate to express their views on the projected enlargement.

With various private plans increasing in number, Gzowski wrote to Macdonald, with whom he was on good terms, suggesting that an independent investigation by a "competent board of Engineers" might be useful in unravelling the ideas that had come forth. (57) Macdonald agreed and passed the suggestion on to Langevin, who, however, realized that although Page was still smarting from the Baie Verte incident, he was worth supporting. "Should he suppose for a minute," replied Langevin, "that I would consider other Engineers in a matter that has received two years of his official attention and which is especially a matter which he has studied

and is conversant with, I have no doubt I should lose his services." (58) On the one hand, there were the politically loaded schemes that had to be considered before action was taken and, on the other, a Chief Engineer who would inevitably regard the outside appointment of a commission as an indication of lack of confidence in his ability. In this case Macdonald was not to be denied and Langevin was left to soothe the hurt pride of Page while a Commission consisting of Gzowski, J. McAlpine and Samuel Keefer met in Toronto at the end of January to begin their investigation. (59)

By January the special Commission was on the line of the Welland and in the full glare of press coverage. The description given by the Montreal Gazette of the Commission being in the company of a "large party of ladies" and of their residence at "Springback, which even now in midwinter is crowded with a fashionable company" may have raised a few eyebrows at Departmental Headquarters, but nothing was said. (60) By February the Commission had finished its excursions and investigations and sent a report to Ottawa. The investigations were completed but not the controversy. (61)

The reports of Page and of the Commission did agree in some details. Both dismissed such major rerouting as proposed by Killaly and Street. It was accepted that the general line of route would follow the old canal, with deviations only where necessary. On the particular nature of the deviation, however, there was disagreement and this included the type of locks to be employed. (62) The Commission presented a conciliatory report arguing that they were in essential agreement with Page. He, however, did not agree and argued that "no advantages could be gained by adopting any of the suggestions of the 'Engineers' but on the contrary there is good reason to believe that if they were followed, a less efficient canal would be constructed". (63) For all the efforts to avoid controversy by appointing a special commission, it once again came down to a question of whether the political heads of the nation were going to trust the competence of one of their senior officials or ignore him for the advice of outsiders. As Langevin put it later, "The conclusion of that (Page's) report, though keenly opposed by Messrs. Keefer, Gzowski and McAlpine were wholly accepted by the Department, and the works were commenced in 1873." (64) John Page had in the end been vindicated and one might suppose that Langevin had been a principal supporter.

Page's success was not just one of technical details; it had elements in its similar to Fleming's victory on the question of staffing the Intercolonial - efficiency before politics. Behind the technical question of the route of the Welland Canal had been the age-old and very political problem of land speculation. A study of a map of the Welland area at the time indicates that there were an incredible number of property interests involved. (65) Hamilton Killaly's "lateral cut" must have passed through large blocks of land held by Killaly at Niagara. T.C. Street's project would certainly have aided the development of his property at Chippewa. Other powerful people like J.C. Rykert and Angus Morrison were involved, and even the Keepers had property interests that would have been directly affected by the route of the canal.

These property interests were especially influential in that most of them were held by men prominent in the Conservative Party. Severe pressure had been put on Macdonald and it is against this background that the Prime Minister's decision to appoint the Gzowski Commission must be viewed. The Prime Minister was facing a number of powerful and

contradictory party interests. He needed all the support he could get in technical terms to justify a final decision. The Commission was therefore useful in that its report, combined with Page's report, negated the more extravagant changes of route and, along with them, a certain number of land interests. Ultimately, the politicians did take the advice of the Chief Engineer over the myriad interests of local politicians. The success of Page has to be attributed partly to his unwillingness to alter his views and partly to the support that people like Langevin accorded him. When the Commission was on the line of the canal, the Montreal Gazette had made the comment that "every farmer in that range can show conclusively that the Canal should go right through his property". (66) The Gazette, however, misrepresented the case: the real pressure came from men with a great deal more influence than the farmers had ever had. Perhaps Page's real triumph lay in his successful opposition to these influential men.

The controversy over the route of the enlarged Welland Canal reveals several things about the Department in the years during which Langevin was Minister. The basic premise of the Minister's approach during this period was a trust in the competence of officials such as Page, who seemed from their past record to have earned that trust. Trust did not, however, translate into independence as had been the case in the 1840s. The Gzowski investigation was started at the instigation of the political heads, and had the Government decided to follow its recommendations, Page would have had to either accept the fact or resign. There was no possibility of his carrying out his own plans without approval from his superiors. And although the political and party considerations that motivated some of the actions of Langevin or Macdonald have to be emphasized, it is also fair to argue that generally, the outlook of the political head was not nearly as local nor as totally concerned with purely political matters during this period as it had been in earlier days. The importance of the projects, further regularization of the practice of patronage, and the relative stability of the Government were all factors in this change. In summary, two things happened: first, the "one-man power" described by McGee was moderated by the power and prestige of the staff in the Department, especially the engineering staff in charge of important projects; second, the "one man" was developing greater breadth of vision while not yet in any way giving up his position as a partisan politician and dispenser of patronage.

Langevin's first term as Minister of Public Works came to an end with the fall of the Conservative administration in 1873. In their desire both to get the Canadian Pacific under way and to win the election at hand, Macdonald and Cartier miscalculated. The result was the Pacific Scandal, the fall of the Government and the assumption of office by the Liberal or Reform Party under Alexander Mackenzie. (67)

Soon after he became the second Prime Minister of the Dominion of Canada, Mackenzie wrote his old mentor George Brown and revealed that he had taken on an additional burden. Macdonald had taken a portfolio in addition to that of Prime Minister and it was thus not unusual that Mackenzie should consider doing the same. "I would have liked to take on the Finance Dept. myself," he lamented, "but I did not see who could take Public Works." (68) Thus the new Prime Minister had decided to add to his responsibilities as Prime Minister one of the heaviest portfolios that existed. Perhaps this former stonemason who had tendered for a contract on the Parliament Buildings and who had later sat on the committee investigating

those buildings, had always had a certain affinity for the Department. (69) To those who understood Mackenzie one thing was certain: his administration of the portfolio would not be the lax affair that had characterized Macdonald in the Department of Justice.

Alexander Mackenzie had emigrated from Scotland to Canada as a young man and settled in Lambton County, then a frontier region. His family was firmly Presbyterian and he inherited from them very strong religious and moral convictions. These convictions never left him and showed themselves in both his character and his politics. It was conviction that drove him to politics, and unlike his predecessor, he seemed ill at ease in the tough political world of the late nineteenth century. The man who had finally reached the ultimate political position in Canada was the same man who, still fresh to his office, could look at the spectacular view from his West Block window and long "for rest from the incessant vexations of the seething cauldron of public political life" and "look forward with joyful expectancy to that glorious rest prepared by our heavenly Father for his people when the cares of this life are done". (70) His religion and his reforming drive make Mackenzie a workhorse and a somewhat dour man, too serious to appreciate some of the ironies of politics. At the same time the man was not totally devoid of humour so long as the point did not conflict with his moral scruples. Even Mackenzie realized how little the civil service examination meant at that time, but took great amusement in using it as a tactic to disarm office seekers. One such applicant he put off by asking him if he was ready to write the exams in "Algebra, Geometry and all the other technical, Mathematical phrases I could think of at short notice." (71) The look on the discomfited man's face gave Mackenzie a chuckle as well as a means of removing the applicant from the anteroom.

This was the man who, in 1873, became Minister of Public Works. To understand the type of administration that Mackenzie ran in that position, it is necessary to remember the particular goals of the man who chose to take the portfolio. More often in Opposition than in the Government, and never before having had a Cabinet post, Mackenzie had developed his skill for detail into a powerful force for attacking waste in government. Reminiscent of Malcolm Cameron in the 1840s Mackenzie exemplified the Reform distrust of corruption and expensive government. Thus it was his watchdog function as a member of Opposition rather than his administrative talents that had been sharpened by his previous political experience, and Public Works had often been the focal point for this propensity. Within a year after Confederation, for instance, he had charged the management of the Department with waste and condemned the "extravagant, almost scandalous manner in which public moneys were squandered by certain officers of the Department". (72) If William McDougall brought to the portfolio his expansionist ambitions, Mackenzie brought his suspicions of extravagance and a desire to ensure that the Department was run honestly and economically. His attitude was summed up in the letter to George Brown when he said that "it is the great spending office and besides I want to unearth past transactions". (73)

With this approach to the office it is not surprising that Mackenzie was unwilling, as Langevin had been, to leave details to the permanent staff. During his years in Opposition he had been strongly critical of such senior officers as Page and Dawson and when he took office, he still retained some of the suspicions that had given rise to this attitude. (74) Dawson had never

had much of a reputation for understanding financial details and on at least one occasion Octave Dionne had been sent from Headquarters by Trudeau to set his accounts in order. (75) It is thus not surprising that this competent engineer but hopeless bookkeeper quickly ran into trouble with the new Minister. Ironically, it was over the matter of an expense that could not have been avoided. His first financial report under the Liberals included a large item for the transport of the Mounted Police. Mackenzie, of course, did not know all the circumstances and wrote indignantly in the margin "\$61,794.30 to pay for taking 150 men and horses - or \$412 each when they could have been sent for \$60 each way". (76) Dawson was able to explain this account, the result of the men trapped by the freeze-up, but it was not the last time his accounts were to run afoul of Mackenzie. The new Minister of Public Works made it obvious that he intended to pay close attention to the accounts of the Department and a good many public servants received harsh lectures on economy and orderly accounts over the next few years.

Related to the whole question of efficiency and honesty in a government department was, of course, the problem of patronage. The Liberals, like the Conservatives, were a political party with partisan aims, and both the climate of the age and historical practice dictated the use of patronage. This, however, put Mackenzie in a personally difficult position. Patronage threatened to undermine both his own set of political values, reinforced by years of criticism from the Opposition benches, on the use of patronage by the Conservatives, and his personal mission in office of making the Department honest and efficient. Unable to avoid party requirements, the Prime Minister nevertheless clung to a belief in the non-partisan Civil Service. If he often had to accept a modification of the principle, he never ceased to find the whole subject extremely distasteful.

In his resistance to patronage Mackenzie encountered both strong support and strong opposition. The whole climate of the nation, in the wake of the Pacific Scandal, was highly sensitive and hostile to the least charge of government corruption. The Liberals had come to office pledging honesty, and this provided Mackenzie with a powerful card to play. Support also came from individuals like the Governor General. Lord Dufferin had been greatly shocked by the Pacific Scandal and when a new Prime Minister came into office, the Governor General used his influence in an attempt to ensure that history would not be repeated. "I attach such enormous importance to the Maintenance of the principle of the non-political character of the Civil Service", he wrote to Mackenzie, "that I venture again to press upon your attention the observation I made during our last talk on the subject." (77) If Dufferin feared that Mackenzie would immediately begin a wholesale transfer of staff, he misunderstood the character of his chief adviser.

Working in the opposite direction two interrelated pressures pointed to the active use of patronage. First, the Conservatives had been in power for several years and had left a good many political partisans in high office. According to the Liberals, the situation had been aggravated by the last-minute actions of the Macdonald government. As Mackenzie complained to one correspondent, "Little or nothing was done in the depts. except giving and creating offices for the last three weeks." (78) The presence of a large number of political partisans of the Opposition was discomfiting. And on this score, Mackenzie had earlier complained, "I have a horde of spies

around me in the office" and he feared that they "will carry to late Ministers all they can see or hear." (79) This particular statement may have been exaggerated, but there was enough truth in it to affect the smooth functioning of office. The second pressure was from members of his own party. His resistance to patronage meant that throughout his tenure as Prime Minister he received complaints along the lines of the one that said that "I fear you don't give enough importance to the little things that affect us down here." (80)

Mackenzie did develop some personal guidelines for the subject of patronage. First, he seems to have accepted Dufferin's pleas and refused to dismiss appointments simply because they had been made by the previous government. "It is quite impossible," he wrote to one Member of Parliament, "for any Government to dismiss public officials without good and efficient cause." He further lectured this partisan that if such a practice were followed "the result would be the introduction of the United States system of dismissing all officials whenever there was a change of Government." (81)

There was, of course, some acceptance of patronage. Mackenzie seems to have continued without question the old practice of allowing local government M.P.'s the right of making the appointments for local offices. As he warned one Member who wanted to name an appointment outside his area, to change this practice would be "to unsettle the question of patronage over the whole country". (82) With the acceptance, however, went a strict definition of what constituted a local appointment. Any position that might in the slightest degree be associated with national interest was excluded from the practice. When one member complained that he had not been consulted on a temporary post in Montreal to handle the trans-shipment of steel rails, Mackenzie commented that "this is not, in any view of it, a local appointment, any more than the Departmental offices in Ottawa are local appointments, at the disposal of the City member here". (83)

Although the Prime Minister was generally willing, albeit reluctant, to compromise his position for the sake of party advantage, he was especially resistant to patronage that might impede the efficiency of the Department. This applied equally to personal cases. Malcolm Cameron applied for an appointment for Hamilton Killaly's son, and in spite of the fact that Mackenzie had known the elder Killaly and had even promised him an appointment "had he lived," the request was turned down. The problem was, as Mackenzie reported it, "that he has been given to drinking." He did try to smooth things over by agreeing that if the younger Killaly gave up the bottle, "I will try and find work." (84) There is no record of the eventual outcome, but the dilemma of the Prime Minister is well-reflected.

Perhaps Mackenzie's position was best summed up in a letter of his concerned with patronage on the Intercolonial. Accepting the reality of patronage he noted that "my rule was to employ our own friends whenever one could be found". The statement was hedged, however, for the one found had to be "suitable" and the principle that "good men must be got at all hazards" took priority over patronage requirements. (85) The practice was thus more or less set. A man could not be dismissed, except in the most flagrant case, for his politics. Unlike the case under Macdonald, this political factor was not to be allowed to enter even as a background force in dealing with the individual. Appointments, however, were a different matter and local appointments - narrowly defined - were to go to the local

member. Wider patronage did exist but, at least in theory, only if the man was qualified. One gets the impression that Mackenzie, like Fleming, was throughout his administration opposed to patronage but willing to accept some in order to relieve the political pressure.

The man who set out to run an honest and efficient Department was not himself unchallenged on the very grounds of honesty and efficiency. In 1876 charges began to appear in Conservative newspapers to the effect that under Mackenzie contract securities would not be accepted unless the securities were Liberal. When Mackenzie heard the charges, he seemed to be genuinely surprised and wrote Trudeau, asking him "to say whether there is a word of truth in the above statement". (86) The Deputy Minister replied that it was "utterly untrue". (87) Offended at being challenged by the party that he had always regarded as the epitome of corruption, Mackenzie prepared to deal "in extenso on that point" and to fight fire with fire by going "back two or three years and see how they manipulate contracts". (88)

The Prime Minister's position was weakened, however, by another set of charges. These pointed not to partisan advantage but to personal corruption and stated that Charles Mackenzie, Alexander's brother, had been involved in and had received favoured treatment on a contract for steel rails. (89) Mackenzie completely denied the allegations saying that "Charles has no interest in Fairman and Cooper's Commission as the agents to the English makers." (90) Yet as is often the case in such instances, the facts of the rail contracts remained ambiguous. There would seem to have been little profit to Charles Mackenzie from his involvement with the company but, as Pierre Berton has argued, the company did seem to receive special treatment at the hands of the Department. Mackenzie's best defence lay in the fact that it had been Sandford Fleming who had urged the purchase of the rails as a form of speculation. "Fleming first urged me to buy," Mackenzie complained to a party supporter. (91) Nevertheless the charges, though unproven, had some substance, and the image of Alexander Mackenzie as the honest politician and as the absolute contrast to the Conservative leadership was tarnished.

To a politician who accepted patronage more frankly, and there were a good many in the ranks of both parties, such charges would have been annoying in direct proportion to the degree of political danger they contained. To Mackenzie, however, any charge, politically dangerous or not, represented a personal insult and an attack on his whole purpose in taking the portfolio of Public Works. "I saw I must do it or have it ill done," he had commented to Brown. (92) Consequently, when it was said, in effect, that there was no difference between his and earlier administrations, the charges were painful. It was thus with some indignation and not without a touch of self-righteousness that the Prime Minister met the Opposition challenge. When Tupper had the nerve to say that he had dismissed people for political reasons, Mackenzie replied angrily: "It is a fact that the Government did not dismiss a single individual, from one end of the country to the other, for political reasons." (93)

Mackenzie was also anxious to put the record of the Department under his administration before the country. When the Conservatives challenged Edward Blake, Mackenzie's right-hand man, for using influence to get a firm contract, the Prime Minister took the opportunity to reply. Ignoring the specifics of the charge, he asserted that "he could prove that his Government was more honest than the former". In 1871, he went on, only 37 per

cent of the dollar value of contracts let went to the lowest bidders. The percentage had, however, climbed throughout the Liberal administration until, by 1876, the figure had reached 92 per cent. (94) The vote of confidence that the Government received from its supporters was, of course, a standard one, but it may have accorded more than the usual amount of satisfaction to the man who had set out to end political favouritism in the largest-spending Department in the Government.

For all the impressive statistics that Mackenzie could bring to bear, his record as Minister of Public Works had its negative as well as its positive aspects. The Minister entered office suspicious of the staff, determined to supervise the Department down to the smallest details. The inevitable result was that Mackenzie took on a number of tasks that would have been better left to subordinates. Langevin had often intervened in what, at a quick glance, might seem superficial, but these instances were usually ones of high political content. Such was not the case with Mackenzie, who seemed anxious to know everything about the operation of the Department, important or trivial, political or non-political. The decision was a deliberate one by which the Minister attempted to minimize the independence of the Deputy Minister and the permanent staff. Highly conscious of the events in the years before Confederation and perhaps suspicious of men so long under Conservative influence, Mackenzie made it his special task to remove responsibilities from his chief assistants. Such a goal was an arduous one and his comment to Cameron that "it might be quite true that many things were done in the old form during the last six months from a simple inability to overtake all the details of a complex system" reveals the burden it put on the ministerial level. (95)

The simple fact was that Mackenzie was overworked to an incredible degree as a result of the role he had chosen. When Malcolm Cameron again wrote to the Prime Minister, this time to complain about his inability to see him, Mackenzie replied "How could I help it. I give all my time, at least sixteen hours a day and saw everyone in their turn." (96) The tendency of Ministers in the early years after Confederation to take an interest in the day-to-day functioning of their Department has been noted elsewhere. (97) Alexander Mackenzie, who tried to see everyone and was even concerned with the fact that the Welland Canal office was receiving newspapers at public expense, was certainly the ultimate example of that tendency. (98) He was also the ultimate example of its problems. No amount of hard work could allow the Minister to cover both the trivial and the important and give each matter the attention it deserved. In June 1874, Mackenzie wrote a piece of advice to the new Superintendent of the Welland Canal:


I have looked over a great many of your letters and recommendations within the last few days, and I think it desirable to point out to you particularly that it might be well to confine yourself to the discharge of your official duties. In short I would confine myself solely to dealing with subjects which you must deal with, and let everything else go through the regular channels. This course will save you much trouble and prevent anyone from feeling annoyed. (99)

It was a piece of advice that the Prime Minister would have done well to heed himself.

The approach Mackenzie took would have been difficult for any Minister in any Department. In a situation where the Minister was also the



Sir Sandford Fleming in 1870



John Page, Chief Engineer of Public Works, 1853 - 1879


(Department of Public Works)



CPR survey near the elbow of the Saskatchewan, 1871



The Honourable Sir Hector-Louis Langevin, Minister of Public Works,
1869 - 1873, 1879 - 1891



The Honourable Joseph Israël Tarte, Minister of Public Works, 1896 - 1902
- the last of the old-style Ministers -



Dominion Government telegraph Office, Nakina River, B.C., around 1900

(Department of Public Works)



Moving Camp – the Yukon Gold Rush

(Department of Public Works)



New wharf facilities at the Lakehead

Prime Minister and the Department was Public Works, it was a crushing burden. In the 1870s the Department was growing rapidly; even under the best-organized system, with adequate delegation of authority, it would not have been a simple matter to handle all the matters that flowed into Headquarters. Both Mackenzie and the Department thus suffered to some degree as a result of the top-heavy concentration of power. Efficiency had turned out to be incompatible with a drive for complete honesty and economy.

A further burden was added to the Minister's office in 1874 when the Intercolonial Railway Commissioners were disbanded. This group had lost much of its rationale when Fleming achieved a degree of independence from them and, after 1870, rather than acting to simplify matters, they had simply become another source of red tape. For this reason, because of the progress of the railway, and perhaps because they had been appointed by the former government, the Commissioners were disbanded and their powers transferred to the Minister of Public Works. (100) The move was a sensible one, but it did add to the burdens of the office. The appointment of C.J. Brydges as an individual manager of government railways at the amazing (for that day) salary of \$8,000 a year did relieve some of the pressure, but the Mackenzie correspondence indicates that Brydges himself made several demands on the Minister. (101)

Second to none in adding to the responsibilities and demands on the Department was the Canadian Pacific Railway. This project had its origins under the Conservatives, and it had been the cause of their downfall. From the summer of 1871 Fleming had survey teams spread out across Canada, some of them covering areas that had not been mapped in even rudimentary fashion. From the beginning the surveys were expensive. Within a month of their commencement Fleming predicted that the rate of expenditure was likely to be about \$40,000 per month and that "it would appear that the appropriations made by Parliament will not be sufficient to carry the surveys over the winter". (102) By June 1872, the expenses for surveys alone had amount to some \$500,000. (103)

In essence, the Canadian Pacific survey involved the Department in a huge and far-flung project. Fleming was a capable man and, as had been the case with the Intercolonial, he enjoyed a great deal of independence. At the same time, there was a rough correlation between total expenditure and the burden put on the staff. The expenditure on the survey was large from the beginning and growing. The Department, already faced with the problems of railway management and with major projects like the St. Lawrence Canal expansion, had a new burden thrust upon it - a burden that showed every indication of becoming a great deal heavier in the future.

When Mackenzie and the Liberals took office they were to some extent committed to slowing down the monster project of the Canadian Pacific Railway. The Canadian Pacific Scandal, the depression of 1873 and the complaints of extravagance, all encouraged the party in this direction. The decision to decelerate the project, however, contrary to expectations, merely increased the burden on the Government and especially on Mackenzie. The controversy with British Columbia, the squabbles between Mackenzie and the Governor General, the pressures on the one side from people like Blake and on the other from the Conservatives, took their toll in time and anxiety from the Prime Minister. (104)

In terms of the Department as a whole, the decision of the Government to let the line out for contract piece by piece under the direct control

of Public Works, was more significant. While the squabbles continued, Fleming proceeded with the location of large parts of the line. By the end of 1876 several contracts, especially in the area between Lake Superior and Manitoba, had been let and all the headaches that go with a major project began to beset the Department. Expenses were also mounting rapidly. To the beginning of 1877 the surveys had cost \$3,136,615.75, and another \$4,942,739.12 was chargeable to construction, although the latter figure included the money spent on the ill-fated steel-rail speculation. (105)

For the men directly involved, for the Department and for the Government as a whole, it was a herculean task. In the field, thirty-four men had been killed as of 1877. This price in human life was small compared to the eventual death rate during construction. The Government and the nation was split on the issue and the deepening depression, with its effect both on human optimism and on revenues, did not help matters. Mackenzie plunged himself into this project with the determination that had characterized his approach to previous projects. Once again, however, his zeal led him to become involved with unimportant as well as important matters. On one occasion, he wrote to Fleming:

I am greatly astonished that you or your chief officers have been in the habit of allowing payments, so called, without any reference to the Head of the Department. I think it well to say at once that I will not allow this in the future and everyone in the Railway Department must serve as all other gentlemen in the Public Departments, and work whatever hours might be required of them. (106)

In judging the workload resulting from the railway, it must be remembered that, as Mackenzie said to Holton, the Canadian Pacific Railway would have come to his door whether he was Minister of Public Works or not. It was simply the sort of project that demanded the attention of the Prime Minister. (107)

The growth of the Department and the attitude of Mackenzie inevitably created problems. At the departmental level Mackenzie sometimes alienated competent engineers such as Dawson and Page by what they regarded as interference in purely technical matters. These tensions, however, lessened as time passed, and the new Minister received and accepted the loyalty of his staff. Also, for all the exertions of Mackenzie, the structural changes that were part of the growth of the Department could not be reversed. It was impossible for the Minister to oversee everything and the power of engineers like Fleming, Dawson and Schreiber or of individuals like Brydges remained essentially unimpaired. It was also impossible - as the charges of the Conservatives had revealed - to root out all actions that might cast suspicion on the Department or, in this state of flux, to eliminate inefficiencies.

Caught between the twin forces of a powerful political head and a system of decentralization to the sites of the projects themselves, the departmental staff at Headquarters found its power very much reduced in the 1870s. Toussaint Trudeau kept what might best be termed a low profile under both Langevin and Mackenzie. John Page, in a position that before Confederation would have put him in ultimate charge of the details of every project of the Department, concentrated on canals and left the railways to others. The appointment of Brydges, whereby another man reported directly to the Minister, further fragmented the authority of the Department. It had

now become a number of separate compartments - the Intercolonial and other constructed railways, the Canadian Pacific, the construction activities connected with public buildings and the canals.

It was not those who saw their power diminish, but those who saw it grow who were most affected by the events of the 1870s. Alexander Mackenzie was, of course, the man most affected. In personal terms, the burden of office caused the Prime Minister to become a lonely and overworked man with little time for family and friends. The greatest cost, however, was in his efficacy as Prime Minister and leader of his party. Mackenzie was so involved in running the largest Department in the Government that he had to sacrifice his efficiency as party leader. The results were to be manifested in a party without leadership and a man who had little time to be Prime Minister. The party faithful noticed this fact and correctly attributed it to the burden he had undertaken. They also realized the effects it would have on their party, their chances for re-election and, in a less partisan tone, the effect on the nation. Alfred Jones, a Member from Nova Scotia, addressing his remarks to Mackenzie, commented that since it was "absolutely necessary in order that you may give your time to the service of larger questions affecting the management of the party and the interests of the country" that he, Mackenzie, should give up the Public Works portfolio. (108) Jones had been one of the members of the party who had been most anxious throughout the administration for patronage and Mackenzie may have been able to dismiss his plea on those grounds. It would have been harder, however, to do the same with the suggestion of Luther Holton. As one of the old-time reformers, Holton commanded a great deal of respect in the party and the nation. He took whatever influence he had and pitted it against the stubborn nature of the Prime Minister:

I claim the privilege of an Elder in our Israel to remonstrate against the absorption of your time and the exhaustion of your energies in the dreary drudgeries of Departmental abstracts to the unavoidable exclusion of work of a different kind which cannot be left undone without great detriment not to say infinite damage to your administration in which we have so deep a stake. The capabilities of the human Mackenzie are limited and it is impossible that with devoting 14 or 16 hours a day to laborious details in your Department you can bring your mind with the exquisite freshness and elasticity to the consideration of those higher problems of statesmanship that want solutions at your hands. (109)

Mackenzie's stubborn nature proved stronger than the influence of Holton or any other member of the party. He had taken a complex portfolio and he was determined to stick to it and so he did. Holton, however, has to be regarded as the better judge of the needs of the administration. It was not the sole role of the Prime Minister to improve the administration of the Department of Public Works. "I have no doubt," said Holton, "the Dept. of Public Works is better-administered than for 20 years before, but this, important though it is, is not enough to fire the public imagination." (110) The comment is a suitable summary of Alexander Mackenzie's administration, which suffered so much because its leader, in his secondary role as a Minister, was determined to administer the affairs of one of the most complex departments in the Government.

The nation, prodded by the depression and John A. Macdonald's promise of a National Policy that would include the rapid completion of the Canadian Pacific, confirmed the opinions of people like Holton. The Liberal Party was not able to hold the public imagination. In 1878 the Conservatives were re-elected and Alexander Mackenzie was at last freed from the responsibilities that had so borne him down.

The Conservatives had none of the hesitations that had plagued Mackenzie on the question of removal of partisan appointees of the previous government. William Buckingham, the man who had acted as Mackenzie's private secretary in the early years of the administration, had later been appointed to the position of Deputy Minister of the Interior. Within a few weeks of the Conservative return to power he was out. Jones also wrote to Mackenzie shortly after the election that "Tupper has commenced his old tricks on the railway." (111) Another disgruntled Liberal wrote his party head to say that "Langevin is hard at work in distributing patronage to his friends on a large scale." (112) Of course these comments were from a biased perspective, but it would at least seem that the Conservatives approached the question of patronage in 1878 more frankly than had the Liberals under the hesitant Mackenzie in 1873. When a little later one man in British Columbia complained that some Liberals were getting employment on the surveying crews there, Macdonald commented that "the engineers should have the sense to employ the men of the right politics". (113) Even Toussaint Trudeau, who had been Deputy Minister for fourteen years under both parties, came closer than he probably ever knew to being dismissed. He was saved from the suspicions that had obviously been present, however, when Tupper wrote to Macdonald that "I am satisfied that A.R. was wrong and that Mr. T. is entitled to our fullest confidence." (114)

One important official, Charles Brydges, was dismissed from the Department of Public Works. Brydges had the ignominious experience of learning of his own dismissal from a newspaper. Tupper offered to withdraw the notice of his dismissal if Brydges wished to resign but as the latter commented bitterly to Macdonald, "This would be useless after what has passed." (115) Although Brydges was understandably sullen about what had happened, it could not be said that his was simply a political dismissal. Alexander Mackenzie had known for some time that the manager of railways was an unpopular figure and there had frequently been clashes between the two. (116) The Conservatives were simply not willing to put up with a repetition of such incidents in the future. However it is quite possible that had the Liberals been re-elected they would eventually have found it necessary to dismiss Brydges. Also, the new administration had plans for a general reorganization of the management of public works in Canada.

By 1879, the annual expenditure of the Department was over \$10 million, a tenfold increase from that of 1866. (117) The Canadian Pacific had to date swallowed some \$11,538,866.55 in construction funds alone and the Government was pledged to put the whole line under contract. (118) The future thus indicated rapid expansion for a Department that was already both too diffuse and, relative to the rest of the bureaucracy, too large. At the opening of the first session of the new Parliament, the Speech from the Throne included a promise that "a bill will be laid before you for the rearrangement of some of the Departments of the Government". (119) The Government intended to split the Department of Public Works in two.

As Frederick Brecken, the Conservative from Prince Edward Island, made clear in the debate on the Speech from the Throne, the size of the

Department was the main reason for the impending split. On the basis of Mackenzie's experience Brecken felt it possible to say, "I am sure that the hon. leader of the Opposition will quite agree with me that the labours entailed on the head of that Department are more than ought to be expected from any man." (120) Mackenzie did not reply but there was probably silent assent from a good many men sitting on the Opposition benches.

The bill "Respecting the offices of Receiver General and the Minister of Public Works" was introduced in late March 1879. It was, however, the middle of April before the House began debate. The Opposition fulfilled its constitutional role and opposed the bill, but one does not get the impression that they put much heart in it. Luther Holton, the man who had seen the portfolio as so destructive of Mackenzie in his position as leader, argued that "the whole responsibility should be borne by the Minister of Public Works, with subordinate bureaus forming part of one great Department". Tupper easily refuted Holton, saying that "were he charged with neglecting his duty in connection with this enormous service, under the present system, his answer would be precisely the same answer as his predecessor would have made, that he was so overwhelmed with the work that it was impossible to do it thoroughly". Thus Tupper also felt that the direct role of the Minister in running the Department should be a large one. This attitude made it more necessary than ever that Public Works be divided. Two Ministers in charge of two departments, argued Tupper, would be "able to answer all questions authoritatively, from personal supervision". (121) Mackenzie's approach may have been extreme, but it was not significantly different from the popular belief of the time as to the role of the Minister.

In 1878, when the Liberals had brought in a bill to divide the Department of Justice, the Conservatives had attacked it as unnecessary, arguing that instead two Deputy Ministers should have been appointed and overseen by one Minister. However, the Conservative introduction of the bill on Public Works in 1879 on the grounds, as Tupper argued, that the Department had become too burdensome for one Minister, indicates that their approach to departmental organization was not appreciably different from the approach of the Liberals. The "sensible view", as Hodgetts aptly describes it, that the Minister should direct the work in a general manner while the deputy took care of day-to-day matters, was not yet generally accepted. (122) Even Mackenzie argued not for a new perspective on the Minister's position but, half-heartedly, that "there was no reason why the work for the next five years should approach what it had been for the last five years". It was a weak argument, for he admitted afterward that what Tupper had said about the workload under the current conditions was "correct". (123)

Two days later the bill passed the House. It was given assent on May 15 with the details of setting up the departments to be left to the Executive. Shortly after the passage of the bill, Langevin was transferred from his temporary post as Postmaster General back to the Department of Public Works. Charles Tupper, who had been Minister of Public Works was made the Minister of the new Department of Railways and Canals. (124) It was not until five months later, however, that the other departmental appointments were made and the new arrangements became functional. (125) With this series of actions and with little opposition, the Department of Public Works underwent the most dramatic transformation of its history.

CHAPTER 7

THE LANGEVIN YEARS

1880-1896

The Act that had such a decisive impact on the shape of the Department of Public Works was a short one: less than five pages. The basis on which the Act was promulgated was both sound, and as the relative lack of debate indicates, straightforward. In essence it was based on the premise that, given the size of the Civil Service and the current belief that a Minister should remain cognizant of the daily activities of his department, the Department of Public Works had grown too large. Especially with the large-scale plans that the Macdonald government had for railway development, it seemed necessary to divide the workload of the old Department of Public Works between two departments and two responsible Ministers.

In principle the Act was sound: but in practice it was not. It stated that "the Minister of Railways and Canals shall have the management, charge and direction of all railways and works appertaining thereto, and of all canals, and works and property appertaining or incident thereto". The Department of Railways and Canals was regarded by Macdonald as the more important of the two and the one that was likely to be highly visible to both the Opposition and the public. Consequently, its functions were set out in precise detail, but this concentration on the specific functions of the new department meant that the functions of the older one had received less attention, insofar as they were defined in comparatively vague terms: "The Minister of Public Works shall have the management and direction of all other public works and property which are or may be at the time aforesaid under the management and direction of the Department of Public Works." (1)

The problem was that the Department of Public Works, from the time of its creation as a Board by Sydenham, had considered the development of transportation to be the essence of its mandate. Canals, and later railways had been its most important concern, as the major projects of the 1870s clearly indicate. This identification of transportation under the term of "other" public works had led to a melange of loosely-related functions and an unspecified jurisdiction.

The attention of the political heads of the Government and of many of the top officials of the Civil Service seems to have been focused on the new Department of Railways and Canals. In fact, this was a mistake, for there already existed a "Department" for Railways and Canals in the old Department of Public Works. Instead of the creation of a separate Railways and Canals Department, a definition should have been developed for the new, truncated Public Works department. Railways and Canals, as set up in 1879, was in effect the core of the old Public Works Department stripped of its minor functions. This view is confirmed to the extent that the Department was divided into two more or less distinct functional areas of activity. Deputy Minister Toussaint Trudeau, John Page, the Chief Engineer of the old Department of Public Works, and Frederick Braun, its Secretary, took their knowledge and experience to the new Department of Railways and Canals. (2)

The Government had attempted to create a new department separate from an old one and had done so, but not in the way that it thought. The removal of Railways and Canals, together with its chief officers, affected the structure of the old department. By this token, the Department of Public Works could also be regarded as new. In other words, Public Works was left with a set of activities that had previously been on the periphery of the Department's jurisdiction but were now central to its working interests. These activities had developed to a large extent in an ad hoc manner and in response to particular needs. They had never been defined nor had they any necessary connection with each other. Consequently, the Government should have defined the resultant functions of the two departments with equal clarity.

The Department of Public Works, as defined by the 1879 Act, resembled the present-day department much more than its predecessor did. Having given up the specific transportation functions, Public Works henceforth had as its major activities such things as government buildings, dredging, harbours and rivers (where not a part of a canal), and numerous other small works. If the 1879 division gave the Department a jurisdiction somewhat similar to the Department of the twentieth century, it also produced many problems that would continue to plague it for years to come. Largely as a result of the inadequacies of definition under the 1879 Act and partly as a result of the increasingly important role of the Department as a "service department" to other arms of the Government, questions of jurisdiction, cost allocation and ongoing control became major headaches for Public Works.

However flawed the 1879 Act may have been, the results were not altogether unfortunate. By reducing the number of activities for which Public Works was responsible and by redefining the central thrust of their mandate, the way was prepared for smoother handling of an impending large increase in such areas as construction of government buildings and their subsequent maintenance. The Government of the day may not have found these areas to be of much interest but the act did create a department that, for all the vagaries and problems that existed, could concentrate on responsibilities that were to expand enormously in the coming years.

Nonetheless, in 1880 the Department of Public Works was much smaller than it had been. The total expenditure of the Department in its first year under the new act shrank by some 90 per cent. (3) Its chief permanent staff had gone to the Department of Railways and Canals and in

their place several men found that they had gained rapid promotion. A career engineer, G.F. Baillarge, who had joined the Department in September 1844 as an assistant draughtsman, was named Deputy Minister. Henry Perley, the regional engineer for the Maritimes, was appointed Chief Engineer. F.H. Ennis became Secretary. Thomas Scott remained as Architect. (4) To these men fell the task of shaping this new and smaller Department.

One man did not leave the Department of Public Works for the Department of Railways and Canals. Hector Langevin moved from this temporary position in the Cabinet as Postmaster General to take up the portfolio he had held in Canada's first administration as Minister of Public Works. In 1880 Langevin was at the height of his career and was Macdonald's unchallenged French-Canadian lieutenant. He could have had his choice of a number of portfolios and for this reason many assumed that he took Public Works because of the patronage opportunities it offered. Others, more idealistic, believed it was because he had developed a competence for and interest in the Department from the earlier administration. Whatever his real motivation, and it would seem that both patronage and interest were involved to some extent, Hector Langevin was to be a major force in shaping the Department of Public Works in the 1880s. It was a period of office that culminated in political scandal, which led to his tragic resignation as Minister.

Before the 1879 split the Department of Public Works had always been a highly-visible department, but afterward it took on a much lower profile in both Parliament and the press. Opposition fire in the early 1880s was concentrated, as it had been before, on the railways and in particular on the syndicate that had taken over construction of the Canadian Pacific Railroad. Langevin found his opponents in the House relatively unconcerned with Public Works. For example, one of the major questions brought before the Minister in the 1880 Session concerned the proper ventilation of the House itself. Even so, the comments were sometimes complimentary. John Charlton, a Liberal M.P. from Nova Scotia, initiated the newly-shaped Department in the Parliamentary forum by "making some complimentary acknowledgement to the Minister of Public Works on the great success with which he has grappled with this question ... We sit today in a Chamber which I venture to say is the best-ventilated hall in North America". (5) Langevin gave the credit to his permanent officials, commenting that the "credit is due to the officers who have performed the work under my orders". (6)

This exchange was not representative of the whole session. There were still criticisms of the Department and even of the ventilation of the House but in general, the initial Charlton-Langevin exchange typified the new status of the Department in Parliament. Missing from the 1880 Session are the full-scale debates, the major charges and relentless attacks on government policy for the Department or the Minister's handling of it. Questions directed to the Minister seemed more truly to ask for information than to serve as a basis for criticism. Hector Langevin had an easy time in the 1880 Session and this best reveals the shift in the place of the Department that took place as a result of the division. And although the 1880 Session was calmer than those that were to follow, this relative lack of attention - at least when compared to the 1870s - was to continue for some time.

At the same time the Department itself was not inactive. Behind the political calm existed a number of important tasks of construction and development. During the early years of the decade the Department devoted much of its attention towards fitting its various duties into some sort of comprehensive pattern and thereby began to see clearly just what its capabilities and boundaries of activity were. Also, the vacuum in the centre of activities was now filled by two major areas of responsibility. The first was the work concerning harbours, rivers and dredging. The second area was concerned with the construction of government buildings. These were not by any means the exclusive activities of the Department but they were new major responsibilities. (7)

First, it should be emphasized that although the Department of Public Works had lost its jurisdiction over canals, it had not relinquished all involvement in the improvement of water transport facilities. Railways and Canals was a department created for specific purposes and "canals" as defined by the Act meant just that - artificial waterways. Public Works retained control of such items as construction of wharves and other harbour works, dredging unless it was part of a canal project, and a supervisory capacity over the Harbour Commissioners of Montreal and Quebec. Under the immediate supervision of the Chief Engineer these activities gave the Department a continued connection with the efforts of the Government to improve facilities for transport and trade. After 1880, as before, the Department of Public Works would mirror in its expenditures and projects the development of the Canadian nation. At the same time there were undoubted restrictions on the Department that had once had exclusive charge of these areas. On the one hand there was the Department of Marine and Fisheries, which had from the time of Confederation impinged on previously exclusive activities. On the other was the new Department of Railways and Canals. Inevitably, squabbles arose from conflict of interpretation of the statement contained in Clause 5 of the Act: ... and works and property appertaining or incident thereto".

The early 1880s saw several important projects - either undertaken directly by the Department or under its indirect supervision - being administered by the Harbour Commissioners. The first of these, a major renovation of Toronto harbour, reflected the growth of that city as a metropolitan centre. The economic growth of southern Ontario, the development of the West and especially the growing industry of Ontario's capital, all added to the importance of Toronto as a shipping centre and worked to make the existing harbour facilities inadequate. (8) Petitions from interested merchants and representations from local members caused Langevin, who stated that the matter "has occupied the attention of the Government for some years," to order a full full-scale investigation. (9)

In June 1881 District Engineer Kivas Tully was joined by Perley in a thorough investigation of the harbour to see what action was necessary. After making detailed soundings and studies throughout the summer, the engineers noted that shifting sand had caused a significant shrinkage of the entrance to the harbour. They concluded that three major things would have to be done to give Toronto an adequate and more or less permanent harbour. First, the "eastern gap" to the harbour would have to be closed. It was the source of too much of the drift and was inadequate as an entrance. Second, a major breakwater would have to be constructed to maintain a deepwater channel in view of the lake's drifting bottom. Third, there would have to be

a good deal of dredging to obtain the deepwater channel in the first place. (10) All in all it amounted to a major overhaul of Toronto's harbour facilities and a significant undertaking for the Department.

Once the report had been received from Perley and Tully, work began almost immediately. By the end of 1882 the dredging on the harbour had been started; by 1884 expenditure had risen to \$253,363.15, and by 1887 the major work had been completed. (11) The speed with which the work had been planned and accomplished perhaps indicated the gain in efficiency that could be achieved by lightening the over-all load on the Department.

The second major work in this area of the Department's activities, begun shortly after the departmental split, was on the West Coast. The decision to build the Esquimalt dry dock arose from two commitments. The first, which was designed to "complete" Confederation, had resulted in a promise to British Columbia from both the Dominion and the Imperial Governments of a subsidy for the construction of such a dry dock. The second stemmed from the necessity to provide repair facilities to meet the increasing volume of shipping on the West Coast. This had also prompted the two outside Governments to participate. The British government was especially interested when it was guaranteed that the dry dock would be large enough to handle ships of the Royal Navy. With these considerations in mind it was thought at first that neither the federal Government nor the Department of Public Works would have much to do with either the construction or maintenance of the dock.

British Columbia did not have much luck with its undertaking. Before very long, things connected with the construction of the dock began to go seriously wrong. In 1882, for instance, a special provincial commission revealed that in budgeting for the dock, the Government had, among other things, failed to allow for the supply and use of cement - an item that would cost some \$250,000. Needless to say, this threw out the Government's financial planning. (12) The province made a valiant try from this point, taking over the work from the contractors. This only created other problems, problems that were compounded by a lawsuit against the Government by F.B. McNamee, the former contractor on the work. (13) Within a year it became apparent to all that if the work was to be completed it would have to be done under the auspices of the federal Government.

In September 1883, partly as a result of the ever-present negotiations between the Government of British Columbia and the federal Government over outstanding grievances, it was decided that "the Government of the Dominion shall take over the Graving Dock forthwith, and, upon Parliamentary sanction being given, complete it with all convenient speed, and thereafter operate it as a Dominion work". (14) In this respect, the federal Government was to acquire the £50,000 that the Imperial Government had offered towards the venture but was also expected to pay British Columbia for work done to date. This agreement only served to create further controversy as attempts were made to find out exactly what this was worth.

As expected, the Government obtained the parliamentary sanction required to complete the agreement, and funds were voted to allow the Department of Public Works to continue construction. (15) By late autumn of 1884 tenders had been let and the contract given to the firm of Larkin, Connolly and Company of Quebec. The Annual Report for that year could state that under this new contract "good progress had been made". (16) Langevin also wrote optimistically to Macdonald that the "Esquimalt works

have fallen in the hands of Larkin, Connolly and Murphy who are building the Lévis and Quebec docks. They are experienced men and will, I believe, do the work well." (17) Considering the number of contracts that Public Works had entrusted to this firm, it was to be hoped that Langevin's estimate of them was correct. Future events, however, were to bring both the Esquimalt dry dock and the firm of Larkin, Connolly and Company very much back into the public eye.

There were also a number of projects of some importance in the area of harbour and river works supervised only indirectly by the Department. This indirect supervision was the result of that long-standing and somewhat vague connection between the Department of Public Works and the Harbour Commissions of Montreal and Quebec. In theory, the Harbour Commission were independent bodies, but in fact the Department of Public Works often acted as overseer of their projects. This degree of control existed because more often than not the projects of the Commissions depended on funds or loan guarantees voted by Parliament. Rather than completely lose control of federal funds, Public Works exerted a secondary control on their expenditure, although the Commissioners remained responsible for the actual planning and direction of the projects. It was a far from satisfactory relationship and events of the next decade were to indicate that efforts would have to be made to find a better one.

Two major projects in this category were under way in 1880, although they were to grow in importance and were pressed to conclusion under the newly-defined Department. The first was the construction of a major graving dock at Lévis, to serve the needs of the East Coast as Esquimalt was to serve the West. An 1875 Act of Parliament had provided funds for the construction of the Lévis dock, which was supposed to be finished in 1882. But as a result of problems with the contractors and additions to the original plans, \$97,856.08 had been spent by 1881 and the dock was still far from complete. (18) Eventually, new contracts had to be let with Larkin, Connolly and Company, and further money raised by Parliament in the form of a loan guarantee. With the passage of a bill to obtain another \$100,000, the dock once again started to move towards completion. In all this the Department of Public Works acted as a go-between for the Commissioners and the Government. The confused relationships often made it difficult to tell exactly where the crucial decisions regarding the work were made. The relationships were to become even more confused when individuals like Henry Perly undertook work for the Harbour Commissioner while he was Chief Engineer of Public Works and when Hector Langevin's brother-in-law, Thomas McGreevy, sat on the board of the Quebec Commission. Such details did not seem too important so long as progress continued on the works at hand, but the overlapping and blurring of responsibility were to contribute to major problems as time went on.

Public Works also had indirect responsibility for the performance of the Montreal Harbour Commissioners in the dredging of the St. Lawrence ship channel. The channel of this most important of all arteries had been a matter of concern for the Department of Public Works from the time it had begun canal construction in the 1840s. Early efforts had resulted in the improvement of such crucial and tricky areas as Lake St. Peter, but it was not until the post-Confederation period that the ever-increasing volume of shipping, ship size and displacement made the question of the channel a central one. There was little or no point in merely enlarging the canals or

improving the rail facilities to Montreal if modern ships could not reach that city in safety.

In 1873, in response to this need for increased depth, arrangements were made for the expenditure of \$1 1/2 million by the Montreal Harbour Commissioners in an attempt to reach a minimum depth of 25 feet between Montreal and Quebec. By the end of the decade the money had been spent and the depth nearly achieved. The problem was that just as one depth was achieved another seemed desirable. With a large financial investment already made, the St. Lawrence channel seemed to demand continued improvement if it was to remain competitive. As an 1881 memorandum from the Chairman of the Montreal Harbour Commission well illustrated, the argument was very similar to, and very much tied to, the investments made in the St. Lawrence canals:

The importance of this work thus described, in developing the St. Lawrence as our great commercial highway, can hardly be overestimated. It is no longer necessary to argue for the superiority in economy of large vessels over small ones as that question has been settled by universal consent.... In fact, therefore, the improved channel to Quebec is a necessary continuation of the great St. Lawrence canals, and without it these works would practically fail in their object, and the outlay upon them, especially the wisdom of enlarging them must be greatly questioned. (19)

The logic of the argument was irrefutable. So too was the fact that the number of ships and the amount of goods they carried were increasing. Within a couple of years the Government made the decision to take the depth of the channel down another 2 1/2 feet, to 27 1/2 feet. In a report to Council dated May 17, 1883, Langevin related that on his request, John Kennedy, the engineer of the Montreal Harbour Commission, had reported that it would cost an additional \$900,000 to reach the 27 1/2-foot depth. The Government decided that the investment already made and the probable increase in future traffic justified undertaking the project. It was recommended that legislation similar to that used to advance money to the Quebec Harbour Commissioners be passed to provide the necessary funds. Once again, Public Works was to act in a supervisory role, all expenditures of money to be approved by the Governor-General-in-Council on the recommendation of the Minister of Public Works. Also, and of more immediate importance, Langevin suggested that "Mr. John Page, Chief Engineer of Railways and Canals and Mr. Henry F. Perley, Chief Engineer of Public Works be named at once to verify Mr. Kennedy's calculations, measurements and estimates of cost". (20)

Support for the project and the general acceptance of its worth was such that within four days the Government introduced the Act required and saw it pass the House of Commons. (21) The general support was further indicated by the absence of any attempt on the part of the Opposition to block, slow or even debate the bill. The only objection came from a Government member, Joseph Ouiment, who felt it unfair that the money would eventually become a debt of the Harbour Commission when the work was in fact a national one. (22) The passage of the Act assured the continuation of the project that had begun in 1873. The growth of the

nation's trade meant that through to the twentieth century, expenditure on the St. Lawrence ship channel was to be a major annual item.

The second general area of activity for the Department was in the construction and maintenance of public buildings. This, of course, had always been a function of the Department and one that had continually increased in size with the growth of the Dominion. The 1879 Act meant that this (by now) major activity could receive greater attention and thought. In the public mind it probably became the activity most associated with the Department of Public Works. Major projects were few and far between, but local post offices or government buildings served as physical reminders of the Department's efforts in practically every town in the Dominion.

The Department was fortunate in finding an able successor to Thomas Scott upon that architect's retirement. Thomas Fuller, the man who had designed the Parliament Buildings, was one of Canada's best-known architects. He had also shown his administrative abilities when he had kept both his reputation and his contract during the scandals that surrounded the construction of these buildings. Thus, when Fuller, hearing that Scott was about to retire, wrote a note to Samuel Keefer saying, "I should like the appointment", Keefer wasted no time in passing the information on to the Prime Minister, pointing out that "if it is the intention to fill Mr. Scott's place, you have here a rare opportunity of securing on your own terms, the services of the best architect I know of in North America. You remember him as the architect of the Parliament Buildings". The only problem that might exist, Keefer felt, was Fuller's age, but he hastened to reassure the Prime Minister, "I am sure there is plenty of good work in him for years to come". (23) To the 66-year-old Macdonald, the 58 years that Fuller had reached did not disqualify him for responsibility and he passed the idea on to Langevin with the comment, "You ought to secure him." (24) Langevin in turn recognized the opportunity and immediately wrote to Fuller. By the time Scott retired, which was within a couple of weeks of the Keefer note, the arrangements had been made and on October 31, 1881, Thomas Fuller became Chief Architect of the Department of Public Works. (25) He was to remain in the position for sixteen years and leave his mark on a good many of Canada's public buildings.

The actual construction efforts under Fuller's direction varied widely in both size and location. It is nevertheless possible to discern two general patterns of construction in the period from about 1880 to 1900, patterns that reflected the current state of the nation's development. First, in the older eastern provinces the small and basic edifices of a generation before were being replaced with larger, more imposing buildings, which mirrored the more mature societies of these older regions. In St. John, New Brunswick, for instance, a major new Customs House was completed by the end of 1883. In Toronto several buildings were constructed, the largest of which was a government warehouse under construction by the middle of the decade. In Hamilton, a new federal building was to cost the Government \$231,409 by 1885. (26)

Fuller and the Department planned such buildings on the assumption that they would be used for some time and would stand as symbols both of the Canadian Government and of Canadian wealth. A growing young nation, as Langevin put it, had to have "public offices on a scale commensurate with the wealth and the extent of the city. It is hardly dignified for the

Dominion to have its public offices in a rented or poor building in large cities". (27) This was an attitude that could be and was contested. As Richard Cartwright commented during a supply debate, "It seems to me that an immense amount of money is wasted on filigree work, that does not add much to the dignity or importance of the building." (28) These were question of aesthetics and economy, which like many others in the Department's history, have remained a source of controversy and changing policy.

If the Department constructed major buildings in the East for a maturing society, it sought in the West to provide basic buildings for a frontier. Post offices, sheds for immigrants, and barracks for the Northwest Mounted Police appear as recurring items in the 1880s for the western territories. (29) The buildings were most often basic in construction and small in size. Nevertheless, the provision of such services for the growing West was a crucial part of the work of the Department. The decision to provide, or to not provide, facilities at a particular location could have a significant effect on the future growth and development of the area. Throughout the process of development, those involved in the West attempted to bring this central government agency around to their view of where such buildings should be built.

Not all construction in the West was on a small scale or even basic. The Department became involved in a grandiose and more controversial piece of construction in the new Province of Manitoba. In 1879 a delegation from this province took to Ottawa, as was traditional in this period, a demand for remedy of various grievances having to do with their original decision to join the Dominion. The Conservatives responded favourably, and it was decided that the Department of Public Works should undertake to provide the province with a residence for the Lieutenant Governor and a Legislative Building. (30) The rationale that Langevin used to defend what seemed an unnecessary charge on the federal purse was that "all the other provinces when they came in had Parliamentary buildings and residences for Lieutenant Governors, but Manitoba being a new Province was not provided with these new buildings". (31) It was Richard Cartwright who once again voiced the scepticism of the Opposition with the comment, "I was not aware that there were any promises or pledges given in the terms of union with Manitoba." (32) As Cartwright should have realized by 1880, relations between federal and provincial governments were much more complex than the official terms of union indicated. The Manitoba Parliament Buildings were constructed by the federal Department of Public Works.

The Department had always had harbours, rivers and government buildings within its jurisdiction. It acquired a new activity in the 1880s when it assumed responsibility for government telegraph lines. Government involvement in telegraphic communication was a relatively new thing. It had developed out of the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railroad and the need for a system of communication through areas as yet too sparsely settled to attract private firms. As the Government's involvement developed, it was decided that the system could be expanded to other areas of Canada, for as with many other aspects of Canadian development, the Government would have to remain involved if adequate services were to be developed.

The system was organized on more than a temporary basis in 1880 when Frederick N. Gisborne was appointed Superintendent of

Telegraphs, (33) but it was not until 1882 that the final step in organizing this service was undertaken. Until then there had been a split jurisdiction, with telegraph lines connected with the Canadian Pacific Railway under Railways and Canals and the rest under Public Works. In March of that year, it was finally decided that "as a consequence of the handing over of the Canadian Pacific Railway to a Syndicate the requirements which made the control of the corresponding lines of telegraph necessary to the Minister of Railways and Canals no longer exist, and the management of these lines should more fitly rest with the Minister of Public Works". (34) Gisborne and the government-owned telegraph lines became a new and important branch of the Department.

Government involvement in telegraph services implied no intention of supplanting private companies. Rather, the activities of Gisborne and the men under him were restricted for the most part to the development of communication in sparsely-populated areas. First, in the East there was a concerted effort to extend telegraph communication eastward from Quebec City along the north shore of the St. Lawrence for the sake of ships using this major transportation route. With the development of the line it would be possible to relay news about weather conditions, the arrival of ships and information concerning vessels in distress to the populated centres to the west. It was a major task to string the lines through rugged and empty country and several hundred thousand dollars were spent on it annually through the 1880s and 1890s. By 1898 however, the telegraph service had been established to such an extent that it was possible to talk of an extension through to the Strait of Belle Isle. (35) Of course, the lines never really paid even their own operating costs, but they were considered important enough to shippers to be kept in operation.

The second major project, as might be expected, was the provision of telegraph facilities to the frontier areas of the nation. Under Gisborne's direction the Government undertook, in an energetic fashion, to string telegraph lines across the Northwest. In this case, the assumption was that eventually the area would be able to support such lines. The Government decided that it could not wait to do the work until this hypothetical future day arrived. As it had in many other areas, the federal Government took a direct role in developing the West. In general, lines were extended in the 1880s from the original Canadian Pacific Railway line to settlements off the track. Such towns as Carleton, Humboldt and Prince Albert were quickly added to the national communication system. (36)

A concomitant of the federal Government's involvement in the West was its control of decisions and policy with regard to that area. There was much more support for the Canadian frontier in Ottawa than there was in Washington for its American counterpart; but there was also more centralized authority. Centralization, however, could also create problems. Gisborne was stringing wire across open prairie; decisions on the towns that he decided to put or not put on the route could affect their future as much as did similar decisions about public buildings. Thus the Department was often faced with local interests and the demands of settlers to have some say in a decision that would affect them directly. If the Department chose to accept the suggestions of local interests, it would run into a number of varying and often contradictory suggestions. If it chose to ignore them, it ran the risk of serious local resentment.

In 1883, when the telegraph lines reached Prince Albert, the people of that town were already in none too good a mood. The decision of the Macdonald government and the Canadian Pacific Railway syndicate to run the railway across the southern part of the prairie had surprised and hurt these people who firmly believed they inhabited a town that would be a major centre in the opening Northwest Territories. This blow had been followed by the transfer of the capital from nearby Battleford to "Pile of Bones" (rechristened Regina, as a name more in keeping with its new status). Thus, when Gisborne arrived in town and began to give instructions on the route of the telegraph, he ran into considerable local resentment.

The incident that followed was sparked, it seemed, when Gisborne decided to ignore the recommendations of a local committee as to where the line should run. As one Alex Sproat later recounted it, the ignored citizenry "resolved to stick together, come weal or woe". Having obtained no satisfaction in their representations they turned to direct action, for "after the meeting was over about 300 lined the street to John Macdonald's and pulled out every pole - carrying them up to T. McKay's lot on Hind and Baker's property". The next morning Gisborne responded by having several warrants of arrest sworn out. However, when the persons charged were brought to court they were "backed up by 150 to 200 people". In order to avoid a major and possibly violent confrontation, court was adjourned. Gisborne seems to have decided that he would be wise not to push the point too far and, as Sproat phrased it, "Mr. Gisborne has taken leg bail during the early morn and fled the country to Battleford." (37)

Although this was a relatively minor incident, it serves to illustrate both the importance of the Department of Public Works to the developing areas and the resentment that could arise as a result of ignored local interests. The Canadian Government, in its development of the West, opted for centralized planning and control. No doubt there were a good many advantages (not only to a given area but to the nation as well) in such a policy; yet the above incident indicates that this attitude could create both resentment and resistance when taken to the extreme.

For all the problems that existed, the construction of telegraph lines in the Northwest indicates that the Department, in spite of the 1879 Act, remained much more than a "service department". Though less completely and less dramatically than before, the activities of Public Works reflected and to some extent determined the direction of development in Canada. Battleford resident William Laurie commented, for instance, that the arrival of Public Works officials and Public Works money "naturally attracted several traders, and speedily the nucleus of a small town was formed". (38) The creation of a telegraph line, post office or other government presence added to the attractiveness of a town and, as in the case of North Battleford, increased its chances for further growth and prosperity.

The Department also had direct connections with the economic development of the West. The Prairies had always been thought of as a potential hinterland of the St. Lawrence and given the belief in canals at that time, it is not surprising that the possibility of navigating western rivers was taken into consideration.

As early as 1848 British engineer and visionary Millington H. Synge had envisaged the natural waterways of the Prairies as an integral part of any scheme to bridge the continent. (39) Others picked up on the idea, including Henry Youle Hind, who suggested in 1887 that "if the channel of the North

Saskatchewan were cleared of boulders and improved, it might be ascended by a powerful steamer". (40) The terms of union between British Columbia and Canada, with their commitment to a transcontinental railways, relegated the scheme to the sidelines, but the potential of the Saskatchewan was not completely forgotten. In 1880 a small step was taken to turn the ideas of the last several decades into something more concrete. In that year an arrangement was concluded whereby the Hudson's Bay Company would build and provide steamer service up the river, "provided", as Charles Brydges, now a company official, put it, "we can have assurance that the river will be put into such a condition as to allow our boats to run with safety". (41) The Department of Public Works responded by including \$20,000 in the estimates, but nothing was actually spent and in the following year Brydges had to complain that "you never did anything about the improvements on the Saskatchewan". (42) Finally, as Public Works seemed to be none too anxious to do the work, it was decided that the Hudson's Bay Company would make the improvements and the Department would retain supervisory rights and foot the bill. By the end of 1883 the work was under way. (43)

The Saskatchewan improvements were minor compared to such gargantuan tasks as the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway. At the same time, if the effects of this improvement are added to those of one of a similar size on the Red River, along with the results of telegraph lines, post offices and other facilities, the presence of the Department of Public Works in the developing West becomes very significant. In terms of the development of physical facilities it would be fair to say that it was second only to the railroad itself.

The Department of Public Works had always been a construction department. The fact that it lost railway and canal projects in 1879, did not alter this fact. One of the problems that had always faced the Department as a construction agency was the role it had in maintaining and controlling works once they were finished. It was generally the policy of the Department to maintain as much control as possible over works it felt to be important and central to its mandate. Thus, in the 1840s and 1850s, for instance, Public Works had attempted to retain control over the operation of canals and had been relatively unconcerned about other works. It was fitting then, when railways and canals were removed from its jurisdiction and as public buildings came to the fore, that the Department should indicate a concern for continuing control of such works.

Typical of this increased interest was the Department's concern about its ability to maintain responsibility for the day-to-day upkeep of public buildings. Prior to 1873 it had been up to the occupying department to find, hire and supervise caretakers for their building. After 1873, Public Works had responsibility for the hiring and nominally for supervision, but salaries remained under the individual department, which made for a confused jurisdiction. Experience showed that caretakers took orders from the people who paid them. In an attempt to resolve the matter, it was decided in 1881:

With a view to preventing any possible misapprehension in the matter that hereafter, in addition to the employment of such employees and the direction of their duties, the question of their number and remuneration be placed within the province of the Department of Public Works,

and that the expense consequent upon their employment be charged against the appropriations for the maintenance and repairs of Public Buildings generally. (44)

With this decision the Department took greater control over the functioning of government buildings and thereby increasingly assumed the role of a service department.

As the Department took on a greater service role, it faced increased jurisdictional problems. In part, the problem could be traced to the vagueness of the 1879 Act. The lines distinguishing the responsibilities of the construction-department (Public Works) from those of the client-department were not clearly drawn. The Department of Public Works, although it was willing and anxious to take over a good many of the duties of managing government buildings, often felt that far too much was handed over to it only when things went wrong. Thus, for instance, when problems arose concerning the Customs House at Montreal, Langevin wrote to Mackenzie Bowell, the Minister of Customs, "If an investigation is to be made it should be conducted by your Department and not by mine." Bowell disagreed; he wrote on the back of Langevin's letter, "Customs not having anything to do with it other than to occupy it, I am of the opinion that the investigation should be made under the authority of the Department of Public Works." (45)

Such incidents constituted the negative side of the increased responsibility for the management of constructed works. With such broadened jurisdiction, Public Works might be able to ensure that things operated more smoothly, but they would also be called upon whenever problems arose with regard to accommodation, construction, or inadequacies, imagined or real, in government buildings.

This negative side meant that in certain cases the Department also made a concerted effort to leave responsibility to other departments. Usually the same general rule was followed: where the Department saw the particular responsibility was central to its mandate, it attempted to acquire greater control. Where control seemed to be more trouble than it was worth the Department was by no means unwilling to let it lapse. An important precedent was set in just such a case, when in January 1884 Langevin suggested to Council that

the repairing of Military buildings and fortifications might be placed under the control of the Minister of Militia and Defence who has control of such works after their construction. The Minister therefore recommends that the work of repairing Military buildings and fortifications be under the control of the Minister of Militia from and after the 1st of July next. (46)

Not much was said at the time about the rationale for the transfer. When the bill to put the recommendation into effect was before Parliament, Langevin said simply that "it is considered that these works would be attended to perhaps more scientifically if they were under the Department of Militia." (47) A clue is given in the recommendation to Council. Unlike other public buildings, military fortifications, once completed, remained almost exclusively the concern of Militia. There could be no reallocation of space, nor could the Department view them as typical of government-owned buildings. When the Department of Public Works found that it could exert little control over either maintenance or repair policy, it may have concluded that such a building was quite simply a nuisance.

Whatever the reason for the decision, the Opposition was not at all pleased with it. Alexander Mackenzie, now back in his old role as watchdog of the Government from across the floor, charged, "This is an attempt practically to create a new Department under the Militia Minister, for it will be blown out into a Royal Engineer's Department." (48) Edward Blake termed it a "vicious division of labour, not a real division". (49) There was some validity in the comments of the Opposition. The decision to turn over part of the authority for government property to the Department of Militia hampered the development of what would seem to have been a major new mandate of the Department after 1880. In the same way that the creation of the Department of Marine and Fisheries in 1867 had confused the responsibility for transportation, so the transfer of repairs confused the responsibility of the Department for construction and maintenance.

There were already a number of cross-currents in the area of the responsibility of the Department of Public Works for the maintenance of buildings and other facilities already constructed. The inability to find a clear-cut line of jurisdiction became more of a problem as time went on and as the property of the Government grew. With every building constructed, there was an increase in the overall importance of such post-construction administration. By the approach of the twentieth century, it was becoming a significant part of the overall activity of the Department. The average amount spent on repair and maintenance by the Department between 1884 and 1886, inclusively, was 17.7 per cent of all expenditures. Between 1891 and 1893 this average had risen to 38.2 per cent, while between 1894 and 1896 it reached an amazing 49 per cent. On the other hand, between 1884 and 1896 construction dropped as a percentage of the total from 83.7 per cent to 43.73 per cent. Obviously, the decisions that the Government and the Department took with regard to such operations were becoming more and more important as years went on. It was becoming questionable by the end of the century whether Public Works should even view itself primarily as a construction department.

Expenditures of Public Works, 1884 to 1896:
Repairs and Maintenance as a Percentage of Total (50)

Year	Total Expenditure (in \$)	Repair and Maintenance (% of Total)
1884	4,021,768.04	16.24
1885	3,375,555.35	17.22
1886	3,586,042.02	19.59
1887	3,343,759.49	23.57
1888	3,428,943.00	22.06
1889	3,517,297.66	24.91
1891	2,762,020.95	33.54
1892	2,089,644.38	41.90
1893	2,274,448.47	39.17
1894	2,315,021.67	42.43
1895	2,033,219.53	48.86
1896	1,583,409.35	56.26

Note: The year 1890 is excluded because the Department absorbed a large debt from the Montreal Harbour Commissioners in that year; thus the figures for that year are distorted.

As the totals in the table indicate, the expenditure of the Department had increased significantly between the 1879 departmental division and the mid-1880s. Most of the growth was due to the increasing number of projects and the maintenance work of the Department. There was also in this period a significant growth in the "management" charges incurred by Public Works. This category, which meant salaries, in part reflected the increasing demands for staff in the wake of new projects. It was also, however, an integral part of the development of the Department into a self-contained entity after the 1879 division. The Opposition noted this development and complained bitterly about this by-product of the division. Edward Blake pointed to the growth of this category in the two departments and wondered if it would not be more economical to undertake "the reconciliation of these two departments". The only noticeable result of the division, he concluded, was "a very large additional expenditure". (51) Needless to say, Blake's suggestion was ignored by the Government. By the mid-1880s the Department of Public Works had gone a long way towards developing a set of procedures and goals different from those of the Department of Railways and Canals. There was to be no reunification, then or later.

By the middle of the decade Hector Langevin was able to put out an annual report full of confidence that the Department had both a challenging and an important role to play in Canada's development. He stated, "I desire to direct the attention of Your Excellency to the great increase in the work of the Department which has taken place in the last four years, especially as regards the number of new buildings which have been erected, and of piers, breakwaters, etc. which have been built." He summed up the degree of activity of the Department in a revealing sentence, saying, "A greater number of necessary and useful works have been undertaken during the four years from 1st July, 1882 to 30th June 1886, than were undertaken during the fifteen years from Confederation to 30th June, 1882." (52)

The report indicates that by 1886 the Department of Public Works (as defined after 1879) had found its footing. It had developed a sense of its priorities and had brought harbours, rivers and public buildings to the central place once occupied by railways and canals. By this time Baillarge, Perley and Fuller seemed as comfortable in their positions as had men such as Trudeau and Page. The organization of the various branches and the decision-making process had also solidified in the seven-year period.

The organization of the Department as it existed in the middle and later 1880s was fairly straightforward. Under the Deputy Minister there were four principal officers, each of whom presided over more or less distinct branches. Henry Perley as Chief Engineer, Thomas Fuller as Chief Architect and Frederick N. Gisborne as Superintendent of Telegraphs headed what might be termed the operational branches of Public Works. The Headquarters staff of these branches was quite small, consisting of a few assistants, some clerks and messengers. Their main staff was in the field, from where dozens of regional officers reported to the heads of their divisions.

The fourth principal officer was the Secretary of the Department. In 1886 this position was filled by Alex Gobeil, appointed after the sudden death of F.H. Ennis. This branch was really the administrative section of the Department. It handled the preparation of reports, coordination of activities, general administrative functions, and through the accountant, all

financial matters. This branch also differed from the others in that it acted much more as an arm of the Deputy Minister, sending down his instructions or sorting things out for him. An alternate way of viewing the Department might be to see the function of the fourth branch as a general supervisory one under the Deputy Minister, with the Secretary as his chief administrative assistant.

The most obvious thing about organization and procedure in the 1880s was the degree to which the top officials became involved in seemingly trivial decisions. Historical problems of pinning down responsibility seem to have resulted in an insistence that upper-level officers take actual as well as theoretical responsibility for most matters under their charge. Thus it was still the direct task of the Chief Engineer to prepare accounts for submission to Parliament.

The Architect's branch was equally involved in such matters. To the famous designer of the Parliament Buildings fell the task of deciding on every piece of office furniture, window blind or repainted room that might be requested by another department. (53) Nor was the designation to his office merely a formal procedure with some minor official actually carrying out the work. In a good many cases Fuller himself or his assistant, also a professional architect, would personally see to the order. This was certainly the case if the request was at all out of the ordinary. The amount of relatively trivial matter dealt with by senior officers can also be illustrated by the other end of such requisitions. If a department wanted to have its request complied with, stated a Public Works directive of December 1880, then the requisitions had to be signed personally by the Minister of the department making the request. (54) The few times that a responsible official, such as a Deputy Minister, attempted to put through a request he inevitably had his form returned by the Department of Public Works. Perhaps, then, all things considered, Thomas Fuller need not have felt that such activities were beneath his position.

Only the Secretary's branch seems, by this time, to have developed any sort of systematic delegation of responsibility. It had been standard procedure for Thomas Begley and one assistant to go through every account and transcribe all the correspondence of the Department personally; but this practice was being superseded by new methods in the course of time. The organization, as set out in 1880, gave recognition to the position of accountant and under Octave Dionne, this position acquired a fair degree of authority for matters that had previously fallen directly on the shoulders of the Secretary. (55)

The permanent staff was of course responsible to the Minister and the Cabinet. As had been the case from the time the politicians had asserted control over the Department, the Minister and the Cabinet as a whole were very much involved in the operation of Public Works. Hector Langevin continued to entrust a fair degree of responsibility to his permanent officials. At the same time he kept very much abreast of what was happening in the Department. His knowledge of affairs was impressive. Nearly fifteen years after he left office, one colleague would take the opportunity to use his example in criticizing the (then) Liberal Minister of Public Works. In a 1905 supply debate, Sir George Foster commented that he "never knew a Minister of Public Works who was so explicit in details, and who in his book had so many of these little plans ready". (56) Hector

Langevin's combination of experience and political power made him a very strong Minister.

The Cabinet was the collective decision-making body of the Government. Probably more than Parliament as a whole, it had a decisive role in determining departmental policy and organization. As was the case at the permanent level, a great number of relatively trivial matters seem to have gone to Council. For instance, when a messenger in the Charlottetown public building requested a leave of absence, his request went first to Langevin for approval and then to Cabinet where an Order-in-Council finally made the leave possible. (57) Not too much time was probably spent agonizing over the decision, but that such a matter should come before Cabinet at all indicates how the attempt to maintain adequate controls over the Civil Service had meant that decisions were forced to a very high level for resolution.

The 1880s were actually a period of transition in terms of such controls. In 1878 the Auditor General had been made an independent officer and could thus begin the aggravating task of criticizing the expenditures of both the Civil Service and its political heads. (58) The Treasury Board had also come into existence as a subcommittee of Cabinet and was beginning to handle some matters that had previously taken the time of the whole Cabinet. These bodies, however, were relatively new and their activity seemed to be confined to small matters of travelling expenses, overtime and retirement procedures. (59) They had begun to relieve the top political officials of some work and to systematize procedures, but it would be a long time before the process was complete.

The development of such exterior bodies as the Auditor General and Treasury Board was only one of several changes affecting the Civil Service in the 1880s. The decade was also a period of rapid technological change and this was to have an equally powerful effect on the working environment and methods of the Civil Service. In particular, the decade witnessed two technological developments that symbolically mark the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century.

The first development was the telephone. Invented by Alexander Graham Bell in 1876, it very quickly became a practical instrument of communication. The government was quick to take advantage of this new device and since as a communication instrument it was related to telegraphs, it fell to the Department of Public Works to make arrangements for its use. Every Minister, Deputy Minister and other high official soon felt it to be an urgent necessity to have a phone put in both his office and home at government expense. As early as 1880 Langevin had to tell his staff to place no phones in public buildings without his authority in writing. (60) With this assertion of control the Department was able to allow for expansion of the service and at the same time maintain some order. By the middle 1880s the telephone had become a standard part of the technology of the Civil Service. (61)

The other major change was the application of electricity to lighting. Once again, this time because the Department was in charge of public buildings, it fell to Public Works to decide on a policy for its use. The Department and the Government were much more cautious about the installation of electricity than they were about the telephone. Quizzed by Laurier in 1883 about the possible adoption of electricity, Langevin replied carefully that he was not yet satisfied with the durability and flicker of

electric lights. (62) Part of the reason for the hesitation was cost. There was of course no power grid that could simply be hooked up, and expensive generating facilities would have to be constructed if large-scale use of electricity was adopted. Over the years 1882 to 1885 Public Works experimented in various places with electric lights, but by the latter years was still not ready to light the Commons chamber. The reason, as Langevin replied to a question by Cartwright, was the cost. "If we have electric light in this Chamber as well as in the Senate ... we will require to have engines erected below the cliff." (63) If the adoption of electricity was slow, however, it was also constant and by 1890 most government buildings in urban areas had electric lighting.

Another conspicuous feature of the decade was the growth of the Civil Service. The East and West Blocks of Parliament, which in 1867 had seemed so luxurious and spacious after years of temporary accommodation in temporary capitals, were by the 1880s overcrowded. Several departments, or parts of departments, had to be moved to rented buildings scattered around the city. (64) Langevin summed up the problem in the 1882 Annual Report: "The great increase in the business of the country, and the consequent enlargement of the Departmental staffs, has, for some time past, caused overcrowding in the Departmental buildings." (65) The Government therefore decided to erect another major building for the Civil Service outside of Parliament Hill. In 1883 the Department of Public Works moved to acquire property on Wellington Street, facing the Parliament Buildings. (66) By June of that year the property was "legally vested in Her Majesty" at a cost of \$88,136.84. (67) The session of that year saw Parliament vote \$207,000 for the building; plans were drawn up and tenders let.

This building, which was eventually to be named the Langevin Block and which still stands at the corner of Metcalfe and Wellington Streets in Ottawa, was contracted out to A. Charlebois. The Department and the Government as a whole seem to have been proud of the new structure. Great care was taken, for instance, in the selection of sandstone: John Page's advice was even solicited by his old department before the final selection was made. The building was to give the Civil Service room for expansion and to incorporate the latest design techniques. Tastes change, and for those familiar with the massive stone structure, the description Langevin gave of the building as one where "we should be able to have plenty of light and airy rooms for the use of officers" will illustrate the prevailing taste in the official architecture of the late nineteenth century. (68)

The building was a costly one and it was charged by many that this was the result of favouritism to the contractors. Finally, after the expenditure of well over a million dollars, the Department of Indian Affairs had the honour of being the first to move in at the end of May 1889. (69) This department was eventually followed by the Departments of the Interior, Agriculture and the Archives. (70) As has often been the case, by the time the building was complete it had become inadequate. The continued growth of the Civil Service between 1883 and 1889 meant that even with the completion of the building some officers would have to make do in overcrowded rooms and rented buildings.

If technological and physical changes heralded the growth of certain modern characteristics in the Government, other events indicated the

persistence and increase of an older feature of the Government. Various historians of the United States have portrayed the political climate of that nation over the latter decades of the nineteenth century in extremely negative terms. Canada, which was not as well-developed industrially, was by no means a mirror image of the political climate to the south. At the same time there are several indications that politicians, businessmen and those in charge of the public purse acted in such a way, that a phrase used by one American historian, describing the period as the "Age of Cynicism" could also have been applicable north of the border. (71)

As the earlier history of the Department of Public Works made abundantly clear, patronage was always a part of the life of the Canadian Civil Service. Yet it has been argued that Canadians have generally clung to the concept of a non-partisan Civil Service along British lines. The concept of a partisan Civil Service, popularly known as the Jacksonian system, had never been acceptable. Thus a climate of disrepute pervaded the whole concept of patronage or other uses of the Civil Service for political ends. Alexander Mackenzie's anguish in attempting to reconcile this belief to political needs serves as a good example of the strength it had. And while Langevin and other individuals were less troubled about it, there always remained the belief that a "good man" - whether of one's party or not - deserved a chance for advancement. The principle that merit was the reason for a person's position had always been maintained, though often in bent and tarnished form. Whatever failures existed in the practice of meeting the ideals, it does seem that the ideal itself did serve to some extent to buffer civil servants from political influences and partisanship. (72)

Partisanship and the use of patronage existed in the 1880s as it had in other decades and the Department of Public Works was no exception. "Castle, the bearer of this note", wrote Bowell to Langevin, "has been employed at Government House for some time but his services were dispensed with." If Langevin would see that he was rehired, continued Bowell, "I shall consider it a favour." Langevin replied, "I have done this for you." (73) Such interministerial favours were as standard as the old practice of having the local Member of Parliament choose men for temporary positions. Such practices had been in existence for a long time and were unlikely to upset the informal guidelines between partisan politics and the Civil Service.

Two trends had more serious implications. First, the Government in the 1880s seems to have been highly systematic in directing public works to ridings where political advantage would result. The practice itself was not new to this decade. A note from Hugo Kranz to Macdonald requesting a new post office in his riding because "my chances of re-election depend upon this grant" was almost identical to Walsh's letter to Chapais of eighteen years before. (74)

What was changing was the degree to which the special favour was becoming standard practice. Also, more and more ridings that had made the mistake of voting for the Opposition were being cut off from public works development. As the decade went on, the Opposition began to accuse the Government of setting out construction policy for partisan ends. Peter Mitchell, a former Conservative turned Liberal, summed it up in one sentence in a supply debate in 1888. "I notice", he commented in an almost resigned manner, "that all the grants are for constituencies of members who supported the Administration". (75)

More disturbing than this was the changing attitude of the Government to criticism of these tactics. With the possible exception of minor local appointments, the Government in power had previously always denied in the most vigorous terms that it practiced any sort of systematic partisan policy. It was a fiction but one that indicated not only the persisting existence of the ideal of a non-partisan Civil Service but also the realization that too much patronage was unacceptable to the public. A significant exchange in the House, however, indicated that even the fiction was disappearing. Langevin was at the time attempting to put through the supply vote for Nova Scotia buildings, when as was usual by this time, he was charged with favouring Conservative constituencies. Specifically, Jones charged the Minister with making policy on the basis of advice given by a Conservative ex-member. Rather than deny it, Tupper and Bowell came to the defence of both Langevin and the practice. Bowell's comment was uncomfortably explicit: "You consult your friends when anything is to be done in a constituency, and it is the merest hypocrisy to preach or lay down any other doctrine, as being practiced by any other political party in this country." (76) David Mills replied with the opposite and more traditional doctrine that "the Government are trustees, not merely for those of their own way of thinking, but for the whole people of this country". He was, however, unable to shake the Conservative stance. (77) Bowell's position reflected a significant change in the principle on which patronage was practiced. If his theory was taken too far than it would come very close to destroying the concept of a non-partisan Civil Service and administration of government policy.

The above exchange typifies much of the atmosphere that surrounded the Government and the Civil Service by the later 1880s. As elections became closer, politicians directed more and more of their time and energies towards securing their party's position. The public in turn seems to have been relatively tolerant of such attitudes and charges of patronage and corruption had little effect on the electorate. The trends of the decade, however, moved in a dangerous direction. Partisanship and patronage, in more extreme forms, shaded easily into unconscionable corruption. The 1873 Pacific Scandal, the North Shore Railway scandal of 1882 in Quebec, and other less infamous examples on record revealed how easily partisanship could become tainted with graft. A warning was given once again in 1890 when a prominent Conservative member, J.C. Rykert, was implicated in fraudulent timber deals. (78) The warning, if it did any perceptible good, came too late and in 1891 a bigger scandal surfaced. In the centre of it was Hector Langevin and the Department of Public Works.

From Cartier's death in 1873, Hector Langevin had been Macdonald's French-Canadian lieutenant and the head of the department most amenable to patronage in the Government. As Minister, he was certainly no stranger to the use of his position for political advantage, nor was he much less explicit about this fact than Bowell had been. When a freshman Member attempted to press him on the question of a post office being constructed in St. Thomas, the Minister coolly replied, that in effect, "if he had the misfortune to lose his election and his friends were in power and he consented to be clerk of the works, he would not find the pay given Mr. Achell too much". (79) At another time, during a debate on a bill to end the use of patronage in hiring of staff for the Civil Service, Langevin gave a very guarded evaluation of the probable result: "I have no doubt there will

always be politics connected with appointments made by any Government. I have yet to see a Government which will appoint its opponents to office. As a rule a Government appoints its friends." (80)

The end of the decade was to see Langevin embroiled in a scandal that went beyond patronage. Around Langevin and Thomas McGreevy - who, besides being Langevin's brother-in-law, was treasurer of the Conservative Party for Quebec - was to swirl a political scandal comparable in magnitude to that of the famous Pacific Scandal of 1873.

The construction firm of Larkin, Connolly and Company was involved in a great deal of contract work for the Department of Public Works in the 1880s. The Esquimalt graving dock, the dock at Levis and major construction in Quebec Harbour were among the larger works under their control. In fact, the firm seems to have done especially well at the hands of the Department of Public Works and its loosely related body, the Quebec Harbour Commission. This is especially true, given the fact that they had very rarely submitted the lowest tender for the works they had obtained. (81) In spite of this there was little reaction from the Opposition throughout much of the decade and it is conceivable that nothing would have resulted from this high proportion of contracts awarded to a single source.

Nevertheless, such a possibility quickly disappeared when there began, in the words of one historian, "La version canadienne et moderne du fraticide de Caïn." (82) It all began when Robert McGreevy took his brother Thomas to court over the division of profits. Robert McGreevy was the contractor who had taken over the construction of the Canadian Parliament Buildings from his brother Thomas towards the end of the project. In more recent years, however, he had been a "silent partner" of Larkin, Connolly and Company, hired primarily to use his influence with his brother and, in turn, with Government officials, to the company's advantage. The potential of the scandal building up in the wake of the estrangement of the two brothers was enormous. Possibly nothing could have prevented a scandal, but it is certain that the presence of one man hastened its disclosure.

Israel Tarte was known in political circles as the editor of the powerful newspaper, Le Canadien. Forty-two years old in 1890, he had had close connections with politics in Quebec for years. He had at one time been regarded as a Conservative, but was independent enough or erratic enough - depending on one's views - to remain somewhat of a renegade, and quite willing to break party ranks to speak out on an issue. Everyone did agree that Tarte was a perceptive editor with an eye for political news. Thus, when Robert McGreevy brought him facts and figures concerning the collusion between himself and Thomas, Tarte realized he was sitting on political dynamite. In April 1890 he started to detonate the stuff, a little at a time. Le Canadien began to unwind what Tarte knew of the scandal. (83) Thomas McGreevy and the Minister of Public Works, Hector Langevin, figured prominently in the articles.

Langevin, Tarte implied, had knowingly cooperated with the McGreevy brothers in obtaining information that would enable Larkin, Connolly and Company to obtain contracts. There were charges of illegally rigged tenders and favouritism by the Minister and Harbour Commissioners. Most serious perhaps, was the charge that Langevin had in effect been bribed, receiving for his efforts money that might have found its way into the party's coffers or the Minister's pocket.

The way the scandal unfolded (and the public and political reaction to it) must of course be viewed against the background of the political circumstances of the period. By 1890 Langevin was no longer the undisputed leader of the Quebec Conservatives. Joseph Chapleau had made serious inroads on the Minister's base and was demanding greater recognition from the party. Chapleau's interest in removing Langevin from his position complicated matters and made it much more difficult for the Conservative Party to close ranks in the face of impending trouble. Chapleau, posing as a man out to find the truth whatever the cost, could put pressure on the party and by judicious statements to the press, warn that any attempt to cover up would be useless. Throughout the early months of the scandal Langevin could not be sure the Conservative Party would not suddenly abandon him.

Another important factor was the age and health of Macdonald. In this crucial period he was unable to exert the control and direction over his party that would have been possible a few years earlier. And across the floor from the aging Prime Minister was a new leader of the Liberal Party. Wilfrid Laurier had replaced the temperamental Edward Blake in 1887 and had given the Opposition an aura of freshness, youth and unity that contrasted sharply with the plight of the Conservatives. There was no doubt that even without scandal the Liberals were ready to press hard against the Government.

It was some time before Parliament got around to dealing with the charges against McGreevy, Langevin and the Department of Public Works. The winter of 1891 brought an election in which the question of "unrestricted reciprocity" with the United States temporarily eclipsed the scandal. There was little doubt that the last had not been heard of it. Israel Tarte was elected to Parliament as a Member for Montmorency, pledged, it was said, to unearth the truth: "Mr. Tarte goes to Parliament expressly to demonstrate that Sir Hector's department is no better than a den of thieves, and says he can accomplish the task without difficulty." (84)

Thus, although both Langevin and the Conservative Party were successful in their re-election bid, it was apparent that they were in for a very difficult session. In fact, it was to be the last one for the Minister of Public Works. Against a complex tableau of intra-party rivalry, the tactical ascendancy of the Liberals, the ruthless independence of Tarte, and the corruption of politicians and contractors, the Langevin-McGreevy scandal began to unfold in earnest.

On May 11, 1891, Israel Tarte formally introduced in Parliament what the Globe referred to as "by far the most serious indictment ever preferred against a Minister of the Crown". (85) The scene was a dramatic one. Tarte had given notice that he would present a motion, and as a result the galleries were packed with curious spectators. There were several minor items of business to be dealt with before Tarte could take the floor but no doubt all eyes were on this "ministerialist" who sat on the Opposition side of the House. The huge stack of papers that lay on his desk gave the impression of vast knowledge of the events of the scandal and when Tarte did finally rise to present his motion, there was "funereal quiet". (86)

Although a good many of the charges had been stated before informally in Le Canadien and copied by newspapers throughout the land, the formal presentation left no doubt of their potentially devastating effect on Langevin, McGreevy and the Department of Public Works. (87) Tarte

dodged little in his resolution and specifically charged Langevin and McGreevy with having received money for their efforts:

That from the year 1883 to 1890, both inclusive, the said Thomas McGreevy received from Larkin, Connolly and Co. and from his brother, R.H. McGreevy, for the consideration above indicated, a sum of \$200,000 ... That certain members of the firm of Larkin, Connolly and Co. paid and caused to be paid large sums of money to the Hon. Minister of Public Works out of the proceeds of said contracts. (88)

It was further charged that officials in the Department of Public Works itself had accepted bribes from McGreevy or from Larkin, Connolly and Company. Langevin and McGreevy both denied the charges completely and they were referred to the Parliamentary Committee on Privileges and Elections. The stage was set for high political drama.

When the Committee began its sessions, the public and press both found it of much more interest than the regular proceedings of Parliament. There were three general levels of charges to be investigated. The first, and strongest case, was against Thomas McGreevy. Did he work with his brother to obtain favours for Larkin, Connolly and Company and did he use undue influence in doing so? The second general level was the question of whether or not Langevin was involved. It was this question that attracted more public attention than any other, and understandably so, for there was the career of a Minister at stake, a Minister who had laid claim to the leadership of the party should Macdonald die. The third level, generally ignored by the press or mixed in with the second, nevertheless had important and distinct implications. There were allegations that permanent officials of the Department of Public Works had knowingly participated in the conspiracy. If these charges were proven, the already bruised reputation of the Department would be seriously injured and the principle of an independent and respectable Civil Service called into question.

If political drama was expected, the events before the Select Committee did not disappoint. Besides the continuing revelations, there were such things as disappearing witnesses, destroyed records, and that common phenomenon of all scandal, extremely vague memories. The sittings made front-page news for months. (89) By the end of May the situation had reached the stage where the Globe could comment: "It is the general opinion ... that McGreevy is already a political corpse and the chief speculation is whether or not the inquiry will prove fatal to Sir Hector Langevin." (90) The Globe was a Liberal paper and thus perhaps a little too quick to pass sentence, but it is significant that the government newspapers were conspicuously silent on the question of Thomas McGreevy's innocence. There was good reason for this. The first few days of testimony had very nearly proved that McGreevy had indeed used his influence and had received money for doing so. Henceforth, the investigation centred on the question of the involvement of Langevin and the Department of Public Works.

As was to be expected, when it was all over, the Committee's majority report convicted McGreevy. Although it had found "no evidence of any express agreement on the part of Thomas McGreevy to give his help", there was little doubt that he was involved. "It seems to have been understood by the parties involved that such help and influence would be given." (91) The Committee further concluded specifically that McGreevy had relayed information and used his influence as a Member of Parliament in relation to the

"cross-wall contract" for Quebec Harbour and the Lévis graving dock. Thomas McGreevy was disowned by his party and expelled from Parliament a short time later.

The majority report found McGreevy guilty and Langevin innocent. Reviewing the testimony given and pointing to the absence of hard evidence to accompany what did seem to implicate Langevin, the report concluded that Langevin was not involved:

Your Committee, for the reasons given above, report that the accusation of personal corruption has not been sustained, but has been disproved.

As to the second of these charges ... the Committee report that no evidence was submitted to show that Sir Hector Langevin was connected with the "improper manipulations", or the giving of information improperly. (92)

The conclusion on McGreevy had been accepted by all the members of the Committee. Such was not the case with this majority report on Langevin. A minority report was composed by Opposition members who charged that Langevin was being whitewashed by his party colleagues. Although they did not feel that the charges of having accepted bribes were conclusively proven, they did conclude that Langevin was "guilty of a breach of the public trust." (93) The Committee was a parliamentary one and whatever the merits of either side, it was inevitable that the majority report would carry the day. Its report was adopted by a vote of 17 to 9 and later confirmed by a straight party vote in the House. (94)

The consequences of scandal in political circles are not always simply those formally recorded in committees. By the time the report was presented, Langevin was finished as Minister of Public Works and as a political power. Whether the charges were formally proven or not, sufficient suspicion had been raised against the Minister in the public mind as to leave him no choice but to resign. There were even rumours that his resignation was part of a bargain, whose other part was the exonerating majority report.

Essentially, as the investigation had developed, Langevin had been forced to choose between two positions. As Laurier put it in the House, "Either the explanation is knowledge, participation and connivance on the part of the Minister, or the Minister was utterly incompetent." (95) The choice was not very palatable and whatever his choice, resignation would be necessary.

Adding to Langevin's problems were the political rivalries between himself and Chapleau. On June 6, John A. Macdonald had died. With his passing Langevin lost his most powerful ally and the party lost the man most able to pull it together. In the wake of the Prime Minister's death, rumours flew that Chapleau was demanding the portfolio of that other great spending department, Railways and Canals, and that he openly demanded that Langevin be deposed as French-Canadian leader. There was no possibility that Chapleau and Langevin could be accommodated and there was no John A. Macdonald to mediate.

By August 11, Langevin had made his decision. Taking the stand at the inquiry he announced that although he intended to give the "most positive denial", he had concluded that he was "bound at once to lay my resignation as Minister of Public Works in the hands of the First Minister." (96) He then went on at great length to deny any sort of involvement but in a way this

was irrelevant. The decision had already been made and the political price paid. The satirical magazine Grip put the choice in cartoon form when it showed a bull's head with one horn marked "knavery" and the other marked "incompetence". Langevin was pictured clinging to the latter horn. (97).

With Langevin's resignation, nearly twelve years of continuous administration by one man came to an end. There were both ironies and tragedies in the scandal. Israel Tarte, the man who more than any other brought Langevin down, had originally been a Conservative. In fact, in the 1887 election Hector Langevin had recommended him as a candidate, writing to a C. Clement that Tarte "fera un candidat fort; actif et capable". (98) Tarte did not run until 1891 - and then as one working to bring down the person who had supported him four years before. One wonders if, as the scandal unwound, Langevin remembered this letter.

There was also irony in the position Langevin took as a way out of his dilemma. From all accounts he seemed a very capable Minister, much more able to follow and understand the complex activities of the Department than many before or since. It will never be certain that Langevin did in fact know of the actions of McGreevy, but his own record as Minister tended to make a good many people suspicious. Laurier, for instance, after outlining the choice Langevin had made, commented that any man "who has seen the Minister leading the House in the Committee of Supply" could not possibly conclude "that he was incompetent to discharge the duties of his department". (99).

If these were the ironies, the tragedy was Langevin himself. A man who a few years before had been Macdonald's second-in-command and seemingly destined for the leadership of the party, suddenly, at the very time Macdonald's mantle should have fallen to him, found himself discredited and politically ruined. Even if Langevin was guilty and consequently deserved his fate, his rapid fall made him a tragic figure. The faithful party politician, in an age that had always seemed to allow people to go one step further in political partisanship, suddenly found himself alone. Hector Langevin sat as a private member and then retired to Quebec City waiting for a vaguely promised appointment as Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec. The appointment never came and Langevin died in 1906. (100)

The fall of Hector Langevin dominated the scandal. But beneath the turbulent political surface lay a good many disturbing questions about the Department of Public Works in its non-political context. Israel Tarte, in his motion for an investigation, had argued that there were officials in the Department who had been either bribed or otherwise influenced into cooperating with Larkin, Connolly and Company in having their tenders accepted or arrangements made whereby they would reap greater profits. Specifically singled out by Tarte was Henry Perley:

That the said Thomas McGreevy used his influence as a member of this House with the Department of Public Works, and in particular with Henry F. Perley Esq. to induce him to report to the Quebec Harbour Commissioners in favour of the payment of the said sum of 35 cents per cubic yard for dredging in Quebec Harbour. (101)

In the early stages of the investigation it became apparent that McGreevy could not have done so well had he not had the cooperation of officials in the Department, but as several people pointed out, it was only natural that McGreevy should get some cooperation. He was, after all, both

a Member of Parliament and a member of the Quebec Harbour Commission. The relationship seemed much more dubious when on July 8th Owen Murphy, a member of the firm of Larkin, Connolly and Company, testified that he had given Perley a large present. (102) The next day a very ill Perley took the stand to testify that "Mr. Murphy's statement is correct". (103)

Perley was a victim of human weakness. Murphy had offered to give the Chief Engineer a present for "what I had done for the Commissioners". Perley refused to take cash but when Murphy continued to insist, agreed to accept a "little thing" for his wife. (104) The two men were thinking in different terms: Murphy purchased some \$1,800 worth of jewellery and plate as the "little thing" Perley had agreed to accept. Up to this point Perley was not necessarily implicated, but rather than return this large "douceur" he accepted it. A year later his conscience seems to have caused him to give Murphy an IOU for the gift but until after the investigation, the value of the "little thing" was never actually repaid. Before the gift there is no indication that Perley had acted deliberately to throw work to Larkin, Connolly and Company because McGreevy, Langevin or anyone else wanted it done. Rather, if there was favouritism, it was because the Chief Engineer felt that "their equal is not to be found in Canada". (105) Whatever the reasons for his previous actions, he did, in accepting the gift from Murphy, seriously compromise both himself and his Department. As the Globe phrased it after his testimony before the Committee, "His usefulness in gone." (106)

Perley's weakness cost him his position. The very day that the Chief Engineer confessed, the Minister, nearing the end of his tenure, wrote Perley that, "The decision of the Council is that under the circumstances you should be suspended ... and that from this moment you must cease coming to your office and transacting the business and work of the Chief Engineer." (107) Perley attempted to gain restitution by repaying Michael Connolly the value of the IOU with Gobeil as a witness. (108) But the Government, fighting for survival in the wake of the scandal, could not afford to be overly generous with the Chief Engineer. A memo dated October 29 stated conclusively that "the suspension of Mr. Perley ... be final". (109)

Scandal spreads a wide net. Several minor officials of the Department who had really played only a very small part in the events under investigation found themselves under fire. John Arnoldi, the Chief Mechanical Engineer of the Department, Horace Talbot and Earnest Dionne, clerks in the Department, were dismissed because at one time or another they had accepted gifts from the firm of Larkin, Connolly and Company. (110)

Although in the end the Committee found the Department of Public Works innocent of any illegal activity, the actions of Perley, Langevin and the others, as well as the whole aura surrounding the scandal, had seriously hurt the image of Public Works. Grip, referring to the scandal of the year before, pictured Rykert standing beside a huge foot marked "Department of Public Works", with the former M.P. commenting, "Didn't I tell you I was only a little boddler?" (111) The Montreal Star, when it heard Perley's confession, demanded both a "sweeping reorganization of the Ministry and a sweeping civil service reform". (112) The Department of Public Works was deeply enough involved in the Langevin-McGreevy scandal to once again raise the question of the proper relationship between the Government of the day and the Civil Service.

Typical of the reaction to the events of the scandal was that of the Liberal-Conservative Association of Toronto. Writing to the Minister of Justice shortly after the Perley testimony, this organization put forth a plan whereby public works would be under the auspices of an independent commission composed of the Chief Engineer of Public Works and the Chief Engineer of Railways and Canals. There would be a Minister, but he would have "practically no active duty to perform". (113) An honest attempt to find a way out of the dilemma of political control and partisan pressure, it was a form of commission government that was to become increasingly popular over the next few years. There was little chance, however, that the Department of Public Works would be organized on this technocratic basis. The Department had had an experience with a similar organization years before. Hamilton Killaly and the Board of Works was not the answer to Hector Langevin and political partisanship.

There was in fact no sweeping reorganization of the Department or its procedures in the wake of the scandal. Perley was replaced by his capable assistant, Louis Coste, and the Department sought to rebuild its badly tarnished image. Another effect was manifested in departmental operations. Badly shaken in the wake of the scandal, the Department seems to have cut down on new major projects over the next few years. To some extent, this was the result of the depression that settled over the nation in 1893, but the traumatic effects of the scandal also contributed to this reduction in public works projects. The 1891 Annual Report listed the total expenditure as \$2,762,020.98, the smallest since 1883 and some \$3 million dollars less than the previous year. (114)

Insofar as major abuses were concerned, patronage within the Department of Public Works was significantly reduced in the final years of the Conservative administration. In part this was the result of the contrast between Langevin (of whom it was once said by a colleague that "he likes it - patronage - too much") and Joseph Ouimet, Langevin's successor. (115) It was also partly the result of the Langevin-McGreevy scandal. In some ways the scandal helped to remedy the problem that had created it. Implicit in the events of 1891 was a distinct warning, which politicians and civil servants alike were not slow to note. While patronage by no means ceased to be practised there does seem to have been a change in direction, a decline in partisan use of the Civil Service. The next year, for instance, a Royal Commission on the Civil Service expressed the new sense of division between permanent employee and politician when it suggested that the Minister should not be too involved in running his Department. The reason the Commission gave was that such practice "may tend to bring the administration of public affairs somewhat too closely into contact with politics". (116) The statement summed up a great deal about the growing awareness of the division between the two.

Perhaps more than any other department, Public Works felt this change of attitude. Patronage continued, but the permanent staff seems to have increasingly demanded that it be made clear who was taking responsibility for it, so as to ensure that the general integrity of the Department and its projects would not be destroyed. (117) The year 1891 was not the last year to see dubious connections between the permanent Civil Service and political heads, but in evidence of the effect of the scandal and the lessons that were learned from it, there was never again to be anything like the Langevin-McGreevy scandal in the history of the Department.

CHAPTER 8

YEARS OF PROSPERITY AND GROWTH

1896-1911

The Conservative Party took a long time to recover after the death of Macdonald and the disgrace of Langevin. Problems of leadership, the aging of Party members, and French-English relations plagued the Government through the 1890s. Sir Charles Tupper assumed party and government leadership in early 1896, but the 75-year-old veteran of the Confederation era failed to give the party a new lease on life. In the July 1896 general election Wilfrid Laurier led the Liberal Party to power. It was the end of eighteen years of continuous rule by the Conservative Party.

A change of government after such a period of time was bound to have an effect on the Civil Service and in particular on the Department of Public Works. The party in power, however, represents only one of the factors that influence the policy formation of the permanent Civil Service. Other factors such as the needs of the nation, the presence or absence of prosperity and hence availability of funds, and the general outlook of the public towards development are also important. The changes that took place in the spirit and policies of the Department of Public Works after 1896 could not have come from a change of government alone. Rather, the year 1896 brought a change not only in the government but in other factors as well.

Throughout the last years of their administration the Conservatives faced a general depression that hampered development and brought the value of the West and the future growth of Canada into question. In such an atmosphere major new projects and grandiose schemes seemed foolhardy, and the Department of Public Works reflected this spirit in its routine and cautious policies. Coincident with the Liberal accession to power, however, came a lifting of the depression and the beginning of a new period of prosperity for Canada. Between 1891 and 1911, for instance, the population of the Dominion grew from 4.8 million to 7.2 million. On the economic front, exports were to increase from \$82 million to \$356 million. (1) Canada began once again to show the rate of growth that had been so confidently predicted at the time of Confederation. Optimism revived, and it was in

keeping with the spirit of the age that Wilfrid Laurier made his famous statement: "The nineteenth century was the century of the United States, the twentieth century will be the century of Canada."

Like the coming of the depression, the return of prosperity was a world-wide phenomenon. In any event, Canada, an expanding country dependent on exports, was very conscious of the revival; and of all areas of Canada, the most affected by the boom was the West. The Northwest had been the great hope of the Confederation age but it had never quite materialized. The 1880s had brought disappointment in spite of a gradual growth in population. Relative to the booming American frontier to the south, such slow progress could only be seen as failure. The great wheat export market that had been promised had yet to develop in 1896: with the advent of prosperity at the turn of the century, however, it developed at a truly amazing rate and more than any other factor accounted for and symbolized the prosperity of the age. The population of the West increased rapidly during the first decade of the twentieth century. Whereas the population in the whole of the vast area then known as the North West Territories was only 95,000 in the middle nineties, by 1905 the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan had come into existence and the population of the two new provinces stood at some 400,000.

These figures show that Laurier held office during a boom period. The growth and prosperity of the nation were reflected in government as well. Government revenue increased from \$40 million to \$135 million between 1890 and the First World War. (2) Such prosperity and growth imposed new demands on the Civil Service. The Department of Public Works was no exception. In turn, the increased activity of the Government and the Department of Public Works led to secondary problems of organization and management. For Public Works, the ensuing years were to be both exciting and perplexing, in sharp contrast with the depressing atmosphere that seems to have hung over the Department in the early part of the decade.

When Laurier chose his first Cabinet in July 1896, the man he picked as Minister of Public Works was already connected with that Department in the public mind. In the wake of the Langevin-McGreevy scandal Israel Tarte had swung over to the Liberal Party. A valuable and tough-minded fellow-combatant with Laurier in capturing the former Conservative stronghold of Quebec, Tarte was almost certain to obtain a Cabinet position in 1896. His appointment as Minister of Public Works both increased the power of the Department in government circles and indicated that it was considered an important portfolio. Tarte was one of Laurier's most powerful allies and their enemies often referred disparagingly to this relationship as the Laurier-Tarte administration. Events were to indicate that the relationship was not as durable as the previous one between Macdonald and Langevin. There is however no doubt that Tarte was considered a senior member of the administration when Laurier took office.

As had been the case with Langevin, Tarte accepted this particular portfolio partly because of his ability and desire to control the dispensation of patronage throughout the nation. Tarte was an extremely tough-minded politician and saw this as a part of his responsibility. His activities in the port of Montreal, for instance, were important in breaking the decades-old Conservative hold on that city. (3) One disgruntled Liberal was to say of the new Minister that the former activities of Langevin were "completely eclipsed, cast in the shade by ... J. Israel Tarte". (4) Tarte himself

admitted, with a frankness reminiscent of Mackenzie Bowell, "I have employed a good many of my political friends - it is my duty to do so as a Minister." (5) At the same time Tarte was never to become implicated in a major scandal nor does he seem to have ever attempted to turn the Department of Public Works into a vehicle for personal enrichment.

There were other things about Tarte besides his frankness about patronage that were reminiscent of the man he helped to expose. Like Langevin, Tarte combined a sense of what was politically necessary with a genuine enthusiasm for the projects of the Department of Public Works. He was a dispenser of patronage but he was also a man who caught the spirit of the nation's potential and saw the possibilities of the role of public works as a factor in national development. Also like Langevin, Tarte was a Minister who seems to have understood the workings of his department, a fact that gained him respect in both the House and the Cabinet.

Tarte's genuine interest in both politics and the Department was strengthened by the fact that he was also a tough-minded administrator. During his tenure as Minister there was never doubt as to who was in charge of the Department. Moreover, he seems to have been able to work closely and on good terms with his permanent staff. During one prolonged absence of Tarte, his Deputy Minister, Gobeil, wrote that "*j'ai été un peu beaucoup comme un poisson hors de l'eau depuis votre départ*". (6) Thus, for all his political manoeuvrings, this erratic and egotistical genius exercised an important influence on the Department during his tenure. He presided over it at a crucial time of growth both for Canada as a whole and for Public Works in particular. In essence, he was the right man in the right office at the right time. He was able to set general policies and strategies of development that were to last throughout the whole period of the Laurier administration and long after his own period of office had ended.

While Tarte's first major action in the Department revealed his ability to make changes and administer plans, it did not reflect the spirit of progress and growth that was to typify the age. Tarte took the portfolio intending to cut down on staff and expenditure. His motivation may have been similar to Alexander Mackenzie's, where years on the Opposition benches had made him critical of the waste and expenses of the Government. It also went back to the 1891 Royal Commission, whose visit to the Department of Public Works had led the Commissioners to conclude: "This Department is somewhat overmanned." (7) The Commission also came to the conclusion that the need for other staff could be done away with by revising the methods of bookkeeping and record maintenance. Tarte seems to have remembered the report and to have attempted to follow its recommendations when he took office.

While the decision was Tarte's, he seems to have had the support of Gobeil. At the time of the Royal Commission, the Deputy Minister had admitted that the Department was indeed overstaffed in some areas but complained that it was extremely difficult to reduce staff; each man appeared to have a plausible reason why neither he nor his section should suffer. (8) Since the Minister and the Deputy were like-minded in this matter, any objections could be firmly overruled. Certainly both men were rigorous in their decision to carry through the policy. Within a year, twenty-five men had been dismissed from the inside service under the general heading of "reduction of staff". (9) The cutbacks continued and the overall effect was significant. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1894, the

total expenditure on "inside service" salaries had been \$168,385. By the end of the 1898 fiscal year the figure had dropped to \$133,500, a reduction of more than 20 per cent. (10)

The deliberate policy was confined to cutbacks in staff, not projects. Tarte, in fact, denied that projects were involved in his "reforms" of the Department. (11) At the same time it is apparent that in the first few months of his administration the primary effort was directed at tightening the efficiency of the Department with the object of eliminating waste. In this atmosphere few new projects were begun and the total expenditure, which had been heading downward since 1890, remained at the very low figure of \$1,744,654.21. (12) The Langevin-McGreevy scandal, the depression of the 1890s and Tarte's initial concern with waste had combined to reduce the expenditure of the Department and its impact on the nation drastically.

Tarte's reductions of staff, may have allowed the removal of expendable employees but such reduction could at best be temporary. The depression had lifted and demands for projects throughout the nation would soon force the expansion of departmental staff. The increase in staff salaries would be insignificant compared to the operational growth of the Department. Tarte himself admitted in Parliament that "our public works are in a very dilapidated condition". (13) The need for maintenance and repair of old works and the constructions of new ones meant that the next year's expenditure rose to nearly \$2 1/4 million dollars and that by the 1902 fiscal year expenditures had risen above the 1890 figure. (14)

This increase in the expenditure of the Department in the first years of the twentieth century once again reveals the close connection between the development of the Canadian economy and the response of the Canadian Government. Nor was there ever a more spectacular or sudden example of this relationship than what occurred on the far reaches of the Canadian frontier during the late 1890s.

One historian phrased it well when he said that August 1896 saw the "most important single event in the history of the Canadian North". (15) Gold was discovered on a tributary of the Yukon River. The strike proved to be a rich one and was quickly followed by other equally lucrative finds. As it always seems to do whenever the smell of gold is in the air, the news spread rapidly to the rest of the Yukon. During the next few months residents of this northerly and isolated Canadian area were staking out claims with feverish intensity. The remoteness of the Yukon and the iron hand of winter that soon fastened on the area meant that it was not until the summer of 1897 that the news and rumours reached the more southerly and populated areas. And shortly after - when individual prospectors began to come out as rich men - the Klondike Gold Rush began.

Before this sudden development the Yukon had been an unsettled and largely forgotten area. Like the rest of the Canadian Arctic and Subarctic it had neither demanded nor received much attention. Its residents, few and far between, consisted mainly of Indians and Eskimos leading a life that was a mixture of old and new patterns. The other residents were adventurous and optimistic prospectors seeking for the magic strike. Until comparatively recent times, the Yukon had existed under the most primitive form of institutional organization. Only in 1895 had the North West Mounted Police established a Yukon force of twenty men to represent the authority of the Canadian Government in the region. (16)

The gold rush changed all this. The Canadian Government was suddenly faced with a new and distant frontier of great importance to the nation. The population and the potential of the area were growing rapidly and the territory could no longer be ignored. Moreover, the speed that characterized the development of the gold rush meant that official circles had to move with equal rapidity in response to problems implicit in the situation.

The problem of the Canadian Government was basically twofold. First, it had to try to assert Canadian control over a large area that had previously been loosely patrolled and governed. Thousands of tumultuous miners, a good many of them from the United States, were pouring into the region. The possibility of social chaos and lost revenue if control was not established and maintained was very real. More hypothetical, but no less important was the chance that the idea of American annexation might gain a hold on the miners. Certainly the possibility of American economic control over the area was not to be discounted.

The second and equally compelling necessity was for the provision of government facilities for transport and trade for the boom region. Thousands of miners had to be given means of entrance and exit from the territory and following the miners were the traders with their demands for facilities to transport their goods to the area. The second necessity was, of course, connected to the first. If the Government would provide facilities to link the Yukon to the general network of Canadian trade and transportation, then the problem of sovereignty and economic control would be largely solved. If the Government failed to develop this connection, the Yukon market would of necessity follow routes that were more likely to lead the San Francisco than to Vancouver or Victoria.

Beneath the grand strategies of economics and politics was the basic question of human need. Thousands of adventurers were entering the region with little experience or money. The hardships inherent in the climate and scale of distance could be, and often were, great at any time in such a frontier region. With the sudden expansion of population and in the absence of basic facilities the hardships could become incredibly great. Hundreds went home penniless, and for every man who became rich several died. It was Canadian territory, and both the hope of development in the future and the urgent necessities of the day demanded immediate action.

The Department of Public Works was handed the task of finding out what could and should be done for the Yukon in the areas of transportation and communication, and then doing it. Early in 1898, while thousands in both Canada and the United States laid plans to enter the area in the spring, the Department created a new subject classification. The volume referring to this matter was entitled simply "Yukon". (17) The sense of urgency was revealed by the speed with which the Department acted. Louis Coste, the Chief Engineer, was immediately sent to the West Coast; from there he made his way up to the Yukon to study the problems of transportation and communication with the outside. Arthur St. Laurent, a rising assistant engineer in the Department was sent to Edmonton, and though "delayed by snow and train wrecks", was in that city by April, assessing the same problems as Coste but from the eastern side. (18)

St. Laurent's specific task was to investigate the feasibility of access to the Yukon from Edmonton. Such a route would avoid numerous problems, which plagued any route developed from the West. It would have allowed

direct access from the Yukon to the east-west axis of trade, specifically to the great railways on which the Canadian transcontinental economy rested. It would have ensured that the Yukon purchased both its food supplies and manufactured goods from Canadians. It was, however, a long and extremely arduous route from Edmonton to the Yukon. Even while St. Laurent was investigating the possibilities, J.D. Moodie of the Mounted Police was tracking his way overland from Edmonton to the Yukon. The hardships his group underwent and the fourteen months it took them more or less proved that such a direct route was impracticable. (19) Rather, as St. Laurent concluded, the best possibility was to proceed westward from Edmonton over the mountains to British Columbia and from there northward by interior rivers. He concluded that the most the Department could do would be to fund the Edmonton City Council for the blasting of boulders on the Athabasca River. This, he noted, would "save a half a mile portage". (20)

If a few hundred were waiting in Edmonton for the opening of navigation, thousands were waiting at various points on the West Coast. Obviously the route from this area would be the important one and it fell to Coste to ascertain what should be done. Coste certainly accepted the premises of the Government on the importance of his assignment and warned that the Americans were "preparing for a twenty-five year boom" in the Yukon. (21) The development of a Canadian route was an absolute and urgent necessity.

There were two problems of major import on the western side of the mountains. The first was the difficulty of terrain. The Yukon remained a rugged and wild country whatever the effects of the boom, and to make improvements would be costly and time consuming. The second problem was international in scope. From the time the United States purchased Alaska in 1867, there had been a dispute as to where the international boundary was located. When both Alaska and the Yukon had been wilderness not much attention had been paid to the problem nor had any resolute attempt been made to solve it. Now, however, as the gold rush began in the Yukon, Canada was faced with problems of transportation to an area almost totally cut off by the Alaska panhandle.

One of Coste's assignments had been to investigate the alternative American and Canadian routes. At first he seemed to feel that an all-Canadian route would have to be found:

The port of Wrangel (American) is very inferior to Port Simpson. It is small and will, in my opinion, not be able to handle the whole of the business ... Furthermore, I learn on good authority that every pound of merchandise brought to Wrangel by ocean steamer will have to be landed on a wharf and go through a bonded warehouse before it is allowed on river boats. (22)

The Canadian route, he also felt, would have physical advantages. Port Simpson, Coste reported, "is a magnificent harbour, spacious and well sheltered, having one wharf 900 feet long". (23). Port Simpson was, however, farther away and more difficult to reach from the Yukon. After more investigation he was forced to concede that Wrangel, for at least a couple of years, would have to be the major port of entry. The Yukon would have to be brought under Canadian control and into the Canadian economy by a route that began at a foreign port. (24)

The immediate plan was to construct a Canadian warehouse at Wrangel as a means of providing cheaper transshipment and bonding facilities. Such a course added further complications since it required the permission of the American Government, and Coste warned that "it might be well to ascertain whether there would be any objection". (25) From Wrangel, Coste envisaged, men and goods would proceed by the Stikine River overland to Teslin Lake and from there by water to the goldfields. All of this had as a first premise a portage from the Stikine to Teslin, which would have to be "improved by the construction of a railway or wagon route". (26) This would provide a route to the Yukon usable by both prospectors and merchants within the year. Coste also looked ahead to the construction of a railway to a Canadian port, which "would certainly assure to Canadians the vast trade to the Yukon and a larger share of the immense riches contained in that territory". (27)

Coste's series of reports reveal a great deal about the interests and priorities of both the Department and its Chief Engineer. First there was the need for speed in development. Long-range plans alone would not suffice. The seasons of 1898 and 1899 had to see government action and improved facilities. This necessity forced the decision to use an American port for the time being. There was also the belief that the Yukon gold rush would be a long-range phenomenon. Plans for a railroad and the search for means to tie the area into the Canadian economy indicate that Coste and others expected that this new boom area would continue to be important and would henceforth be an important region in Canada. The Americans may have been planning for a "twenty-five year boom" but the Canadians had every intention of being there as well.

Besides the government warehouse at Wrangel and the improvement of the portage several other improvements were felt urgent. Coste was given authority to begin what was considered necessary in the way of improvements to the rivers that would form a part of the transportation system. Governor General's warrants, headaches for the Auditor General and an unusual degree of authority delegated to the staff on the spot characterized the first year of the Department's involvement in the Yukon. (28) By the end of the season a great deal had been done to change the routes into the area. The Government had definitely become involved in this previously ignored wilderness.

With the approach of the 1899 season Public Works began to form more definite plans and to set out priorities for development. A report of the Deputy Minister set out three priorities, all designed "to give better access to and communication with the Yukon country". The first - the improvement of the navigable or nearly navigable waters leading to the goldfields - had already begun. This included work on the Stikine-Teslin route advocated by Coste and on the route more popular among the miners, via Skagway. The latter was less desirable from a Canadian Government point of view because it could never be made into an all-Canadian route. Gobeil estimated that basic improvements on these two routes would cost about \$24,000.

The second area of necessity was the establishment of those services that a populated area of the country had a right to expect. Specifically, the Department of Public Works would have to begin construction of "postal stations at various points to be indicated by the Department of the Post

Office, and the construction of huts and buildings wherein the postal business required may be transacted".

If the transportation routes to the Yukon were to remain both foreign-based and rudimentary for some time to come, it was thought possible to connect the Yukon to the Canadian communication system. The plans were formulated for the construction "of a telegraph line from our present British Columbia terminus at Quesnelle, via Fort Fraser, Hazelton, Telegraph Creek, Teslin, Fort Selkirk to Dawson City". (29) The government telegraph service thus became responsible for its most major effort to date.

The sense of urgency had not disappeared and Gobeil urged that the projects be "carried through at the same time and without delay". (30) While one group of men worked on the construction of the necessary buildings, another group under J.B. Charleson worked on the improvement of navigation. Work was begun immediately and continued at a feverish pace over the next couple of years. The speed with which the projects had been initiated and the rugged nature of the country created a good many problems. For instance, as several men complained, the Department could not follow the normal routines for hiring and firing men. To dismiss a person on the spot without salary or means of returning to the south was to create unfair hardship. At first Charleson followed the normal routine, but after a number of complaints reached headquarters Gobeil telegraphed, "Should not something be done to assist them out of the country?" (31) Henceforth the Department paid for transportation back to civilization for its men.

The demands of the wilderness also brought about a high degree of cooperation between men and departments in the field. Any significant interruption of supplies or lack of adequate shelter could seriously hamper the continuity of a project or even become a matter of life or death. Thus, for instance, the North West Mounted Police made a habit of providing supplies to the working parties of the Department of Public Works. (32) The practice created problems for the officials in Ottawa responsible for allocating costs. Nevertheless, it was very helpful indeed in ensuring that things proceeded smoothly in the field.

The most challenging, and most expensive, of the projects decided on in 1899 was the provision of telegraph service to Dawson. A glance at a map of the West Coast reveals that the government's "Yukon" telegraph line was, in fact, one that stretched across much of the interior of British Columbia. The distance from Quesnelle to Dawson was nearly a thousand miles: magnificent country, mountainous and mostly forested but largely uninhabited and impossibly difficult as well. Supplies had to be brought in from the Coast, ravines traversed and myriads of lakes and rivers crossed. Nevertheless, by the time of the Annual Report marking the turn of the century, it could be reported that the construction of this new line "has been successfully completed without any mishap". (33)

The burst of activity by the Department in the wake of the gold rush was not to last. By the early years of the twentieth century two things had altered the relationship of the Department to the Yukon. First, as procedures developed, more initiative was given to local officials. By 1904 the Commissioner for the Yukon also directed improvements for the federal Government in the area. (34) The second factor was the passing of the gold rush. Once the first major and urgent improvements were completed, the Department found it less and less necessary to continue development of the

area. As an example, the portage between the Stikine River and Teslin Lake had been contracted out to the Mackenzie-Mann syndicate for railway construction; but when the syndicate failed to complete the project, nobody seems to have considered finding another builder. (35) The simple fact was that the great boom that had been expected to last twenty-five years passed away in less than a decade. The Yukon once again became another area of routine preoccupation and minor importance to the Department of Public Works. With the passing of the Gold Rush and the Government's declining interest in the area, the Department of Public Works decided to sever Yukon affairs from its hitherto special classification records in departmental files. The last entry for the "Yukon" book was on February 17, 1910. For some years prior to that date only a few pieces of correspondence a year had been entered. (36)

The Yukon experience had been a romantic and adventurous interlude in the history of Canada and of the Department of Public Works. It had brought the Department into contact with the Far North for the first time and in turn, Public Works had played an important role in bringing the Yukon into closer contact with the rest of Canada. Although the gold rush came to an end, the improvements remained - especially the new telegraph line - and served to make the Yukon much more a part of Canada. The long-term effect on the Department was also significant, as it helped to push up its expenditure in the early years of the twentieth century. It had cost hundreds of thousands of dollars in construction activities and over \$200,000 a year simply to keep the Yukon telegraph line in operation. (37) The boom years had begun with a spectacular episode.

Though significant, the Yukon Gold Rush was not nearly as important to the Canadian economy or to the policies of the Department of Public Works as the wheat boom. In its own way, the growth of the prairie-based trade was as dramatic as the gold rush. Here at last, Canadians of the period could think, was the realization of the hope of Confederation. And as the flow of wheat eastward increased, so did the demand for harbour facilities on the St. Lawrence. The boom seemed also to create the opportunity for a revival of the transportation system that had for so long been unable to fulfil expectations.

Israel Tarte, the man charged with forming a policy response to this situation was a man who saw in it both political and economic possibilities. During his term of office as Minister of Public Works he exerted pressure on the administration to follow an aggressive, expansionist policy. On one occasion he wrote (to the Prime Minister), "The government should not hesitate a minute to spend \$20,000,000 or even \$30,000,000 if necessary." (38) The resultant flow through the St. Lawrence would, he felt, be worth the expenditure; for, "it means cheaper rates for our farmers, for the manufacturers of this country, for everybody; it means the building of towns and cities. I do not despair of seeing half a million more population in the city of Montreal than it has today". (39) Not since the 1870 Royal Commission had the possibilities of the St. Lawrence system been so fervently stated.

As the above quotation indicates, Montreal was seen as the focus of the whole system. It was the transshipment point, from the wheat cars of the Canadian Pacific Railway to the ships, and from the ships to other ships. It was also Israel Tarte's political base. The Opposition often charged the Government and the Minister of Public Works with deciding policy on

political rather than economic grounds. There is little doubt that Tarte was conscious of the political implications in this crucial and pivotal area. Whereas he was politically careful in matters of expenditure, his vision of the potential of Montreal went far beyond that city merely as a Liberal stronghold. Montreal, he commented in reply to various charges of opportunism, was the "natural point along the whole line of internal water communication in Canada where vessels should break bulk". It was for this reason that the city was regarded as the focal centre of the new grain trade: "I am firmly of the conviction that Montreal is destined at no distant day to be one of the greatest cities on the continent, and I am convinced that the day may be hastened or delayed by the action which is shortly to be taken with regard to the harbour." (40)

If Montreal was the focus of the system, it was by no means the only part that received attention. With the advent of the wheat boom the Department turned its attention to the achievement of two primary objectives. One was to provide adequate harbours, both at Montreal and inland, to allow lake shipping to become a viable alternative to railways. Various ports from Fort William through Georgian Bay towns to Port Colborne and Kingston had experienced tremendous new demands on their facilities, and the Department began to develop plans to meet the requirements of the new trade. Second was the necessity of supplying all the ports - especially at the two ends of the system, the Lakehead and Montreal - with sufficient grain-storage facilities to handle the tremendous crops coming out of the West. (41)

The Government and Tarte were thinking once again in terms of the rivalry between the east-west St. Lawrence axis and alternative American routes. Tarte specifically stated on several occasions that "we must organize the best possible means of communication so that we may be as independent from our neighbours commercially as we are politically". (42) Especially worrisome to the Department was what Gobeil referred to as "the rapid advance of Buffalo with regard to the improvement of harbour facilities and elevator equipment". (43) The diversion of trade to the United States imparted a sense of urgency to the Department.

Previously the nationalist attitude that surrounded the St. Lawrence system had made this general strategy of development almost exempt from criticism. By 1900, however, a good many efforts to stabilize the situation had been attended by at best indifferent results. This had led some to wonder whether Israel Tarte's philosophy that "in all commercial and national questions our motto should be 'Canada First' " was not an expensive and wasteful approach. (44) A good many heated debates arose over the expenditures on the St. Lawrence. (45) Yet although opposition arose, Tarte maintained his policies and seems to have been supported by Laurier and the administration. Certainly the permanent staff at the Department of Public Works seems to have pursued the policy with enthusiasm.

The St. Lawrence system was thus still - or perhaps, once again - seen as a valuable and important Canadian asset. It may have been, as Gobeil reported, that Tarte was "wide awake" in this matter, (46) but it is clear that once convinced, the Government as a whole undertook a policy of east-west development philosophically the same as that followed by Macdonald. Indicative of this were the similar policies followed after Tarte resigned. He left the portfolio of Public Works in 1903, yet the years after that revealed continually increasing expenditures on harbour facilities for the

grain trade under three different Ministers. The Annual Report for 1909 summed up what had been the outlook of the Department for the last decade in the comment, "These ports being naturally the spout through which the immense crop of the west finds an outlet, have claimed a special measure of attention from the department and will necessarily continue to do so for several years to come." (47)

The sums expended on what had previously been small harbours were huge. Collingwood Harbour on Georgian Bay serves as a good example of the effect of the wheat boom. Originally created by the construction of the Northern Railway in 1856, Collingwood had always had a certain connection with the West. The railroad itself had been, at least in part, the result of oronto's hopes for a new hinterland in that direction. The port had always been a jumping-off point for travellers to the Prairies from the time of the Dawson Route through to the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway. The combination of the railway and the failure of the West to live up to expectations had, however, left Collingwood a rather quiet town with only rudimentary harbour facilities. Then the wheat boom began and all this changed. Over the next decade Collingwood again became an important port and the Department of Public Works set out to construct a harbour suitable for the currently large grain trade and its seemingly limitless future. Between 1898 and 1907 more than \$600,000 was spent on improvements in this one town. (48) Nor was Collingwood by any means the largest of the Department's expenditures. Fort William, for instance, saw \$377,109.31 spent on it in 1909. (49) The wheat boom and the response of the Department of Public Works meant that a good many Great Lakes ports saw an increase in development and trade that would make the Laurier years an era to be looked back on with envy.

The renewal of faith in the St. Lawrence also created a renewal of interest in an auxiliary project. The construction of the Georgian Bay Canal had been strongly advocated at the time of Confederation by such people as Alexander Mackenzie. Yet despite the support given to the idea by the 1870 Royal Commission and the initial improvements made on the Ottawa River shortly afterward, by 1896 the project seemed long dead. Then the wheat boom came and the concept of linking Montreal to Georgian Bay captured the imagination of those interested in the trade once again. Moreover, the increasing revenues of the nation meant that it was once again feasible for the Government to think in terms of the vast expenditure that would undoubtedly be required. Talk once again began to circulate concerning the possibility of opening up the old Champlain route. (50)

Israel Tarte, with the enthusiastic support of his staff, seems to have been the first government member to suggest the idea of constructing the canal as an adjunct to the newly-invigorated St. Lawrence system. (51) Such major projects take time even for the decision to look into: it was not until 1904 that Parliament voted \$250,000 for a study of the feasibility of the canal and a survey of the country it would traverse. The new technology, the new demands of the trade and the current size of ships had made the old studies of little use. Thus even the study was to constitute a major project lasting several years.

An idea of the magnitude the study was expected to take on and the importance the Department attached to it is suggested by the serious consideration Public Works gave to the idea of an independent board of engineers to supervise the work. In the end it was decided that "the work

should be carried out under direct departmental control". (52) Arthur St. Laurent, the Assistant Engineer who had gone to Edmonton in connection with the Yukon works, was given the task of overseeing the project. It was to be a major boost in the career of this able engineer. To support him in his work, a "nominal board", consisting of Louis Coste, St. Laurent and the District Engineer, was in the habit of meeting regularly for the purpose of consultation. (53)

Supporting this board of engineers were, of course, the field parties, nine of them, dividing the route of the canal from Montreal to Georgia Bay into the same number of sections. These groups were the actual working parties and on them fell the most difficult physical work. As was the case with much that Public Works had been involved in from the time it was formed, the hours for the men in the field were long and arduous. F.G. Goodspeed, a young assistant engineer on his first assignment with the Department, referred to his immediate superior as a "slave driver" and obviously felt that the salary he was being paid was well earned:

The working parties were out of the camp by seven o'clock in the morning. If not, the Old Man's head would appear out of his tent door and he would shout: "What in h--- are you doing here at this time of day?" We usually started back toward camp to be there about six o'clock but it was often seven o'clock before we arrived. (54)

C.E. MacNaughton, whom Goodspeed referred to as a slave driver, seems to have been a tough character. Accustomed to life in the wilderness, his ways were as rough as his tongue. At various times, as Goodspeed records, the men of the party had to sober up their chief before the day's work began - or at least before the District Engineer saw him. (55) Nor did this young man of strict religious background find the survey parties to be composed of men with citified manners. In fact, the engineer's first assignment had been to sober up another member of the party, the rodman. Starting off a long and successful career on the right foot with the Department, Goodspeed reported that he had made a complete succes of his "first assignment as a civil servant". (56)

While Goodspeed's experiences may have had some sides that were extremely difficult to bear and seemingly irrelevant to an engineer, he had to admit that he learned quite a lot about working hard. In the process the young engineer gained a great deal from the survey, for it was a major project, and to do well was to earn advancement. By the end of the survey Goodspeed had been made a "first assistant engineer". (57)

Not the least valuable experience for this well-bred young man may have been his realization that men who led a life roughened by the wilderness still proved skilled and energetic in their position. Not all surveys were headed by men like MacNaughton, but Goodspeed's experiences were probably not atypical of the life and men to be encountered by a young professional in the field. It was a testing occupation that, with slight variations, had been endured by men of the Department on the Dawson Route, the Intercolonial, the Canadian Pacific survey, and in a dozen other instances where Public Works planned to prepare the wilderness for development.

After several years of investigation, St. Laurent decided that if the canal was to be built, it would have to be of a depth sufficient to meet the

demands of new and large vessels. Rejecting a 14-foot barge canal as a waste of money he called for a 22-foot depth:

In a growing country like this, with its vast possibilities, great wheat, mineral and forest lands, whose boundary extends from Atlantic to Pacific, having on its southern boundary the most extensive system of inland waterways in the world, there is no doubt that the future volume of its trade and transportation will be beyond all expectations. (58)

It is obvious from the tone of the report that St. Laurent and the others involved in writing it were in support of the project. The report argued that only the Georgian Bay route could "ever successfully compete with the routes which the United States authorities are trying to develop, and keep the transport of our trade within Canadian territory". (59) The logic was that once a shipment was committed to this canal system there would be no alternate routes along the way, no Buffalo or Detroit.

The engineers involved supported the project but they admitted that the costs would be enormous. A 22-foot waterway, with a width of 160 feet and a length in the locks of 600 feet, would cost the amazing sum of \$100 million and take ten years to build. (60) Only the transcontinental railways were comparable in cost to this work on a canal that would be "one of the largest in the world". (61) To have even contemplated such an effort would have been unthinkable ten years earlier and the enthusiasm of the 1909 report stands as evidence of the optimism that pervaded the nation.

The Georgian Bay Ship Canal was never constructed. The Laurier government was already committed to the support of two new transcontinental railways and before these were finished the First World War diverted the nation's energy to other tasks. By the end of the war the bankruptcy of the railroads and the heavy debt that the nation had accumulated made such grandiose projects seem more questionable than they had in the first decade of the century.

Enthusiasm for the Georgian Bay Canal was a spin-off of the renewed interest in the St. Lawrence. It also indicated that the concept of an east-west trade axis centred on Canada's waterways remained strongly ingrained in the minds of Canada's civil servants and politicians. A great deal had changed since 1840 and obviously the scheme was very different from the one that had inspired William Hamilton Merritt. There remained the same basic presumption that the nation's geography and commercial requirements dictated the flow of goods. Under a new Minister and a new Deputy, the Department of Public Works could still, at the end of the decade, point with certainty to the premise that so many officials had worked from:

Owing to physical conditions and the establishment of settlements along the St. Lawrence which retarded the development of the country to the north, we have a long and comparatively narrow stretch of territory, extending three thousand miles from ocean to ocean by as many hundreds in width. It was therefore necessary to develop channels of commerce from east to west and vice versa. (62)

If the old concept of a east-west trade flow along the St. Lawrence still played a part in the formation of policy, it was, as the events of the last decades of the nineteenth century make clear, no longer the sole

responsibility of the Department of Public Works. Israel Tarte, with his great interest in this concept, seems to have desired to retain as much of the old jurisdiction as possible. While he was Minister he fought hard to retain a wide interpretation of the Department's role. But now there were other departments with contesting claims and the Department of Public Works saw its mandate significantly narrowed by a decision of the Government.

Tarte was a powerful and alert Minister. He took a major role in formulating and representing the plans of the Department before the Government. He was as much Minister of Public Works as he was a member of the Laurier administration, and perhaps more so. Consequently, when he felt that his Department was being unjustly infringed upon he did not hesitate to complain. Tarte found his most constant problem in this area to be the Department of Railways and Canals. This department, he felt, was stepping far over the boundaries set out for it in 1879. Quoting Section 7 of the Public Works Act he argued that "there does not seem to be any possible doubt as to the meaning of that section. When the two departments were divided", he continued, "it is manifest that it was intended to leave with the Minister of Public Works the management and improvement of the rivers, of the harbours, through the construction of any work of an hydraulic nature which might be necessary to achieve the ends desired." Referring to several instances where Railways and Canals was infringing on his own department he concluded, "I do not intend to allow the Department of Railways and Canals to take control of works which I earnestly and honestly believe belong to the Department of Public Works." (63) Throughout his tenure as Minister, Tarte was to wage a running battle against the Department of Railways and Canals and preserve as much as possible the widest possible interpretation of the Public Works Act.

While Tarte was Minister the Department had a powerful voice in administration circles; but he was to lose both his portfolio and his standing in the administration. Several comparisons have been made between Tarte and Langevin and indeed in several ways they were alike. There were also differences. Hector Langevin was a true party man, devoted to John A. Macdonald and the Conservative Party. Israel Tarte was at heart an independent. His switch after 1891 and his devotion to issues rather than men were far more representative of his attitude towards party than were his efforts on behalf of the Liberals. Thus when Tarte felt it was necessary to speak out he did not hesitate to do so, even if he had to break party ranks to do it. As it turned out, the issue that broke the Laurier-Tarte alliance had nothing to do with the Department of Public Works. Israel Tarte was a protectionist, and in 1902, while Laurier was in Europe, he began to speak in favour of a higher tariff. (64) Richard Cartwright and Clifford Sifton disagreed openly with the Minister of Public Works; on his return Laurier found the potential of a major party schism. There was no other choice: on October 20, 1902, Tarte wrote to Laurier, "vous recevrez, par la malle de demain au matin, ma démission". (65)

Israel Tarte was the last Minister of Public Works to be appointed head of the Department in the nineteenth century, and it is fitting that his exit should mark the final disappearance of an older breed of Minister. The combination of personal involvement, direct control over patronage, policies and administration was passing. The new Ministers were to be just as politically and policy-conscious as Tarte, but they would remain a step

removed from the Department. The bureaucracy was growing, and if the collective ability of the Cabinet to concentrate an over-all policy was to be maintained, individual details would increasingly have to be left to the Deputy Ministers and public servants under them.

Tarte's departure precipitated a number of important changes in the Department. For some time the Department of Marine and Fisheries had been trying to obtain an extension of its responsibilities. Tarte had once claimed that the dredging of the St. Lawrence was a nuisance and that "if I could get rid of it ... I would not continue it". (66) He was, however, referring to the alternative of direct dredging versus contract work. It is unlikely that he would have been willing to turn such a central activity of the Department over to Marine and Fisheries any more than he was willing to let Railways and Canals encroach on others. This would also seem to be true if one considers Tarte's belief that Marine and Fisheries was a poorly-run Department. He once said to Laurier: "I hope you will shake it up." (67) Tarte's jealous guard of the jurisdiction of Public Works blocked the attempts of Marine and Fisheries for several years, but his resignation provided a convenient opportunity for the long-sought changes to be carried out.

An Order-in-Council of March 1904 stated that "from or after the 1st of July next (1904), the management and control of the St. Lawrence ship channel, together with the dredging and sweeping plant, steamers and all other appliances now used by the Department of Public Works in connection with that work be transferred to the Department of Marine and Fisheries". (68) Thus one of the more important tasks of Public Works was to be lost to the Department. The dredging, originally under the Montreal Harbour Commissioners, had been taken over from them in 1888. Expenditures had been considerable ever since, running as high as half a million dollars a year. (69) The Department had come to see it as an important part of its mandate and as closely connected with the over-all development of the Great Lakes system. The transfer was obviously a severe impingement on its mandate and jurisdiction.

Other less-important functions were also transferred. The hydro-graphic survey was one. Another ended a relationship that went back to the Board of Works when supervision of the Harbour Commissioners of Montreal and Quebec went to Marine and Fisheries. There is no doubt that Israel Tarte would have fought such transfers for political and departmental reasons and that the permanent staff of the Department was opposed to them. The Deputy Minister's report for 1904 admitted with regret that "one of the branches of the service ... has been diverted by legislation to another department". (70) The Department of Public Works found one more of its links with the St. Lawrence system severed.

The reasons for the transfer are difficult to discern. The official reason was that the change was necessary "so as to place the supervision of the improvements to navigation on the St. Lawrence route under the direction of the Department which is directly responsible for the aids to navigation on this route". (71) In some ways this was a reasonable explanation. The Department of Marine and Fisheries gained a greater ability to develop over-all policy for the St. Lawrence. It also allowed the two Departments become more balanced in terms of size and expenditure. At the same time there were aspects of the transfer that made no sense whatsoever. Dredging might (or might not) have been considered an

important part of the mandate of Public Works. Certainly it had occupied a great deal of the Department's time and attention for several years. Although a case might be made for transferring dredging, this was not done; only the responsibility for dredging the St. Lawrence was given to Marine and Fisheries. Thus the Department lost a geographical rather than an operational responsibility, for it was still responsible for the dredging of the Great Lakes and smaller inland waterways. The transfer served to split this operation and as a result made it somewhat of an anomaly for both departments.

The confusion created by such a division was compounded by the fact that behind the relevant Order-in-Council was an Act, passed shortly before the Order-in-Council was passed, which allowed the Governor in Council to "at any time transfer the management, charge and direction of any public works, or any power, duty or function with respect to any work or class of works ... which is assigned to, or vested by statute in any Minister or department, to any other Minister or department". (72)

The purpose of the statute was to allow for administrative flexibility. At the same time it left the Department of Public Works and other departments with an even vaguer idea of the jurisdictional lines that existed. The significance of the statute should not be underrated. Henceforth the Government could, and would, seek to amend the problems that existed in the 1879 Act by decisions in Council. This would solve some problems but, as with the 1904 Order-in-Council, it would cause others. The Act allowed the Government to move things around, but it tended to delay a basic reinterpretation or definition of the role of the Department of Public Works. Indeed, it could be used to nullify whatever definition had been given to its jurisdiction in 1879 or in subsequent acts. Effectively, the responsibilities of the Department were no longer those set down by any act: instead they were determined by the current state of Orders-in-Council. The old Act was made usable by the 1903 Statute, but usable or not, no attempt was made to create a new and more clear-cut act that would allow the Department to group its activities into a logical mandate.

There was one other problem with the 1903 Act. Seemingly it removed much of the power of Parliament to control the expenditure and direction of the money for which it was responsible. The Opposition recognized this and when the 1904 supply vote for the Department of Public Works came to Parliament, they balked at easy passage. Conservative John D. Reid objected that given the rumours, "It is most unfair that these estimates should be placed before this committee first.... I think the estimates should be allowed to stand until this reorganization takes place". (73)

Member after member took Reid's position. They demanded to know if the Department of Public Works was to be altered and whether the Minister of Public Works would in fact have the control of the money he was requesting. Most vociferous of all was the man who had just left the Department, Israel Tarte. Tarte objected both to the expenditure of money under a department different from the one voted supplies, and the logic of altering Public Works. "The Department is a unit today", he argued. "It is organized on a solid basis. Its officers work together." (74) Under the circumstances, he felt that it was not fair "to ask the House to vote money for the Public Works Department if the money is to be spent in the Department of Marine and Fisheries". (75) The only way the new and

beleaguered Minister of Public Works, James Sutherland, could get the estimates through at all, was to promise that anything passed for Public Works would in fact be spent by that Department. (76)

The 1904 Order-in-Council and the Act that preceded it meant that the Departments of Public Works and Marine and Fisheries were for some time involved in overlapping areas. When, for instance, in 1905 the Minister of Public Works replied to a question on St. John harbour by saying that it should be directed to the Minister of Marine and Fisheries, a frustrated Sir George Foster burst out, "It is such a Siamese twins business that we never know where we are." (77) There was a good deal of truth in the statement and the Department of Public Works often found itself subjected to the same frustration as that felt by Foster.

Part of the problem may have been that the 1904 changes stemmed to some extent from political rather than administrative considerations. When Israel Tarte resigned, Laurier, rather than continue the tradition of appointing a Quebec Member as Minister, turned to Sutherland who was from Ontario. There were a good many people, including Israel Tarte, who felt this to be a slap in the face to Quebec and its place in the party. The Opposition in turn charged that in order to mollify the province, a Quebec Member was appointed Minister of Marine and Fisheries and some of the functions of Public Works turned over to that department. The situation was further confused by the fact that the new Minister of Marine and Fisheries, Joseph Préfontaine, was a political enemy of Tarte; moreover, he was not very tactful in his speeches. (78) The result was an acrimonious debate with regional and racial overtones.

The debate began in earnest when Thomas Casgrain quoted a Préfontaine speech that seemed to indicate that the Department of Public Works was having its jurisdiction altered for the sake of Quebec politics. Préfontaine was quoted as having said to a group of electors:

If we put every man in his place, and if we say to the Department of Public Works ... you shall have only under your control the works on public buildings and the public works which relate to the maintenance of the country, but everything which concerns navigation ... concerns the Department of Marine and Fisheries, and if this is put into law, is it not true that you have there all the guarantees you can desire? (79)

With this as evidence, the Opposition took two directions for their attack. Casgrain and other French-Canadian Members ridiculed the acceptance by Préfontaine of an "inferior department", and Ontario Conservatives ridiculed Sutherland for allowing his department to be so emasculated:

I hope the Hon. Minister of Public Works ... is not ashamed to tell the committee how much of his prestige and authority have been taken away from him by the Hon. Minister of Marine and Fisheries. I sympathize with the gentleman, because my impression is that he has not been fairly dealt with, and we in the Province of Ontario would prefer that Public Works had not been dealt with the iron hand. (80)

The whole debate threatened to become extremely ugly, bringing to the surface sectional and racial animosities that in this period were never far below the surface. The Laurier government, however, was in a strong

position, and the Prime Minister himself capable of bringing things under control. Sutherland denied that anything had been given away for political reasons and Préfontaine quickly learned to be more discreet in his speeches.

It is difficult to judge to what degree these political and regional considerations were involved in the decision to transfer the St. Lawrence dredging operations to Marine and Fisheries. Certainly the Department of Public Works was not very happy with the transfer and it is equally certain that Marine and Fisheries was pleased with the decision. In all probability politics and the desire of the permanent officials of Marine and Fisheries caused the objections of the Department of Public Works and the potential jurisdictional problems to be ignored. The whole episode reveals that there was no easy way to resolve the question of which department should have control over what area. The debate on the question also reflected the trauma and political difficulties involved in breaking the tradition of Public Works as a Quebec portfolio.

The loss of the St. Lawrence dredging operation was significant in terms of the overall activities of the Department, but not nearly as significant as it once would have been. The previous few years had witnessed a major increase in the number of activities in which the Department had a role. There was still a great deal to do after the St. Lawrence dredging was transferred. The Annual Report for the year of the transfer stated that "the general expenditure for the balance of the harbour and rivers works more than trebled" in the last few years and thus "the gross total of the work under the charge of the Chief Engineer has not ... been in any way materially reduced". (81) The Annual Report for the next year reiterated the statement. (82)

Not only did the Engineer's branch absorb the reduction that resulted from the loss of the St. Lawrence operation and continue to grow, but the other branches were expanding at an extremely rapid rate. The loss of the St. Lawrence hardly registers as one looks at the total expenditures over the first decade of the century. In 1900 the expenditure had been \$3,091,987.50, less than the peak reached before the Langevin-McGreevy scandal. By 1904, the last year in which the St. Lawrence operation came under its control, the Department's expenditure had risen to \$6,492,289.62. The next year it had reached \$8,304,009.77 and by 1909 \$14,784,739.39, an amount greater than the expenditure of 1879, before the division of the Department. (83) The splitting of the dredging operations in Canada may have caused jurisdictional problems but obviously did not halt the tremendous growth and impact of the Department.

As Public Works approached and then surpassed the old expenditure records of the period when it had included Railways and Canals, the question of the ability of the Department to handle all the duties assigned to it came up once again. It had been theorized in 1879 that the Minister of such a large department could not keep up with the activities of his portfolio and his political responsibilities as well. The need for "efficiency" had demanded a split in 1879. Would not the same demand require another split in 1910? This of course did not happen. To have continued to divide departments every time they reached a certain size would have created a fractionalized bureaucracy and an impossibly large Cabinet. (84)

Rather as the Department grew, its responsibilities remained under one portfolio but with a gradual abandonment of the practice of having authority concentrated at the top. The years from 1900 to 1911 saw a fairly

rapid devolution of authority and the consequent development of a specialized organizational pyramid. By the beginning of the second decade of the twentieth century the type of organization that had evolved bore an ancestral resemblance - though on a smaller and cruder scale - to the bureaucracies after the Second World War.

As early as 1805 part of the load of the Chief Engineer was lightened when it was decided that his assistant, at that time E.D. Lafleur, could sign all accounts and paylists except the final estimates. Thus the man responsible for overseeing such a vast number of projects was freed of a time-consuming, routine matter. (85) The Chief Architect's branch soon adopted the same procedure. In addition, the chief officers of both branches began to rely on their assistants to a greater extent, for example they would give them sole responsibility for specific and important projects or problems. This development both relieved the top officers of details and allowed the men who were most likely to succeed them (as the practice of the Department to date showed) to gain experience.

The great increase in work between 1900 and 1911 accelerated this devolution of authority. By at least 1909 the Chief Accountant was considered to be the head of a separate branch of the Department. (86) Octave Dionne's efforts to acquire greater responsibility had obviously borne some fruit. As a result of this separation, the Secretary's branch seems to have become more than ever an administrative arm of the Deputy Minister. Handling correspondence, passing on orders or questions, this branch acted as the coordinator of the branches of the Chief Architect, Chief Engineer, Accountant, and Superintendent of Telegraphs.

The greater volume of business and the increased specialization were reflected in several ways. Not only the specialization of staff within branches but the organization of operational functions revealed the changes in the Department. Perhaps not typical, but worth recounting along this line, is the relationship of Public Works to the National Gallery. The Department had probably acquired responsibility for the Gallery in the same way that it had so many other things. It was in a government-owned building and, more important, it fitted neatly under no other department. Founded by the Governor General in 1880, the National Gallery first appeared in the estimates of Public Works in 1885 with the tiny expenditure of \$772.20. (87) By and large Public Works seems to have asked for just enough to keep the struggling entity open. By 1885, for instance, Langevin noted that the money was not enough to buy pictures and simply covered salaries for the keeper, cleaner and one messenger. (88)

The Department's relationship with the Gallery seems to have been largely the result of the efforts of J.W.H. Watts, an architect in the Department. He was chiefly responsible for keeping the concept of a National Gallery alive in the face of indifference in higher quarters. Because of his love for paintings he cajoled enough money, time and time again, to purchase for the Gallery. It was a commendable effort, but hardly the way in which to develop a national art collection in the long run.

Whether through indifference to the Gallery or fear that the Opposition would regard increased expenditure as an extravagance, neither Langevin nor Ouimet attempted to increase the vote for the Gallery. Finally it was the Opposition who took the initiative. In 1893, when Ouimet asked in supply for the (by then) traditional \$1,000 for the Gallery, Louis Davies, a Liberal from Prince Edward Island objected, claiming, "We have

some very good Canadian artists whose works are not to be despised, and although I am not given to encouraging extravagance in any department, still I would be glad to assist the Government in voting a reasonable sum every year for purchasing one or two of the best Canadian pictures." (89) Duncan Fraser seconded his colleague, stating, "I will be ready to vote any reasonable amount to lay the foundation of the National Art Gallery of this country." (90) The exchange must have pleased Watts for the Minister took the debate to heart and the next year brought in a supply request of \$5,000 with the comment, "This vote has been taken in compliance with the wishes expressed last year." (91) The House passed the larger vote without objection.

The growth of the Gallery meant that the ad hoc fashion in which the Department had been running it would no longer be acceptable. In spite of the individual efforts of men like Watts, a more systematic means of choosing paintings was required. Eventually, in April 1907 the Government took steps to organize purchases with the appointment of an advisory board. Sir George Drummond, Sir Edmund Walker and the Honourable Arthur Boyer were given the responsibility of selecting paintings for the Gallery. (92) The role of the Department of Public Works reverted to what might safely be said was its proper jurisdiction, that of ensuring adequate accommodation and caretaking facilities. The record of the development of the National Gallery serves simply as one example of the way in which functions handled on an unorganized basis began to be systematized as the work load of both the project and the Department increased.

The increase in expenditure, number of branches, and levels of authority within the branches meant that it became virtually impossible for the Minister to remain as knowledgeable of the day-to-day details of the Department as he had been in less busy times. Political and parliamentary responsibilities meant that the political head was forced to concern himself directly only with general policy and with politically important details. This fact further indicates why Israel Tarte could be considered the last of an older breed of Ministers. The Department, expanding rapidly, could no longer be handled so tightly by a man with many other responsibilities. The result was a significant increase in the power of the Deputy Minister.

While the Deputy Minister was always regarded an important official, his power varied a great deal depending on the Minister and the administration involved. If there was a rapid turnover of Ministers and if the individuals were relatively weak or unconcerned, the Deputy Minister could assert his power. In the years prior to Confederation this type of situation did develop as a result of rapidly changing administrations; this had meant that the Chief Commissioners found few opportunities of gaining the required knowledge to administer the Department. In contrast, the period after Confederation was quite different. Alexander Mackenzie, Hector Langevin and Israel Tarte, a little later, were all capable men who were in their portfolios long enough to understand the working of the Department. The Deputy Minister had remained very much an administrative official under these men with his powers significantly curtailed.

Part of the reason for the relative weakness of the Deputy Minister had been the idea that the Minister should remain in daily touch with his Department as its chief executive officer, in principle and in practice. As the work load increased, however, this concept began to change. In the same way that the various branches of the Department were willing to

delegate greater authority downward, so too it became necessary for the Minister to allow greater responsibility to fall on his Deputy Minister. More and more in the period between 1896 and 1910 one gains the impression that the Deputy was taking on authority and making decisions that previously would have been referred to the Minister. Even under Tarte, for instance, Gobeil had a fair degree of independence in carrying out and developing plans for the Yukon. (93) A new philosophy of the structure of the Department was coming into being. Richard Cartwright summed up the changing attitude in 1907, when the day of Gobeil's retirement drew close. He wrote to Laurier, urging that a "capable and trusting" deputy head be found: "We may have to pay for such men but I do not believe the Minister can do the work in these cases single handed and as a matter of administration the choice of a good deputy head is almost more important than a minister." (94)

Normally the choice of a new Deputy Minister had been left to the Minister with the approval of the Prime Minister. However, a part of the reason for the rise of the Deputy Minister in the Department of Public Works lay in the weakness of the Ministers that succeeded Tarte. James Sutherland commented in Parliament, "If I had my own way I do not think I would occupy any position in the government." (95) Nor does his comment seem to have been inspired by false modesty. Sutherland was not well and whether or not his illness was aggravated by the new burdens of office, by early 1905 he was too sick to attend either Parliament or the Department. He died in May 1905, the Department having been to all intents and purposes without a Minister during the last four months of his illness.

Laurier was not much more fortunate in his choice of a successor. Charles Hyman seems to have been a capable Minister. He had been a Minister without Portfolio and had acted for Sutherland during the latter's illness. It takes time, however, to become familiar with the duties of a department and Hyman had been in office for only two years before he became too ill to continue and handed in his resignation. (96) Thus with two Ministers in the portfolio only a short period of time there was a natural increase in the responsibility and power of the Deputy Minister. This, in addition to the changing conception of what a Minister's role should be, led to a significant rise in the level of responsibility and a corresponding increase in the workload of the Deputy Minister.

When it became apparent in the summer of 1907 that Gobeil could not long continue in his post, careful consideration was given to the choice of a successor. Laurier could not really turn to his new Minister, William Pugsley, who had been in office only a few months. Instead he wrote to Gobeil himself, asking for his recommendations as to who should follow him in that post. Specifically Laurier wondered about Arthur St. Laurent. Gobeil, after thinking the matter over, was unable to come to a firm decision. He did feel that in many ways St. Laurent was an excellent man:

Je me suis mis en mémoire sa conduite et son travail passé depuis qu'il a franchi un à un tous les postes inférieurs et supérieurs de sa carrière d'ingénieur jusqu'à ce qu'il soit devenu d'une part Assistant Ingénieur en Chef du Département, et, d'autre part, Ingénieur en Chef préposé à l'exploration pour le canal de la Baie Georgienne. (97)

Yet although Gobeil could support St. Laurent "sous tous les autres aspects possibles", he had to conclude that he lacked the necessary administrative

ability: "je ne lui croyais pas assez de fermeté pour remplir les fonctions de député ministre". (98) To be a good engineer was no longer enough. Arthur St. Laurent did not become Deputy Minister; the position went instead to James B. Hunter. (99)

The growth of the Department of Public Works was only a part of the growth of the entire Civil Service. This growth and the increased specialization of functions made some sort of regularization of appointments and promotions more necessary than ever. The use of patronage in determining appointments had been on the retreat from the time of the Langevin-McGreevy scandal. Nevertheless it remained an important and disturbing aspect of the Civil Service. This too had become more of a problem as the need for ability and technical expertise increased. In 1908 a significant step was taken to provide for an ordered and non-political means of determining appointment and promotion.

The attempt to overcome the abuses that had crept in over the decades was embodied in the Civil Service Act of 1908. It was the most stringent Act yet passed in this area, and though far from perfect, did a great deal to create a more organized and more complex system to govern the Civil Service as a whole. (100) It was very definitely a response to the demands of the age. Sydney Fisher, the competent Minister of Agriculture who had responsibility for the bill, summarized its purpose during debate in Parliament:

The governments and individual ministers may change, our party may come in and another go out, but the civil service is practically a permanent staff of men engaged in the daily administration of the government system. The character of the service is therefore all the more important. (101)

The bill as it was presented really consisted of two parts. First of all it made provision for the future in an attempt to ensure that ability, not politics, would be the basis for promotion and appointment. "We adopt the principle of appointment of an independent civil service commission", noted Fisher. (102) The hope was that such a commission would find ways of hiring free of political influence. It would also have the responsibility of setting out a system that would allow the civil servant to feel that he was being treated fairly relative to his colleagues.

The creation of this commission and a system of meaningful competitive examination were the main object of the bill. As a secondary measure, however, there was an effort to correct two current problems within the Civil Service. One of these was classification. Previous acts had divided the Civil Service up into very few categories. There had been the officers, men such as Chief Engineers, the Secretary, etc., and the clerks, which included everyone else. Salaries could (and did) range very widely from department to department and from position to position. The Act attempted to remedy this situation by dividing the staff of departments, below the level of Deputy Minister, into three categories, each with two subdivisions. (103) And within each category there was a definite salary range. A civil servant would thus know what his ultimate level of remuneration would be without promotion. (104)

The other problem that the Act attempted to remedy was the use of "extra clerks". The strictures of the Civil Service Act of 1882, the tendency for the organization of the Department to become rigid, and the desire to

pay salaries that were not in accord with regulations, had led to the increased use of these employees from the 1880s on. By the end of that decade, the "extra" clerk was very much a permanent fixture of the Department. As early as 1891 Gobeil complained that the fixed nature of the departmental organization meant that the "list of officials of this department now on permanent staff is absolutely out of proportion to the increase of work which has taken place since 1880". (105) By the time Tarte took office, the Department of Public Works listed only three more men on permanent staff than when Gobeil had complained. (106) The "extra" staff, however, had grown to such an extent that almost half again as much in salaries was paid out to extra staff as to permanent staff. The growth of the Department between 1900 and 1908 made the situation ridiculous. By 1905 the permanent staff was actually smaller than it had been in 1897. Obviously this did not reflect what was really happening at Public Works.

The Civil Service Act of 1908 made provision to bring all those members of the Civil Service who were listed as "extra" into the permanent ranks of the Civil Service. It also made provision to allow certain members of the Headquarters staff listed as being on the outside service to become classified as permanent inside staff. The necessity for such action is underscored by the fact that the permanent staff that had been set down as consisting of 27 people in 1905 increased under the new provisions to 234! (107) All but a few of these were people previously employed by the Department, who, because they were extra employees, were not listed with the official organization.

The 1908 Act was extremely important. It was a response to the growth of the Civil Service and to new attitudes about the relationship of the permanent employee to the political head. It did a great deal to remove the interference of patronage and partisan considerations with the course of a man's career. It also brought the actual organization of the Department more into line with the real needs that existed. At the same time the Act was open to several criticisms. Most obviously, it applied only to the "inside" Civil Service and thus left the whole question of local and minor appointments untouched and thousands of civil servants unprotected. Robert Borden also challenged the Government on the sections of the Act that outlined the organization and salaries of departments, stating that it did not seem "to provide for any real organization". (108) It was a valid comment. The Act, which spent such a great deal of time setting out salaries, did not attempt to solve any of the problems of authority and position created by the new and much-layered bureaucracy. Only salaries and titles, not chains of authority or division of function, were considered. This failure was to create unfortunate rigidities in the Act itself and problems for the future.

Perhaps it was too much to expect one statute to solve all the problems of a bureaucracy that was growing and changing at a rapid pace. Departments like Public Works had seen their expenditures go up tenfold from the time Laurier had taken office. Such growth created new problems and inefficiencies that could only be solved over the course of time. The next decades were to see increasing attention paid to these problems, by Public Works in particular and by the Civil Service as a whole.

CHAPTER 9

ECONOMY IN WAR AND IN PEACE

1911-1928

In 1911, after fifteen years in power, the administration of Wilfrid Laurier fell. Before 1896 Laurier and the Liberals had often criticized the national policy, especially the protectionism of the Conservative administration. Once in office themselves, however, they changed the policy very little. Tariffs remained the same, at least in their over-all impact, and as Tarte's policies indicated, the Government continued a nationalist policy of trade development. That is, all remained more or less, the same until the election of 1911.

In 1910 an unusual congruence of political needs and economic conditions made reciprocity attractive both to the American President, William Howard Taft, and to Laurier. The Prime Minister, listening to the appeals of the western farmer and perhaps to echoes of the Grit free-trade ideology of the nineteenth century, campaigned in 1911 on the basis of reciprocity with the United States. The result was disastrous. There was a great deal more fear of American influence than Laurier had thought and when the votes were counted, the Conservative Party under Robert Borden was in power. (1)

The change of administration in 1911 tends to support the thesis presented earlier that economic conditions as much as political leadership have determined the course of the Department of Public Works. The new government, which for most of its tenure put the Department of Public Works under the strongly partisan Robert Rogers, did not embark on major changes of either staff or projects. The nation still seemed prosperous, having recovered from a temporary slump in 1908, and the new administration, like the old, looked to the development of trade and service facilities for the nation. The Department of Public Works continued the rapid growth that had characterized the previous decade. Perhaps the attitude of the officials and politicians was best summed up by a simple reading of the facts. This, at least, was the approach of the 1912 Annual Report:

In 1912 the population of Canada is 7,203,527; the total revenue \$136,108,217.36; expenditure \$129,960,416.97; imports \$559,320,544; exports \$315,317,250; miles of railway in operation, 26,200. The expenditure incurred by the department in 1912 is \$13,928,666.87; the number of buildings, 328; harbour works, 1244; miles of telegraph, 8639½ with 624 officers. (2)

The statement reflected the optimism of the officials in the Department. The growth of Public Works was closely linked to the growth of the nation and there was no reason for Canada's prosperity to cease. On the contrary, as far as the Department was concerned, there were plans to accelerate the rate of development.

On the West Coast, Public Works was preparing for the revolution in trade that was expected because of an engineering feat thousands of miles away. The United States Government, having surmounted or circumvented various political and legal obstacles, was by 1912 in the process of cutting a continent in two. The Panama Canal was one of the most impressive engineering feats of all time and the Department of Public Works realized that it was bound to have an effect on the trade off Canada's Pacific coast. In order to prepare for this, "substantial appropriations were secured at the last session of Parliament", noted the 1912 Report. These appropriations were intended to carry out the recommendations of Louis Coste, now a consulting engineer for the Government, which would make both Vancouver and Victoria first-class harbours. The optimism for the future of the area had not diminished with the change in administration: "There would seem no reason, if facilities are provided, why millions of bushels of western grain should not find an outlet through Panama, and that, without in any way injuring or preventing the growth of the traffic of this commodity now enjoyed by lake ports, Montreal and St. John." (3)

Nor were the works at Vancouver and Victoria the only major projects undertaken at this time. In Ottawa itself the continued growth of the Civil Service and the expectation that its growth would continue with that of the nation meant that new departmental facilities had to be planned. The Government, on the recommendation of the Department of Public Works, took a step towards long-range planning for the accommodation of the Civil Service with a major expropriation. An Order-in-Council of February 1912 authorized the expropriation of a large area of land along the north side of Wellington Street "to serve as a site for the erection, from time to time, as necessity demands, of new departmental buildings". (4) This purchase, on the street where the Parliament Buildings and the Langevin Block were already located, indicated that it was intended to become the centre of the nation's Civil Service. So much was this area associated with national government that the City of Ottawa balked at the cost of repairs for the street. Eventually these were taken over by the Department of Public Works.

Ottawa, Vancouver and Victoria were but three among many major projects. Important harbour developments in St. John, Quebec City and Fort William testified to a continued belief in the east-west trade axis. On the Ottawa River a significant study by Arthur St. Laurent led to the construction of dams to provide for, as Rogers put it, "equalizing the run-off of the Ottawa valley throughout the year". (5) The project proved invaluable both to the timber trade and as a preparation for future hydroelectric develop-

ment. All these projects clearly indicate that the Government and the Department of Public Works believed that prosperity was to continue and that the demands on the Department would increase.

The result of such activity was a continued rapid increase in expenditure. By 1913 it had climbed by almost \$6 million to \$18,844,223.90 and by the close of the 1914 fiscal year had reached \$27,991,336.94. (6) The total expenditure of the Department had almost doubled in two years; the overall expenditure at the turn of the century had been less than 9 per cent of the 1914 figure.

On the surface it seemed as if the Borden government was to continue on the path of the Laurier government and enjoy the same political asset of a prosperous and growing economy. Things were not to go quite that smoothly however. In fact, there were economic indications from 1912 on that Canada was heading into a recession. The money markets of London, that prime source of Canadian investment funds, had tightened up. (7) If the recession developed, the Government would in the normal course of things have had to choose between the demand for public works and that for other expenditures. The decision would have been made on the basis of public opinion, the departmental Ministers involved and the worth of individual projects. It was a familiar story which had recurred several times in Canadian history.

However the normal course of things was not to be witnessed for the next four years. Events in Europe were to force a drastic reordering of the Government's priorities and put an unprecedented strain on its finances. On June 28, 1914, the heir to the Austrian throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, was assassinated by a Serbian extremist. This event, seemingly so remote to Canadians, ignited a fuse that by 1914 brought Great Britain into a war that included every major power in Europe. With Britain went the Empire; the citizens and politicians of Canada felt this nation could not remain at peace when the mother country was involved in a major war. Laurier's "ready aye ready", as has often been noted, symbolizes Canada's acceptance of her fate. The events of the Balkans had reached Canada and were to affect the course of the nation profoundly.

In the Department of Public Works, as in other departments and businesses throughout the nation, the initial response was enthusiastic. The Government made provision for civil servants to take leave of absence to join the armed services. Over the course of the war 251 permanent employees of the Department and an unknown number of temporary employees enlisted and fought overseas. J.B. Hunter, the Deputy, even had to write the Prime Minister in the early days of the war to find out whether French citizens who wished to join the forces of their home country would be covered by the Order-in-Council. Borden replied that the Order-in-Council would apply if they could get the permission of the head of the Department. (8) In the enthusiastic opening days it was unlikely that any Minister would have refused such a request.

Beyond the immediate and personal questions of employees of the Department lay the larger problems of government policy. The war would have to be financed. The opening year alone saw a war appropriation of \$50 million. The Canadian Government had never had any experience with war finance and in 1914 its revenue sources were still extremely limited. Tariffs continued to be the mainstay of government revenue. (9) From this source, according to traditional financing policy, the costs of war as well as the

regular costs of government would have to be derived. It was questionable whether the funds would be sufficient.

At first, perhaps because of the widespread belief that the war would not last more than a few months, there does not seem to have been any significant shuffling of financial priorities by the Government. There was of course the war appropriation but this did not mean that other activities came to a halt. For the fiscal year ending March 30, 1915, the Department of Public Works spent more than it had the year before, although the rate of increase was smaller. (10) But as it became clear that the war would not end for some time and as the expense of fielding an army became apparent, the Government began to sacrifice other programs for the sake of the war effort.

The "Great War", as it was to be known, eventually cost the Canadian Government over two billion dollars. It forced a revolution in the Canadian taxation system and in spite of this, left the national debt more burdensome than it had been at any time since Confederation. The Government soon found that to carry on the war in the trenches of France it was necessary to devote as high a proportion of the national revenue as possible to the war effort. In the process the Department of Public Works found its expansion halted and then reversed. The great expansion of government facilities for trade and for its own accommodation was to wait for several years before it began again.

The high priority given the war effort was made clear in the budget address for 1915. "Our estimates", stated Minister of Finance W.T. White, "contain no new items and as to items they include we shall proceed with works not already under contract only as we feel justified having regard to the financial situation". (11) The last phrase, "having regard to the financial situation", was a watchword that was to impose greater and greater strictures on the Department of Public Works as the war went on.

The Department followed the policy outlined in the budget speech; to free funds for the war "it was decided to curtail in every way reasonably possible, the expenditure on public works", as the 1915 Report put it. (12) In its own cruel way the war saved Canada from a sagging economy and a time of unemployment. The Government agents for the development of trade and service facilities, however, were not to participate in the wartime expansion. Public Works, like the Department of Railways and Canals and the Department of Marine and Fisheries, was oriented towards the expansion of a peacetime economy. In war these departments were forced to take a back seat to those more immediately concerned with the issue at hand. The rapid expansion of the activities of the Department came to a halt.

The results of the departmental austerity measures were reflected in the over-all expenditure by the next fiscal year. In 1916, the Department's expenditure dropped by nearly \$10 million (relative to 1915), to \$19,539,298.04. (13) By 1917 the expenditure had been reduced to \$16,161,596.20. These reductions were accomplished only by applying the most rigid criteria for the undertaking of works. No new works were to begin unless of pressing urgency or related in some way to the war effort. As a result, the categories of expenditure that reflected new work dropped dramatically. Between 1914 and 1918 the dredging account, which included nearly half a million dollars in fixed costs for plant, was slashed from \$5,326,334 to \$1,550,077; the account for the construction of public buildings from \$18,103,251 to \$7,171,805. (14)

Such economy was not accomplished without cost. The Government and the officials of the Department were forced time and again to ignore areas that under any other circumstances would have received immediate attention. R.C. Desrochers, the Secretary, had the unenviable task of replying in the negative to a good many pleas that everyone from the District Engineer to the Deputy Minister knew were reasonable. Robert Rogers specifically indicated to the nation the particular plight of the Department by recognizing in Parliament the justice of various works while refusing to undertake them. It was his practice, year after year, to bring in estimates that the Department had no intention of spending as long as the war continued. Asked by an Opposition Member to explain the practice, the Minister said that it was an act of faith:

Each of the works for which there is an appropriation in my Estimates was regarded as a necessary work, and the vote was asked for in good faith and with the hope of carrying out the work. At the outbreak of the war we announced in good faith that these works would not be carried out during the continuance of the war; but we retained these votes in the Estimates as evidence of good faith, and as indicating that we would proceed with these works as soon as possible after the close of the war. (15)

Whether this should be considered an act of faith or an act of politics, Rogers was stating to the nation that the Government was caught in an emergency situation but as soon as the emergency ended, prewar policy would be followed and the urgent demands of the nation met.

The very existence of the war made demands on the Department. While Public Works could cut back and continue with a frozen or reduced staff, other departments, especially those connected with the war, were growing rapidly. The staff of Public Works grew only slightly between 1912 and 1918 - from 311 to 350. This was more than made up for by such departments as Militia and Defence and Navy. Between 1913 and 1920 the Civil Service grew from 31,355 employees to 49,705. (16) And by law and jurisdiction it was the responsibility of Public Works to provide accommodation for these people at a time when it was supposed to avoid further expenditure. The inevitable result was a dramatic increase in the rents paid by the Department for accommodation throughout the nation and particularly in Ottawa. By 1917 the Department of Public Works rented some 885,058 square feet of office space for other departments in Ottawa alone. (17) In Parliament a former Minister of Public Works, William Pugsley, complained that the \$452,000 in the estimates for Ottawa for that year was "very large indeed". (18) If Pugsley had not left Parliament that year, one wonders what he would have said by 1919 when the Department paid \$723,598.69 for accommodation in the Capital. (19)

By 1917 the war had created a shortage of office space that was reaching discouraging proportions. Rents had increased while the quality of accommodation had declined. Departments were scattered over the city to such an extent that top officials and politicians found it almost impossible to contact everyone or even to find out where to go concerning a particular problem.

No one was more aware of the problems nor faced with the headaches to a greater degree than J.B. Hunter. Regarding it as false economy to continue to rent so much office space at commercial rates, he presented his

view to the Minister in early 1918. Basically Hunter argued that for the Government to erect new office buildings would not be a departure from the principle of reducing expenditures as much as possible. "In my opinion," he wrote F.B. Carvell, the new Minister of Public Works, "it would be good business for the Government to erect a new commercial building of its own." Such a building, he felt, would be designed for the specific purpose of meeting the wartime pressure on office space, without contravening the principle of economy. The building should not be located on Wellington Street but "in the business part of the city where there are exceptional opportunities of securing a site". An austere and practical office building and not a monument to government and nation, it "would not in any way interfere with the subsequent development of the scheme of erecting imposing departmental buildings on the property already purchased, along Wellington Street". (20)

Backed by the rising costs of rental space, Hunter was able to convince the Minister of the need for a new office building. A site already partly owned by the Government, at the corner of Queen and O'Connor Streets in downtown Ottawa, was selected for the building. A wartime building erected under the most rigid controls in the search for economy, it was designed without the attention to ornamentation usually given to large government buildings in the nation's Capital. Even so, the tenders were too high; Hunter returned them and told R.C. Wright, the Chief Architect, to cut costs as much as possible. Wright and his staff, recognizing the imperatives of a wartime situation, "overcame that distaste which nearly all architects or artists for that matter have to changing their original conception" and trimmed from the building everything that was not absolutely necessary. (21) Tenders were called again and by the middle of June 1918 a contract was signed with Bate, McMahon and Company for slightly over a million dollars. (22) By the autumn of 1919 the building was far enough along to be partly occupied and by March 1920 it was complete. The Department of Public Works, gathering its staff from various offices scattered around the city, was the primary occupant of the new building, and was to remain there for a nearly a quarter of a century.

The concept of the building, and to a large extent its design, had been the work of James Hunter. He had decided to go against the sacred policy of "no new construction" for the sake of economy and he had watched over its construction to ensure that it remained the economical building he had envisaged. Carvell, responding to a compliment in Parliament, replied, "I take no credit to myself, whatever credit there is belongs to the deputy minister who was the author of the building." (23) In an unusual step the Government decided to recognize the efforts of the Deputy Minister in connection with the building. On a suggestion that seems to have originated with Chief Architect Wright, Carvell authorized him "to call it the 'Hunter Building' and proceed accordingly". (24)

The Hunter Building was not the only new major government edifice to be erected in Ottawa during the war. The other one, however, resulted neither by design nor because of increased requirements. Rather it was a project forced on the Department and the Government by a disaster that, even in the midst of a war, had to be made good for the sake of the spirit and dignity of Canada.

The evening of February 3, 1916, saw Ottawa gripped by true winter weather. It was not snowing but the temperature hovered around ten

degrees Fahrenheit and there was a great deal of snow on the ground. In the House of Commons (the Senate was not sitting) the subject was the marketing and transportation of fish. This topic had been under discussion for a good part of the day and when the House resumed after dinner at 8 o'clock the debate continued. Though a topic of some importance to Members of Parliament from the Maritimes and other coastal areas, a good many Members found the debate of little interest and wandered off. Robert Borden took advantage of the free time to work on correspondence. Francis Glass, the Conservative Member from Middlesex East in Ontario, also decided that the fish marketing debate was of little interest to him and went to the Reading Room to browse through daily newspapers. Before Glass could decide what newspaper to read, however, he noticed an unusual degree of heat coming from behind him. Turning around he saw that a number of the papers were on fire.

Fire in these old buildings was always frightening and this building had a great deal more inflammable material in it than the stone construction indicated. Since much of the support work, partitions and ornamentation of this mid-nineteenth-century building were made of wood, fire was potentially dangerous, as had been clearly demonstrated by a major fire that had gutted the West Block some years before. Glass immediately called for the caretaker and when he failed to answer, got the help of a Constable Moore of the Dominion Police. Moore grabbed a fire extinguisher but it had little or no effect, and before long the flames had spread through much of the Reading Room. By the time a fire hose had been brought into action the flames had spread into the corridors. Obviously this was more than a local fire. (25)

The fire spread with amazing speed and chaos broke loose. G.R. Stewart, Chief Doorman of the House of Commons, broke in on the speech of William Loggie and yelled to Members "to get out quickly". The House immediately suspended its sitting. Borden was alerted at about the same time by a messenger and his diary well reflects the confusion of the minutes that followed:

We hurried out and in the corridor leading to the reading room there was a great volume of thick black smoke through which darted tongues of flame, accompanied by short, sharp sounds like explosions. The corridor leading past the Press Room was also filled with smoke and water was running over it. I darted back for my coat but Phil urged me to come at once. After a moment's hesitation I followed him with [Arthur] Boyce. A policeman told us not to go through the P.O. corridor but down the messengers' stairway and through their room which we did. There was a large number of members and others in the entrance vestibule. Could get no information as to where the fire first originated. Soon saw [Martin] Burrell, with his face badly burned. Thick black cloud of smoke in P.O. corridor. The hose was turned on in various places but no firemen then inside vestibule. Asked Rogers about fire extinguishers and he said they had been used. Dr. Clark soon emerged from the suffocating heat of P.O. corridor, roaring like a bull and shouting that Nesbitt, Douglas, Loggie, Elliot and others were in the Chamber. Some men,

including White, attempted to go in but were drawn back by smoke. (26)

There was no possibility of stopping the fire. The Ottawa Fire Department had received the alarm at 8:57, only about ten minutes after it was first discovered, and were on the hill before 9:00. Even as they arrived, however, the flames could be seen breaking through the roof of the building. The wooden beams, a ventilation system that sucked the fire through the corridors and a strong wind meant that within minutes most of the building was burning. There were no fire doors and the white-pine panelling of the Commons Chamber was later described as "a veritable forest of timber". (28) The Fire Department and dozens of volunteers fought the blaze throughout the evening but it had long since become apparent that the Parliament Buildings could not be saved. At 1:21 on the morning of the fourth of February the tower that crowned the building collapsed. The greatest memorial to the work of Thomas Fuller was little but a pile of smouldering rubble.

Seven people lost their lives in the destruction of the buildings, including the Liberal Member of Yarmouth, Bowman Law. The only consolation was that it might have been worse. The debate had been of little interest to the public so the galleries had been nearly empty. Borden said the next day, "When one thinks what might have occurred under different conditions with all the galleries crowded, I am sure we have reason indeed, to be thankful that the loss of life was not more appalling." (28)

The loss of the building presented major problems in logistics. Canada was involved in a war and for the sake of the spirit of the nation as much as for the continued operation of the Government, it was imperative that the House continue to sit. The question, however, was where. The particular accommodation required for a large forum like the Parliament, with its adjuncts of office space and committee rooms, was not likely to be easily duplicated in the crowded Ottawa of 1916. Even before the tower on the building had fallen, steps were being taken to meet this problem.

About 11:30 that evening Borden called Rogers, John D. Reid and John Hazen together at the Chateau Laurier. There it was decided that somehow the House would meet at the usual time the next day. It was then left to the Minister of Public Works and Hunter, who joined him after the meeting, to find a building where this could take place. (29) Hunter and Rogers set off in the latter's automobile to look into the possibilities of various government buildings around the city. It was soon decided that the Victoria Memorial Museum was "probably the most adaptable building in the city for the purpose". (30) Then, while firemen were still fighting the flames at the Parliament Buildings, Hunter rounded up anyone he could at this late hour and began to turn the Museum into a Parliament. By noon the next day Borden was able to announce that the House would meet at the usual time in the quickly converted chambers. The sitting was a short one, devoted mainly to expression of regrets at the tragedy of the night before. Then, thankfully for the Department of Public Works, the weekend had arrived and there were three days to prepare the building for truly receiving the Parliament of Canada.

The Department, under the direct supervision of Hunter, had already accomplished a great deal simply by making it possible for the House to meet temporarily for the Friday sitting. The Ottawa Citizen noted the next

day, "The public works department is warmly eulogized for the expedition displayed in providing in the space of a few hours, such acceptable quarters with carpets and seats and everything essential to the conduct of business." (31) The sitting on Friday had, however, been possibly only because the Department concentrated on the single Chamber. By Monday it was hoped not only to have a Commons Chamber but offices for the Members and officials of the House and committee rooms for the necessary meetings. The task of the Department was far from over.

For the next few days Hunter and his men worked around the clock, pressing into service anyone that could be rounded up. Decisions and orders were characterized by notes hastily scribbled on scraps of paper. Furniture was chosen and ordered in a matter of hours and where possible scrounged from other buildings in the city. The task of the Department was made more difficult by the wartime situation, which meant that both men and materials were in short supply. It was not a question of receiving tenders to see who would give the best possible design at the lowest price, but a basic matter of finding enough to go around. The day after the fire the Department cabled every furniture manufacturer in Ontario and Quebec asking for a list of their inventory and prices, and how soon they could deliver it to Ottawa. Fortunately the furniture and other supply companies, as well as other departments in the Government, reacted to the crisis situation and helped as much as was possible. By Monday morning the Victoria Memorial Museum had become a suitable, though far from perfect, place for the Parliament of Canada. (32)

The conversion of the Museum was a monumental task. The contents of the Museum required careful packing, classification and storage, and offices were created from display rooms with the generous use of beaver board. Hunter remained at the building from the time it was decided to use it until Sunday afternoon, sleeping when and where he could. (33) The effort that the Department was able to put into the task and the cooperation it received from citizens, public servants and suppliers certainly helped to make the task less onerous. There were even moments of amusement such as when some unknown figure attached a sign from the Museum to the door of the room planned for the Senate, which read pointedly, "Prehistoric Fossils". (34) All in all the Department had reason to be proud of its effort and Borden himself recorded that the work "reflected great credit upon the Minister of Public Works and his officials". (35)

Whatever the efforts of the Department of Public Works, it was obvious that the Victoria Memorial Museum was at best a temporary residence for the Parliament of Canada. The construction of new buildings could not wait until the end of the war nor could they be constructed on a principle of economy as the Hunter Building had had to be. The fire of 1916 had suddenly committed the Department of Public Works to a major undertaking. The day after the fire David Ewart, the retired Chief Architect of the Department, was hired to supervise the removal of debris from the old buildings and to make a preliminary report on damage. A week later the effort was put on a more organized basis with the hiring of the firm of Peter Lyall Construction. (36) In the meantime the Department and the Government were actively considering plans for the reconstruction of the buildings.

While Lyall's firm cleared the debris, two architects, John Pearson of Toronto and J.P. Marchand of Montreal, joined Ewart in his investigation of the ruins. Their first report was optimistic. The Library was still intact, a testimony to the value of the only fireproof door in the building. More

surprising, however, was the estimate made by the architects that the walls that remained, as Rogers reported to the House, "represents an asset in labour and material in position, of fully \$2,000,000, that can be reused". He further reported that these "external walls require but few repairs, and when these are made all evidence of fire will be obliterated". (37) Thus it seemed as if the cost would be less than had at first been expected and that the old building could serve as a core for the new one. On the basis of the architects' report plans were developed and the Lyall Construction Company retained to carry out what now truly seemed like a reconstruction. In the spring of 1916 optimistic estimates stated that Parliament could be reconvened in the building in a year.

Any major construction project raises the question of the possible use of patronage and partisan advantage and the Parliament Buildings were no exception. But the spirit surrounding the reconstruction of a building of such national significance and the underlying spirit of nationalism that arose from the war created strong pressures for the politicians to pass up opportunities of patronage and to work together for the common good. As early as February 24th the Ottawa Citizen editorialized that "the new building will be a national edifice, and the control and direction of building it should be under a representative national board". (38) One also wonders whether J.B. Hunter, remembering the fate of the last Deputy Minister to supervise the construction of a Parliament Building, may not have supported the idea for personal reasons.

The Government seems to have been receptive to the idea. The Conservatives and Liberals had cooperated over the last couple of years on a number of issues and the time was not far off when a serious movement for coalition government would testify to the strength of the belief that the wartime situation demanded the total removal of partisanship. Thus it was not surprising when, on March 22, the day after the Pearson-Marchand conception of the new buildings was released to the public, Robert Rogers picked up the idea broached by the Citizen:

In view of the fact that our House of Commons is a common ground for both parties at all times ... I feel the need of the friendly and sympathetic cooperation of both sides of the House. In the hope of being able to secure this, I am going to ask the right hon. the Prime Minister and the right hon. the leader of the opposition to be good enough to name three members from each side of the House to act with me in the making of all necessary arrangements for the immediate rebuilding of the House of Commons. (39)

Both Borden and Laurier agreed to the proposition. Besides Rogers, who acted as Chairman of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction of the Parliament Buildings, the Government also appointed J.D. Reid, Minister of Customs; Pierre Blondin, Secretary of State; J.D. Hazen, Minister of Marine and Fisheries; and Senator James Loughheed, Minister without Portfolio. Laurier appointed William Pugsley, his former Minister of Public Works; Rodolphe Lemieux, former Postmaster General and one of the most respected of the Liberal Members; Charles Murphy, former Secretary of State; and Senator Robert Watson, former Minister of Public Works for the Province of Manitoba. (40) Some of the most experienced men in the House and some of the best brains of both parties were represented on the Committee. It is apparent that both Laurier and Borden saw the reconstruc-

tion of the Parliament Buildings as important. It may also be that both parties wanted men on the Committee who were capable of keeping an eye on their counterparts, for the spirit of partisanship was not completely dead.

The existence of the Joint Committee did not end the role of the Department of Public Works, although it altered the role. The Department henceforth had its main contact with the reconstruction through the Minister, as a member of the Committee, or through Hunter who acted as Secretary to the Committee. Hunter also sat on a technical subcommittee with David Ewart and the two consulting architects. (41) Although it was through the authority of the Committee that contracts were let, specifications approved and orders made, it was done with the advice of Hunter, the subcommittee and the technical staff of the Department. Nor is there any doubt that the advice of the Deputy Minister and his colleagues on the subcommittee was taken seriously.

At first the arrangements made in March went well. In April Rogers was able to tell Parliament that "good progress is being made with the preparation". (42) By June a tentative completion date had been set for December 1918, a postponement of the original one at the insistence of the architects. Most significant of all, at least as a symbol of the spirit of the Committee, was the decision "that no preference was to be given by the contractors in employing labour, or making purchases, to adherents of either political party". (43) In a move that reflected the wartime spirit and previewed other events of the near future, the patronage list was abolished.

The smooth beginning did not, however, last. The plans for the buildings as they developed began to change. The old Parliament Buildings had been far from perfect. From the time of Confederation the number of Members in the House had increased; the individual Member's role had altered, becoming more and more a full-time position. This meant that the practice of putting several Members into one office was proving increasingly unsatisfactory. This and the demand for more space from permanent officials meant that the architects began to look for ways to increase the size of the building. Eventually they decided that an additional storey was the answer to the problem and prepared plans accordingly. The Committee approved the change but, in so doing, opened the door to a number of problems.

Even in an age when wartime nationalism dictated that a spirit of cooperation be observed there was distrust between the parties. Too many personalities and the memory of too many fierce political battles stood in the way of complete trust. Many party supporters felt that the Joint Committee was a dangerous experiment where one side could easily be taken advantage of. The newspapers of the two parties did not hesitate to print such suspicions even though there was official cooperation. Especially singled out for attack were Robert Rogers by the Liberal papers, and William Pugsley by the Conservative papers, the present and the former Minister of Public Works. Neither man received such attention without reason. Both Rogers and Pugsley were reputed to be very "political" in their thinking and in the past, neither had hesitated to use the patronage list. Many were sceptical that this way of doing things had really ceased. Until early August the complaints were merely rumblings below the surface, but the whole issue became much more important as a result of the actions of the architects on the building.

In early August 1916 the architects concluded that, given the change in plans, the old walls were not an asset but a liability. Inspection had revealed that some of the old scandals of the 1860s never had been unearthed. Poor workmanship and inferior materials made it questionable whether the walls were safe for the old building much less for the new larger one being planned. The architects then decided, apparently without prior consultation with any elected official, to tear down the old walls. (44) It was an amazing and questionable act, at least in the way it was carried out. The old walls had to this point figured strongly in the plans and had been estimated to have a value of \$2 million. Ordering the old walls torn down was thus a major responsibility, which the architects probably had no right to assume. The question now was what the reaction of the Committee would be.

Most hostile were the Liberal members. Wilfrid Laurier and the men in his party had for some time had to face criticism in the party press towards the "tyranny of Robert Rogers" over the Committee. Laurier had at first dismissed such attacks as "dictées autant par le désappointement de quelques contracteurs que par toute autre considération". (45) The destruction of the walls, however, made him wonder whether the criticisms had not been correct. It was hard for him to believe, and with some reason, that the architects would do such a thing without consulting someone, and who was a more natural person to consult than the Minister of Public Works? When he learned of the action, Laurier wrote to Lemieux, "La destruction des murs de l'ancien édifice me paraît tout-à-fait injustifiable." (46)

Before the Liberals could decide on a course of action, however, they had to wait to see the reaction of the Committee as a whole. Generally the members were angry with the lack of consultation and nervous about the rising criticism in the press. They demanded that Pearson accept formal and written responsibility for the destruction of the old walls. (47) Once he did so, at least some of the members of the Committee felt that this was sufficient, but it did not end the worries of Wilfrid Laurier.

The Liberals were suspicious and had decided that some action was necessary but it was a question of how far they should go. Charles Murphy, a man who had been suspicious of the Committee from the outset, left no doubt as to what he felt the action should be:

What I tried to express to Sir Wilfrid is this - it does not matter whether the walls fell down, were blown down, or were dynamited down - the fact of interest to the public is that they are down, and being down, the public demands that after Lyall has been paid for his work, that the plans and specifications will be finished and tenders called for by public advertisement in the regular way. (48)

Laurier seems to have accepted Murphy's point of view quickly. Perhaps prodded by a critical editorial in the Montreal Star that day, he wrote Lemieux on August 10 that "il me semble incontestable que le temps est maintenant arrivé d'agir". (49) Laurier, however, wanted the action on the part of the Liberal members of the Committee to be united and he was unable to achieve this. Senator Watson, having been away during most of the discussion, had a different point of view and wrote to Laurier, "I see by your letter that you still have a longing for the old walls. Well so had I but when it was decided to put (up) an extra storey this old wall had to come down." (50) Pugsley soon joined Watson and as Murphy had already

effectively ceased functioning as a member of the Committee, it was left to Lemieux to make the protest.

Lemieux had originally been prepared to resign instantly, but at the urging of the party leader he stayed on the Committee long enough to have his position officially recorded. (51) At the meeting on the first of September Lemieux moved that the construction of the Parliament Buildings be let out by tender. When, as had been expected, he was unable to find even a seconder, he submitted his resignation to Hunter. (52) The action did not create a political storm. Some newspapers, such as the Toronto Globe, continued to complain that "the hon. Robert Rogers is the real power behind the architects" but the Committee remained intact. (53) The split within the ranks of the Liberal Party had seriously weakened the efficacy of Lemieux's resignation. The Committee remained in existence until 1921, becoming more and more Conservative in character as Laurier refused to make any new appointments.

The whole affair had become one of party unity and considerations of strategy. In these twistings and turnings a good many questions were left unanswered. If, as was publicly maintained throughout by Rogers, he "was not aware of the fact that they (the architects) were going to take down the walls until most of them were down", then the question becomes the age-old one of political authority, not political favouritism. (54) If it was a decision taken by the architects without prior consultation, then the most significant thing about the destruction of the walls may be the degree of power assumed by the experts, a power eventually accepted, though with misgivings, by the Committee. In these circumstances the attacks on Robert Rogers were irrelevant, for it was not a question of favouritism but of technocratic control.

The Committee remained intact, and the laying of the cornerstone by the Governor General took the attention of the newspapers away from the more unfortunate aspects of the project. The construction of the Parliament Buildings proceeded for some time without further major problems or controversy. By the autumn of 1917 construction had proceeded to the point where the buildings could be closed in and work continued on the interior for the winter. (55) It was hoped that at the latest, the Parliament Buildings would be ready to receive the 1919 Session of the House. By the spring of 1918 even Lemieux admitted, "I have no fault to find, from an architectural point of view especially. I think the new building will be a monument worthy of Canada." (56)

This is not to say that the situation was without difficulties. The demands of war had continually made it difficult to obtain materials and men for the work. Time and again the Committee had let tenders only to find that only one or perhaps two companies were interested, and at prices much higher than anticipated. Ironically, as the war came to an end the contractors were faced with their greatest problem to date - inflation. The year 1919 was one of industrial unrest. Plagued by rising prices and resented by employers, unions attempted to regain some of the wage losses of the last four years. Patriotism could no longer be used to appeal to men to postpone their demands and throughout the nation the strike became a common phenomenon. The spring and summer that opened with the Winnipeg General Strike also brought work stoppages to the construction site of the Parliament Buildings. Over a period of several months, strikes by various trades prevented the continuation of work on the building. (57) By

the time they were resolved, a great deal of time had been lost and wage costs had gone up significantly.

Wages, however, were only a part of the picture. Stone, steel, wood, and practically every other item that went into the building rose in price dramatically in that first year of peace. The over-all effect was a marked increase in the cost of the building. The original contract had been signed on a cost-plus basis, and the point at which the contractor and architects ceased to receive any commission - \$5 million - may be taken as the upper estimate of cost at the time of the signing of this contract. For a time it seemed as if this estimate would be met, or nearly so. By early 1919 the exterior work, except for the tower, was pretty much complete. It was also noted that the four upper floors "will be completely plastered by the middle of March, and by the end of May should be sufficiently dried out to receive the wood trim". (58) The cost to this point had been \$3,768,080.70. (59)

The combination of strikes and rising material costs altered the situation dramatically in 1919. The money, which had seemed to go so far before, now disappeared rapidly. By May \$4,623,532 had been spent. By September the original estimate had been exceeded, the expenditure to date coming to \$5,340,094. By the end of the year it had reached \$5,980,354 and by the spring of 1920, \$6,496,555. (60) And the work was far from finished.

Rising costs and work stoppages began to draw criticism from the politicians and press. In May 1919 Carvell publicly expressed his chagrin at the recent course of construction, stating, "I have been very much disappointed with the programs of the work." (61) In the Committee, previously amicable relations between contractor, architects and politicians began to show strains:

The Chairman called the attention of the Committee to the unsatisfactory progress which is being made with the work on the Parliament Buildings ... The contractor, Mr. Lyall, who was present at the meeting claimed very emphatically that good progress was being made, considering all the circumstances and conditions. (62)

Sometime earlier the Government had been forced to agree to move the occupation date back to 1920. Now it was becoming questionable whether or not even this date could be met. The Cabinet was determined that the House of Commons at least should sit under the new roof for the 1920 Session. The Opposition was becoming more vociferous in their complaints of rising costs, and less and less stoic in their role as occupants of the Museum.

Responding to these pressures, the contractors concentrated all their attention through the latter part of 1919 on the Common's Chamber and offices for Members of Parliament. And although it was close, they succeeded in their efforts. The main door could not be used, since it was still under construction and the Senate wing was far from complete, but the 1920 Session opened in the new Parliament Buildings.

By the standards the Members had become accustomed if not resigned to in the Museum, the new building was luxurious. It even made one wonder how the old building could have seemed suitable. No more did private members have to share an office with three or four colleagues. The ventilation and acoustics of the new Chamber were far superior to the old. There was even a parliamentary restaurant and so much extra space that a previously unthought-of luxury, a gymnasium, could be suggested. In the

success of its occupation old political difficulties were forgotten. William Lyon Mackenzie King, the new Leader of the Opposition, gave wide-ranging compliments to those whom his party had earlier condemned:

The Committee of both Houses in charge of the work of reconstruction, the departmental officers and officials of Parliament, and all who have assisted in thought or execution of design, are to be congratulated upon what we behold to-day. They are not less to be commended for permitting the architects great freedom in working out their ideas. (63)

It had been a monumental task under difficult conditions. In the end, for all the difficulties that had plagued the architects, contractor, Committee members and departmental officials, it was a success. As one Member put it, the new Parliament Buildings were a "fitting place for the political home of a great people". (64)

The Parliament Buildings had been a major project for the Department; significantly, in the later years of the war it was about the only major project under Public Works. Few new works had been started and even those under way had, whenever possible, been cancelled. As the war came to an end however, various demands developed that were to become a part of the responsibility of the Department of Public Works.

By 1918 Canada had fielded an army of half a million men. The casualties had been enormous in this war of muddy trenches and bloody battles fought for a few hundred yards of territory. By the end of the war the Government faced the problem of the veteran, a problem new to Canadian history. Preparing for the influx of men, the Union Government had in early 1918 created the Department of Soldier's Civil Re-establishment. The major single duty of the new department was the provision and care of military hospitals for those of the 179,000 wounded soldiers who would need further medical treatment. At first the new department was given the task of constructing as well as manning and financing the new hospitals. Since it had no experience in this field and no trained personnel, however, the Government soon decided that it would be more sensible to turn the construction aspects over to the Department of Public Works. By Order-in-Council all the existing and planned buildings under this department, along with the "unexpended balance of the appropriations", was turned over to the Department of Public Works. (65)

The Department found itself faced with a pressing and major, if temporary, responsibility. It moved quickly and before long had successfully completed several military hospitals across the nation. The importance of this and other related activities is revealed by the size of the "war appropriation" from which the funds were derived. In the 1919 fiscal year, for instance, the war appropriation comprised some 40 per cent of the total expenditure of the Department. (66) The transfer of responsibilities indicated that the Government saw Public Works as the Government's construction agency. It certainly made sense to allow the Department to carry out the construction, since this would bring existing expertise to bear and avoid needless duplication.

The end of the war was a period when the Department, accustomed to seeing responsibilities taken away, found itself assuming a number of additional ones. On the day the above Order-in-Council was passed, it was decided that the accounts for the "char service" should come under the

Department of Public Works rather than Finance, "as the service is one more closely allied with the work of the Department of Public Works". (67) In a more significant shuffle, the Government abolished the Department of Inland Revenue and divided its duties among existing departments. Public Works found that the Government (using the 1903 Transfer of Duties Act) had made it responsible for the administration of the Ferries Act. (68) It made as much sense for Public Works to undertake that Act as any other department, but the very fact that it could just as sensibly have been put under Marine and Fisheries or even Railways and Canals indicates how ill-defined the jurisdiction for transportation had become.

The new activities of the Department did not exempt it from feeling the continued pressure of economy. For years it had been cutting back on projects and refusing to initiate new ones. The natural result was that a good number of its staff found little to do. This was not so true of Headquarters, where administration and planning were less affected by the economies, but it was certainly the case in the field. The District Engineers, each of whom was responsible for works in his geographical area, had long been a vital part of the Department's structure. Their importance and number had increased with the size of the Department in the expansionary days of the Laurier era. The expansion of staff to meet the expansion of projects had been necessary but the reverse side of the coin applied with the economies of 1914-18, and by 1918 the local engineering offices were overstaffed.

Against this background, when a vacancy developed in the Antigonish District, J.B. Hunter decided this might provide an opportunity to reorganize the whole province of Nova Scotia and bring the number of officials more in line with the current workload. Writing to Carvell, the Deputy Minister suggested "the Antigonish office be closed, and that the province be divided into four engineering districts with headquarters at North Sydney, Truro, Halifax and Yarmouth". (69) The Minister did not seem to be in any hurry and it was over a year before the new Minister, A.L. Sifton, replied. He felt that "although the memo with regard to Nova Scotia appears to be satisfactory, it would be impossible to start in one province". (70) He suggested that Hunter take a look at the national arrangement of districts. The project had taken on a new and unexpected magnitude.

Sifton's reply to Hunter's proposal reflects the continued drive of the Government for economy after the war. Unsettled conditions at home and a national debt unparalleled in the nation's history meant that the Government took a cautious financial course long after the armistice of November 1918. At the opening of the 1919 Session Carvell had admitted that the Public Works estimates for that year would bring "disappointments in the minds of municipal bodies and different organizations in Canada who had been looking forward to the construction of public works". (71) And Sifton, some months later, obviously still felt that for a time yet the Department would be operating at a reduced level for long enough to make a reduction in staff worthwhile. The "estimates of faith" that Rogers had included in appropriations through the war would have to wait a while yet.

Now it was the turn of the Deputy Minister to take no action. Whether he simply felt that a careful study should be made or whether he was stalling because he opposed a wider reorganization, Hunter never seems to have presented a wider proposal to Sifton. There is some indication that he opposed the move in that when Sifton left the post and J.D. Reid became

acting Minister, Hunter repropoed that concept of a limited reorganization in Nova Scotia. (72) If he had hoped to circumvent a wider reorganization by awaiting a new Minister, Hunter was unsuccessful. Reid replied that the "position taken by the Government is that every economy must be made". He instructed his Deputy Minister to take "each province and deal in same way and submit to me for approval and consideration". (73) Whether or not he liked it, Hunter was obviously going to have to oversee an extensive reorganization.

Hunter, in consultation with Chief Engineer E.D. Lafleur, effected a considerable reduction in the outside engineering staff. The number of districts were cut from 31 to 15 and the staff involved was reduced from 230 to 146. (74) The proposal was accepted and the reorganization was under way by late spring of 1920. As with any such change there was controversy. Municipalities and politicians complained when their area lost a district office, fearing that the quality of supervision would suffer. Complaints were not with the principle of a reduction, however, but with the details. Everyone thought it was fine idea as long as it was some other town or constituency that lost the office. Departmental officials did their best to arrange things for the greatest possible efficiency but it was inevitable that a good many dissatisfied people were left in the wake of the reorganization. There was also the personal side. Such a reduction inevitably meant that a number of senior and well-respected district engineers or officers under them were forced into retirement. Typical of the reaction to this step was the statement of Rodolphe Lemieux who commented, "This reduction has caused many heart-burnings." (75) Whatever the misgivings, the reorganization of the Department was accomplished; this probably resulted in a more streamlined staff - one better suited to its current workload.

The reorganization and the reduction in the number of projects had another and inadvertent effect. As the activities of the Department had grown, the number of district engineers and the responsibilities they shouldered had increased. With the reduction in the number of offices, however, there was less possibility for on-the-spot supervision, and more and more of the planning and authority gravitated back to Ottawa. A decentralization process of several decades was reversed. In addition, as the number of projects under way decreased, a greater percentage of the Department's time was taken up with administration, which was of course a Headquarters' responsibility. The 1920s saw the focus of activity in Public Works move back to the head office.

If questions had been raised about the structure and organization of Public Works at the end of the war, the same was true of the whole Civil Service. Although the 1908 Civil Service Act had done much, it had proved far from perfect. First, it applied only to the inside service, a small proportion relative to the thousands of people in the Post Office, Public Works, Marine and Fisheries and other highly-scattered departments. Second, and this was challenged at the time, its classification system seemed designed more for the convenience of the pay officers than for the efficient running of a department. In fact, the Act had barely come into force before the Government began to look at the whole problem of the arrangements and regulations for the Civil Service of Canada again.

Robert Borden had been among those who had questioned the efficacy of the Act put through by the Laurier government in 1908. He had also been

committed in principle to some sort of Civil Service reform from the time of the enunciation of the "Halifax platform" in 1907. (76) It was thus not surprising that shortly after Borden took office he ordered yet another investigation of the workings of the Civil Service. On the advice of George Perley, who was acting as High Commissioner to Britain, Borden was able to secure for his investigation, Sir George Murray, a respected retired British civil servant. (77)

Within a short time Murray presented a report that reflected both his long experience in the Civil Service and his British orientation. It was a wide-ranging discussion, perhaps wider-ranging than the Government had intended. It would also seem that any discussion of Civil Service reform in this period can be divided into two parts: patronage and organization. Borden's commitment was to the removal of the first, whereas Murray concentrated pretty much on the second.

The first thing that struck Murray about the Canadian Civil Service was the degree to which Ministers became involved in seemingly minor administrative decisions. "They both have too much to do and do too much", he commented. Obviously the tendency for the Minister to become directly involved in the administration of the Department, which had been so standard in the nineteenth century, was not yet completely ended. Murray warned that unless greater delegation of power could be achieved, the Civil Service would become increasingly inefficient, hampered by an overloaded top rung. Typical of the lack of proper delegation, he felt, was a practice initiated by the Department of Public Works:

As an illustration of this, I may refer to an Order-in-Council of December 1905, under which every requisition for furniture, fittings and repairs for all public buildings throughout the Dominion must be countersigned by the Minister of the Department making the requisition. (78)

It was an Order-in-Council that had been passed at the request of the Department, and of course followed a practice that went back to the 1880s. Murray concluded with a comment that many people had agreed with for some time: "The business of a Minister is not to administer but to direct policy." (79)

Overloading the Minister was the most apparent problem but it was not the only one that Murray picked out. He also argued that Parliament could not, in fact, act as a strong check on spending in the Civil Service. Affairs were becoming too complex to be handled in supply debates; besides, once a Minister got that far, he was likely to use the majority behind him to push the estimates through, whatever the opinion of the Opposition. The danger was that a number of uncoordinated requests from various Ministers could lead to an unwanted expansion and duplication of effort. Murray suggested that it was up to the Minister of Finance to provide the coordination and controls that were so necessary. (80) This was not a new idea. From at least the turn of the century, the Laurier administration had tried to use the Minister of Finance in this manner. The very fact that the concept needed reiteration indicates how difficult such an assignment was.

Authority and delegation were only one side of the problem. Murray also felt that it was crucial for a civil servant to feel that "throughout his career his advancement depends on his own ability and industry" and not on the question of political partisanship or personal contacts. (81) He also felt that as far as it went, the 1908 Act had helped to create this atmosphere.

The problem was that it did not go far enough: Murray felt that the Act should be strengthened and applied to the outside service.

In his last section he stepped back from the details of organization and looked at the over-all jurisdiction and responsibilities of departments. He felt that there were a good many irrational divisions and that these would create both unnecessary expense and a debilitating effect on the whole organization of the Civil Service. It is perhaps not surprising that he again turned to the Department of Public Works for an example and to the division of dredging as it had developed:

The Department of Public Works maintain harbours, piers, and navigation works generally; but the maintenance of the St. Lawrence Ship Channel, a work not very different in character from the other navigation works is under the control of the Department of Marine and Fisheries... I am not quite in a position to make a definite suggestion as to the redistribution of these duties; but I think that the whole subject should receive early consideration by the Government. (82)

It was a significant report, perhaps the most penetrating commentary presented on the organization of the Civil Service to that time. The Government, however, took little action on it. A subcommittee of the Cabinet was established to look at the problem of ministerial powers and duties, but that was all. The Borden government seems to have backed off from the implications of the report and Borden himself was later to say somewhat defensively that Murray "went considerably beyond the scope of the proposed inquiry". (83)

To some extent Murray was pressing for a formal restructuring along lines that had already begun in a less formal way. The delegation of power from the Minister to the Deputy was much greater than it had been in the years of the nineteenth century, and over the next few years it was to go a great deal further. And Treasury Board, which, ironically, Murray felt should be abolished, would begin to take over many of the functions that still rested with the Cabinet in 1912 over the course of the next couple of decades.

Murray's report was concerned more with the question of structure and authority than with patronage. But as the Government came to consider the problem of the Civil Service over the next few years it did so from the opposite direction. Patronage was seen as the major problem, and ridding the Civil Service of patronage as the way to achieve efficiency. Organization and delegation were problems backed into, almost unwittingly, as corollary to the effort to end patronage. It is beyond the scope of this work to give in any detail a history of the Government's efforts to reform the Civil Service. Several works in this area already exist. (84) A summary of events is necessary, however, because of the obvious impact that such change would have on the Department of Public Works, both internally and in its relations with other departments.

The war itself had a major role in shaping the drive for Civil Service reform. In the first instance, it gave the Government an excuse to do nothing, pleading the imperative demands of war. It also created a sense of the need for national unity and a belief that the interests of the nation had to be put ahead of partisan considerations. The resolution of the Joint Committee during the construction of the Parliament Buildings to abolish patronage, and the very existence of the Committee, indicate the strength

of this wartime feeling. With national survival seemingly in the balance, politicians found it hard to justify to the public or themselves the placing of partisan considerations in the way of the efficient operation of the nation's business.

The conscience of the political heads of the nation was not left unprodded. Adam Shortt, the respected Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, strongly believed that much of the trouble in the Government was attributable to patronage. And unlike many in the Government's employ, he did not hesitate to make his views known to the public. Much to the chagrin of Borden, Shortt did not exclude criticism of the current government from his analysis of the problem. Speaking, for instance, before the 'People's Forum' in 1915, Shortt gave an extensive criticism of the practice of patronage and its effect on the Civil Service. He also stated that patronage still existed, though more in promotion than appointment. Such a trend, he concluded, "continued as it had been for many years, was to make the Civil Service like an army with an undue proportion of officers". (85)

The pressure from Shortt and from members of the Opposition and the press began to force the Government to consider direct action to follow up the vague promises that had always been a part of Borden's rhetoric. The Prime Minister himself seems to have had a real belief that his government would break the hold of the partisan traditions of the nineteenth century. Though hesitant and often mired in the realities of practical politics, Borden nevertheless seems truly to have believed that part of his mission was to reform the Civil Service. Several years after he retired, he read R.M. Dawson's criticisms of his administration. (86) His attitude towards the whole question was such that he spent several months researching the record of his administration to prepare a rebuttal. Beginning with a mild criticism, Borden's anger seems to have grown with the research. When he was finished, he had completed a sweeping and extremely harsh critique of Dawson. His former colleague, A.K. Maclean, perhaps trying to prevent a confrontation, was able to convince Borden that "Dawson's really not worth the compliment of such a letter". (87) It was never sent. This incident, as much as any other, reflects Borden's sensitivity to the whole question of Civil Service reform. It was thus not surprising that the combined criticism during the war and the spirit of the war itself caused the Government to take action on its long-standing principle.

What seems to have finally brought the Government to a definite commitment was the formation of the Union Government in 1917. The politicians were themselves laying down the cudgel for the sake of the war and it only made sense that partisanship in the Civil Service should follow the same route. On a less idealistic level, the administration of patronage in such a government was practically impossible. How could it be divided between Conservative regulars and Liberal newcomers without awakening suspicions and animosity? Thus the official Union Government platform in 1917 promised "the extirpation of all abuses, and a wise and bold policy of constructive reform" for the Civil Service. (88)

Shortly after the election, the Government took its first step to carry out this campaign promise. Using the authority of the War Measures Act, it passed an Order-in-Council that effectively widened the 1908 Act to include the outside service and abolished the patronage lists. (89) The authority was at best valid only so long as the war continued, and for this reason the

Government hastened, under the guidance of A.K. Maclean, to bring in a bill that would give these changes the force of law. The new Civil Service Act was introduced in April 1918. In introducing it, Maclean left no doubt about his belief in the connection between the Union Government and the existence of the bill: "This is the most interesting Parliament in Canada's history, and probably it will be the most important for the next century and a half of its history, and everything lends itself to the accomplishment of a reform of this character." (90) One might quarrel with the value Maclean placed on the 1917 Parliament, but it is hard to dismiss the obvious belief that this government felt it had a strong place in history.

Not everyone felt that the bill drafted by Maclean was good either in principle or in detail, and a long, hard debate followed. Backed by an overwhelming majority, however, and by a tradition that made it difficult for anybody to openly defend patronage as a good thing, the Civil Service Act of 1918 passed into law. From the time of its introduction, attention had been fixed on the question of the abolition of patronage, but in the wake of the bill a chain of events was to develop that would have a much wider and more controversial impact on the Civil Service than had been anticipated.

With the passage of the Act, it was decided, that if its clauses pertaining to competition and promotion were to be enforceable, the positions in the Civil Service would have to be more carefully defined and standardized. The Civil Service Commission was the body responsible for such classification, but feeling that they did not have the staff to cope with such a major task and sympathetic to the vogue of "scientific management", they contracted the work out to an American firm, Arthur Young and Company of Chicago. The firm, "the acknowledged North-American expert on scientific management", was to introduce very wide-ranging changes into the organization of the Canadian Civil Service. (91)

Until the end of the First World War, Canada had pretty much adhered to the British practice of grouping its civil servants into broad categories. At one time there had been only officers, a very restricted class, and clerks. By the time of the 1908 Act this had been considerably modified and the Act grouped the Civil Service into several subdivisions. These subdivisions were salary ranges rather than job descriptions and remained quite broad and flexible. Arthur Young and Company developed a much more specific system of categorization. The numerous classifications and descriptions that are a part of the Civil Service today really had their first statement in the efforts of the firm hired by the Civil Service Commission at the end of the First World War.

The categorization was developed by Arthur Young and Company by sending out questionnaires to employees of different types throughout the Civil Service. The replies to these forms gave the company the necessary details on duties, lines of promotion and salaries. Then, in consultation with the Deputy Ministers, an organizational structure was developed and the classification specialized as much as possible. The company was convinced of the value of its methods:

It will remedy the confused condition now existing in respect to the relation of pay to work. It will insure the same pay for the same work. It will carry the uniformity throughout the service regardless of departmental lines or geographical location of work. It will make possible the

advancement of pay for an individual within proper limits for increased efficiency in the same position but will call a halt on seniority advancement out of all reason when there is no change in duties and consequently no increase in usefulness to the Government. (92)

The classification was certainly detailed. Everything from Deputy Minister to the rather unusual position of "Baker and Winter Caretaker" received a salary range and job description. The ideal would seem to have been one description for one position. Often, for instance, where two similar though not identical positions existed, they were classified separately. The Chief Engineer of Public Works, for example, was given a different classification from the Chief Engineer of Railways and Canals. (93) The system, or lack of system, previously used by the Civil Service was completely overturned.

The classification had some of the desired good effects and some unexpected ones. On the positive side, the variance that had often existed between departments in pay for men doing the same work was ended. The Act also gave employees an idea of their futures in any position and their potential lines of promotion. But the minute classification system and especially the "lines of promotion", which every position had with it, tended to some extent to rigidify appointments. If the Chief Engineer of Railways and Canals was seen as having a different position with different skills from the Chief Engineer of Public Works, then the likelihood of, say, an Assistant Chief Engineer in one department being appointed to the Chief Engineer's position in another was very small indeed, no matter how skilled that man might be. The classification meant that in such a case the department would find it easiest to promote the man directly below the vacant position, although a wider job search might have yielded a better candidate. The other problem was perhaps unavoidable. Juggling hundreds of positions and thousands of individual salary ranges, the Arthur Young Company and the Civil Service Commission ended up with some glaring anomalies. In the case of Public Works, for instance, it turned out that the Assistant Chief Engineer was making more money than his superior, the Chief Engineer. As the Minister put it in Parliament, it was a result "scarcely anticipated". (94)

The overall effect of the 1918 Act and the classification must be set in the context of another change that had occurred over the previous decades. The position of the Deputy Minister, increasing in power from before the turn of the century, had developed rapidly in the expansionary Laurier era and under the strains of war. The increased power of the Deputy Minister, when added to the detailed classification system, the presence of the Civil Service Commission, and the application of the 1918 Act to the outside Civil Service worked to keep the Civil Service one step removed from the political heads of the Government. This engendered two opposite fears. There was the suspicion that patronage by political party would be replaced by a patronage system within the Civil Service. William Nickel, a Member of Parliament of this Government, warned the administration "to see that a system shall not be established by which nepotism, favouritism and the power of the Deputy Minister be increased to such an extent as that the powers of Members of Parliament shall become so dwarfed as to be a negligible quantity". His fear that "a small group centralized in Ottawa will become all-powerful" was shared by a good many people. (95) Both in Parliament and in the press, the distrust of too much

power accruing to non-responsible civil servants was expressed on several occasions.

There were also many who felt that the Deputy Minister was, properly, the administrator of his Department and that as such he should have the prime authority and responsibility for his staff appointments and arrangements. To fence him in on all sides with commissions and classifications was to prevent him from carrying out his assigned task. Alfred Fripp, Member of Parliament for Ottawa, and a person very conscious of the attitude of the Civil Service, was of this group. At one point he demanded that the Government "dispense with the services of these gentlemen from the United States, and ask the Deputy Ministers to make a report and clean up the classification in order that we may have an efficient Civil Service not only in Ottawa but throughout the whole Dominion". (96) The fact that Fripp was conscious of the attitude of the Civil Service was significant. His approach to the problem indicates that the civil servants themselves trusted the Deputy Ministers to a greater extent than they did the distant and aloof "experts" from the United States. Such attitudes reached deep within the Government. George Yates, at the time a Secretary to Borden, wrote to the absent and ailing Prime Minister about his thoughts on the classification:

One Deputy Minister told me that he considered the Classification a 'monument of ignorance'... There are a good many factors in a Civil Servant's usefulness which cannot be reduced to a card-index basis and as to which neither the Minister nor his Deputy now appear to have the deciding voice. It is the Classification which governs. My own opinion is that it will be necessary in the interests of the Service to clothe the Deputies with more elastic powers in the interests of the very efficiency for which all concerned are honestly striving. (97)

In the complex organism that the Civil Service had become it was impossible to arrive at a clear-cut "either-or" answer. The Deputy Ministers put forth their view in 1922, arguing before Mackenzie King that "the complicated classification should be repealed". (98) It was modified but never repealed. Although the Deputy Ministers usually found the Civil Service Commission cooperative, and although there were loopholes for them to use when necessary, there is no doubt that their increased power was to some extent modified by the greater number of regulations and controls that bound them. From 1920 on, the question of the proper relationship between the various interacting groups has been debated, and occasionally the belief in what is proper has changed. But the issue could never be completely resolved and remains contentious to the present day. Since it is probably an unavoidable characteristic of large-scale bureaucracy, it will no doubt remain a problem for some time to come.

Perhaps one other thing about the reforms in the wake of the war should be mentioned. The primary purpose of the 1918 Act was to eliminate patronage. It did accomplish a great deal in this direction. Increasingly, after 1918, politicians replied to requests for positions by saying that such appointments were under the control of the Civil Service Commission. Often, of course, the Members were only too happy to use the Civil Service Commission to avoid the unpleasant task. Typical of this attitude was the comment of Sir George Foster, the Minister of Trade and Commerce: "What a load the cutting out of patronage will take off the shoulders of the

Ministers." (99) At other times, however, even genuine support for a candidate ran headlong into the regulations of the 1918 Act. When Arthur Meighen, Borden's powerful Cabinet Minister, sought employment for a friend of his in the Post Office at Portage La Prairie as a caretaker, he was told by Public Works that "these positions are now filled through the Civil Service Commission". Turning to the Commission he was again refused his request. (100) Things had obviously changed a great deal from the time of widespread and common exchanges of favours between Ministers.

Yet neither the Civil Service Act of 1918, the Civil Service Commission, nor all the classifications in the world could totally remove patronage. There were too many loopholes. It was not, for instance, the intention of the Act to bring the idea of patronage by purchase under control. Certain firms, newspapers, and other organizations had always received favoured treatment at the hands of one party or other. And although this seems to have stopped temporarily during the war, it was not long before partisan politics again asserted itself. "I attach", wrote Mackenzie King's secretary to the Department of Public Works, "a copy of the new patronage list for the Prime Minister's constituency." (100) Some things had not changed.

Of course all the changes of the period after the war applied to the Civil Service as a whole and not just to the Department of Public Works. But they were to have an important effect on the Department and the way it functioned. The nature of the Civil Service was to be, with geography and the state of the economy, one of the major forces determining the structure and policy of the Department. The specific developments in the Department were also to be important in determining the interaction between it and the Civil Service as a whole. Organization and leadership were to remain crucial in its functioning.

The Department of Public Works was, like other departments, affected by the changes that had resulted in increased authority and independence to the Deputy Minister. The Department was exceptional only to the degree to which the power of its Deputy Minister had increased. Typical of the changes that had taken place over the last few years was an exchange in the Commons in 1920. Faced with yet another new Minister of Public Works, an Opposition Member asked whether this might not retard the programs of the Department. Sir George Foster replied scornfully to the supposition:

What does it matter who are the ministers and acting ministers of the department? They are only temporary, they are in and out; it is the permanent officials who carry on. My hon. friend knows they did so when he was a Minister of the Crown, and he knows they still do it. So long as we have good deputy ministers the work goes on without interruption. (102)

Here was a statement similar to the one made by Cartwright to Laurier in 1907 but without qualifications. Foster did miss one point: there had been an effect on structure as a result of the rapid change of Ministers that had characterized the last couple of years. It has been argued that the longer a Minister is in office the more likely it is that he will exercise close control over the Department. Conversely, if the Minister is a weak figure, or if the portfolio changes hands rapidly, the influence and power of the permanent head will increase. In the case of the Department of Public Works after Robert Rogers' resignation, the rapid changeover of Ministers may not have hindered the work of the Department, but it certainly

accelerated the rise in influence of its Deputy Minister. In the three years before the above exchange in Parliament, the Department had had five Ministers or Acting Ministers of whom only one, F.B. Carvell, had been in the portfolio more than a year.* And until the fluctuating political situation straightened itself out this was to continue. The next two years saw two more Ministers, a total of seven in five years.

This unsettled political administration combined with the general rise in the influence of the Deputy Minister throughout the Civil Service to make the Deputy Minister of Public Works more powerful than any other permanent head since the time of Hamilton Killaly. But the Civil Service of the 1920s was not that of the 1850s. Well-established procedures of finance and responsibility meant that it was extremely unlikely that another Killaly, indifferent to the policies of the elected government, could have reached the position of head of a department. Nor was the man in the Deputy Minister's chair at the Department a person at all like Hamilton Killaly. James Blake Hunter, B.A., had been appointed Deputy Minister in 1908 and was to remain in that position until his death in 1941.

Born in Woodstock, Ontario, Hunter had entered the Civil Service through a fairly common route, the patronage of a politician. James Sutherland had noticed the academic success of this boy from his constituency at the University of Toronto. Minister of Marine and Fisheries at the time, he encouraged Hunter to give up the idea of journalism and brought him to Ottawa as a Private Secretary. Later when Sutherland became Minister of Public Works, Hunter accompanied him to that Department and, upon Sutherland's death, moved into the office of Charles Hyman. Such secretarial positions had always been seen, for the man with ability, as a staging ground for higher positions. It was later reported that as early as 1904 Hyman had related that Hunter "was to be groomed for promotion". (103) After moving temporarily into the position of Assistant Deputy Minister, Hunter was made Deputy Minister of Public Works in 1908.

The political connections of the new Deputy Minister had certainly not hurt his career. There was only one other deputy younger than himself at the time of his appointment, and, as William Lyon Mackenzie King later recalled, both he and Hunter had found the older officials of the service suspicious of the ability of these two young men. Hunter proved himself a very capable administrator, and if his career had begun through political influence, it did not rest on it. His efforts in moving the Parliament after the fire, the part he played on the Committee on Reconstruction, the construction of the Hunter Building and numerous other projects, had made him a senior and widely respected civil servant by the end of the war.

The B.A. that Hunter habitually put after his name was symbolic of more than an affectation of the age. Hunter was a generalist. He had had no background in engineering as had most of the Deputy Ministers of Public

* The Ministers and times of tenure after Roger's resignation were: C.C. Ballantyne, October 3, 1917, to October 12, 1917; F.B. Carvell, October 13, 1917, to August 2, 1919; A.L. Sifton, September 3, 1919, to December 30, 1919; John Reid (acting), December 31, 1919, to January 25, 1920. At the time of the exchange Newton Rowell was in office, having been appointed January 26, 1920. He would remain until July 10, 1920.

Works before him. It was indicative of the changing nature of the Department and the Civil Service that Hunter was a successful Deputy Minister in a Department traditionally thought of as technical. One other trait distinguished Hunter: from all accounts that survive of his personality it would seem that the word most often applied was "gentleman". Although he could be tough-minded and demanding of his staff, he seems always to have had about him an air of politeness and refinement. Honest, hard working and capable, there is little doubt that this Deputy Minister had both the loyalty and the respect of his staff.

Reform of the Civil Service and the increase in power of the permanent heads of the departments were trends that began at the turn of the century and culminated after the First World War. There was another trend that began as a result of the war and was to exert a major influence on policy through the 1920s: the belief in the need for strict economy. The Government did not resume massive public works on conclusion of the war. This trend did not disappear over the months that followed, but was accentuated. It was felt that the war had left an intolerable burden of debt on Canada and that the Government must bend all its policies towards the reduction of this debt. Hume Cronyn, speaking for the Union Government, summed up the attitude and its implications in the 1920 debate on the Speech from the Throne:

Members of Parliament and their constituents should alike refrain from pressing upon the Government their claims - long delayed though these may be, necessary as they may appear to local interests - until this country is in a sounder financial position. Deflation of our swollen credits is a more vital matter than magnificent public edifices or memorials, nor can there be any speedier means found whereby the mounting cost of the necessities of life may be reduced. (104)

As the speech implied, public works, visible and costly items, were items very likely to be sacrificed in any drive for economy. In fact Cronyn made this explicit by stating that "a halt must be called in the prosecution of public works". (105)

The economy drive of the Government therefore meant that in spite of several years of neglect, the public works of Canada would have to wait for attention. The policy was not temporary; it was found that the Liberal government which succeeded the Union Government was as much in favour of the policy as its predecessor. The new Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, saw the policy as both necessary and politically useful. Writing to his Minister of Public Works, J.H. King, in 1924, he summed up the Liberal philosophy and its application to Public Works, stating, "I am sure you will agree that nothing is quite so important as that the effect of our much-heralded surplus and reduction of taxation should not be destroyed on the eve of an appeal to the electorate by a reversal of what, in this direction has been so splendidly achieved." (106) King replied to the Prime Minister, "I have already instructed the heads of the branches in my Department to observe every economy with respect to this year's expenditures." (107)

The demand for economy was completely understandable in these postwar years. The war debt was of a size totally unfamiliar to Canadians. In an effort to provide revenue for the war expenditures the Government had been forced to bring in profit and income taxes - despite which revenue had fallen further and further behind expenditure. After the war, people

began to demand a reduction in both the tax load and the debt load, which had such an effect on taxes. This seemed very much in accord with the general laissez-faire spirit of the 1920s. The Government's role was regarded as fairly small. Throughout the decade the Government responded to the mood, avoiding further involvement with the Canadian economy and working towards the magic goal of reducing both debt and taxation load.

For Public Works, perhaps to a greater degree than for other departments, reduction of expenditure became a fetish throughout the decade. Pressure from the Prime Minister and the Minister meant that officials cut back expenses wherever possible. But the long-term validity of such a policy is open to question. By the middle of the decade it had been almost ten years since the Department had reduced its activity to a minimum. Many important works were neglected during these years. Hidden costs - such as those to the economy of an area that watched as a work fell into ruin, or another where no response could be obtained to requests for an essential work - have to be included in any discussion of true economy. But to the Government the question was one of public, not private, solvency.

Both parties were in essential agreement on the matter of economy. If anything, the Conservative Opposition, during the first King administration, seems to have been more interested in savings than the Government. This may perhaps have resulted from the peculiar psychological situation where a supply vote practically bare of major expenditures exposed such exceptions as did exist. Each exception then became the basis for Opposition concern that the Government was deviating from its stated policy of economy. When, for instance, J.H. King pointed out in 1925 that "since taking office we have refrained from starting any new public works", Arthur Meighen was not satisfied. True, he admitted, the expenditure was small but he was worried about the number of contracts the Government was entering into: "I notice the Minister is doing his best to mortgage the prospects of future Governments in their struggle to pull the country out of debt. It is not the money that is being spent so much as the commitments that are being tied around the country's neck." (108) On another occasion the Government had to fight to obtain funds from the House to build the tower to the Parliament Buildings. The attitude of Parliament in these years was perhaps best summed up by Liberal Member Andrew McMaster who said, "Our governmental expenses must be cut, and cut to the bone." (109)

There were some major public works constructed in the 1920s. In St. John the harbour improvements begun in Courtenay Bay and suspended during the war were completed. Major dredging, deep-water wharves, and a breakwater over 2,000 feet in length were undertaken to make St. John a true winter port for Canada. By 1924 some \$18 million in expenditure had brought this goal close to reality. (110) On the opposite side of the country, at Esquimalt, a new dry dock was begun to complement and to some extent replace the older one. At first the project was controversial, but before long both parties found it expedient to support the project, lest they forfeit valuable British Columbia seats. The contract was let in 1921 and the dock was soon referred to by Hunter as the "most important and costly harbour work the department has in hand at the present time". (111)

Whatever the exceptions, Hunter presided over a department with very restricted activities in these years. The demand for economy meant that throughout the early part of the decade the Department was unusually

quiescent. With few major projects under way, work became a routine of minor repairs and administrative details. Such inactivity led in turn to secondary demands for economy. There was a strong suspicion, given the reduction in activity and the demands for economy, that the Civil Service was overstaffed. A story told by Daniel D. McKenzie, the Liberal Member from Nova Scotia, reflects some of the attitudes prevalent at the time. McKenzie related an apocryphal story of a man who bothered a Minister time and time again for a position in the Civil Service. For a while the Minister resisted but finally the man became such a nuisance that the Minister told his deputy to hire him. The deputy, not having a real position for the man, used his ingenuity to find something for him to do:

He told this fellow: "Here is a pile of books. Take them out of here and put them away back there, then you can bring them back here. Keep at it all the time." Well the man started in to move the books around from place to place, and kept at it continuously for a week or so. Then he came back to the Deputy Minister and said: "Mr. Brown, I am not going to stay here. There is something the matter. There is a blooming Bolshevik or something in this office that follows me around wherever I go. If I go into this room he is after me. If I go into that room he follows me there, and when I came back here he is here too." "Oh, don't be alarmed about that," said the Deputy, "that is your assistant." (112)

Though not really fair, McKenzie's anecdote reflects an attitude fairly widespread in the 1920s. The nation felt that the Civil Service had less to do because of the reductions in expenditure and began to wonder whether the staff it supported was not excessive.

Public Works, again because it was highly responsive to reductions in expenditure, was criticized on this count far more than other departments. In 1922 Arthur Meighen accused it of being "nearly all overhead". (113) Three years later things had not changed and H.H. Stevens argued that since the work of the Department had been reduced it should be possible "to carry on with a small staff". (114) The logic of Stevens' argument had a strong appeal and there was some truth in it. As the earlier reorganization of the Engineering Districts at the end of the war indicated, the reduction in work had also reduced the size of staff needed.

The Government took criticisms such as Stevens' seriously. Both the Prime Minister and Minister took steps to encourage staff reduction in the Department. At various times Mackenzie King made it clear to the Deputy Ministers that the Government believed the size of "the Public Service is out of proportion to what it should be". (115) Responding to these pressures J.B. Hunter did all he could to balance staff reductions with continued efficiency and with fairness to employees. Generally he followed a particular method with regard to reductions. Rather than dismiss people, he would allow them to remain until they wished to leave, so long as they were competent. When a position became vacant, however, he would carefully evaluate whether or not it needed to be filled. If it did not, then a reduction could be accomplished directly. If the position was necessary, a reduction could still be accomplished by moving some competent person from an unnecessary position to the needed one. The method seems to have been fairly successful, and by 1924 he could state, "The Civil Government staff of the Department of Public Works had been reduced by 15 per cent below pre-

war strength." (116) Hunter's method seems to have been acceptable to the Government and was, in fact, followed by a number of other departments in ensuing years.

The question then arose whether the most efficient men for the position were being kept or whether such a method reduced the efficiency of the service as the competent left and the incompetent or unambitious remained. The dangers of such a result were compounded by the fact that the Department of Public Works could in this decade offer the exceptional person very few exceptional challenges. For one of the few times in its history the Civil Service found it difficult to compete for men with the private sector. Inflation, combined with rigid controls on salaries and uncertain cost-of-living bonuses, meant that even in terms of salary, the Public Service was not very attractive in the years after the war. All these factors created the possibility that an unbalanced and inefficient staff could have developed in these austere and uninspiring years.

The Department of Public Works, at least, seems to have avoided this result to a large extent. It had in various important positions men of competence with a lifelong loyalty to the Department. Typical was Thomas Fuller, the son of the famous Chief Architect of the 1880s. Hired presumably through his father in the 1880s, he had been with the Department for nearly forty years. There was little likelihood that he would turn his back on the position of Chief Architect of Public Works for an offer from the private sector. (117) Similarly, K.M. Cameron, appointed Chief Engineer in 1923, had risen through the ranks. Because the department was able to retain such competent people as Fuller and Cameron in a difficult time, it did not have to face a competitive market for skilled professionals. Had these people not been there to fill the positions, however, it is unlikely that men of equal ability could have been attracted from outside the service. As it was, there are indications that at the lower levels the quality of technical officers declined to some extent in these years.

It seems that through a combination of good fortune in the career civil servants Public Works possessed and in the administrative abilities of J.B. Hunter, the Department did not suffer from the reductions that took place. To some extent the criticisms of the politicians had been justified. An expanding department, suddenly stopped in its growth and then reduced, was bound to suffer from some redundancy and from men who, as the phrase went, had "outlived their usefulness". The reductions of the 1920s were necessary if such overstaffing was to be brought under control. And although there were mistakes and individual hardships, it can be said that the Department generally maintained both its level of competence and its morale.

The war had really dominated the policies of the Government and, consequently, the Department of Public Works from the time it broke out until the latter part of the 1920s. Economy had been enforced both during the war and long after peace. By 1927, however, the pattern of changes and policies that had come out of the war were being replaced by others. For better or worse the new classification system, the Civil Service Commission and the powerful Deputy Minister were permanent features of the Civil Service. The bureaucracy was learning to function in this new set of interrelationships.

The organization of the Department of Public Works in the latter 1920s was essentially the same as that before the war. (118) Only the

addition of a Purchasing Branch at the end of the war had altered the general structure. (119) For a while it looked as if this branch might add a significant new dimension to the Department. The War Purchasing Commission had developed the concept of a central supplier for the whole Civil Service. By the mid-1920s however, the Commission had become unnecessary and the Purchasing Branch of the Department of Public Works began to take over some of its functions. G. Dawson, the head of the Purchasing Branch, seems to have handled the purchase of office furniture, writing implements and a good many other things, not only for his department but for several others as the decade went on. For a time it looked as if Public Works might become a central supplier for the Civil Service, but the tendency never became Government policy and when it met the resistance of certain departments, nothing could be done. The opposition of these departments (particularly, it would seem, Railways and Canals) and the lack of government support for expansion of the service meant that eventually a new department would take over the role. (120)

Most important in indicating the decreasing influence of the war on policy was the rising demand that public works again be made a part of the Government's program. The change was first apparent in the Opposition. By the 1928 Session, demands for economy on the part of the Conservatives were mixed with those for more attention to public works in certain areas. Richard Hanson, a Conservative from New Brunswick, expressed the new attitude when he stated that he was "not quite satisfied with the Minister's policy to delay the erection of needed public buildings for the conduct of the country's business". (121) He was followed by a plea from his colleague, Robert Grimmer, that was as old as Representative Government but had been strangely muted over the last few years: "I do not understand why the Government will not look to the necessities of the public works of the country; the breakwaters in my constituency are very inadequate." (122) The Government seems to have been only too willing to change its policy by this time. Holding the line on expenditure to such an extent is both frustrating and, politically, a policy with finite appeal. Thus the new Minister of Public Works, J.C. Elliott, replied to growing criticism of the policy by stating that he, at least, was beginning to think that the whole policy should be re-evaluated: "I think the Government ought to consider very seriously in view of the great increase in business since most of the buildings now housing public services were constructed, whether or not at some time in the not distant future they should attempt to embark upon a fairly extensive policy of building." (123)


The statement by Elliott was in fact soon reflected in policy and it was not long before it was reflected in the activity and expenditure of the Department as well. For the 1927 fiscal year the total expenditure of Public Works had been \$14,421,933.36, practically the same as for the year 1918, but 1928 saw the expenditure rise to \$17,309,378.06 and 1929 brought it to \$20,680,902.45. (124) It looked as if, with the war drifting into history, the Department was going to resume an active part in developing the facilities of the Government and the nation. Within a year, however, events were to so shake the nation and the western world that the Government and the Department of Public Works were again faced with a crisis. No sooner had the problems of reorganization and fiscal difficulty of the war era sorted themselves out than Public Works was to find itself faced with new pressures and demands of an unprecedented nature.



The Honourable Robert Rogers, Minister of Public Works, 1912 - 1917




Parliament Buildings on fire, night of February 3, 1916



"Where the Speaker sat", the morning after the fire



The House of Commons, sitting in the Royal Victoria Museum, 1916



After the old walls came down, in late 1916




James B. Hunter, Deputy Minister of Public Works, 1908 - 1941

(Department of Public Works)



Hugh A. Young, Deputy Minister of Public Works, 1953 - 1963

(Department of Public Works)



Symbol of success: the demolition of Ripple Rock, April 5, 1958

(Department of Public Works)

CHAPTER 10

THE DEPRESSION DECADE

1929-1939

As the last year of the decade of the 1920s opened, things augured well for the nation. Canada was prosperous and seemingly content. Disparities in income and regional pockets of unemployment were more than compensated for by the generally booming state of the economy. The cost of living had stabilized and the government fiscal situation was such that it could begin to loosen up the tight-fisted approach to expenditures that had characterized much of the period since the war. If the state of the economy caused discomfort, it was the ranks of the Opposition who found that prosperity worked against political fortunes. And it became apparent early in the Session that Mackenzie King was not about to let the relationship between the Government and the state of the economy be forgotten:

After all, one of the great objectives of government is to make a people happy, contented and prosperous, and when a government is able to exact from the leader of the opposition the admission that the country is happy, contented and prosperous, that government has reason for congratulation. (1)

The situation meant that the Government could finally turn from economy to the development of lagging facilities. The Department of Public Works, operating for so long on a strict budget, began to plan major projects once again. The cutback on the number of buildings constructed through the 1920s had resulted in rising rental costs. By the 1929 Session however, Public Works Minister J.C. Elliott could promise that this tendency would be reversed: "We are trying to put up buildings as fast as seems reasonable." (2) Symptomatic of the change was the awarding of the contract for the Confederation Building in Ottawa. This major departmental office block had actually had its cornerstone laid two years earlier as part of the ceremonies marking the sixtieth anniversary of Confederation. It was not until 1929, however, that the firm which had built the Parliament Buildings, Peter Lyall and Sons, was given the contract and construction begun. (3)

Nor were buildings the only sign that the Government had become more optimistic. A major enlargement of the Welland Canal was nearing completion and would put new demands on the harbour facilities of Lake Ontario. To provide facilities to meet these demands the Department of Public Works undertook the creation of a deepwater port and grain transfer point at the town of Prescott. It was planned to develop an elevator capacity at dockside of 5½ million bushels, with wharf facilities to match. The project was fully under way by the end of the decade and the fiscal year 1929-30 saw nearly \$1½ million expended by the Department on the development of the harbour. (4) Across Canada, activities such as the developments at Port Burwell and Sorel testified to the newly active mood of Public Works.

In this change of policy there was, of course, an irony. For nearly a decade of high government revenues and an increasingly prosperous economy, policy had been made in the shadow of the debt left by the First World War. As a result, the Government and the Department of Public Works had fallen farther and farther behind in their response to demands for new facilities of all sorts. Then, just as the war was receding into the background and Cabinet and Public Works were beginning to take vigorous action, the economy collapsed.

A stock market reversal in the United States in the fall of 1929 began the chain reaction that dramatically and tragically revealed the flawed structure of the prosperity that the western world was experiencing. Canada, very much dependent on its trading partners and suffering from many of the same economic instabilities, could not be expected to escape. (5) At first, as in other countries, it was hoped that the reverse was temporary and that all would soon return to normal. When R. Kelley, a man connected with the construction industry, wrote to Elliott towards the end of the year and expressed his pessimism about the future, the Minister had a confident reply drafted. Arguing that "there is every reason for optimism during the coming year", he predicted that his department would continue to expand "in order to keep step with the ever increasing needs of the country".

It is the object of the Department by these expenditures to afford more adequate accommodation for the transaction of public business and to encourage and promote the general trade of the country wherever new avenues open up following the increasing development of its various sectors. (6)

The pessimism of the man who wrote to the Minister was to prove more justified than Elliott's assured reply. The next few years saw avenues of activity closing down rather than opening up. Through all sectors of the economy, business declined to the extent that by 1933, the Canadian Gross National Expenditure was only 57.6 per cent of what it had been in 1929. (7) The role of the Department of Public Works over the next decade was not devoted to keeping pace with an expanding economy. If that had been its purpose it could have quietly closed its doors in the fall of 1929 and left them closed for a decade.

It is perhaps understandable that Elliott preferred to take an optimistic view of the future at the end of 1929. He and his officials had only recently obtained the mandate from the Government to embark on a program indicating a growth of the Department's responsibilities and prestige. And like most people, the Minister and many of those who worked

under him found it difficult to accept the fact that a whole new set of decisions would have to be made as to policy.

Elliott also had the political situation to consider. He was a member of the Government that, having taken credit for the prosperity of the nation, would find it difficult to escape from the blame for its depression. By early 1930 the political fortunes of the Government had begun to decline rapidly. The aggressive leader of the Opposition, Richard Bedford Bennett, took the offensive: "During the winter we have entered upon greater suffering and privation than we have known during the last quarter of a century," he charged. (8) It was no longer possible for the Prime Minister to reply as confidently as he had twelve months before. The Liberals were trapped by the deepening depression. Believing that the Government should interfere as little as possible in the economy and that "the economy would recover with little help from governments," the Government would do no more than try to make both the people and itself believe that the nation was still basically sound and prosperous. (9) The Prime Minister could only reply to Bennett by saying he would "let the people of the country judge as between my hon. friend's views of conditions and conditions as the country generally knows them to be". (10) As unemployment rose, breadlines grew longer and the relief facilities of municipalities were overwhelmed, the nation lost faith in such optimism. In the 1930 general election the Conservative Party came to power.

The Bennett administration was soon to find that it too had no easy answer for the Depression. The new Prime Minister's promise to "blast his way into the markets of the world" with a new tariff policy did not prove to be the magic cure, and the new Government soon had to face the problem of just what could be done. Over the next few years, as people sought for an answer to this question, a good many new theories were developed. Some were too mild, others too radical and some absurd. In the end economic theory and the Government's role in the economy were to change significantly. Along the way the Department of Public Works found itself engaged in new and unfamiliar areas, with criteria that differed radically from those it had been used to in the past.

From the beginning the Government was in a dilemma. The nation cried out for an influx of money and projects that would create work. This implied that the Government should follow an expansionary policy. On the other hand both major parties believed that the Government, like any business or individual, had to pay its way. The countercyclical policies that so dominated the postwar world were understood by few people and accepted by even fewer. Thus, whatever the Canadian Government undertook to do in the early 1930s, it would do in light of its revenue. Of course, this revenue, dependent on the volume of income and trade, shrank with the arrival of the Depression. In 1929 the total government revenue had been a healthy \$460 million. In Bennett's first year as Prime Minister it slipped to \$356,189,000 and by the fiscal year 1931-32 it was down to \$333,839,000. (11) Given the economic theories of the day there seemed nothing to do but cut expenditures as much as possible. As the Conservative Minister of Public Works put it in 1932: "We are endeavouring to keep within our revenues because our expenditures are made from revenues." (12)

The decline of revenues caused the Government to develop a series of deflationary measures in an attempt to balance the budget. In the Civil Service, for instance, Bennett demanded extreme economy. This economy

took two forms. First, wherever possible, the number of civil servants was reduced. This was a traditional measure for governments caught in a difficult revenue situation and resulted in an over-all decrease of 12,500 civil servants between 1930 and 1935. (13) Second, the Government decided that its employees ought to contribute directly to the search for savings. Early in the 1932 Session, Bennett announced, "We have determined that we will have this economy begin with ourselves." (14) The salaries of the Members of the House of Commons, the Senate and the entire Civil Service were reduced by 10 per cent. Given the unemployment in the nation, the individual civil servant had little choice but to bear this reduction with as much good grace as possible.

The drive to economize was also reflected in the expenditures of the Department of Public Works. Expenditures, which reached a peak of \$34,118,404.25 by 1931 as the Department finished contracts begun before the Depression, soon began to decline. In 1932 spending was down to \$22,360,329 and by 1934 to an incredible \$11,146,000, the lowest figure since 1908. (15) Of course, with a good many expenditures fixed or increasing, the Government had to be especially tough on those areas where it could reduce expenditure. As Public Works Minister H.A. Stewart once admitted, many of Public Works expenses were "more controllable", and as during World War I, were the first to go. (16) By avoiding commitments to new contracts or projects, the Department could slash its expenditure to the basic amount required for staff and upkeep. By 1934, with over 65 per cent of its expenditure directed to staff and maintenance, indications are that the Department had almost reached that point. In fact, if one takes the figures for new construction, the skeleton nature of the budget on which the Department was operating by 1934 becomes even more apparent. In that year, only \$1,568,525.45 was spent on the construction of new buildings. One would have to go back to the nineteenth century and the aftermath of the Langevin scandal to find a lower figure!

Statistics, of course, can only begin to give an idea of the effect of the Government's fiscal problems on the Department and the nation. For it was a cruel irony that both the Department and the Government as a whole, should contribute to unemployment or to the hardships of citizens in its service. This did not go unnoticed; time and again, in Parliament and in public speeches, members of the Opposition criticized the Government for creating further distress in a nation that already seemed to have its share. When Bennett introduced the Civil Service salary reductions, for instance, J.S. Woodsworth complained that "a ten per cent reduction for lower-paid employees in the Civil Service means almost disaster". (17) His sentiments were echoed by a good many others.

To have one's salary reduced was bad enough but to lose one's source of income completely at such a time was disastrous. When it came to the attention of Members that the Department of Public Works was contributing to unemployment instead of relieving it, they complained loudly. Alphonse Fournier, the Member from Hull and a future Minister of Public Works, uncovered an example of such policies in his own riding. In 1932 some 75 men were laid off by the Department in an attempt to meet the reductions forced on it. "Yesterday," commented Fournier, "I received a visit from one of those men who was employed by the Public Works department. He had been working there for the last eight years. He is the father of nine children." The statistics of budget and revenues became at this level a very

human problem. As Fournier concluded, "What is he to do now, under present conditions?" (18) Nobody had an answer to the question.

A more widespread problem was the effect of the reduction in the activities of Public Works at a time when many needed help in a desperate way. Several communities and occupations relied on the services provided by the Department in order to maintain their livelihood, and it is perhaps not surprising that the public did not sympathize with the Government's efforts to reduce expenditure. Petitions flowed into the Government from across the nation urging projects in one area or another. Essentially these petitions were of two types. The first sought the construction of a public building or other structure for the sake of the employment it would provide while being constructed. The construction industry was hard-hit by the Depression and it was as anxious as the unemployed to find work. Typical of this approach was the resolution sent to Bennett from the town of St. Catharines: "That this Council seeks the assistance of the Dominion Government to relieve the acute unemployment situation which exists in this City and District by undertaking the erection of a new Post Office and Customs Building at as early a date as possible." (19)

Public works as an activity was one of the few means that, by 1930, had been accepted as a proper method of government intervention in a slack economy. As far back as the nineteenth century, works had been recognized as a tool to relieve unemployment. It is, however, one of the interesting points in the past of the Department of Public Works that although this type of activity had been accepted as a relief measure, the federal Government had never become involved in it to any extent. Every recession from the 1840s on had created discussion on the matter but none had ever caused the Government to launch a program through Public Works designed specifically to give employment. From the time of its formation Public Works had been seen as an adjunct to the prospects of the Canadian economy rather than as a lever. Its contribution, it was felt, was through the facilities it provided rather than through the money it spent. It had been left to the provincial and municipal levels to carry out such employment schemes. As a result of this view, the Department had consistently followed a cyclical rather than a countercyclical pattern of expenditure in relation to the economy as a whole.

There still remained the second way in which the Department could aid the public. Public Works had always had an important role to play in providing such facilities as wharfs, dredging and other matters that fell within its jurisdiction. Steps to improve these facilities for those who needed them would simply be a continuation of traditional government policy. In fact the more optimistic might hope, given the slackening of trade, that even with its reduced budget the Department would be able to meet the more necessary requests. Such was not the case. Trade may have slackened but the needs of people for facilities to carry on their form of livelihood had not. Large projects could with some justification wait but the Department was also responsible for thousands of smaller projects throughout the nation. Fishing ports in coastal areas and along the Great Lakes gave thousands their only hope of earning a living and these ports in turn depended on the Department of Public Works.

The choices the Department had to make within its shrinking budget were extremely difficult. In many cases requests had to be refused even though they were obviously urgent. In Liverpool, Nova Scotia, for instance,

the main occupation was fishing. Without access to the sea and adequate harbour facilities, the already depressed area would face extreme hardship. Thomas Locke, the District Engineer for Nova Scotia, wrote to support dredging in the harbour. "Filling in" seriously threatened the livelihood of those still able to earn a precarious living in already depressed times. Locke noted that he fully understood the policy of the Department, "that only the most urgent work be undertaken". To him, however, Liverpool certainly qualified as an urgent case: "If there were only sufficient funds to perform one dredging work in this district and I was asked to report recommending which one it should be, I would under these exceptional circumstances select Liverpool as that one place." (20) In spite of this plea from Locke the work was not undertaken. When the supplementary estimates came to the House a few weeks later Liverpool was not on the list. William Ernst, the Member of Parliament for the area, wrote Stewart that he was "astonished" and could not "think any efforts to economize are justified if they are made at such a cost to the people". (21) The problem of the human costs of economy was one that was to plague the Government and the Department through the 1930s.

In the face of shrinking revenues and a mounting debt, the Department of Public Works not only did not expand into new areas of activity but was unable to maintain its old role of service satisfactorily. The problem was summed up by the former Postmaster General, Peter Veniot:

I do not see how it is possible for the department to get along with that amount of money and at the same time do justice to the industries, especially the fishing industry, in the provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island. (22)

The case of Liverpool indicates that they could not. It was one of the frustrating things about the Depression. To act would impoverish the Government, said economic theorists; the nation's credit would be endangered and the situation aggravated. Nor did this seem a far-fetched concept. Several municipalities and one province did go bankrupt under the strain of the Depression, and it was feared that the federal Government was not immune to this danger. At the same time the question raised by Ernst remained to haunt those who had to make the decisions.

Of course the Government did more than just try not to spend money. Bennett had won the election on promises of immediate action, and on taking office, he called a special Session of Parliament to legislate some of them. The Department of Public Works fully expected that it would be given additional responsibilities as a result of this Session. In August 1930 Hunter wrote to Cameron urging him to prepare a list of works that would be useful "in relieving unemployment". The Department was obviously expecting from the beginning to step into a new role and act as an agency to fight unemployment. Hunter told Cameron that he wanted the list "with a view to asking for an apportionment of some general vote for unemployment relief". (23) When Bennett moved to bring in a bill to provide money "for the relief of unemployment in constructing, extending or improving public works and undertakings," it looked as if Hunter's preparations had been wise. (24)

The Cabinet had other intentions. Indeed, \$20 million was voted at the special Session for the relief of unemployment, but it soon became apparent that Public Works was not to be the prime agency for its disbursement. (25)

Writing a supplicant early in the autumn, Stewart warned that "a comparatively small amount, if any, will be placed at the disposal of the Department of Public Works". (26) In the end the Government decided that the money would be used mainly to aid municipalities and provinces in providing schemes of work and unemployment relief. The interests of the federal Government were to be administered by the Department of Labour. The Government had left "public works" for the relief of unemployment in its traditional place, with the lower levels of government. Hunter was not to see his department expand into a new area. In fact, Public Works had no involvement at all with this first unemployment relief project. The next year Stewart replied to a question in Parliament by saying that "none of the \$20,000,000 was expended through the Public Works Department". (27)

The efforts of the Bennett government in the initial stages of the Depression make two things apparent. First, economic theory and circumstance forced it into pursuing two paradoxical policies. To match revenues and expenditures it tried in every way possible to cut expenditures to the bone. Traditional projects under the Department of Public Works were reduced drastically. At the same time \$20 million was handed out to the provinces and municipalities in an effort to relieve them of some of the burden of unemployment. Second, from the administrative point of view, the Department of Public Works was willing to undertake works aimed at unemployment but was not initially seen as the proper vehicle for such action. Such money as was used for this purpose went to other levels of government, with the Department of Labour acting to safeguard federal interests.

The nature of the administration of the funds served to make the paradox inherent in the policy even more apparent. Perhaps understandably, Members of Parliament tended to see the Government's effort in the area of "public works" in terms of the Department of the same name. A statement by W.R. Motherwell, the Liberal from hard-hit Saskatchewan, illustrates the way in which the reductions of the Department of Public Works made the contradictions in government policy more obvious:

Considerable relief was required in Saskatchewan out of the \$20,000,000 voted at the special session, and if public buildings are looked upon as a means of providing relief why reduce the aggregate expenditure for public buildings in Saskatchewan this year to one-sixth the amount spent last year? (28)

The point is, however, that the Government did not see public buildings "as a means of providing relief". While the Government handed out funds to the provinces, the Department of Public Works was instructed to reduce expenditures.

Needless to say, the 1930 relief funds did not provide a cure for the nation. Economically, Canada continued to slide deeper into the Depression. Politically, the Government's efforts did not satisfy the public. It was soon apparent to Bennett that provision would have to be made for 1931. The eventual result was the Unemployment and Farm Relief Act of 1931. Its wording was extremely general. It simply provided that funds could be used in a multiplicity of ways to relieve unemployment. (29) Once again the relief funds were to be under the administration of the Department of Labour and once again grants to the provinces were seen as an important part of the disbursement process. There was one significant difference: the

Department of Public Works was to play a role in the construction of works for the sake of relieving unemployment.

As early as August, R. de B. Corriveau, the Acting Chief Engineer, wrote to the various districts instructing them to "advise by night letter" any works in their area that would be suitable for such funds. (30) The engineers were able to respond quickly. There was no shortage of projects needed and their only real decision was to rank them in order of priority. Thus when Orders-in-Council began to allocate funds in September, the Department was ready. By autumn numerous projects had been started in dozens of centres across Canada.

It is difficult to ascertain exactly what thoughts went into the Cabinet decision to shift the approach to unemployment relief to include direct federal involvement. It may have been that Bennett was not satisfied with the lack of control involved in grants to the provinces. It may also have been a political decision that active participation by federal departments made the efforts of the Ottawa administration more visible and thus more politically rewarding. There are also indications that officials within both the Department of Labour and the Department of Public Works were anxious to take a more active part in unemployment relief. It may have been that the respective Ministers were able to influence the decision of Cabinet. This is only speculation, but two things are certain. The tendency towards greater involvement by the federal Government on works projects would continue as the 1930s advanced. And although the 1931 Act was a step towards federal use of "public works", it was a conservative step. The greater part of the money still went to projects under provincial and municipal jurisdiction. The Department of Public Works was even one more step removed, in that its projects were to a large degree under the control of the Department of Labour. The money used by Public Works was carefully set aside in accounts separate from the regular funds. (31)

Access to these funds, even on a limited basis, was welcomed by Public Works. It was not a gratifying role to be responsible mainly for refusals to requests from communities or people in need. The funds from the Unemployment and Farm Relief Act meant that engineers and architects in various districts could proceed with projects they had been urging for some time. The local official and the Department generally could feel itself a more positive force in the eyes of the public than it had been before.

At the same time, any new project creates problems and one as visible as unemployment relief could be counted on to cause more problems than most. The money available was far short of what was required and it is not surprising that the nature of the projects and the question of who was to work on them became a widely discussed issue. From the introduction of the bill, the Opposition had voiced fears that it would become a vehicle for patronage rather than for employment. Nor could it be denied that there was political involvement. For instance, every item suggested by Chief Architect Thomas Fuller was approved by the local member. (32) This political participation did not necessarily imply patronage. The lists included members from opposition parties and suggest that the political involvement was the proper one of representing a particular locality.

The complaints did not cease when the projects got under way. It was argued that in many areas hiring was done on a discriminatory basis. Part of the problem came from the fact that the federal Government had previously had little involvement with unemployment. There was no national organi-

zation to direct those in need to the positions available. Local engineers or architects had to seek help from various local organizations. These might be municipal welfare offices, charity organizations or local political organizations. The last choice was unfortunate, for a good many local organizations were not loath to take over the direction of hiring on a political basis. With hiring supervised from afar and responsibility split between the Department of Public Works and Labour, it was not long before abuses crept in.

There was a sense of national urgency about the relief projects of the Government and men were desperate to obtain work. People who watched their families go to bed hungry night after night were not likely to remain quiet and accept widespread political patronage as inevitable. It was not long before letters began to pour into the offices of the Minister of Labour, the Minister of Public Works, and particularly the Prime Minister, complaining of abuses in various localities. In fact, it would seem that in this case the first pressure to rectify these abuses came from neither the press or the Opposition but from the public itself. Typical was a letter from a Mrs. J. Voyer to Bennett in 1931. Her husband had found that his political affiliation had prevented him from obtaining a position on the local Public Works project: "As you know money has been voted for repairs to the wharf. Is it wise on the part of Mr. J. Baptiste Deschênes, to employ none but Conservatives when the money was voted for the unemployed in general?... We are not rich, and have a family to look after and must have money to meet our expenses." (33) Poverty made what had often been regarded as traditional political practice unacceptable and citizens who suffered did not hesitate to voice their complaints.

In response, the Department of Public Works issued a directive reminding its local supervisors of the "spirit and extent" of the Unemployment and Farm Relief Act. Cameron warned the officials under his charge that employment was to be given to the needy "regardless of political affiliation, race or creed". (34) The directive seems to have been effective, although isolated abuses of the Act for political or other motives no doubt continued. The decline of serious criticisms of the Act in this area, however, and the concentration of the Opposition on other areas in the 1932 Session, indicates that patronage was prevented from becoming a major feature of this employment effort.

From this time on, the major criticisms fell into two opposing views: the Act was regarded as either too large or not large enough. Whereas the Department of Public Works spent approximately \$2½ million under the Act, its regular expenditures declined by nearly \$12 million. (35) The paradox between the two lines of government policy obviously remained unresolved. On the one hand, it could be argued by Mackenzie King that although the Government pretended to economize, it was actually spending large sums under the various relief and unemployment programs. Referring to the 1932-33 supply vote for Public Works, King noted, "The reduction that appears here is very largely, if not more than, offset by the amount of public expenditures made on public works under the Unemployment Relief Act." (36) The implication was clear. The Government was really not economizing at all. Other critics, especially those on the left of the political spectrum, argued that the Government was not spending enough. George Coote, a radical Progressive Member from Alberta, called for a large-scale public works program amounting to a potential \$100 million. His

criticism of the paradox in government policy went in the other direction to the one of King's: "This year, when we most need the work, we have the smallest expenditure on public works that has been made since I have been a member of the House. I think government activity in connection with public works should be speeded up whenever there is evidence of a slackening of the economy." (37)

Behind these two contrasting sets of demands on the Government about the extent of relief activity was the subsidiary but equally important question of what form future relief should take. Public Works had the advantage of stimulating industry directly and appealed to the strong belief that men should work for what they earn as well. On the other hand this was to some extent a clumsy method of disbursing funds. For every dollar that reached a truly needy person, there were funds channeled into the pockets of contractors, middlemen and other necessary adjuncts of the construction industry. This flow of funds might eventually stimulate the economy, but it did not put money quickly enough into the hands of those who needed it. If that was the purpose of such programs, then pure relief was by far the most effective short-run means of helping the unemployed. But the dole, as it was disparagingly called, running counter to the strong belief in the work ethic, also had serious flaws as a policy.

These major alternatives faced the Government as it sought to find some magic route out of the Depression with increasing frustration. To a large extent the direction of future policy rested in the hands of one man, R.B. Bennett. Bennett was a self-made man with definite ideas: more than most other Canadian Prime Ministers, he kept the Government's authority under personal control. One historian has recorded a story that even if apocryphal, illustrates much about Bennett's administration:

One of the stories going the rounds in the 1930s was of the tourist who saw R.B. Bennett walking alone towards Parliament Hill from his suite in the Chateau Laurier, talking to himself. He asked a bystander who it was and got the reply that it was the Prime Minister holding a cabinet meeting. (38)

A lonely and complex man, Bennett was besieged on all sides with the ideas of friends, enemies and strangers, but before any major change took place in government policy he had to be convinced that it was right.

Involved in any such decision was the future role and importance of the Department of Public Works. The direction of policy would very possibly determine whether the Department would become an active and important part of the Government's effort to combat the Depression or, because of lack of funds, a frustrated and impotent agency. Understandably the Department itself hoped that it could continue to be involved in federal works projects. Nor was this so because the men in the Department were so naive as to believe that Public Works was the only agency that could solve the Depression. Rather, it was felt that only through such involvement could Public Works obtain the funds necessary to continue its traditional role as construction agency. Hunter and others supported the idea of using public works for relief in a desire not only to lead the Department into a new role in the Canadian economy but to ensure that it could continue in its old one.

The Department of Public Works did not lose its concern with the efficiency and results of construction simply because the purpose was to

provide employment. Under the Unemployment and Farm Relief Act, for instance, it was late autumn before a number of the projects could begin. The funds were due to lapse on March 1, 1932, and there was no guarantee that follow-up funds would be available. If the Department had been concerned only with providing employment, the fact that a number of the projects might be left uncompleted would not be that troublesome. But neither Hunter nor the district architects and engineers were satisfied with such an approach. They still saw as their ultimate goal the provision of needed facilities to other government departments and to the nation. To have left the works uncompleted would have been like the "public works" projects where one party dug a hole in the ground and another came along and filled it up. This was not the view that Public Works had of its responsibility. Almost from the time the works were begun, letters from the field urged the Government to provide a means of winding up the works in some sort of orderly manner. Eventually the Government agreed, extending the Act by two months to allow the projects to reach some rational point for their suspension. (39)

Although the Department had limited success in this area, the long-range efforts to convince the Government to continue the use of public works as a vehicle to relieve unemployment were seemingly unsuccessful. A 1932 version of the Unemployment and Farm Relief Act was passed, but on a smaller scale and relying much less on the Department of Public Works than had its predecessor. In the 1932-33 fiscal year the Department spent only \$138,369.65 under the heading of unemployment relief. (40) Bennett had lost faith in the ability of any such program to stimulate the economy. The Prime Minister later wrote that the 1930 and 1931 Acts had been predicated on the belief that the Depression was local and that the economy would respond to such measures but "subsequent events indicated that the depression was so widespread that it was impossible to cope with it by this means". (41) The Government had lost faith in the power of public works as an economic lever and had in fact begun to wonder whether any measure would be successful. Reverting to the expediency of "camps" for the unemployed under the firm hand of the Department of National Defence, the Government withdrew from its schemes for public works. By the 1933-34 fiscal year the Department of Public Works once again found that it had no money allocated for unemployment relief projects.

By 1932 there was no doubt that the prime objective of policy, insofar as the Department of Public Works was concerned, was economy. Bennett and the Minister of Finance continually submitted the estimates of the Department to a thorough review before they were allowed to go to Parliament. At the administrative level a new organ acted to ensure that economies would be carried out in all levels of the Civil Service. One of the more amazing administrative events of the 1930s was the rise of Treasury Board "from a position of relative insignificance to the status of the Chief Government control agency". (42) And with the powerful figure of W.C. Ronson at its head, Treasury Board soon gained the reputation of being the Prime Minister's watchdog. The newly-powerful agency acted as a major obstacle to any department in search of further funds.

Treasury Board's new position had a tremendous effect on the structure of financial responsibility in the Civil Service. Before the rise of Treasury Board, either the Minister or the Civil Service Commission, depending on the nature of the item, had been the real checkpoint on expenditure. If the

Minister approved he would submit the item to Cabinet with his support, and attempt to convince his colleagues - and particularly the Minister of Finance and the Prime Minister - that it was worthwhile. With the interposition of Treasury Board, however, a good many items never reached Cabinet, or were dealt with there perfunctorily on the basis of Treasury Board recommendations. It has been said that Treasury Board under Ronson "was usually negatively assertive in the one sentence which said 'No.' " (43) Given this attitude, a project probably had less chance of approval at the hands of Treasury Board than it had had when the Minister could take it directly to Cabinet. Hunter and his officials no doubt ran into the "No" of Treasury Board a good many times in the Bennett years.

By 1933 the Government's determination to operate as cheaply as possible had become a dominant feature of policy. Stewart, as Minister of Public Works, accepted and perhaps agreed with the policy, but at the same time seems to have regretted that his Department should feel the austerity so strongly. At one time he referred to Public Works operations as "a victim of circumstance". (44) It was not only the Conservatives that pursued this policy with vigour: the Liberals continued to urge the Government to even greater savings for the sake of the nation. In April 1933, J.C. Elliott, the former Minister of Public Works, characterized the attitude of the main Opposition party: "I do not think the government realizes how important it is to pay as little attention as possible to the appeals that come from the ridings.... These expenditures must be cut." (45) In the search for a balanced budget politicians on both sides of the House forced the Department to return to a negative policy and refuse most of the hundreds of requests that reached them.

Generally then, with the Government avoiding any large-scale relief efforts by means of public works, the Department had no choice but to carry on as best it could within the existing strict budgetary restrictions. It would seem that every project had to be considered primarily in terms of cost. Those that could be justified under such terms would be approved and those that could not would die either in Treasury Board or in Cabinet.

As had been the case during the First World War, Public Works found that the best way to obtain funds for an undertaking was to prove that such expenditure would actually result in a saving. For instance, the Confederation Building's effect on overall rental costs was seen by Bennett as "very important as regards further construction of new buildings". (46) If a substantial saving in terms of rental costs had resulted, then future buildings could be justified in the same way that the Hunter Building had been justified in 1917. Hunter and Stewart did their best to present a favourable case for future construction. The Minister sent a detailed explanation along with the figures on rental costs:

You will notice that practically every Department involved in the change has asked for and received additional accommodation. Notwithstanding that, there is a very substantial saving and we have done our best in every instance to encourage Departments to limit their requests for space as much as possible. (47)

He obviously felt that to delay construction would be unfortunate for the efficiency of the Civil Service, and in the long run would cost more. Pointing to the prepared plans for an adjoining office block, the Minister even hoped that Bennett would make it possible "to proceed with the

erection of one of these buildings out of funds provided for unemployment relief". (48) Stewart does not seem to have been convincing enough, for his suggestion was not accepted. The attempts that had just begun (in 1929) to catch up on the backlog of projects for government accommodation went the way of so many other areas under the Department's jurisdiction.

Such austerity was bound to have an effect on the internal organization and efficiency of the Department. Years of austerity, which went back practically unbroken to the First World War, were taking their toll. Staff, even highly-trained architects and engineers, could have been easily obtained during the Depression. The 10 per cent cut in Civil Service salary was more than made up for by the security of employment and by the fact of any employment at all in an economy where even a professional education gave no guarantee of work. And the Department could have used new men. Senior positions were filled by men of an older generation. Most remarkable was A.G. Kingston, the Chief Accountant, 78 years old in 1932. Thomas Fuller at 67 and even J.B. Hunter at 58 also exemplify the generally advanced ages of the men at the top of the Department. (49) It was a generation beginning to feel the pressure of years of understaffing and excessive concentration of work at the top levels. K.M. Cameron was a case in point. The Chief Engineer had worked conscientiously from the time he was appointed. He had rarely taken even his full allotment of vacation and had dedicated himself to his work to a high degree. The combination of increasing age and lack of adequate support staff meant that, as the Depression went on, he suffered more and more from illness. By 1934 a physical exhaustion that his doctor stated probably resulted from "hard work" forced him to take 135 days of sick leave. (50) Although Cameron suffered more than most, his case was not untypical. Hunter, Fuller and others found that as the Depression continued the proper management of their duties created a severe strain.

The Depression, coupled with the years of economy that preceded it, also had a long-range effect on the structure and competence of the Department. Public Works desperately needed to draw younger men from the pool available in the 1930s. Too many of its top officials were reaching retirement age and there was a serious danger that skilled and experienced personnel would not be available to succeed them. Many competent men were available. C.D. Sutherland, from all reports a capable architect and administrator, was able to step into Fuller's position without difficulty when the latter retired in 1936. F.G. Goodspeed had gone on from his experiences on the Georgian Bay Canal Survey to become a mature and valuable district engineer, able to move easily to the position of Assistant Chief Engineer in the 1940s. Even with Goodspeed the problems of the Department become apparent, for he was over 60 years old when he became Assistant Chief Engineer. The years of economy had seriously distorted the normal age patterns of the Department and were beginning to affect both the capabilities of some areas and the morale of the Department. The Depression of the 1930s aggravated the effects of the economies of the 1920s. The absence of new and capable men was beginning to have its effect both on the ability to delegate authority and on the overall vitality of the Department of Public Works.

The Depression dominated events in the 1930s. Neither Government nor Civil Service could escape from its implications wherever they turned. There were, however, other issues that arose and other problems that had to

be solved. One of these concerned the relationship of the National Gallery of Canada to the Department of Public Works and the Government generally.

Ever since the Gallery had been removed one step from Public Works and put under a Board of Trustees, the Department and the Government generally had had little to do with it. Funds were provided, but the selection of paintings and the administration of the Gallery were independent of politicians and other areas of the Civil Service. Like all other government-supported functions, the Gallery had felt the effects of the austerity measures of the Bennett administration. Its annual budget had been slashed from \$130,000 in 1931 to \$25,000 by 1935. (51) Yet it still found the money, especially in the early part of the decade, for the Board of Trustees and Eric Brown, the Director, to purchase and exhibit paintings. And it was in this area of the operations of the Board of Trustees rather than in the Gallery's expenditures that basic questions of responsibility arose.

Art is to some extent a question of personal taste, and the Gallery had had its critics from the very beginning; but in the 1920s the criticism became much louder. At the root of a growing controversy was the school of art that had dominated the Canadian scene after the First World War. The Group of Seven led an upsurge of interest in art, with paintings that were judged excellent by international standards and yet had a uniquely Canadian form of expression. But the style of the group also marked a significant departure from the standard approaches of earlier Canadian works and many questioned its value.

Taste is, of course, subjective and the relative merit of a particular group was unlikely to have brought about political intervention by itself. What took the growing controversy to this stage were charges that Canadian artists outside the Group of Seven school were systematically being discriminated against by the National Gallery. The charges were so frequent that by 1927 Mackenzie King felt it necessary to write to Elliott, "It is alleged ... many of the artists of the Royal Canadian Academy are having their paintings totally excluded." King, who was himself not very sympathetic to the newer styles, felt that this was probably Eric Brown's doing and urged Elliott to call the Board of Trustees together "and have an understanding in the matter". (52)

The Prime Minister seems to have assumed that the Trustees, once the matter was brought to their attention, would support him and rectify the matter. This would have solved the problem but would have left the Gallery still in the hands of an independent Board of Trustees. But King's assumption was wrong. The Trustees solidly backed both their Director and the selection of art. Typical of the response to Elliott's message was the telegram from Vincent Massey: "Feel very strongly present attacks on gallery administration have been made with no justification whatsoever." (53) King and Elliott had no choice but to let the matter drop or overturn the authority of the Board of Trustees. The cautious alternative was chosen and nothing more was said.

By the time Bennett took office, criticisms of the National Gallery were growing both more frequent and more strident. It was now a standard charge that unfair bias on the part of the Gallery was really responsible for the popularity of the Group of Seven and that their paintings were being forced on the Canadian public. Typical of the strength of feelings involved

were the following comments contained in a letter to Bennett in 1932: "The great majority of Canadians know that Lauren Harris is running the Group of Seven, that the Group of Seven is running Vincent Massey, that Vincent Massey is running Eric Brown, that Eric Brown - a mere civil servant - is running the Board of Trustees." (54)

From the time of the formation of the Board of Trustees, it had been the practice of both the Minister of Public Works and the Government generally to stay out of the selection of paintings and the management of the Gallery. Mixing politics with art, it was felt, would have resulted in both bad art and bad politics. Yet if the criticisms were even partly true, then the whole arrangement would be brought into question. Essentially the charge was that gross favouritism was being practiced by Brown and the Trustees to the detriment of Canadian art and the stated purpose of the Gallery. Letters and petitions mounted and after a member of the Board of Trustees resigned over the issue, it began to seem that there was already a great deal of politics in the selection of art for the Gallery. If such was the case, then it might be better to bring the responsible elected officials and representatives of the Canadian people into the question.

Although intervention was considered, neither Bennett nor Stewart intervened. (55) In a way this set an important, if negative, precedent. By deciding at a time of such controversy that the Gallery should remain independent of elected officials, a pattern was set for subsequent administrations. Two things seem to have been responsible for the lack of action. First, as the charges reached a crisis point, supporters of the Gallery began to appear and presented a number of counterpetitions, which to some extent removed the image of the Director and the Trustees as a small conspiratorial group attempting to force their views on an unwitting nation. More basic was the feeling that, even if some of the criticisms were valid, the alternative of direct political control was not much better. Years of experience with the views of Members of Parliament on art, exposed during discussion of Gallery estimates, would have convinced most people of that.

In the end the administration left the Gallery alone. Eric Brown remained Director until his death in 1939. In spite of the controversy that had marked his administration, there was some truth in the statement made at the time of his death: "During the period of his administration, the National Art Gallery developed from a small and comparatively unknown collection to rank as one of the great galleries of this continent, and its usefulness has been extended to every part of Canada." (56) For better or for worse, the Department of Public Works remained only loosely connected with the Gallery. The relationship was not to change significantly until the Gallery was removed from the Department's jurisdiction in 1953.*

Bennett's decision to leave the National Gallery independent of the political administration was perhaps a bit surprising in light of the tendency of his government to centralize control. The Government under Bennett was often accused of gathering power to itself at the expense of Parliament. As early as 1930 Ernest Lapointe warned the Prime Minister of any attempts to abuse the Unemployment Relief Act. What worried Lapointe was the

* The National Gallery became the responsibility of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration when that department was created in 1953.

vague wording of the Act. The funds were granted only for the general purpose of relieving unemployment. Beyond that it was up to Cabinet to decide. This pattern, which was followed in the 1931 and 1932 Acts, greatly reduced Parliament's control:

My hon. friend says there will be the Auditor General to keep a check on these expenditures. Well, the Auditor General has functions and duties, and he is there for the purpose of seeing to it that every penny voted by Parliament is used for the specific purpose for which that penny is voted, and for nothing else. That is the only control that can be executed by Parliament, or rather I should say by the House of Commons... The only control that can be exercised is to have every sum of money voted by Parliament appropriated for a special destination, for a special and specific reason. (57)

Lapointe's criticism was an acute one. The vague wording of the bill meant that in fact Parliament would have no control over the allocation of funds, so long as it could be said that the funds had been spent on the relief of unemployment.

The unemployment measures introduced by the Government were part of a general trend away from specifically stating the purposes of the funds voted. Bennett's administration soon made the Opposition extremely suspicious and it was not long before the charges of "blank cheque" bills became common to the debates. (58) Such procedures also spread from the special bills to the general estimates. The Department of Public Works covered more and more items of unspecified size or nature under the general appropriation for repairs. By 1933 Elliott and others were complaining that such a vote "brings about a condition similar to that which occurred under the blanket powers given to the government by the unemployment relief measures". (59)

Yet although there were similarities between the estimates and the special votes under the unemployment schemes, there were also differences. Both were administratively convenient. It was simply easier to shift funds to meet the requirements of repairs in a thousand places if the vote had not been broken down into subcategories ahead of time. The same principle lay behind the general votes of the relief measures.

The two votes also had important differences. Whereas the unemployment relief votes do seem to have been deliberately designed to avoid endless debate in Parliament and thus to some extent centralize control in Cabinet, the Public Works estimates reflected another development: the changing nature of financial control. Treasury Board was to a large extent replacing many of the watchdog functions of Parliament. For better or worse, the position of Parliament was evolving in a fashion analogous to that undergone by the position of Minister after the turn of the century. It was becoming a step removed from the administration of funds and voted more on general aspects of policy and commitment than on amounts. Day-to-day control, or perhaps dollar-to-dollar control, was being left more to the Cabinet and to regulatory bodies within the Civil Service. In evidence of this it might be said that whereas the "blank-cheque" votes characteristic of the Government were to end even before Bennett left office, the latter trend - with regard to general estimates - continued to make use of wider and wider general votes to cover a multitude of smaller items. By the end

of the decade it had become standard practice for the Minister of Public Works to present an estimate of a fairly large amount with the covering phrase "to supplement on approval of Treasury Board ... any of the appropriations of the Department of Public Works". (60)

In spite of the fact that many of these trends were a function of the changing nature of the Government regardless of party, there was little doubt, even in the minds of the Conservatives, that by 1933 there was a great deal of distrust and suspicion of their administration. The control the Prime Minister exercised over both Cabinet and Parliament, the ill-famed relief camps under the Department of National Defence and the "blanket" votes under the Relief Acts, all combined to discredit the Government in many eyes. Most important, however, was simply the fact that the Depression continued and the Government seemed unable to bring the country out of it. It was becoming very clear that austerity was in itself an insufficient policy.

The catastrophe of the Depression forced people and governments to turn to new ideas and concepts as old ones failed. The formation of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in 1932 and the dramatic rise of the Social Credit philosophy testified to the effects of the Depression on political thought. And if R.B. Bennett and the Conservative Party were unlikely to be swayed by such unorthodox approaches, they were nevertheless forced to re-examine their policies and priorities. At the very time that the demand for austerity was reaching a peak in both older parties, forces were emerging that would lead the Government on a new course of action.

Eventually the pressures for a more innovative approach to solving the Depression would lead the Prime Minister to a sweeping change in policies. Before that, however, a modest and traditional approach began to gain in favour. In the fall of 1933 John White, an Ontario Member of Parliament, wrote Bennett urging the Government to adopt a large-scale program of public works. White was a Conservative and for this reason his request was more unusual than a good many other letters. His constituents, he noted, did not accept the Government's reasoning that such a program would be too expensive and he, too, was beginning to wonder whether "it may be that now is the time to consider another program of Public Works". (61) The surprising thing was that the Prime Minister, who had only a short while before abandoned such an approach, replied sympathetically to the suggestion: "I am inclined to think that there is much in what you say and that an early effort must be made to deal with the situation ... now that the trend is upwards it may be that we can really obtain beneficial results by the adoption of such a program". (62)

A great deal has been said about the effect of the American New Deal on Bennett's last-minute program of reform in 1935. However, it would also seem that the New Deal had an impact on government thinking at an earlier stage. Public works were being undertaken on a large scale by the Roosevelt administration. Apparently this particular response to the Depression intrigued a good many Canadians. It was acceptable in traditional economic theory, yet it also had the benefits of positive action. White referred to the American efforts in his letter; Bennett himself was no doubt very conscious of the program. In addition, a great deal of material from the American program began to show up in the Department of Public Works itself. Several officials sent enthusiastic reports to Headquarters on

the latest plan or speech of Harold Ickes, the American head of the Public Works Administration. (63) A good many officials and politicians were now looking at the potential of public works as a truly countercyclical measure. Others were enthusiastic for more traditional reasons.

By early 1934 the Government had decided to part from its program of strict austerity. The Speech from the Throne promised "further to promote employment by expenditures on essential public works and undertakings throughout the Dominion". (64) It was not exactly the "passing of the old order" that Bennett was to announce a year later, but it was a significant shift in government policy.

As usual none of the details of the program were given in the Speech from the Throne and a good many questions remained unanswered. One of these was the question of who would administer the money. There were suggestions, such as the one from contractor Cecil Gunn, that "a commission be set up by government ... to advise or recommend works". (65) Such a commission would remove the program entirely from the regular Civil Service, with the obvious advantage of removing the fund one more step from the Government, which would protect it from charges of partisanship. On the other hand, however, removing the fund from the control of the elected and responsible officials might leave it open to domination by construction firms and result in an allocation designed to suit them rather than the unemployed. Bennett rejected the suggestion from Gunn. The fund would remain within the ranks of the regular Civil Service.

Even here several departments had a claim on any fund that might be voted. Foremost among these were the Departments of Labour and Public Works. Labour could make its case on the grounds that it was the natural agency to oversee any unemployment relief scheme. As with the earlier funds, it could coordinate and supervise the various projects undertaken by any number of other departments. On the other hand, Public Works could argue that it was the construction agency of the Government and if the funds were for this activity, then they were best left under its control. A second layer of supervision would be wasteful and unnecessary. The Department also wished to avoid any erosion of its mandate as the government construction agency. Both departments sensed that the Department that controlled the fund would gain in prestige and authority in government circles.

The way the Government chose to develop the Act determined to a large extent that the Department of Public Works would have an important role to play. In the first place this scheme was definitely one of "public works". There were to be no grants to the provinces as in the 1930 and 1931 Acts. For this reason alone, the Government's construction agency was a natural administrator. Second, the Government's previous actions had made it sensitive. There would be no recourse to a sweeping vote to be allocated later by Cabinet. Rather it was decided that every item to be undertaken would be specified in the bill itself. In order to frame the bill Bennett asked various departments to draw up lists for the fund. From the beginning there was no overall control department. The framing of the bill indicated that in its own operations the department charged with the particular project would not be responsible to another department. Needless to say, most of the projects on the list as it began to take final shape were presented by the Department of Public Works.

The role that Stewart played in the formation of the Act also hinted at the central role that was emerging for his Department. The Minister was in close contact with the Prime Minister during the framing of the bill, and in fact suggested the method of drawing up the list. (66) Moreover Stewart was the government member most visible during the passage of the Act through Parliament, next to the Prime Minister. (67) Thus by the time the bill became law on July 3, 1934, it was apparent that the Department of Public works was undertaking a new role for the Government.

The Public Works Construction Act (P.W.C.A.) provided a fund of \$40 million for the relief of unemployment. (68) Several of its features are worth noting. The schedule attached to the bill specifically listed 185 projects across Canada that the money was to be spent on. The existence of the schedule meant that the priorities and decisions had been made before the Act reached Parliament. It also made it easier for the Government to avoid endless debate on what areas should be included, for that had already been decided. Finally, it prevented the charge that the Government was attempting to circumvent Parliament and gather control of the funds into the small circle of Cabinet.

Some features of the Act did draw criticism. First, it was alleged that Conservative ridings got a much greater portion of the fund than did Opposition ridings. It was pointed out, for instance, that 88 per cent of the vote for Alberta went to the Prime Minister's home constituency. (69) Bennett and the other Conservatives denied the charges but they were not being totally frank. Although the Government does not seem to have intended to draw up a patronage list, the Conservative caucus did have certain advantages. They were aware that the list was being drawn up and Bennett told them that suggestions would be welcomed. (70) Consequently, Members of Parliament vied with district engineers and architects to get projects put on the schedule. There was little the members of the Opposition could do by the time they saw the schedule. Scrapping the list would have meant weeks of debate as Members sought favours for their particular region. The Opposition had to be content with making their charges and taking them to the public at the next election.

The Opposition did force one significant change in the bill before it passed. The Public Works Construction Act had provided that tenders would be called except "in the case of work of pressing emergency ... or in which, from the nature of the work it could be more beneficially executed under the direct supervision and control of the officers and employees in charge of such work". (71) The clause was modelled after the one in the Public Works Act and had long been accepted as a means of providing for unusual circumstances. It had, however, been accepted with one provision: the Public Works Act had set a limit for such exceptions at \$5,000, while the Public Works Construction Act put the limit at \$25,000. The change was regarded with a high degree of suspicion by an Opposition already wary of the Government's motives.

It was on the question of the \$25,000 limit that Opposition fire concentrated. Referring to Stewart, Frederick Sanderson, the Liberal M.P. for Perth, charged that "he knows it is wrong; the Minister of Justice knows it is wrong; the Prime Minister knows it is wrong". (72) Pierre Casgrain feared that the bill could result in the Liberal use of the "pork barrel". In committee Elliott moved an amendment to alter several features of the bill including the \$25,000 limit. (73) The amendment was defeated, of course,

but under pressure the Government did modify the section and restored the traditional \$5,000 limit. (74) The Opposition accepted what it could get and the bill quickly passed.

The course of the debate suggests that the Opposition was in support of the general principle of the bill. In fact both the Liberals and the C.C.F. laid claim to the idea of the program. (75) Similarly, public reaction to the Act was generally favourable. The Montreal Gazette, for instance, remarked that "the programme as a whole would seem to command commendation". (76) And although there were serious and valid criticisms of some of the features of the Act, the general reaction seems to have been one of relief to see the Government once more taking positive action.

Although it was obvious that Public Works would play a large part in the administration of the Act, there were still a number of questions unresolved. Marine and Fisheries, Railways and Canals, National Defence and the Interior also had projects on the list. And there were just enough votes and overlapping areas of jurisdiction to cause potential friction. In fact, many of these "grey areas" seem to have been directed by Order-in-Council to the Department of Public Works. Thus, although Public Works was responsible only for those projects on the list that fell under its jurisdiction, the importance of the "grey areas" category and the granting of the "general votes" to the Department gave Public Works a foremost position in the administration of the Act. In some instances it even stepped into the role of allocator of funds. In 1935 for instance, the Department of National Defence wanted a sum of \$840,000 out of a general vote. An earlier Order-in-Council, however, had put this appropriation under Public Works and Hunter replied that Defence should "substantially scale down the works you request". (77) Department of National Defence complied with Hunter's suggestion. Thus it is obvious that the Department had assumed a central role in the Government's economic policy, in sharp contrast to the earlier years of the administration.

The funds made available by the P.W.C.A. allowed the Department to assume a level of activity higher than it had known since the beginning of the Depression. Projects from the construction of an Amherst, Nova Scotia, public building to an alteration of the Yukon telegraph line gave the Department a great deal to do in the months after the passage of the Act. Even the new departmental office building in Ottawa that Stewart had advocated two years before was begun with the use of funds from the P.W.C.A. The additional activity, in turn, made it essential that the staff of the Department be augmented. Even before a bill passed the House, Fuller wrote to Hunter: "Unless the present depleted staff is considerably augmented by the employment of additional highly qualified architects, structural heating and electrical engineers, the work ... will have to be placed in the hands of outside architects." (78) It was indicative of the new attitude of the Government that the reply to Fuller's request was in complete agreement: "The Minister is agreeable to your staff here at Ottawa being increased to whatever extent you consider necessary to get the work you are prepared to undertake here at headquarters out as expeditiously as possible." (79) Over the next months professional and support staff were added to all branches of the Department. It was the first significant hiring Public Works had done in several years.

Although the P.W.C.A. was an unemployment relief measure, it was also important in allowing Public Works to resume its traditional role of

providing facilities for the Government and the public. The Act itself contained as part of its principle the premise that the works undertaken would be necessary in themselves, aside from any employment they might create. As Bennett replied to an unhappy correspondent, the work had to both create employment and be useful. "The special program", he wrote, "was for buildings and other works and undertakings urgently required, and which would provide employment to as great an extent as possible." (80) The Act was thus predicated on the twin bases of the traditional role of the Department and the newer role of providing employment. The former was not sacrificed in an attempt to gain the latter.

This is not to say that the P.W.C.A. simply provided funds to the Department and that it then carried on in its traditional manner. From the beginning the Depression had made the question of employment important on any project undertaken by the Government. It has traditionally been said of the Government that it must apply other criteria to a project besides profit or loss. Certain services might be necessary even though they do not make sense economically. This was not new to the Department that had built the Intercolonial Railroad and remote telegraph lines. Service, political unity and other factors had always constituted a part of the Department's criteria for a project. But the question of the amount of unemployment that could be alleviated by a work brought a new and unsettling consideration into planning. A work designed in part to relieve unemployment could and often did have different criteria than a work designed specifically to provide a service.

One good example of the unsettling nature of this new factor exists in the debate that went on during the Depression concerning the merits of using manual labour instead of machines. Essentially the debate was between the old and the new purposes of public works. The question had first arisen as far back as 1931 during the Unemployment and Farm Relief Act of that year. Gideon Robertson, the Minister of Labour, naturally looked mainly to the question of providing employment and wrote to Stewart that "considerable dissatisfaction has been manifested in respect of certain works on account of labour-saving machines". Robertson realized that under normal conditions such complaints could be ignored. But the 1930s were not normal times:

Having regard, however, to the fact that the present situation is one of very critical character and necessitating the expenditure of enormous sums of money for the purpose of relieving distress arising from unemployment, I would like to take this opportunity of making a friendly suggestion, namely, that in connection with the letting of government contracts . . . it might be well to consider the advisability of inserting in the contract such terms as could well ensure the employment of the largest volume of manual labour consistent, of course with due regard to the nature of the work being performed. (81)

Whereas Robertson had as his main goal the provision of employment, Stewart and his officials had to consider the traditional goals of efficiency and cost of construction. The Minister of Public Works replied cautiously that "it is pretty hard to know just where to draw the line". The best he would do was agree that, in the future, "I shall be glad to bear your representation in mind". (82) Public Works was not ready to trade off its traditional goals for the sake of providing greater employment.

Over the next few years the occasional petition renewed the request for greater use of hand labour but the Department did not significantly alter its procedure in this regard. It was not until the passage of the Public Works Construction Act that the issue again became important. During the debate on the bill the question was brought up by Joseph Denis, the Liberal M.P. for St-Denis, who asked specifically that all stonework under the P.W.C.A. be done by hand in order to give employment to this group of artisans. (83) Later, after the passage of the act, several Members of Parliament called on Stewart to urge that "the excavation work on the new R.C.M.P. building be done by manual labour instead of steam shovels". (84) The whole question of the provision of employment versus costs and efficiency had come up once again.

Public Works received several requests for the greater use of manual labour and its officials seem to have taken the whole question seriously. In some instances the Department called for tenders on projects with dual figures, one if done by normal methods and one if done by manual labour. (85) The set of figures beginning to come back from these alternate tenders prevented the Department from following up the plan. Contractors would agree to the manual labour stipulation only at significantly higher rates. The role of Public Works in the provision of employment could be carried out only at significant cost to its other aim, which was to construct the particular project as efficiently and cheaply as possible. Bennett seems to have agreed with the response of Public Works. After finding out that the manual excavation of the R.C.M.P. building would cost several thousand dollars more than an excavation done by machine, he wrote to the Members interested with the comment: "I do not think there is any likelihood of the Government consenting to work on the foundation for the Mounted Police Barracks in this city being done by hand labour." (86) Neither the Canadian Government nor the Department of Public Works adopted the practice followed in several other nations during the 1930s of rejecting to any significant degree the procedures designed for normal times.

There were some changes as Public Works adapted procedure for the sake of employment. It was, for instance, fairly common on P.W.C.A. projects to rotate the men employed on the site. This was not the most efficient way to run a construction project, but it did provide the means whereby the desperately short employment could be spread around. (87) Likewise, in both 1931 and 1934-35, the Department hired men not so much on the basis of experience as on the basis of need. (88)

Thus the program was not run in exactly the same manner as a regular series of projects would have been. Not only procedure but the type of project undertaken was to some extent adapted to create employment. Saskatchewan had been one of the provinces hardest-hit by the Depression, yet this province had received only a small proportion of the funds available under the P.W.C.A. Political favouritism was charged. (89) Stewart denied the charge and once again referred to the criterion of usefulness:

I would remind my hon. friend that the allocation of the works provided for by that program was not made on a provincial basis; it was based on the requirements of the dominion as to buildings and other services... I am sure he would not expect us to construct buildings which were not needed. (90)

The charge of political bias cannot be completely discounted but neither can Stewart's explanation. The province was declining in population and hardly needed new buildings. Nor did it have the large port facilities that demanded attention as did provinces like British Columbia and Nova Scotia. Indications are that the Government was also worried about the small amount being spent in a province so desperately in need. These worries caused the Department of Public Works to step into what was normally a provincial jurisdiction in order to increase Saskatchewan's share of the fund. The Department undertook the construction of a bridge across the Saskatchewan River and upon its completion turned it over to the province. (91) It was a work that the Department would not have touched under normal circumstances.

The Government seems to have been generally pleased with the 1934 Act. After it had been in operation a few months, Stewart confidently reported that the "result has been very satisfactory indeed". (92) Bennett, speaking before the Canadian Construction Association a few weeks later, echoed the enthusiasm of his Minister. (93) The Conservatives further demonstrated their faith in the Act by passing a supplementary program in 1935 and thereby adding another \$33 million to the fund. The Government had never expected that the program would singlehandedly lift the nation out of the Depression, and given this qualification, felt the Act was a success.

Even with modest expectations, however, the overall effect of the Act was minimal. To have had any real effect on the economy or even on the construction sector, a significant amount of money would have been necessary. Yet by the close of the fiscal year 1934-35 the Department of Public Works had spent only \$5,916,559.27 under the Act. Even the more significant amount of \$17,891,039.15 spent in 1935-36 served only to bring the total expenditures of the Department back to the level at which they had been before the cutbacks had begun. (94) It has been said that part of the fault of the American public works efforts was the careful planning and control of a project, "which required fast, even reckless, spending if it were to succeed". (95) In both size and administration the Canadian efforts were conservative. Perhaps the Canadian program suffered from the same flaws as its American inspiration. Certainly it is questionable whether the program had any significant effect on employment.

The Act did serve some purposes. Employment had been provided to needy individuals, even though on a short-term basis, and linkages through the construction industry had provided contracts for firms badly in need of business. More significantly, the Act had an important effect on the Department of Public Works in its traditional role. The P.W.C.A. meant that the Department was able both to hire new staff and to make at least an initial attempt to overcome the backlog of urgent works that had been building up. Although it could not be said that the act allowed Public Works to overcome its difficulties completely or that it ended the austerity in the Department's operations, it at least helped to make the strictures less severe. Public Works was allowed the opportunity of fulfilling the most urgent needs of the Government. Thus the P.W.C.A. did serve a useful purpose. Given the depth of the Depression and the limited policies the Government felt able to adopt, the Act had been at least a qualified success.

The response of the Liberal administration, when it assumed office in 1935, supported the above contention. A few specific projects, such as a planned tunnel under Toronto harbour, were cancelled, but the Government allowed most of those on the schedules of the 1934 and 1935 Acts to proceed undisturbed to completion. (96) In the longer run the Government decided to continue the Act in effect, while for obvious political reasons cancelling it in name. Under P.J. Arthur Cardin, the new Minister of Public Works, a system of dual estimates was developed for the Department. The "ordinary estimates" contained those items considered by the Government to be essential for the maintenance of government property and provision of urgently needed new facilities. A second set of "special supplementary estimates", was also presented. These were, in fact, unemployment relief funds for various works in much the same way as the P.W.C.A. had functioned. "The purpose," the Minister of Finance Charles Dunning explained, "is to set forth as clearly as possible what is required over and above the normal cost of running the institutions of government due to conditions which prevail at the present time." (97) Bennett had a more cynical explanation. He felt that the Government was trying to say to the people: "Behold the economy practiced by thy servant. Then look the other way and say: Look at what we have done for unemployment." (98) Whatever the truth, and both Bennett and Dunning probably had a share of it, the concept of using public works as a means of fighting unemployment continued after the change of administration. From 1935 to 1939 the "special supplementary estimates" were a standard feature in the Department's program.

In assessing the over-all relationship of the Department of Public Works to the Depression, two distinct developments become evident. First, in response to the shrinking of revenues and government concern about balancing the budget, the Department was forced to work under a policy of severe austerity. This austerity affected its ability to carry on in its traditional role as government construction agent and as the Department charged with meeting the needs for certain facilities in the nation at large. This austerity, combined with the economies of the decades before, also began to affect the internal structure and competence of Public Works. By the middle of the decade the age of the staff, the absence of a sense of innovation and the general lack of vitality of the Department had begun to hinder its efficiency.

Second, the Depression forced the Government to seek a means whereby it could bolster the nation's economy. The search led in several directions but one of these took the Department into a new role as an economic lever. At first, as in 1930, government efforts did not include Public Works. Then, as a tentative move and adjunct to several other programs, the Department took part in the Unemployment and Farm Relief Acts of 1931 and 1932. The real change came after 1933. As part of a larger shift in government thinking, the Government decided to use public works as a means of attacking the Depression. Under the P.W.C.A. of 1934 the Department was given a definite countercyclical role and a central place in this effort to aid the nation. The precedent had been set and the election of 1935 did not really alter things in the area of Public Works. The Liberals abandoned the politically-tainted Act in name while continuing it in substance. Thus for the first time, and on a continuing basis, the Department of Public Works became involved in measures of relief.

Ironically, in terms of the expenditure of the Department and the services it could provide, the second facet of the Depression policy only served to cancel out the first. The special votes under both the Conservatives and Liberals after 1934 at their largest did no more than cancel out the reductions that had taken place in the Department's funds since the beginning of the Depression. The expenditure of \$24,699,422 for 1937, the highest since the cutbacks had taken place, was still lower than the \$26,355,856 spent by the Department at the beginning of the decade. (99) Nor did the new staff allowed under the P.W.C.A. compensate completely for the years of "making do". The Department was still short of qualified and experienced men in the middle and younger ranks at the beginning of the Second World War.

With the government approach to public works in the Depression more or less fixed after 1934, other questions previously submerged by the overriding fact of the economy, began to emerge. A look at the record of the Department's relationship to unemployment relief projects between 1930 and 1935 seems to indicate that the Department had successfully overcome challenges by other departments and emerged in the end with a strong new area of jurisdiction. The increasing importance of the Department in this area was significant, but to some extent it masked a trend in the opposite direction, a trend that contained disturbing implications about the role of Public Works in the government structure.

The division of the Department of Public Works in 1879 had left its successor of the same name more or less defined by a number of specific areas loosely grouped together under the concept of construction - for which it had responsibility. Certain of these areas, such as dredging, had fallen into a contested zone between the jurisdiction of departments like Public Works, Railways and Canals, and Marine and Fisheries. The clashes between Public Works and Railways and Canals under Tarte, and the transfer of the St. Lawrence dredging operations to Marine and Fisheries in 1903 testified to the vagueness that existed in certain areas of the Department's mandate. There was, however, one area that had become the centre of the Department's activity after 1879 and had remained more or less unchallenged by other departments. The Department of Public Works was the Government's construction agency, responsible for the housing of the Government itself. (100) More generally it was, as the phrase went, the Government's housekeeper. Construction, rental and repairs of government buildings had been very firmly under the control of Public Works. This type of activity was what the Department had come to define as its major reason for existence.

During the 1930s, however, there was a certain amount of seepage of this activity away from the Department. In 1931 Stewart admitted in Parliament that the number of exceptions to the general rule was growing, adding: "There are other departments that to a certain extent construct buildings for themselves. I have in mind the Department of Justice, the Department of the Interior as far as Indian Affairs are concerned." (101) He might have added the Department of National Defence, which from the time of Langevin had often undertaken its own projects. Whether this was the result of government policy or simply a lack of planning, the initial set of exceptions were beginning to look like a trend.

By the time of the 1934 P.W.C.A. several other departments felt themselves justified in claiming certain construction works. Indian Affairs

obtained \$500,000 for the "construction and reconstruction of residential and day schools", and the Department of Interior was voted \$2 million for a number of items including an unspecified amount for "public buildings". (102) Thus while the Department seemed on one hand to have obtained a central role in unemployment projects, an erosion of its jurisdiction as government construction agent had begun on the other.

The trend did not go unnoticed. Edward Garland, the Member from Bow River, replied to Stewart's statement on the involvement of other departments with the comment: "I think we should put them all under the minister and give him some more work to do." (103) Later, after the P.W.C.A. had been passed, Elliott pressed the Minister of Public Works for a rationale of the division of some of the activities between the Department of National Defence and his own department. Stewart was eventually forced to admit that "there is no underlying principle" in the division of works. He maintained, however, that the P.W.C.A. was unique, and that to have put all the funds under the control of Public Works would have strained the capabilities of the Department. (104) The Opposition was, needless to say, sceptical of the reply.

Perhaps the most significant comment in the debate was Elliott's rejoinder that he "didn't tell that to Council either". (105) In other words, the former Minister of Public Works implied that the funds had been carved up according to the ability of the individual Minister to convince Cabinet that his department should have some. Other departments, anxious to expand their equally austerity-ridden activities, were able to convince the Prime Minister. There is no proof that this was the case, but the admitted absence of any principle for the division of works and the clashes that occurred between Public Works and other departments at a lower level indicate that Elliott may not have been far off the mark with his comment.

Stewart was certainly wrong on one point. The division of construction activities under the P.W.C.A. was not an exception. By the mid-1930s there had been so many exceptions that a number of disturbing precedents had been set. Although Elliott was exaggerating somewhat when he referred at one point to the "creating of five new departments of public works", he was pointing to a disturbing new trend. (106) It was a trend that, if continued, would have serious effects on both the rational planning of government construction and the effectiveness of the Department of Public Works.

Shortly after the change in administration the Department found its responsibilities curtailed in another and more controversial area. In 1936 the Liberal government brought in an Act to create a new department. C.D. Howe, the aggressive and capable Minister from Thunder Bay, developed a plan to merge two offspring of the old Department of Public Works into one new and powerful organization. Railways and Canals was to be joined with the Marine Division of Marine and Fisheries to form the Department of Transport. On June 9, 1936, the bill passed the House and shortly after became law. (107)

"In a very comprehensive fashion," Howe wrote in a memorandum, "the new department will cover transportation in all its forms." (108) The implications for the future activities of Public Works were obvious. After 1879 the Department had been involved in a good many areas left behind because they did not clearly fit under the term Railways, Canals or Marine. Various jurisdictional squabbles at the time adjusted these areas but Public

Works retained a strong claim on the activities that could not sensibly be claimed by other departments. Now, however, a more general mandate had been given to Transport, and it was apparent that a new and strict limit had been drawn for the previously open-ended activities of the Department of Public Works in the field of transportation. Departmental activities that had derived from the Department's jurisdiction before 1879 were now more of an anomaly than ever.

A related event made the position of the Department in the wake of these changes immediately apparent. The Government also passed a new National Harbours Act in 1936. It was designed to give several major harbours a uniform set of regulations for administration. It also extended the degree of autonomy so that a number of local harbour commissions would have to plan and develop their own harbours. The administration of the Act was, in turn, given to the Department of Marine, about to join Transport. (109) By increasing the number of commissions and (as with the Montreal and Quebec Commissions) putting them under Marine, the activities of Public Works in a number of important harbours throughout Canada were sharply reduced. To some extent the Act had been drawn up as the result of a study done several years earlier by Sir Alexander Gibb. At that time Hunter had disagreed with many of its conclusions, including the one that greater control be transferred to the Department of Marine and Fisheries. (110) There is no reason to think that Hunter had changed his mind in the intervening years.

If the creation of the Department of Transport cleared up some areas of overlap at the expense of the Department of Public Works, it created some new ones. For instance, airports fell under the new department. But what about the buildings constructed on an airport site? Would these be handled by the Government's construction department or by the department that would ultimately manage the facility? Public Works had previously been involved in the construction of airports in Canada and had some claim to continue the involvement. It was perhaps indicative of the power of both the Department of Transport and C.D. Howe that the construction of airport buildings was largely taken over by the new department.

All this implies that government departments operate to some extent as independent power centres. The greater the area of responsibility and prestige of the department the more likely it will be able to carry the necessary weight in Cabinet for the planning of its activities, whatever the area of jurisdiction. From this point of view there is little doubt that Public Works found itself to some extent overshadowed by the new and powerful Department of Transport in the late 1930s.

At the same time, the formation of the Department of Transport made good administrative sense. The confusion and overlapping between Railways and Canals, Marine, and Public Works had only served to aggravate both the public and politicians. The decline in the relative prestige of Public Works would have been worthwhile for a more rational division of duties. In fact, Transport could have been beneficial to the efficiency of Public Works by forcing it to define more clearly its areas of jurisdiction and to drop some of the anomalous activities left over from the nineteenth century. The problem was, however, that whereas Public Works was being hemmed in on one side, various departments, including Transport, were beginning to nibble at what had seemed the most promising future area of jurisdiction for Public Works, as construction agent and housekeeper for the Government. By the

time of the Second World War there was a very real danger that the Department of Public Works, suffering from years of austerity and an increasingly confused mandate, would lose both any clear-cut sense of purpose and its spirit. The implications were not good for the overall administrative structure of either the Government or the Department itself.

CHAPTER 11

WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

1939-1950

At the end of the First World War the Government had commissioned Vernon March, a noted artist, to design and construct a statue. It was to be a major monument, placed at some prominent spot in the nation's capital to commemorate those who had fallen in that tragic struggle. Problems with the artist, the design, funds and the site delayed completion of the work. Not until 1938 could the Prime Minister's secretary write to King: "Mr. Hunter reports that good progress is being made in the erection of the memorial." (1) The Canadian Government had barely completed its memorial to the fallen of one war before it was forced to send men to another.

When the long-simmering conflict in Europe broke into open war in September 1939, there quickly developed a depressing air of familiarity about the activities of the Government. War appropriations were hastily passed, Orders-in-Council drafted and emergency powers assumed. Only one thing was missing. There was little of the enthusiasm that had marked Canada's entry into the First World War. In 1939, as in 1914, provision was made to allow civil servants to join the armed forces and a good many did. But they seem to have done so in a spirit of duty and not in a burst of enthusiasm. The memory of the fate of an earlier generation on the battlefields of Europe was still too strong to allow such naïveté. It would be a long, but it was hoped, victorious struggle. Few saw much glamour in the prospect.

Deputy Minister J.B. Hunter must also have found the events of the autumn of 1939 familiar. Once again it appeared that the Department of Public Works would have to curtail its activities to allow the Government's resources to be funnelled into the war effort. Work on major postal terminals then under way in Toronto and Quebec was postponed for the duration of the war. Throughout the nation a good many local authorities found that they would have to wait still longer for the much-sought-after pier, breakwater, or office building.

Even the curtailment of works required activity. Departmental officials worked to sort out a maze of contract obligations and technical

situations to allow for some degree of rationality in the closing down of works. The question of providing protection for the various government works that came within the interests of the Department also arose. In the First World War the German army and fleet had been pretty much pinned down in Europe. Even then, as the rumours of conspiracy in the wake of the fire on Parliament Hill reveals, there was a very real fear of sabotage. In this war, with the airplane and the submarine, it seemed that the presence of an ocean was no guarantee of safety. Steps would therefore have to be taken to protect facilities in Canada.

Even before the war began, the Department of National Defence had been developing plans for the protection of vulnerable strategic sites. As far as Public Works was concerned the most vulnerable and at the same time most strategic pieces of property under its control were the drydocks. Writing to Lieutenant-Colonel Pope in 1938, J.M. Somerville, the departmental secretary, pointed out that the docks at Esquimalt and Lauzon were "capable of accommodating the largest vessels afloat". (2) Private docks at Halifax, Saint John, Kingston, Montreal, Vancouver and Prince Rupert were also tempting targets and crucial to the smooth maintenance of shipping. Consequently when war broke out, the Department of National Defence had made its plans and quickly moved troops to the docks, and the Department of Public Works took steps to make the sites less vulnerable to sabotage. (3)

On less-valuable sites the military did not become directly involved. Rather the Department of Public Works generally took two steps. First, it would have the local supervisor or caretaker sworn in as a special constable. Floodlights and telephones were also installed at such sites as required them. (4) These measures were commendable, but it is difficult to know what a caretaker, with nothing but his certification as special constable, would have done in the face of a trained and determined group of saboteurs. Fortunately, no situations arose to put this matter to the test.

By 1941 procedures for protection had been sufficiently well developed and the contracts that were deemed unnecessary brought to a close. It appeared that the Department was settling into a quiet and austere routine reminiscent of the First World War, for "a further decrease was made in ordinary departmental expenditures, in accordance with the policy of the Government to reduce, as far as possible, all expenditures other than those required for war purposes". (5) The statement could have come from the 1915 rather than the 1942 Annual Report.

The Second World War was, in fact, to have consequences for the Civil Service and the Department of Public Works quite different from those of the First World War. Society, the role of government, technology and even the nature of war had changed in such a way that similar efforts in 1914 and 1939 towards the winning of the war required different approaches and procedures. By 1945 practically all the departments of the federal Civil Service had increased in size and expenditure, and the war was to have profound consequences on the nature and structure of that Civil Service. At some point in the process, the role of government and the role of its permanent officials changed dramatically. Beginning in the Depression, hastened by the war, and confirmed in its aftermath, the Canadian Civil Service underwent a revolution in size and structure.

The Department of Public Works also found that it was to pursue a somewhat different course than it had in the First World War. The 1942 Annual Report, for instance, contained a significant qualifying statement

respecting the reduction of expenditure: "However, since the outbreak of the war, a considerable expenditure for varied war requirements has been made by the department under the provisions of the War Appropriation, as well as under encumbrances from other departments." (6) The Second World War, much more than the First, involved all departments to a greater or lesser extent in the war effort. As the above statement indicates, the Department of Public Works was no exception. In two general areas of activity it found that the war added to, rather than decreased, the demands on it.

The first area of activity was connected to Canada's role as a naval and shipping power. The United Kingdom, almost isolated in Europe after the fall of France, depended on North America for vital supplies. With the Royal Canadian Navy providing protection in the crucial North Atlantic link and the merchant marine of the allied nations calling at eastern ports, a major effort was necessary to put the harbour facilities of such ports on a wartime footing. Much of this work became the responsibility of the Department of National Defence, but Public Works also had to share a substantial part of the burden. The year 1941 alone saw the Department construct five buildings at H.M.C. dockyard in Halifax and a barracks for the Navy in the same city, improve the armouries in Montreal, construct barracks at Comox in British Columbia, and become involved in numerous smaller wartime projects. Public Works was also involved in the extension and improvement of wharves at Halifax, the provision of oil storage facilities in British Columbia and the repair and enlargement of military hospitals throughout the nation to ensure adequate accommodation for the inevitable casualties of war. (7)

A good many of these projects brought both the Department of Public Works and the Department of National Defence into new and somewhat debatable areas of operation in terms of their formal jurisdiction. It was a national emergency, however, and the niceties of jurisdiction had to be set aside. For example, when the Department of Defence decided to install a submarine boom across Sydney Harbour, it asked Public Works to undertake the work, since Defence did not have "the necessary facilities for carrying out work of this nature". (8) And whereas the long experience of Public Works with marine construction no doubt gave it the necessary expertise, the construction of a submarine boom was nevertheless a new departure from its already varied responsibilities.

The war led Public Works not only to undertake new activities but to extend its influence physically as well. Newfoundland, the British colony that had persistently remained aloof from Canada, occupied a position of strategic importance in the North Atlantic. The closest point in North America to Britain, it was a natural rendezvous and supply point for merchant ships and naval patrols. So, not long after the outbreak of the war, officials from the Royal Canadian Navy began to plan for a large-scale presence in St. John's to meet their strategic and logistic needs.

In many ways St. John's is a superb port. Its natural coves ensure protection from North Atlantic gales and, from a naval point of view, a safe haven from attack. Nevertheless, in 1940 it was far from adequate for naval and shipping operations on the scale envisaged by those responsible for the war effort. The Royal Canadian Navy soon found that the changes would be more easily accomplished with the help of the Department of Public Works. "On Saturday, the 7th June," Cameron wrote to Hunter in

1941, "Acting Deputy Minister (Naval Service) told me they might have to ask us to undertake an investigation relating to the accommodation of naval vessels at St. John's, Newfoundland." There was little uncertainty as to what the response would be to such a request under the circumstances. Three days later, when the request was formally made, the Department of Public Works was made responsible for the enlargement of port facilities in St. John's.

At first the role of Public Works in St. John's was seen as limited in both scope and duration. The Department was to undertake initial surveys and plans for later detailed planning and construction: "We are asked to make land and water surveys of general areas of waterfront indicated to me by Mr. Fairbairn, obtain information as to the physical condition of the sites and submit designs, with estimates of cost of suitable wharves and also, if necessary, of dredging." (9) The Navy was understandably in a hurry and it was hoped that within a couple of months Public Works could complete the task.

The hard-pressed Department had to round up what staff was available to conduct the investigations. With Halifax already a major centre of activity, it could not afford to use any men from there. Eventually it became necessary to bring engineers from as far away as Winnipeg and Fort William, with G.E. Martin of Ottawa having supervision of the project. (10) To Martin and the others St. John's was not a particularly welcome assignment. In a city crowded with military and civilian personnel from both Canada and Britain, all involved in a number of important operations, it was extremely difficult to find either the local manpower or the material with which to carry out the assignment. Martin's reports indicate that living accommodation was so hard to come by that it was an achievement to find even a room. (11) Nevertheless, Martin and his colleagues worked quickly and efficiently. In close cooperation with both the Canadian and British Navies, the port was surveyed and plans laid for the construction of the necessary facilities. As the work took shape, however, it became apparent that the Department's involvement in St. John's was to last longer than originally anticipated. By mid-summer many officials were discussing the possibility that the Department of Public Works would handle not only the planning of facilities but the construction as well. By July Cameron was writing to the Navy to ask "if it is the intention that this Department arrange for the calling of tenders and awarding of contracts". (12) A decision one way or the other would at least allow the men involved to plan their schedules more realistically.

It was finally decided that the Navy would undertake the actual construction. Even with this decision the expertise of Public Works remained important. It was to be several months after construction had begun before the departmental survey team had wound up its work. The Navy asked one of the engineers of the Department, Edgar Gilbert, to take charge of the work arising from the surveys. Gilbert, not particularly happy about the prospect of spending more time in St. John's "reluctantly decided to accept". (13)

The work at St. John's was largely completed by the summer of 1942, but as it turned out it was only the first of many projects involving Public Works in Newfoundland. Similar surveys at places like Bay Bull and Harbour Grace picked up where the one at St. John's left off. A temporary and

extraordinary project soon expanded into a series of undertakings that kept Public Works officials in Newfoundland until the end of the war. (14)

The other general facet of departmental activity, intensified by the outbreak of war, was Public Work's role as construction and accommodation agent for the Government. It was apparent as early as September 1939 that it would soon become impossible to function within the existing buildings in Ottawa. Indeed, expansion of the Civil Service proved to be both rapid and massive. The Department of National Defence, now divided into three separate components, watched as its total number of employees grew from 1,498 in September 1939 to 9,140 in the following year. One offshoot of the Department of Defence, the newly-created Department of Munitions and Supply, added 4,300 employees to the Government's payroll by 1942, and the controls occasioned by the war meant the creation of such bodies as the Wartime Prices Board, which grew to over 2,000 employees by that same year. Moreover, the movement of the Government into new areas of policy such as unemployment insurance further added to the rapidly-growing Civil Service. (15) The pressure of such rapid expansion was felt the most in Ottawa, and it fell mainly to the Department of Public Works to meet the accommodation requirements of the continually changing and expanding agencies.

Hunter had a firsthand knowledge of the problem of accommodation encountered in wartime. Thus at the outbreak of World War II he was in a position to assess various methods of easing the situation. It was obviously impossible to handle the steadily increasing demand simply by leasing the accommodation required. This had been a sufficiently difficult matter in 1914, but in the years preceding the Second World War there had been a decade of depression, and as a result little new construction. There was simply not enough space available for leasing purposes, and thousands of incoming employees would quickly strain the facilities of the city beyond its capacity.

At the same time it was impossible to plan the construction of permanent office buildings for the wartime crush. The cost would be too great at a time when the nation needed every penny it could get for the war effort. Even if the money had been available this type of construction would have taken too long. To plan, contract and construct a permanent major office building would take well over a year under any conditions. In wartime it could take much longer. Hunter and Minister of Public Works Cardin, however, did make use of those buildings already planned and under contract. For instance, rather than postpone work on the new Supreme Court it was decided to push the building through to a rapid completion. Eventually that monumental edifice would serve as a suitable home for Canada's Supreme Court. Meanwhile, its completion was justified because, as Cardin reported to Parliament: "As a result of what has been done, six or eight government services are at present housed in the supreme court building." (16)

The logical conclusion to which the Department was drawn from the above circumstances was the construction of a number of temporary buildings. These buildings would not only be cheaper than permanent ones but could be quickly constructed. The temporary nature of the buildings would also be appropriate to the seemingly temporary nature of the situation. Hunter and the Department moved swiftly to get this work under way shortly after the outbreak of the war. By December 1939 the first of

these buildings, known appropriately if unimaginatively as Temporary Building Number 1, had been completed and occupied by the War Supplies Board. (17) Other temporary buildings of similar design were quickly erected, providing large-scale accommodation at prices much below the cost of permanent buildings. By 1942 the Department had constructed six such buildings at a cost of approximately \$2¼ million. (18)

Long, low and rambling, the buildings were anything but elegant. Cluttered mainly along Wellington Street beside the massive new Supreme Court Building, they provided a strange contrast with the more imposing buildings extending along Parliament Hill. Nevertheless they served their purpose. The Department was able to act quickly enough to house the influx of new employees. In the hundreds of offices of these buildings the controls and programs of a nation at war were developed. By 1945 a large proportion of the Civil Service was operating from these hastily-constructed offices.

The activities of Public Works in providing facilities both in Ottawa and in other areas and ports seem to have been healthy indicators of the way in which it had responded to the pressures of war. It had accomplished the difficult task of housing a rapidly-expanding Civil Service. Not only had its abilities and the competence of its staff been recognized by departments such as National Defence, but it had played a significant part in aiding that department in its war effort.

Statistics seemed to confirm these trends. Between 1939 and 1945 the Department did not experience the continually shrinking expenditures it suffered during the First World War. There was a temporary and reasonably minor reduction between 1939 and 1942 with expenditures going from \$21,457,824 to \$20,383,967. (19) By 1943 they were back up to \$23,428,332 and by 1944 to \$26,054,953.44. (20) In absolute terms then, the war actually occasioned an increase in expenditure. Similarly, the size of the staff of the Department increased significantly during the war years. Between September 1939 and March 1945 the number of employees on the payroll of Public Works increased from 3,942 to 5,762. (21) If taken in isolation, these statistics and the activities of the Department give a distorted picture. To understand the trend of events it is necessary to view the Department in the total context of the Civil Service and the developing role played by the Government during the war. It then becomes apparent that, in spite of the activities of the Department, earlier disturbing trends had not by any means been reversed.

It would not be an overstatement to say that revolutionary developments took place in the Canadian Civil Service during the years of World War II. Since Confederation, departmental bodies and jurisdictions had possessed a certain stability. As the history of the Department of Public Works indicates, of course, things could change significantly over time. The formation of the Department as a federal body in 1867 had been followed by the first and most significant shift of mandate in 1879 when the Government had created the Department of Railways and Canals. At about the same time Public Works obtained the responsibility for telegraphs. In 1903 the dredging of the St. Lawrence was transferred to Marine and Fisheries and in 1936 the creation of the Department of Transport had potential implications for the future activity of the Department in various areas of its activity. Thus four significant developments of the departmental mandate had occurred in seventy-five years of operation. And although the degree of change varied from department to department, Public Works was not

untypical of the Civil Service as a whole. Up to this point there had existed in the Canadian administrative structure a certain stability, and this allowed a department, even one with a loosely-defined mandate, a good definition of what its responsibility was and what it was not.

By the 1940s however, this began to change. First, the Depression years had brought new economic and social theories to the fore, theories that implied major changes in the future administration of government. Then the war, which imposed a national emergency, forced the introduction of a rapid series of administrative developments designed to cope with new demands.

When Canada entered the war, the Civil Service began to undergo a period of rapid fluctuation and change. Agencies were created overnight and new and previously unheard-of departments rose to positions of prominence in the space of a few months. Cabinet directed much of its greatly increased workload into a variety of committees at the centre of which was the powerful War Committee. In this atmosphere of crisis and change, portfolios and the allocation of responsibilities became fluid. Orders-in-Council used the Transfer and Rearrangement of Duties Act to a greater extent than ever before. Changes that would previously have taken place over the space of decades, began after 1939 to occur within years or even months.

Most dramatic of all the changes was the rise of the Department of Munitions and Supply. C.D. Howe, accustomed to playing a central role, carved out this department from old departments and from previously unthought-of areas of the Civil Service to ensure that the Armed Forces would have the materials they needed to fight the war. Howe was concerned with the development of a war industry and he did not hesitate to invest his new department with the powers that he felt were necessary. In part, the new department was created from areas of responsibility that he took from his old portfolio. The truncated Department of Transport was then put under the Minister of Public Works. (22) At the same time, however, the Deputy Minister of Transport took on, in addition to his old position, the position as the permanent head of Munitions and Supply. (23) This meant, of course, that one Minister presided over two departments, one of which had a Deputy Minister who was charged with the leadership of a department under another Minister. Such changes and such results marked the end to the prewar stability of the Civil Service.

The Department of Munitions and Supply soon became a giant among the government departments, rivalled only by the department it was charged with supplying. In his capacity as Minister, C.D. Howe had a degree of power second only to that of the Prime Minister. As Mackenzie King himself said without any exaggeration in 1940, Munitions and Supply "has grown to vast proportions". (24) By May of 1942, Howe's department had let contracts worth more than \$4 billion. (25) In 1942-43 its total expenditure was \$689,504,000. (26) When the activities of the Department of Public Works are put beside expenditures of this magnitude, a better sense of perspective can be achieved. The Department of Public Works may have seen its expenditures increase during the war, but this increase was insignificant compared to what was happening in other departments such as Munitions and Supply.

Munitions and Supply was the most dramatic example of departmental expansion, but it was only part of a general trend in the Civil Service as a

whole. The rate of increase in the size of the Civil Service was greater in the six years from 1939 to 1945 than in the entire seventy-five years following Confederation. In 1938 there were some 44,000 federal civil servants. Three years later there were 100,000 civilians administering the nation's affairs, and by 1945 there were more than 140,000 in the ranks of the Civil Service of the Canadian Government. (27) These figures give a fairly clear indication of the revolution in administration and government involvement that took place in the first half of the 1940s.

The growth and complexity of the Civil Service and the pervasive nature of government involvement in society created serious doubts on the part of many people. The term bureaucracy, used in its pejorative sense, began to recur more and more in parliamentary debates. Images of multiple and conflicting regulations and of red tape and inefficiency were conjured up by concerned politicians. There were even charges that the growth of the Civil Service and the proliferation of controls was a deliberate conspiracy emanating from the London School of Economics and designed to force socialism on the nation. (28) If the charges and countercharges were then as bewildering as the changes actually taking place in the Civil Service, it is still possible to discern one recurring theme.

The administration of government policies had been so drastically altered and become so complex, that many critics were afraid the Government was no longer able to exercise adequate control of political events. In essence, they feared that as the bureaucracy increased in size and complexity, policy control would slip into the hands of those who knew what was happening, the bureaucrats themselves. As early as 1940, the Government found one of its own members, Thomas Reid, expressing concern about what was happening: "I do not want to be misinterpreted in what I am about to say, because I am all for the Civil Service merit system; but unconsciously we have built up a bureaucracy which has become almost, if not entirely, our master... I am afraid it may strangle us also." (29) Harry Fleming, another Liberal backbencher, commented a few days later: "I often wonder if any cabinet minister has a hair on his head, that all his hair has not been pulled out in a fit of exasperation with this bureaucracy of civil servants." (30)

The fact that these comments came from members of the Government is significant. Charges against the "bureaucracy" were not simply an Opposition means of attacking the Government. Nor can they be interpreted simply as a desire to return to some theoretical period of *laissez-faire* government. Members of the socialist-oriented CCF party, such as Clarence Gillis, also had real doubts about what was happening: "There is at the present time in government a complete and bewildered bureaucracy." (31) The tremendous growth brought on by the war meant not only that the administration of policy was much more complex than before, but that it was changing so rapidly that few people could understand what divisions were responsible for what services. It was understandable that a good many politicians and citizens began to wonder if the Cabinet was not equally bewildered.

As a corollary to the fears, there was the suspicion that once the Civil Service slipped from the control of Cabinet, it would turn its energies from public service to self-aggrandizement. George McLean, Liberal Member from Simcoe East, expressed this fear of "empire building" in 1942: "I am sure members have noted that there is on the part of a great many civil

servants and officials a tendency to make their own office the centre of a distinct organization, with a secretary, a stenographer, a messenger and so on." (32) Criticism of the Civil Service was nothing new, but in the 1940s the nature of the criticism changed. Earlier, questions had centred on the problems raised by misuse of political control. During the war the question changed from whether political control was being exercised properly to whether it really existed at all. The change in the questions being asked reflected a basic change in the nature of the Civil Service, and the doubts associated with it would continue to be expressed into the future.

There were sound reasons for the fears and suspicions expressed by Members of Parliament towards the changes around them. At the same time those politicians who talked in terms of a unified conspiracy by members of the Civil Service had obviously never experienced the Civil Service from within. A good many permanent officials and departments felt that the changes and growth around them were confusing and difficult to deal with. The question of how a department could function within such a rapidly-growing and fluctuating system was as much of a problem to the officials of the Department of Public Works as it was to politicians.

Next to the giant war departments, the Department of Public Works was very small indeed. Certainly it helped other departments and applied its areas of expertise towards construction and marine projects, but the trends of the previous decade had not been reversed. If anything, they had been accelerated. The worst offender of all was that new department, Munitions and Supply. C.D. Howe had been handed a gargantuan task and he was not about to worry whether or not he stepped on the toes of a few other Ministers. In his effort to supply the facilities and materials for the war, Howe inevitably took the Department of Munitions and Supply into areas previously handled by other bodies. Public Works was no exception. Howe noted, for instance, that among the many projects Munitions and Supply had undertaken were included "250 separate construction projects". (33) These were largely military works and coastal defences, but the fact remained that a separate and self-contained construction capability was being developed and that a good many areas it strayed into had previously been considered the reserve of the Department of Public Works. Divided between the departments by intended function rather than by type of construction, many harbour works and buildings intended for military use soon became the responsibility of the Department of Munitions and Supply.

The Department of National Defence also undertook a significant expansion of its construction activities. Previously Defence had usually handled construction of military works for operational purposes. Such things as barracks and fortifications had been under that department, whereas Public Works had handled its office space requirements and the maintenance of administration buildings. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, however, as a result of meetings between officials of the two departments, it was decided that "the Department of National Defence... would make arrangements for the acquisition by rental or otherwise, of buildings and property required by that Department in Ottawa". (34) From then on the Department of National Defence constructed its own headquarters and administration buildings, many exactly along the lines of the temporary structures built by Public Works. By the end of the war the Department had, in Ottawa alone, property amounting in value to several millions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of square feet of space. (35) It had more or less terminated its

dependence on the Department of Public Works. Between them, Munitions and Supply and National Defence seem finally to have fulfilled the prophecy made by Alexander Mackenzie when repairs of military buildings were taken from Public Works in 1884.

To some extent the impingement by other departments on the jurisdiction of Public Works can be explained by the extraordinary situation. In wartime it was perhaps not surprising that the Departments of Munitions and Supply and National Defence should infringe on other departmental activities. After all, Public Works was not the only department to find its mandate affected. The Department of Transport saw whole sections carved away and turned over to Munitions and Supply. (36) Wartime conditions required a degree of rearrangement of the Government's administrative units.

However these trends were more than just the result of a government restructuring a peacetime establishment to fit a wartime situation. They were also in part the result of a powerful, active and expanding department in the face of a weaker one. The purpose of the Department of Munitions and Supply, and the strong personality of Howe made it a powerful force at the council table and in interdepartmental circles. Public Works was neither able nor prepared to take the stand and provide the services that would have ensured its retention of a rational and complete control of construction activities.

Several problems of staff, structure and leadership plagued Public Works in the early 1940s. Many of these had their roots in the economies of previous years, which had left their mark on the efficiency and morale of the Department. In terms of age the staff was still proportionately elderly and seriously lacking in competent younger and experienced professionals. Moreover years of routine activities and limited expenditures had weakened the ability of the Department to adapt to the rapid changes that were occurring around it. With the possible exception of its mandate under the Public Works Construction Act, Public Works had become a static, even stodgy department devoted almost exclusively to routine activities. In effect, it simply did not have the drive or flexibility to absorb the tremendous number of new responsibilities developing during the war.

There were other specific problems that hindered the Department's effectiveness and sense of purpose. The Minister of Public Works at the beginning of the war, P.J. Arthur Cardin, was closely involved with the delicate question of Quebec's place in the war effort and the underlying issue of conscription. His orientation was really more towards this facet of government policy than towards the activities of the department over which he presided. As a result he took no interest in ensuring that the division of responsibilities within the Public Works area of interest made sense in long-range terms.

Indicative of Cardin's outlook was his threat to resign should Quebec elect Maurice Duplessis in a provincial election based partly on limited participation in the war effort by that province. There was from Cardin little opposition to the activity of Munitions and Supply or to C.D. Howe. Howe was doing an efficient job and Cardin was interested in other things.

Considering the nature of Cardin's overriding interest, it is perhaps not surprising that when he left the Government he did so on the issue of conscription. Shortly after a plebiscite on the question had revealed that Quebec opposed compulsory military service, King decided that the national

majority in favour of it required some compromise. He repealed the Government's formal pledge against conscription for overseas and planned to introduce it immediately for at least the home front. Cardin could not accept this decision and wrote to the Prime Minister: "Nothing has been said nor anything established to indicate that the war situation has rendered necessary... the introduction of a measure containing the principle of compulsory service overseas." (37) In spite of King's efforts, Cardin left the Cabinet. (38) For the next six months the Department of Public Works was presided over by none other than C.D. Howe. His plans did not include a scheme for the long-range rationalization of the departmental mandate. In the autumn of 1942 Alphonse Fournier, Member of Parliament from Hull, stepped into a situation where the ground rules for the war had already been established. (39) He was not able to do much to change what had happened, nor was he particularly conscious of the degree to which the Department's mandate had been altered in the preceeding two years.

The problems of leadership at the ministerial level were duplicated at the permanent departmental level. By 1940 J.B. Hunter had reached the age when he could expect a well-deserved retirement. Under the circumstances, however, the Department and the Government were badly in need of his experience and ability. Accordingly he was given exemption from compulsory retirement and remained in his position to face the increasing workload that the next few years were bound to bring. To the man who had been in the Department for thirty-two years and of whom it was once said that "he was a man of few hobbies, his work was his hobby," the prolonged stay was probably not considered too much of a hardship. (40) Yet it was a risky decision. Already in the autumn of 1939 the pressure had so endangered his health that he had been forced to take a complete rest, and by staying on he faced a greater workload under more difficult conditions than he had ever known before.

The stresses of war made themselves felt in different ways and in many different fields, and dedicated public servants were not immune. In 1940 O.D. Skelton, the permanent head of External Affairs, died at the wheel of his car. In the same year the Deputy Minister of Transport, Colonel V.I. Smart, collapsed in his office and died on the way to the hospital. Hunter was not to escape. On November 30, 1941, he died of a heart attack brought on, not surprisingly, by overwork.

Hunter's death deprived the Department of Public Works of one of the most capable officials it had ever known, and the Civil Service lost one of its most senior and respected members. His funeral brought out some of the most influential figures in the nation's capital - including the Minister, Prime Minister and several leading civil servants - to pay their respects. For a moment the traditional anonymity of the public servant was set aside as press and public praised the man who had commanded Public Works for so many years. A eulogy published in the Montreal Gazette was typical of the general appreciation of Hunter's services to the country:

To all who had come in contact with him - and there are few prominent in the Dominion who at some time or another have not done so - he was the exemplification of the efficient permanent civil servant - a kindly man of the greatest integrity who could get things done in a hurry when the occasion required decisive action. (41)

Given the situation, perhaps the briefest and most accurate comment on the Deputy Minister's death came from the minister of his church: "Let me pause to say that the conscientious public servant today pays a fearful price for the privilege of such high service." (42)

The loss of Hunter was extremely unfortunate for both the Department and the Government at this crucial stage. He had been Deputy Minister for years and had formed personal acquaintances with many of the top civil servants and politicians in the nation's capital. With his access to other departments and his long experience in the affairs of Public Works and the Government, he might have been able to ensure that amidst the fluctuations and growth of the 1940s some sort of over-all policy was developed so far as the purpose and jurisdiction of Public Works was concerned. The Department badly needed such a man, one who knew his way around the increasingly complex trails of Ottawa.

It was not until October 1942 that a replacement was found for Hunter in the person of Emmett Patrick Murphy. (43) The gap was significant. For almost ten months, in a time of tremendous activity, the Department had been without a permanent Deputy Minister. W.P. Harrell, the Assistant Deputy Minister who filled in for this period, could do little but carry out routine functions. In addition, for much of this same period the Department was without a permanent Minister while King looked for a suitable replacement for Cardin. The double vacancy at the top further harmed the Department in terms of its efficiency and morale.

Even with the appointment of Murphy things did not return to normal, if that phrase can be applied to any situation in those years. Murphy was a competent man with skills that made him suitable for the position of Deputy Minister of Public Works. He had risen through the ranks of Railways and Canals and its successor, Transport, to the position of Chief Clerk by 1939. (44) Shortly after the outbreak of the war he was transferred to Munitions and Supply where he acted, significantly, as Director of Construction. Thus the Department did receive a Deputy Minister with the necessary background and ability.

Three facts tended to reduce the efficacy of the new Deputy Minister. First of all he was new to the position. Whatever his abilities, it would take time to gain a clear understanding of what the procedures of the Department were and what changes should be made. In normal circumstances such a situation could have been handled without difficulty. In 1942, however, a lot could and did happen between the time Murphy began work and the time he was fully conversant with the duties of the Department. Second, Murphy's appointment was a promotion from a lower level. He did not have the same kind of rapport with other top civil servants and politicians that Hunter had steadily cultivated over the years. A strong rapport in the right quarters was necessary because close cooperation was crucial to the unravelling of complex and interrelated duties. Third, and perhaps most important, was the fact that the Department of Munitions and Supply did not wish to lose the services of its Director of Construction altogether. For some time after his appointment Murphy therefore continued to act as a consultant to that department. (45) This work diverted some of the time and energy he might otherwise have devoted to Public Works, at a time when the Department stood in serious need of full-time attention.

The increasingly confused mandate of Public Works and the dominance of departments like Munitions and Supply in construction fields, then, were

to some extent the result of internal factors. Years of stagnation combined with particular problems of leadership to make Public Works unable to handle the construction demands created by the war. Given this inability, other departments moved quickly into areas that had always been considered within the jurisdiction of Public Works. The trend of infringement began in the 1930s, but it was the fluidity and growth brought by the Second World War that permitted these infringements to take on major proportions.

In many ways the effects of the Second World War were potentially more serious than those of the First World War. A competent and relatively young staff had merely to postpone activities and projects until the end of hostilities. Even with the austerity of the 1920s the Department had been able to carry out its functions with a reasonable degree of efficiency and dedication. By the 1940s, however, the Department was reaching a position where it might not be able to rise to the occasion entirely on its own initiative. The First World War and the 1920s had been followed by the equally economy-minded 1930s, and the later years of this period had brought about the growth of rival construction agencies within the Government. By 1945 the Departments of National Defence, Munitions and Supply, Transport and Justice had fairly extensive construction branches. It was becoming questionable whether these departments would eventually terminate in peacetime the construction capability they had developed as a result of the exigencies of war.

Furthermore, as time went on and other departments gained experience in the field, Public Works could not even claim uncontested primacy in the area of construction. In essence, the right to exclusive jurisdiction in any area rested on the ability of a department to bring to it a high degree of expertise and efficiency. It was not surprising therefore, that by the end of the war the Department of Public Works was constrained to borrow professional staff from other departments to meet the demands placed on it by construction projects.

The war had had one other effect: it had brought an end to the Depression. Although the situation had improved in the later 1930s, it was not until the nation had begun to prepare for conflict that breadlines and closed factories ceased to be typical of the Canadian economy. When the Government could take time from the pressing details of the immediate situation, however, the future prospects were disturbing. It had not been forgotten that 1919 had brought instability and recession, attributable to demobilization. It was more than possible that the same conditions would be experienced in the aftermath of the Second World War.

The question was what the Government could and should do about this potential problem. Several argued that the Government's efforts should be directed towards ending the controls and regulations that had been fostered by the war. Many had been willing to accept economy and the large degree of state intervention in the society only as a part of the price of victory. (46) King himself had argued that the controls were necessary because of the wartime situation. (47) At the return of peace, it followed, that the large Civil Service should be reduced, with many of its activities brought to a close, and that the Government should return to a much less visible and controlling role. There was also, of course, the basic question of finances. The war had caused Canada's expenditure to increase at an enormous rate. In 1939 the total net expenditure of the Government had been only \$636 million. By 1941 it had risen to nearly \$2 billion and by 1945

to \$5,076,000,000. (48) With the increase in expenditures there had been a corresponding increase in debt. If Mackenzie King was going to follow the precedent he set in the 1920s, the Government and Civil Service would pursue a policy of economy in the postwar years in an effort to reduce that debt burden.

The end of the war automatically brought some decrease in both the size of the Civil Service and the Government's expenditures. Agencies such as the Wartime Prices Board were abolished and others like National Defence shrank rapidly in size. By 1947 the Public Service had been reduced from its peak of over 140,000 to 120,946 employees. By the same token, Government expenditures in 1946 were only a little over half of what they had been the year before, down to \$2,597,000,000. (49) If these figures indicate a significant reduction after the war, they also reveal that the Government's activities had by no means receded to prewar levels. Nor were they going to do so.

By the end of the war, the Government had decided that the risk of a recession and major economic and social dislocation would be too great if an abrupt return to prewar policy was followed. The Government itself would have to play a major part in the conversion of the nation to a peacetime footing. As early as the opening of the 1944 Session, the Speech from the Throne included a reference to the necessity of a large-scale program for the postwar period. (50) Gordon Graydon, a Conservative Member, underlined his own party's equally strong apprehension about the future of the economy during the debate on that Speech:

In a recent estimate the Minister of Labour has revealed that today two million Canadians are in jobs which did not exist before the war broke out and most of which will terminate when the war is over, or before. Thus it should be very easily realised that the employment problem facing our country cannot be resolved by an incomplete uncoordinated effort. (51)

The Government's firm intentions were made known in October of that year when the Department of Munitions and Supply began to transform itself into the Department of Supply and Reconstruction, remaining under C.D. Howe. (52) The Minister and a good many of the men who had prepared the economy for war were now to be responsible for its conversion to peace.

There was even a rearrangement of Cabinet to create what might be termed the postwar version of the War Committee - a Committee of Reconstruction. Consisting of Howe, J.L. Isley of Finance, Louis St. Laurent of Justice and James A. MacKinnon of Trade and Commerce, this committee was intended to be the nerve centre of the Government's economic and development policy in the early postwar period. (53) The implications of these decisions were clear. The Government decided that conversion to a peacetime economy would require the same sort of direction and assistance associated with the economies of warfare. The experiences of 1919 and the haunting memories of the Depression years reinforced the conviction that it was too much of a risk to allow the country to find its own unaided way to a satisfactory economic adjustment.

Behind the immediate pressures for a smooth demobilization, there was a fundamental change in the Government's thinking. The Governments of the Depression had persisted in the old economic concept of a balanced budget and laissez-faire approach to the economy. It was not until the late

1930s that some of the cracks in this concept began to appear. With the war as a catalyst, a broader role of the Government's place in the nation was made not only acceptable but essential.

Although the changes had been under way for some years, the Government's official recognition and adoption of the concept of countercyclical policy was first publicly stated in a White Paper presented by the Department of Supply and Reconstruction in April 1945. (54) Beginning with the general comment that "the ultimate aim of all reconstruction policies is the extension of opportunity, welfare and security among the Canadian people", the paper went on to set the groundwork for a policy of strong governmental involvement in postwar Canada. (55)

Three major points emerged from this paper and the follow-up one a year later. First, the Government would adopt as a general approach the principle that "efforts to increase and stabilize employment and income must pervade all economic policies". (56) The basic means of achieving this, it was hoped, would be the application of a broad range of policies, brought to bear on the economy in a countercyclical manner. Second, the Government would undertake "advance planning of all necessary and desirable Dominion projects, ready for execution when prospective employment conditions make it desirable to increase public investment". (57) Third, such policies meant that there could be no return to economic concepts of the 1920s when balancing the budget was given first priority. In fact, the White Paper dismissed what had so preoccupied King in his early administrations with the comment that it felt "the postwar debt problem to be quite manageable". (58)

There were broad implications in this paper for the Government and public service. The Department of Supply and Reconstruction might be the agency primarily charged with reconversion, but such policies as those outlined were bound to have influence on all departments. It also indicated that there was unlikely to be, in the foreseeable future, a return to the Civil Service of prewar years, in either scale or stability. The revolution in administration occasioned by the war would not be reversed, and the problems and challenges brought by that revolution would continue to be faced in peace.

The broad shift in the Government's policy had a double implication for the Department of Public Works. It indicated that the sort of involvement in the economy that the Department had become associated with in the 1930s was likely to become ongoing policy. The wide net cast by the White Paper also meant that the Government would acquire and use much wider discretion in the economic affairs of the country than it had before the war. Public works were no longer the only acceptable lever the Government could use to influence the economy.

Prewar experience had led Public Works to expect that it would be involved in some sort of employment-oriented program after the war. Long before the White Paper - and even before the creation of the Department of Supply and Reconstruction - Public Works had been laying down tentative plans for postwar employment activity. In the second year of the war Corriveau wrote to his District Engineers on the subject:

In order that the Department may be in a position to submit to the Government, if called upon to do so, a programme of works of construction which would give an opportunity of employment to returned soldiers, will you

submit to me, as soon as possible, a list of projects in your district which would serve the above purpose. (59)

The efforts of the Department were given a broader base with the formation of a Special Committee on Reconstruction of the House of Commons. The two worked closely together and Cameron, as Chief Engineer of Public Works, even chaired a subcommittee on construction matters. (60)

Both Public Works and the Special Committee wanted to ensure that there were enough projects on the list to make the impact of the program worthwhile. When, for example, one member of the Committee suggested, "You could even let your imagination go a bit and suggest something that might be favourably considered," Cameron quickly passed the statement along to his District Engineers. (61)

A report of the Committee revealed the sense of promise felt for the whole program: "At its best, in other words, the reserve of construction projects will become more than an anti-depression measure. Approached with imagination, and in a spirit of cooperative endeavour, it can become an inspiring national programme for providing the equipment with which to win the peace." (62) In the summer and autumn of 1943 the Departments of Finance and Public Works jointly developed an \$85 million list of feasible postwar projects. In preparation for the end of the war the Government was now ready to undertake public works on a much larger scale than had been attempted during the Depression.

Significantly, the plans and lists drawn up began to be considered as part of a more lasting policy approach. Drawing from American policy and warned by the shortcomings of the efforts of the 1930s, officials at Public Works and Finance developed the idea of a "shelf" of projects. (63) The purpose of the "shelf" was to have a number of projects planned, "classified as to locality and fully analysed as to labour requirements". Unlike the normal procedure, however, such planning would not always be followed immediately by construction. Rather the initial steps would be taken "independently of the decision as to the time of executing the project and the allocation of funds for carrying it out". (64) The whole concept was definitely based on countercyclical economic theory. The intention was to ensure that the actual implementation of these projects could be timed to best affect the economy. In theory, a national or regional economic downturn would cause the implementation of the project with the resultant inflow of funds, creation of jobs, and expansionary effect. It was hoped that in this way Public Works would achieve its desired improvement and the economy would be aided as well.

If the Department carried into the postwar world the same concern about influencing the economy that had developed during the Depression years, there was no longer any illusion that public works could be a mainstay of the Government's response to economic downturns. The White Paper began by emphasizing this point: "The postwar employment problem is not to be solved by huge expenditures on public works." (65) Fournier also accepted this and summed up the limitations of such a program very succinctly: "In an economy where the national revenue is some nine billion dollars and we have a public works program of fifty million or a hundred million dollars, it would be a drop in the bucket to boost the standard of living or give purchasing power to the population." (66) Beyond the question of size there were the rigidities of the approach. As the Depression years

had revealed, public works in an age of machines did not always substantially increase employment. Once the Government had shed its distrust of much broader and more varied programs, it could afford to relegate public works to a more or less secondary level as an economic lever. The existence of the "shelf" concept and the extensive use of "winter works" in the 1950s tend to reinforce the belief that public works projects eased some of the problems of unemployment. (67) They were to be widely used as a response to a local and temporary unemployment situation or as an aid to a slack construction industry; but in terms of economic policy they had merely become one of many tools, and a rather minor one at that.

The new approach of the Government was reflected in a basic way in the expenditures of the various departments. The increase of social programs and transfer payment schemes between World War I and 1945 meant that the proportion of the expenditure by Public Works declined in relation to the government total. In 1926, for instance, the Department of Public Works had accounted for 4.91 per cent of the Government's expenditure. By the later 1930s relief grants and a growing debt caused the percentage to shrink slightly to 3.30 per cent. (68) The real change came with the Second World War. In the 1946 estimates, Public Works expenditures amounted to only 0.35 per cent of Government expenditure. The Department was overshadowed by the giant Department of Reconstruction and Supply, which controlled 11.8 per cent. Moreover, new social schemes and the results of the war made items such as the Family Allowance at 3.68 per cent, and Veterans Affairs with 1.55 per cent, important parts of the Government's budget. (69) The percentage of expenditures under Public Works were to increase as postwar construction programs got under way, but it could never again expect to be one of the most expensive departments in the Government.

Even if the Department was but one part of a large public service involving various policy options, it nevertheless faced some challenging years after 1945. Years of neglect in fields not important to the conduct of war, a rapidly growing Civil Service, and the needs of an increasing population made it clear that departmental officials would have a great deal to do. For the first time in years Public Works was able to embark on an active and expansionary policy of construction and repairs.

Before the war had even ended, Public Works began to prepare for the heavy work of catching up after so long a period of austerity. The 1944 estimates included a \$95,000 item for "postwar reconstruction". Fournier explained that "we have not maintained our public buildings, wharves, breakwaters and so on". This item was to allow architects and engineers to make a report on the condition of works throughout the nation "in order to see what expenditures will be necessary to put them in a good state of repair". (70) The next year he warned: "We shall have to attend to the repair of nearly every building we have in Canada, because they have been neglected to a certain extent." (71) The years of economy were finally exacting their price.

It was not only a matter of repairing older works. The expanding economy and the enlarged Civil Service also imposed new demands on the Department. Typical of these pressures were the requests for new postal facilities. The war had accelerated the trend of population from rural areas to urban centres. The old system of postal stations dotted around the country no longer reflected accurately the movement of mail. Large cities,

such as Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver saw the bulk of Canadian mail flow through their post offices. Public Works had to begin an effort to upgrade postal terminals to handle the distribution of mail from these city centres. These new facilities constituted major operations. Even when complete, for instance, Terminal A in Toronto cost the Department of Public Works over three quarters of a million dollars a year just for staff and maintenance. (72) Other federal facilities throughout the country were also expanding at a rapid rate. New departments, such as the Unemployment Insurance Commission and the Department of Veterans Affairs were in urgent need of office space. Certain cities, Vancouver for example, had experienced such a rate of growth over the last decade that federal government buildings were now completely inadequate. In all these areas Public Works faced a very heavy set of demands.

The greatest pressure was experienced in Ottawa. It became apparent after the war that the larger Civil Service was a permanent entity and steps would have to be taken to provide adequate and permanent facilities. Already, at the end of the war, the annual departmental expenditure for maintenance and repairs had reached \$2 million and it was obvious that it would go even higher. (73) It was evident, then, that adequate accommodation had to be created not only for the present but for the future needs in the nation's capital. The Department and the Government would therefore have to develop and complete plans for the Government's future involvement in the city. It was a new stage in the gradual evolution of interest in a problem that had its origins in the early part of the century.

Ottawa had begun as a lumber town. Its designation as the province's and then the nation's capital did not instantly alter the characteristics derived from its origin. Gradually, though, the federal Government's presence had come to mean more to the city than a set of buildings on Parliament Hill. As the federal Government grew in size its presence began to have a greater effect on the character of the city. And as the rate of Government expansion increased, the Department of Public Works found that it was no longer possible to plan one building at a time.

The first attempt of Public Works to plan for long-range development began just before the First World War. The prosperity of the Laurier years had made the Government think in terms of a continual and significant growth of the Civil Service. As a result, Public Works had undertaken a large-scale land purchase north of Wellington Street to the west of Parliament Hill. This was a natural area of future expansion and the Government wanted to ensure that it had control of the property. Once it had obtained possession, however, Public Works had to consider how the property would be developed. To have thrown up buildings as required and on an individual basis could have had disastrous results. In an attempt to avoid this, two landscape architects were hired in 1913 to draw up plans "laying out the grounds and indicating the size and position of the various buildings to be erected on the site". (74)

The Department's first experience with this type of planning may have made officials wonder what they were becoming involved in. World War I and then the austerity of the 1920s prevented them from turning any of these plans into actual buildings. It also seemed that as soon as Public Works began to talk of long-range plans everybody had ideas on what should be done. The original plans of the landscape architects, White and Todd, disappeared beneath committee proposals, political ideas and pet

projects. (75) By 1930, seventeen years after the landscape architects had been appointed, only a partially-completed Confederation Building gave any indication of expansion in the area.

There was another related but distinct consideration emanating from the federal presence in Ottawa. The city was the national capital. The Government naturally felt that it should reflect the pride of the nation and serve as a showplace for visitors. Even apart from the planning of federal buildings, efforts would have to be made to improve the physical appearance of the city. An overgrown lumber town at the turn of the century, Ottawa was not exactly a monument to the greatness of the nation. In an attempt to remedy this, Laurier created the Ottawa Improvement Commission in 1899. Although it was a relatively weak body in both money and power, it was at least an earnest beginning of the federal Government's interest in the area.

If any one person can be credited with bringing the Government's involvement in the city to a significant stage it was Mackenzie King. The Prime Minister had a very great interest in questions of aesthetics and propriety for federal government buildings and for the national capital. J.B. Hunter had many letters from the Prime Minister warning him to pay close attention to some seemingly minor detail of a building; his harshest rebuke from the Prime Minister came once when he had offended the latter's canons of taste. The Deputy Minister suggested that lights be placed on the Parliament Buildings to show when the Government was in session. His idea that a flashing red light be used for the Senate and a flashing green one for the House met with a deservedly sarcastic reply from King, who said firmly: "Parliament is not a lighthouse in the general acceptance of that term, and there is no reason why it should be made into one. You may regard it as the view of the Cabinet that any flash light proposal will meet with no approval." (76) Hunter did not bring the matter up again.

King's personal interest in the general appearance of the national capital and in the aesthetics of government buildings caused him to take a number of steps to improve the efforts being made in these areas. In 1922 he established a subcommittee of Cabinet headed by the Minister of Public Works to consider the question of the "beautification of buildings and grounds in Ottawa". (77) More significantly, in 1927 the Government created the Federal District Commission to succeed the Ottawa Improvement Commission under an Act which gave broader statutory recognition to the Government's responsibility for the area in which it had its national capital. (78) Representation was given to the federal Government, the City of Ottawa and the City of Hull. It was a potential means for coordinating activities and for creating an atmosphere conducive to long-range planning and cooperation in a way that would benefit both the federal Government and the municipalities involved.

The Federal District Commission was also the logical body to relieve the Department of Public Works of most of its marginal responsibilities in the capital region. The Commission was responsible for improving and beautifying the city of Ottawa, and it was thus natural that it acquired some of the landscaping activities previously handled by the Department of Public Works. In 1932 the grounds of Rideau Hall were transferred to the care of the Commission and in 1934 a much more sweeping transfer gave the Commission responsibility for most of the grounds around public buildings in

Ottawa. (79) Such transfers were relatively trivial. The fact was that the Commission and Public Works each tended to go its own way. The Commission remained largely concerned with parks and grounds and Public Works concentrated on buildings. There would have to be further action before any really coordinated and comprehensive plan of development could be formulated.

By the end of the Second World War the need for such a plan was greater than ever before. By 1945 Ottawa had become dependent on the federal Government, which was the city's largest industry and had been for some time. It had control of much of the prime real estate in the city and many of the buildings. Buildings classified as temporary dotted the landscape in different parts of the city. It was also obvious that the Government's presence would not diminish. If the city's growth was not to be chaotic and the federal government's dominant presence not destructive, a comprehensive plan of development would have to be formulated. With this in mind, the Department of Public Works and the Federal District Commission soon became involved in a project to develop a major and comprehensive plan for the future development of the city.

The project that developed after the war had its roots in the 1930s. In 1936 the Department of Public Works decided that economic conditions once again seemed to warrant an attempt to tackle the question of the development of the area north of Wellington Street. T. Rankin was sent by the Department to Paris, France, to interview Jacques Gréber. Loaded with photographs and maps, Rankin presented the eminent town planner with the questions the Department would have to consider in any future development. The discussion was largely concerned with the proposed development to the north of Wellington. Rankin later reported that he and Gréber discussed "the question of sites for the proposed Supreme Court building, a future National Picture Gallery, Upper Town Post Office and the relocating of the Printing Bureau, together with sites for future departmental and other Government buildings other than those north of Wellington Street". (80)

The Department of Public Works was obviously beginning to realize that it could no longer afford to plan one building, or even one group of buildings, at a time. Even with the effects of the Depression years lingering, it was apparent that future construction would be on a large scale. Greber, for his part, accepted the challenge and took a position as consultant to the Department, to plan future sites and a general scheme for government development in the capital region. (81) Before the work could be completed, the Second World War took the town planner back to France and brought a temporary halt to long-range planning.

The efforts of the Department between 1936 and 1939 represented its most ambitious attempt to step into the field of town planning, still however, limited to government buildings. Gréber had been working for the Department of Public Works and had been concerned primarily with its future program in the city. The activities and responsibilities of the Federal District Commission had remained separate. Until the plans of the federal Government's construction agency and the policy of federal involvement in the city were coordinated, the planning process would be incomplete.

After the war, long-range planning on a comprehensive scale really got under way. During the war many different sources had suggested that the Government should commemorate the sacrifices of the nation between 1919 and 1945 in some practical way. King and Fournier seem to have agreed

with this idea and decided that a major effort to enhance the beauty of the national capital would be a suitable project for the purpose. This proposal was summed up in the first Speech from the Throne after the end of the war:

The Government has also been giving consideration to the most suitable manner in which to commemorate, in the capital of Canada, the services and sacrifices of Canadians in the war just ended. In the past, the sacrifices of human life in war have most frequently been commemorated in monuments of bronze and stone. Such a memorial our capital already has. My ministers are of the opinion that something more expressive of the vision of the new world order would... be most appropriate. (82)

As a memorial to the war, the Government would undertake a major project to develop and beautify the region around the national capital.

An Order-in-Council gave expression to the Speech from the Throne by designating some 900 square miles in the Ottawa area as a National Capital District. (83) A further Order-in-Council took another important step when it stated that "it has been decided to re-engage M. Gréber to make a study of that area with a view to preparing plans for a suitable long-term development of such area as a War Memorial". (84) Gréber returned to Ottawa with a much more inclusive task before him than he had faced in the 1930s. With continuing responsibilities in France as well as in Ottawa, he was to lead a very active life over the next few years.

In this new effort to plan the future development of the region, a complex series of relationships arose between the Federal District Commission, the Department of Public Works and the Government as a whole. Gréber was, first of all, paid by the Department of Public Works. He operated out of the Hunter Building and worked closely with architects of the Department, such as T. Rankin, J.C.G. Brault and C.O. Sutherland. (85) At the same time, however, he was expected to report to the Federal District Commission, the authority that was theoretically responsible for the development of the area under the postwar scheme. Obviously the Department of Public Works and the Federal District Commission often had different views about what was an important goal and what was not. A rivalry could easily have arisen between the two bodies as each tried to influence Gréber, the man in the middle, to come up with a plan suited to its own purpose.

Contention was inevitable, but it was not as serious as it might have been because an intermediary body was established to prevent matters getting out of hand. By-law No. 28 of the Federal District Commission created a National Capital Planning Committee, to which Gréber would report. (86) This Committee, consisting of the Minister of Public Works, the Chairman of the Federal District Commission and representatives from the City of Ottawa and the City of Hull, provided a coordinating body for those most interested in the capital plan. Gréber referred to the Committee as "an interdepartmental and arbitrating agency" where the views of various bodies could be discussed, and, it was hoped, reconciled before being passed on to the other bodies involved. (87) The coordination that had always been lacking between the Federal District Commission and Public Works was a prime function of the Committee.

The creation of a plan for the National Capital Region turned out to be a major project. Gréber received several extensions of his contract and it was five years before his Plan for the National Capital was published. (88) The plan was a comprehensive one dealing with everything from the development of parks and recreational facilities in the nearby Gatineau Hills to the design of government buildings. It is beyond the scope of this work to discuss the plan in detail but two points are worth making. First, it contained the general principles and plans that would affect both the Department of Public Works as the Government's construction agent and the Federal District Commission as the guardian of the national capital's appearance. It was also the most comprehensive plan ever developed. For years to come, Gréber's ideas were to have a powerful influence on the development of the national capital.

The events leading up to the publication of the plan had significantly altered the federal Government's relationship with the City of Ottawa. The National Capital Plan and the existence of the Federal District Commission meant that the Department of Public Works and every other government agency came to realize that Ottawa was unique as a Canadian city in that it was the national capital. The presence of the Government inevitably moulded and to some extent distorted the direction of growth of the city and region in which it had such a large presence. In the future the Government would have to make a dedicated effort to ensure that it was a positive rather than negative force on the region.

All events related to the future development of Ottawa and its region had an impact on the Department of Public Works. Gréber had not hesitated to criticize some of the Department's past efforts in the city. The Confederation and Justice buildings, for instance, he dismissed as "indicative of the incorporation of outmoded forms and of structure awkwardly aligned to the streets". (89) In this and other instances he implied that the Department had not spent enough time on design and that in the future greater efforts would have to be made by the Department if it was to contribute to the beautification of the national capital. At the same time there is little doubt that a great deal of input to Gréber's plan had originated with officials of the Department. It is most probable that many of the ideas contained in the "master plan" had been heartily approved by Public Works.

However the effect of the postwar events should not be underrated. Before the war, Public Works had been more or less its own master in terms of planning. With the existence of a "master plan" it would henceforth be forced to work within guidelines, even if those guidelines were partly of its own making. More important, a 1946 amendment to the Federal District Commission Act gave that body a regulatory function over the Government's construction projects in the city. The Commission would have the power to review and reject any design planned by the Department of Public Works for the City of Ottawa. (90) In terms of design or planning, Public Works was no longer its own master.

The Department had certain reservations about such outside control. Murphy had written to the Clerk of the Privy Council in 1945 when an Order-in-Council first proposed giving regulatory control to the Federal District Commission. He warned that "the exact location and size of our buildings depend to a large extent on the requirements of the Department or Departments which will occupy them". (91) Given such constraints, he was

arguing, excessive control by the Commission would leave Public Works with an impossible task. Later, after the regulatory powers of the Commission had been put into law, Fournier hinted at an alternative solution - make the Commission a responsibility of the Minister of Public Works. (92) This would have created the danger that the Commission, rather than view the overall development of Ottawa, would have acted as a mouthpiece for the federal construction department. The Government does not seem to have considered Fournier's idea.

Although Public Works had not relished the idea of giving such powers to the Commission, it learned to work within the new framework easily enough. In 1950 a set of guidelines outlined the degree of the Commission's activity in this field of regulation. "No building or other work shall be erected, altered or extended by or on behalf of the Government of Canada in the National Capital District unless the site, locations and plans thereof have been first approved by the Commission." (93) When sent to Murphy for comment he replied only that "the procedure was well-known in the Department and had been followed closely". (94) The regulatory powers of the Federal District Commission thus became a part of the normal routine for the Department of Public Works. (95) Instances of friction were to occur between the two bodies, but - as with the Civil Service Commission years before - the Department adapted to the existence of one more set of regulations.

By 1948 it looked as if Newfoundland was definitely going to enter Confederation. This brought the Canadian public service face to face with an administrative task of unprecedented nature. The services of the federal Government and the colony would have to be intermixed and divided so as to allow the two levels to assume their new responsibilities. The only parallel case had been at Confederation and immediately afterward, but the complexity and range of government services had grown significantly since then. In 1949 the numerous federal departments, agencies and services would have to develop the means to enter the island smoothly and swiftly. At the same time the Newfoundland Government would have to cease in some functions, such as postal services, and shuffle jurisdictions in others. Essentially then, the immediate means would have to be found to impose a sophisticated federal administrative presence on an already populated colonial government.

Public Works found that the problem was twofold. First, like every other department in the federal Government, it would have to find the staff to handle operations in the region. The thousands of bays and harbours indicated that Newfoundland would require an active presence on the part of the Department. Men who understood the problems of public works in the new province would have to be found and formed into a District Office staff. The Department was also responsible for housing the dozens of other departments that would need accommodation following the island's entry into Confederation. Thus, by the time these departments were ready to set up operations, Public Works should have completed its own arrangements for accommodation with the Newfoundland Government or with private property-holders.

The draft agreement on the entry of Newfoundland had stated that the Canadian Government would take over "public dredges and vessels", as well as "customs houses and post offices and generally all public works and property, real and personal, used primarily for services taken over by

Canada".(96) Without such a clause it would have been practically impossible for the Government to step smoothly into its role after the colony joined the nation. It would not have been possible to obtain or construct the necessary plant or office space to accommodate either Public Works or other federal Government departments. At the same time such a clause added new complexities of definition and legality. In addition, the material that was to be transferred by no means met all the requirements of the Canadian Government, which had different departmental structures and requirements.

Once the terms of Confederation became more or less settled, the Department could begin to move towards a solution of the problems that faced it. W.P. Harrell, Assistant Deputy Minister of Public Works, took charge of the project and during the next months gave it first priority. Before long the Department had made contact and arrangements with its Newfoundland counterpart. The Newfoundland Department of Public Works agreed to carry out some of the essential work for the federal Department, which had no staff on the island and then to bill the Canadian Government for their work: "If you arrange for your department to do the work, the bills for repairs can be sent direct to Mr. E.P. Murphy, the Deputy Minister of Public Works, Hunter Building, Ottawa." (97)

It was a good beginning, but the Canadian High Commissioner warned: "The matter of office accommodation will shortly become an acute problem." Public Works would need a representative in Newfoundland "with authority to act on the spot" if all the difficulties were to be overcome. (98) The Newfoundland Department of Public Works seconded this statement and after a series of meetings between the two departments, Murphy agreed that he would send a man to the province. A.B. Wright, an architect, was given this task and by early February he was in Newfoundland consulting with his colonial counterparts.

Newfoundland was to enter Canada formally on April 1, 1949: thus the next few months were extremely busy for Wright and other officials. By the time the day arrived, the task had been accomplished. Accommodation was in many instances inadequate and temporary and there would be disruptions of one sort or another, but in general the two Departments of Public Works could take satisfaction in the amount that they had accomplished. A comment by the St. John's Evening Telegram a few weeks before the formal entry of the province indicated that they had some basis for satisfaction: "Sifting the various units has not been an easy task and if there is a little disruption in the early days of union it cannot be blamed on the interest the Canadian government has displayed or their desire to make the merger as smooth as possible." (99) Shortly after the formal union a representative of External Affairs commented that "on the level of administration, the change-over appears so far to have been relatively smooth". (100) In spite of the problems, the Department of Public Works had accomplished its part in ensuring a rapid integration of Canadian and Newfoundland Civil Services and activities.

The ceremony on Parliament Hill on the first of April did not automatically end all the problems. Differing procedures, patronage questions and promised works made Newfoundland one of the more interesting and troublesome regions of the Department for years to come. There was also the occasional appearance of a ghost from the colonial past. While Public Works was in the latter stages of sorting out the confusion resulting

from union, Newfoundland was holding an election. And it was discovered that a 1913 Newfoundland law required that all public works be suspended for twenty-one days before any election. To a Department still sorting out the chaos resulting from the transfer, such a law was hardly welcome, but the officials of Public Works had no choice but to suspend work and leave everything until the election of May 27 had taken place. It was to be several years before Newfoundland became just another district to the Department.

As all these events indicate, the Department of Public Works found the immediate postwar years extremely busy. Relative to its operations in the Depression era and the years that preceeded it, the level of activity had increased beyond all recognition. Both the Government's changing conception of its role and a much more complex Civil Service made for new processes of decision-making and new forms of activity. If departments were to meet the challenges of the postwar world, they would have to be adaptable in terms of both internal structure and orientation of service. Public Works was certainly no exception. The expenditures alone indicated the tremendous pressures that the latter half of the 1940s had brought to bear. In 1947 the expenditure of the Department reached \$38,865,993, a new record. The next year the figure had climbed to \$46,223,246 and planned works clearly showed that the growth trend would continue. (101)

There was one contrast to all the activity and growth in the Department. As each year passed, Telegraphs and Telephones steadily declined in importance as a function of the Government. Designed originally to provide a service into which private enterprise was not willing to venture, this service became naturally less crucial as a growing nation began to entice private firms into the remote regions of the country. And even in those far distant areas where heavy settlement was a long way off, technology had supplanted the service of Public Works. Two-way radio, under the auspices of the Department of Transport, covered distances much more cheaply and efficiently than had the telegraph. Furthermore, given the creation of the Department of Transport and the changing technology of the twentieth century, telegraphs made little sense as a part of the jurisdiction of the Department of Public Works. As early as 1939 Cardin had replied to a suggestion on the consolidation of the various communication facilities of Public Works and Transport as "worth considering". (102) The declining importance of the service and its increasingly outmoded placement under Public Works gave clear warning by the end of the war that the nature of the service would soon be altered.

A. McDonald, the new Superintendent of Telegraphs and Telephones, was very much aware that he presided over a dying organization. In 1947 he warned his District Superintendents that "at the present rate the Government Telegraph and Telephone Service would be liquidated in a very short time and we would all find ourselves seeking new employment". The Government had always willingly stepped aside when a private company entered the field. After the war this had happened with increasing frequency. McDonald, with a natural concern for the Government's system, hoped to allow it to continue by putting it "on a strict business basis". (103) If this were done the Government might continue in the field of telegraphs and telephones as a cheaper and more efficient means of communication than the private firm could provide.

In spite of McDonald's efforts it was inevitable that he would fail. The Government's service had been designed to operate where private enterprise would not, rather than compete with it. The service had always been financially costly and there was no reason for the Government to stay in it any longer than necessary. The service would continue to shrink as the population increased, and this shrinkage would have the blessings of the political heads of the nation.

The declining importance of the whole area and the split in jurisdiction over communications caused the Government to look for a means of consolidating and thereby reducing the service. Only a few weeks after McDonald had brought his District Superintendents together to warn them of the possible future, Howe suggested and got an interdepartmental committee to look into the whole question of "eliminating duplication and bringing about standardization of rates". (104) The committee was composed of members of Public Works and Transport, and its recommendations must have been disappointing to McDonald, one of the representatives of the former department. It was decided that, given the areas of communication already under Transport, and the declining importance of the service, it would be better for Public Works to transfer its responsibilities to the Department of Transport.

In general, the administration at Public Works seems to have felt that the recommendation was sensible. In a letter to Howe, Fournier made a wistful reference to the "pioneering work carried out by my department since 1879," but added, "I certainly agree to the proposed transfer." (105) In the spring of 1948 Telegraphs and Telephones Branch was consolidated under the Department of Transport. The provision of telephone service to federal government buildings in Ottawa, which had also fallen under the jurisdiction of Public Works, was given by that Department to Finance. (106) The service that had been a long-standing function of the Department - and was really a reflection of an older concept of Public Works and of a younger nation - left Public Works. McDonald's efforts had been unsuccessful and he had the unhappy task of writing to his District Superintendents for the last time to advise them that "under a decision handed down by a higher authority" their branch of the Department of Public Works no longer existed. (107)

The transfer of the Telegraph and Telephone Branch made a great deal of sense in terms of the jurisdiction of the departments involved and in terms of efficiency. It was, however, a relatively small matter compared to the overall role of Public Works. By the later 1940s the Department had difficulties in a number of areas. The Depression era and the war had seriously undermined both its mandate and morale. Years of emergency and austerity had, everyone admitted, led to serious consequences. At one time an infusion of funds and projects such as occurred in the postwar era would have done much to alleviate the problems that existed. But the growth rate created its own unique challenges to which adequate responses were demanded. And by the postwar era, the problems of Public Works reached so deeply that growth merely aggravated them. By 1950 it was apparent to observers that the Department had in some measure failed to adapt to the new postwar situation and that there would have to be a number of changes if it were to become an efficient entity with a clear purpose for its existence.

CHAPTER 12

TOWARDS A NEW DEPARTMENT

1946-1960

On November 19, 1945, Henry Jackman, a Conservative from Toronto, was pressing Public Works Minister Fournier to define the relationship between his Department and the Department of Supply and Reconstruction. Jackman wondered "why his Department cannot more efficiently and economically carry on these proposed new construction enterprises." Fournier, who had no power to prevent the creation of the new Department anyway, replied optimistically that Public Works would continue to remain the centre of construction expertise and that Supply and Reconstruction would make use of it. Jackman was not satisfied:

If I may caution the Minister, Mr. Chairman, I think he will find that, perhaps because of the personality who will be in charge of Reconstruction and Supply, gradually the power and responsibility will gravitate to the new man and be taken away from the old. I do not know any reason why, if the Department of Public Works is efficiently administered by a capable minister to-day, that department should not do the buildings... That would obviate the necessity of a duplication of architects, engineers and the rest, and the work could be more efficiently and economically carried on. (1)

This exchange of views was symptomatic of the fears that existed concerning the status of the Department at the end of the war. The fluctuation and growth of the Civil Service and the crises of war combined to make the long-term role of the Department of Public Works even more uncertain. Jackman was one of many who feared that the problems already existing in 1945 would tend to increase in magnitude as time passed. If Public Works was to develop a rational and efficient role for itself it would have to be prompt in doing so. If it did not quickly develop such a role, there was every likelihood that the efficiency both of the Department and of government construction would suffer.

As it turned out the pessimists were more accurate than Fournier. Several different factors, all interrelated, seriously damaged both the ability and the prestige of the Department over the next few years. Within a decade of the above exchange the Government was forced to undertake a major reorganization of Public Works in an attempt to enable it to cope with the problems of the postwar world.

Jackman's comment in its most general sense was illustrative of the course taken by the Department in the immediate postwar years. The Department remained essentially weak in the face of indifference on the part of the Government. Also, a fatalistic mood on the part of the staff was engendered by the somewhat daunting experience of watching the energetic expansion of other departments. In this discouraging climate older problems combined with new ones to complicate the status of the Department.

Public Works faced a great backlog of works at the end of the war. The creation of a "shelf" list of Public Works - ostensibly to meet the immediate and future needs of the government service and nation - was based on the assumption of rapid expansion in the economy. In 1944 Fournier had stated: "We intend to employ more architects and acquire more clerical help to look into the conditions of buildings, and so on, throughout the country." (2) This and later statements made it clear that the postwar policy of the Department was to expand, rather than contract. (3) Indeed, expansion was essential to the revitalization of the Department. The demands themselves would have required additional staff under any conditions, and by the same token, an increased degree of professional expertise. At that time, Public Works still had the serious imbalance dating from the 1930s in staff in terms of age and positions. Each of these factors clearly proved that the Department badly needed younger, trained and capable architects, engineers and administrators who were up to date with the latest advances in their own fields of work and research.

It was not always easy to find new staff in the postwar years. In the first place, the Civil Service was not the only sector of the economy undergoing expansion. Private industry did not, as some had feared it would, sink back into a recession. Rather, this sector of the economy competed actively with the Government for the increasingly short supply of professionals. Fournier and his officials thus found it difficult to obtain the men they wanted. In 1947 the Minister told Parliament that he was still actively searching for professionals but that they "seem to prefer private enterprise". (4) When the Department had been unable to hire these people they were potentially available in great abundance. By the later 1940s it was impossible to obtain an adequate supply of professionals to meet the rising needs of the Government.

Part of the problem resulted from economic conditions stemming from the war. Generally speaking, Canada had enjoyed a long record of stable prices. Only in the First World War had this stability been shaken and even then the subsequent Depression era had largely counteracted the inflationary effects of those years. In this context, the Canadian Civil Service had remained more or less competitive with the private sector. The Second World War and its aftermath brought to the cost of living a dramatic series of price increases that were not to be reversed. Giving the years 1935 to 1939 a base value of 100, the cost of living index rose 19.5 per cent by the end of the war. Even this increase in the cost-of-living index was relatively small compared to what it was in the reconstruction period. Two years later

the cost of living was 35 per cent above the prewar level and by 1949 that increase had been doubled. (5)

Bound with rules and regulations to safeguard the public purse, the Civil Service simply did not respond quickly enough to these price changes. A Grade 1 Clerk, for instance, saw his or her basic salary increase by approximately 12½ per cent between 1939 and 1947. The cost of living had gone up by 35 per cent. The situation was even worse in the higher positions. The salary of a Chief Clerk rose from a basic \$2,400 in 1939 to \$2,580 in 1947, an increase of 7.5 per cent, while a Head Clerk's salary rose from \$2,520 to \$2,700 an increase of 7.1 per cent. (6) Thus in terms of purchasing power, the immediate postwar years brought a decrease in the salaries of several categories of civil servants.

This combination of uncompetitive salaries and a market shortage of professionals is sufficient to explain why Public Works and other departments found it difficult to recruit an adequate staff. Conversely, private industry was more responsive in the short run to changing wage levels. The differential was evident in most categories but most of all among the professional groups. As early as 1946 a McGill University study revealed the basic reason for the Department's difficulty in the matter of salary levels. It showed that a graduate engineer of McGill who had gone into the Civil Service would on the average be making \$3,650, and if he had gone into teaching he would have reached an average salary of \$4,250. Had he gone into private industry, however, he could expect to make the very large sum of \$9,300. (7) Given these figures, even if they are not completely representative, the comments of the Civil Service Commission Report in 1947 are not all that surprising: "Great difficulty has been experienced in recruiting technically trained personnel, especially graduates in architecture, civil engineering and other branches of applied science. Persons with these qualifications are in short demand throughout the country." (8)

Although this problem affected the whole Civil Service, Public Works suffered more than most. First, in many categories the imbalance of salaries between public and private sectors was more or less remedied by 1950. Increases in government salaries and a slowing of the rate of inflation helped to make the Civil Service once again a reasonably attractive choice for many skilled individuals. There were exceptions, and engineers and architects were among them. Continued high demand meant that their salaries remained higher in private business than in the Government, and these categories were more important to Public Works than to most other departments.

It might also be said that Public Works was more in need of new staff than many of the other departments. Supply and Reconstruction had recruited widely during the war, as had the Department of Munitions and Supply. Even Transport regained some of its areas of jurisdiction and retained the trained personnel that went with them. Public Works was much more shorthanded than either of these engineering departments. The war had brought an increase of staff, but most of this had been at the non-professional level. The understaffing at the professional levels that had existed in the 1930s was not remedied during the war years. Then, suddenly, the Department found itself faced with an increasing number of projects at the end of the war, while unable to find enough people to fill all the vacancies or new positions. Over the next few years Fournier would be led, inevitably, to state that "we are trying to fill the vacancies as quickly as

possible," (9) but it was not until well into the 1950s that the Department could again attract professionals in number and quality to satisfy its current needs.

Inflation and economic conditions were largely beyond the control of the Department. In an area more directly within its control, however, serious problems had developed by the late 1940s. In the wake of the reforms of the First World War, Hunter had been optimistic enough to begin a letter to his chief architect with the phrase "now that patronage has been abolished..." (10) The observation contained an unwarranted degree of finality. Although the reforms of that period were important, they had by no means resulted in a complete elimination of patronage. In spite of both the Civil Service Commission and Treasury Board, men and governments would continue to use the Civil Service for partisan purposes, but in comparison to the earlier years such usage had become relatively trivial. A Prime Minister would ensure that the contracts for supplies in his riding went to a friendly construction firm. (11) A Minister would probably have a better chance of receiving a coveted government building than would a backbencher, and a government backbencher would have a better chance than a Member of the Opposition. In effect, patronage was random and occasional for the most part after the Borden reforms. Thus much of the concern associated with patronage had more or less disappeared. Exceptions, such as the charges against the Public Works Construction Act, served to prove that if the problem still existed it was certainly much less serious than it had been.

Several incidents after 1945 provided disturbing evidence that Public Works was once again increasingly concerned with patronage. In British Columbia there were some instances of the Department's avoiding the usual tender procedures, seemingly in order to benefit partisan allies. (12) In another case, Stanley Knowles found evidence of influence by a defeated government candidate in the same province: "I like the Minister of Public Works, and I hate to find signs of it (influence) in his department. He is the last Minister in the government I would expect to condone it in any way at all." Fournier's reply was made in a jocular manner; nevertheless it was a little surprising: "I am still a live politician just the same." (13) He had a disarming way of bantering with the Opposition when criticized. But even if the retort was humorous in intent it was only partly effective, because the Opposition was presenting too much evidence to be ignored.

British Columbia was not the only province where patronage was alleged. On the other side of the continent Newfoundland was singled out by many as a region in which systematic patronage was practised. (14) Random patronage had never disappeared nor was it likely to do so. However, if the practice was indeed becoming systematic the Department would seem to be reverting to the habits of an earlier era.

Partisan politics became especially intrusive in one particular area of the Department's operations. Between 1945 and the early 1950s, political patronage became a major factor in determining when and where erosion protection works would be constructed. Part of the reason that such works became so politically based was the unusual nature of the relationship of the Department and federal Government to such works. In theory, protection works were not the Government's responsibility unless a federal work itself had caused the erosion or unless it was needed to protect federal property. At various times Fournier had reiterated that the "type of erosion, which

arises from natural causes, and has not arisen from anything done by the government, is not generally accepted as a federal problem". (15)

For various reasons the Government began to make exceptions to its own rule. In British Columbia in 1948, severe flooding of the Fraser River brought the Department of Public Works onto the scene. Murphy went West and reported back that the flooding had precipitated a major emergency. In response to this report, and for humanitarian reasons, Public Works then interpreted the law as loosely as possible in order to give aid. All of the staff of the Department in British Columbia were "put at the disposal of the people of British Columbia to give what help they may". (16) The same year high-water levels in Lakes Erie and Ontario brought demands that the Department give aid, again as a response to a crisis situation. (17)

There were good reasons for the exceptions that the Department first made in the area of protection works. It would have been unduly legalistic and heartless to have stood by the letter of the law under such conditions. Resignation to the possibility of exceptions, however, led to an unfortunate situation. Exceptions began to be made for more and more reasons. All were justified by the Department in one way or another, but it nevertheless soon became apparent that members of the Government had much more success in obtaining such works than did members of the Opposition. The "emergency" under which such works were authorized often seemed more of a political emergency than any that could be attributed to physical or climatological causes. In fact, it would seem that protection works were well on their way to becoming what post offices had often been in the nineteenth century: a reward to politically friendly regions. A later Deputy Minister of Public Works would not hesitate to conclude that these works were nothing less than vehicles of patronage. Given the way in which they were constructed, there would seem to be no other reasonable way of viewing them, for: "It was common practice to provide protection only for those properties whose owners were designated by the local Member as being in support of the political party in power." (18) Cases were even reported of works that would begin mysteriously at one property line and end abruptly at another. Such things were inexplicable from a technical point of view but made great sense politically.

Protection works and other works - whether or not they could deservedly be regarded as the results of political patronage - soon led the public to see the Department once more as a great political machine. By the end of the decade the Opposition was treating Fournier much more suspiciously than it had a few years earlier, and changes suggested by the Minister were often greeted with serious expressions of doubt. Such incidents served only to further damage the image and morale of the Department. An attempt to alter the Public Works Act in 1951 provides the best evidence of this distrust.

Ever since 1903 the Public Works Act had given the sum of \$5,000 a certain importance. Below that figure it was not necessary for the Department to call for tenders under certain conditions. Inflation - first in 1914-20 and then in the period after 1940 - meant that with the passage of time, the Department became increasingly restricted by the applications of this fixed sum of money. Consequently, it was not surprising when the Departmental Secretary called for an adjustment of the figure in 1946 to reflect the changed price levels:

It is pointed out that under conditions prevailing at that time, work of a sizable character could be erected for that amount. With the gradual increase in the cost of materials and labour wages which has since taken place, however, the present monetary value applicable to this class of work has changed considerably. (19)

The Government's response to this and later suggestions was erratic. At first it rejected any alteration as politically unacceptable. When continued inflation made it apparent that something would have to be done, the Government went to the opposite extreme. The response only served to heighten the suspicion with which the Opposition and the public viewed the Government's intentions concerning Public Works.

The occasion for acting on the question of tenders was the passage of a new Financial Administration Act in 1951. (20) One effect of this was to make it necessary to introduce amendments in the Public Works Act. It was a convenient time to deal with the question of the \$5,000 limit, but the Government's proposal made the amendment far from routine. Fournier introduced a bill that would remove any specific ceiling above which the Department would be compelled to call for tenders. Instead he proposed a clause that would have given him and his successors very wide discretion in determining what should go to tender, stating, "The minister should be satisfied that the nature of the work renders a call for tender by public advertisement impracticable, and that the public interest can best be served by entering into a contract for the execution thereof without inviting such tenders." (21) The Opposition would probably have reacted negatively to such a proposal even under the most harmonious of conditions. Given the atmosphere of the period and the suspicions of the activities of Public Works, Fournier's bill created a storm.

The Minister did not improve matters when he introduced the bill with the comment that it was intended to "reaffirm our faith in the tenders system for public works". (22) This was too much for the Opposition parties. Groans and sarcastic interjections arose from the Speaker's left-hand side. Fournier and the Government were obviously in for a difficult time. Apart from these interjections, the first statement of the Opposition's position came from Public Works critic Howard Greene, a Conservative. He warned Fournier that his party felt, "this bill is thoroughly bad and ought to be defeated". In his opinion, it was neither a routine amendment nor a confirmation of the tender system, for: "That new subsection takes the ceiling out of the Public Works Act and says, in effect, that any minister whose department is to construct works, can, if he so wishes, let contracts without tender. That, we believe, is a very serious change." (23) Nor was opposition confined to political circles. A trade magazine found the bill interesting and important enough to try to find out what the construction industry thought of it. The results were not comforting for those who supported the bill:

A check by the Daily Commercial News finds that there is a distinct disquiet in the industry over an amendment to the Public Works Act (Bill 26), now before parliament. This appears to indicate an abrupt change in the long-established government policy of openly calling competitive bids on almost all federal public projects valued at upwards of \$5,000. (24)

There was little disagreement with the contention of Fournier or departmental officials that the \$5,000 limit had become impracticable. Many asked, however, why the Government did not simply raise the ceiling rather than abolish it. (25) The tender system, for all the abuse it had suffered, was still considered a very important safeguard of the public purse. In the end Fournier was forced to accept the proffered compromise. Opposition was simply too strong in both the House and among the public for the Government to force the bill through. The Minister returned a few days after the initial exchange in Parliament with a significantly revised proposal. This bill retained the concept of the ceiling but raised it from \$5,000 to \$15,000 to reflect increased prices. (26) The Opposition accepted the new version and passage was quickly secured for it.

Fournier's abortive attempt to abolish the ceiling on those projects that could be undertaken without tender added to the already tarnished image of the Department. For the past few years, charges of patronage had been on the increase. Given this atmosphere, Bill 26 only served to heighten the belief that the Government wanted a free hand to utilize Public Works for partisan ends. Whether or not such suspicions were justified, the whole episode further demoralized an already unhappy Department.

There is little doubt that by the early 1950s patronage was affecting the efficiency of the Department and its ability to carry out its proper function. At the operational level, staff often felt that they were working not for the improvement of the nation but for the gratification of various local Members of Parliament. When H.A. Young came in as Deputy Minister in 1953 he found that if "there was a constant feeling among employees in the Department that if they did not do as the Member of Parliament requested, they would lose their jobs". (27) The Department had also lost much of its prestige in the eyes of the public. Blair Fraser, a highly respected columnist, referred to it on one occasion as "the last surviving puddle of the Great Dismal Swamp of politics and patronage which once engulfed the whole government service". (28) His attitude was by no means an isolated one. The motives and actions of the Department were being regarded with more suspicion than at any time since the days of the Langevin scandal.

The growing atmosphere of patronage, the confusion of the departmental mandate and an inadequate staff affected the Department adversely. It is perhaps not surprising that incidents of departmental inefficiency began to appear, although it might be added that the reputation of the Department caused some to pass judgement unfairly. This is not to underestimate the very real problem that existed. For instance, it often took the Department far too long to complete a project. More and more often votes granted by Parliament in one year would reappear in the next with little or nothing achieved in the interim. Fournier himself admitted, "I become impatient when I bring down my estimates and there are revotes." (29) Yet, in spite of his comment, he was not able to do anything to correct the situation.

Two specific instances of seeming inefficiency caused the Department a great deal of trouble in the House. First, in 1950 it was provided by Parliament that the recently-acquired Edwards property on the banks of the Ottawa River would be used as a residence for the Prime Minister, (30) a measure accepted and supported by all Members of Parliament. The Department of Public Works, however, whose responsibility it was to convert and then maintain the residence, showed a frustrating inability to give an estimate as to potential cost. Pressed on the matter, Fournier

replied only that "nobody can give a definite estimate of the cost of trying to make a new house out of this old one". (31) Such answers soon turned unanimity into discord. Donald Fleming, a Conservative Member, summed up the attitude of his party:

I am in complete accord with the idea that a suitable home should be provided for the Prime Minister of this country; let there be no mistake about that. At the same time, as a matter of common sense and ordinary sensible business practice I believe the government should know the cost of a project before it undertakes it. (32)

The unsatisfactory response of the Department meant that even a project of relatively small size and with the backing of the House was susceptible to political controversy.

A more significant example of the Department's inability to please the Opposition and the public existed on the West Coast. And even though the problems were not really the fault of the Department, this work more than any other in this period stood as a symbol - both to departmental officials and the public - of the limitations and failings of the postwar Department of Public Works. Ripple Rock was located in the Seymour Narrows off the British Columbia coast. For years it had been a major navigation hazard and a good many ships had floundered on this twin dome of rock or had been driven ashore as a result of the severe riptides that it caused. It was understandable that, as the importance of shipping along the British Columbia coast increased, demands that something be done began to be heard. As early as 1931 Wilfred Hanbury, a British Columbia Member of Parliament, urged its removal. Stewart replied at the time that he "was not very familiar with the matter". (33) Later Ministers of Public Works were not to be allowed the luxury of such a reply.

Through the 1930s the Department investigated various possible ways of removing the rock. By 1938 Cardin was able to report that the extensive surveys were finished and a means of opening the channel available. (34) To all intents and purposes, it was just a matter of time before funds were allocated and the rock removed. The suitable time arrived with the outbreak of World War II. The Department of National Defence became concerned about the security of an inter-island route down the West Coast and added its powerful voice to the chorus urging the rock's removal. Public Works responded in 1941 by inviting tenders for the removal of Ripple Rock. (35) The problems, however, had just begun.

The Department intended to use a combination of drilling and blasting as a means of removing the obstacle, but this technique did not work and was abandoned after several thousand dollars had been spent on the project. In 1946 another \$257,705 was expended "to test a new method for effecting the removal of Ripple Rock". (36) This money was spent to no better effect than the earlier amount. By the end of this second experiment, Public Works had spent a grand total of \$802,825 on the project. (37) Apart from a few minor chinks in its surface and dozens of test borings, Ripple Rock remained undisturbed. Fournier had to admit defeat:

Actually if the government could have found somebody to undertake the work at an exact or even approximate price, so that we would know where we were going, we would have had the work done. The best experts were consulted. My own deputy was in Washington and New York to meet

their experts, but as yet no method has been found which could promise success. (38)

The very fact that no contractor would risk making an estimate indicates that the problem lay in the nature of the work rather than in the abilities of Public Works. Nevertheless, Ripple Rock was an embarrassment to departmental officials. Every year after the war the Minister was forced to admit to curious Members of Parliament that his department had not yet found a way to remove the rock. To make matters worse, the United States Government, concerned about the coastal passage to Alaska, offered to do the work. Canada turned down the offer, stating that it could and would do the job itself, (39) but it was not able to live up to its promise. With politicians and public offering suggestions and pointing with confidence to the American offer, Ripple Rock remained a thorn in the side of the Department as long as it existed.

Of all the problems faced by Public Works in the postwar era, the most basic concerned the question of jurisdiction. Faced with heavy new demands, internal problems of structure and staff and a declining prestige, Public Works found itself unable to halt the increasing infringements by other departments on its areas of responsibility.

The prediction made by Jackman was more or less fulfilled in the years that followed. The only qualification that might be made is that Supply and Reconstruction was not the only department to impinge on the mandate of the Department of Public Works. In general, the departments that for one reason or another had developed construction capabilities tended to augment them after the war. By 1953 it was questionable whether the Department of Public Works could really claim to be the construction agent of the Government any longer. Large-scale architectural establishments were common to several departments. The various branches of National Defence had fifteen architects, Agriculture had five, Transport, Veterans Affairs, and Resources and Development each had four. Labour, Health and Welfare, and External Affairs were just beginning with one architect each. (40) The trend seemed to be towards an absorption of the activities of the Department of Public Works into the individual operational departments of the Government. It was a disturbing and ominous situation to anyone responsible for the structure of government service.

It is highly probable that this continued intrusion on the Department's area of activity was directly tied to the low prestige and internal problems of Public Works after the war. The reputation of the Department had its effect on other civil servants as well as on the public. General H.A. Young recounted how, when he had been Deputy Minister of Resources and Development, Public Works had been called in to provide "conveniences for the Indians assembled at Fort McPherson". Young's department had estimated the cost of the project at \$5,000 but "by the time the Department of Public Works had completed the job, it cost \$40,000". (41) The comment was not completely fair, for in a good many cases Public Works did handle projects much more efficiently and cheaply than other departments. The point is not whether it was fair or not but whether it reflected a general evaluation of the Department. Not many such instances would be needed to make other departments wary of turning over their funds to Public Works. By the same token, if the reputation of Public Works were to suffer as a result, other departments would probably seize on this to justify the development of their own independent construction potential. This seems to

have been a factor in the increasing rate of intrusion into the Department's jurisdiction between 1945 and the early 1950s.

Moreover, the internal weaknesses of the Department - weaknesses that were not lessened by the separate activities of other departments - instilled a spirit of defeatism among some of its officials. This acted to prevent Public Works from pressing very strenuously for the repatriation of the construction function implicit in the name of the Department. The decline in its prestige over the years could not be attributed solely to the Department itself. The Department could not find enough men to meet its requirements, and often the men it had could not finish projects within a reasonable time. It is not difficult to understand why its officials were not eager to demand further responsibility. The fatalistic response of Alphonse Fournier to the whole question seems to have set the mood of the Department: "Nothing would please me more than to handle a good many projects, but I do not believe I could give satisfaction without increasing the staff. I think the other temporary departments could do the work more expeditiously than it could be done by the Public Works Department." (42)

Fournier was really making two admissions. First, the existing organization and procedures of the Department rendered it incapable of acting as the Government's exclusive construction agency. Second, the whole atmosphere of the Department was such that he doubted whether the necessary changes could be made. "I cannot change the mentality of my staff", the Minister complained. "These men come in at an early age and are trained under a certain procedure and technique." Such rigid and traditional approaches, he pointed out, made him head of one of the more "economical" departments in the Government. It also made him the head of a department that was bound by antiquated rules and procedures, for: "It is often said that the Department of Public Works has the most red tape, and after ten years at the head of the Department I think it is true." (43) It was an incredible opinion, coming from the man who had been at the head of Public Works for nearly a decade. It was the description of a Department so undermined as to no longer have the will to reform itself.

Yet in a way the worsening of the problem itself pointed the way to a solution. In the 1930s and even during the Second World War, impingement on Public Works by other departments had been a problem internal to the bureaucracy. By the 1950s the problems of jurisdiction and the weaknesses of Public Works had become serious enough to threaten the efficiency and economy of government operations in the construction field. Gradually, Opposition members, the press and the public became aware of the situation and began to demand that something be done.

George Drew, the Leader of the Opposition, made one of the first comprehensive attacks on what was happening to the Government's designated construction agent. In 1950, in a thoroughly researched speech, Drew brought out the obvious fact that "not all buildings that are being constructed by the government are constructed by the Department of Public Works". He was able to detail the degree of dispersion that had taken place, and the figures were amazing. The Department of Transport was spending \$20,410,816 a year on its construction operations. Resources and Development was spending \$13,482,390 and National Defence \$36,265,257. Altogether Public Works was spending less than half of the construction funds of the federal Government. Drew concluded his revelations with a demand that the Government take action: "I do suggest that the enormous increase

in the cost of building which in the year before the war was \$35 million to the present figure of \$168 million, should be a warning, a signal, that the time has come to reiveu the methods by which these arrangements are made." (44) Drew's speech set the tone of discussion for the next few years. Under the leadership of the effective Opposition critic and future Minister of Public Works, Howard Green, the Conservatives continued to press the Government closely on the operations and jurisdiction of construction activities. (45)

In 1952 the position of the critics of Public Works was given a strong boost by a Senate Committee Report. The Senate Committee on Finance, composed mainly of Members of the Government, found the problem of government construction responsibility important enough to occupy a good deal of space in their report. Even exlcuding military construction, the Committee found that the estimates of Public Works related to the construction or acquisition of buildings had shrunk to less than half the expenditures in this area. (46) It was a situation that the Committee felt was at variance with both the intent of the Public Works Act and a rational division of duties:

Under the Public Works Act, the Public Works Department of Canada has the responsibility of providing and maintaining all the public buildings and works required by other civilian departments. It is true that Part II of the Public Works Act makes an exception to the effect that the Governor in Council 'may at any time transfer the management, charge or direction of any public work . . . to any other Minister or Department'. But surely this was only intended to be used to meet special circumstances and was never intended to be used in the broad sense in which it is used today. (47)

The Committee's report was straightforward. The distortion of the arrangements for the easy transfer of duties had contributed to the destruction of the lines of jurisdiction between departments. Over the past years several departments had been acquiring, as fast as they could, as much of the responsibility as they could from the problem-ridden Department of Public Works. The Committee felt that this trend hurt the government service and the efficiency of construction and urged that it be reversed. It concluded, "With very few exceptions . . . we do feel that this part of the administration of our public business should be under Public Works." (48)

Thus, by late 1952 it was becoming apparent to Louis St. Laurent and his colleagues that something would have to be done to meet the problem that had been allowed to drift for so many years. At the same time it was evident that it would be far from easy to correct matters. It was not simply a matter of passing an Order-in-Council that would magically return all construction activity to Public Works. In its current low state of morale and prestige, Public Works was not able to handle additional responsibilities, and other departments would have strongly resisted any such move. Before the Government could even begin such a redistribution of responsibilities, there would have to be a thorough reorganization of Public Works to raise it, willing or unwilling, to the essential level of capability where it could confidently handle the enormous construction demands of the postwar world.

It was also apparent that such major changes required new leadership. Alphonse Fournier's fatalism was hardly conducive to the success of such a

difficult task; and by 1952 Murphy was already beyond the age of retirement. New men would be required at both the political and permanent levels to head the reorganization.

At the same time there were some positive factors. In spite of all the problems, the Department contained a good many capable men. It must be remembered that the Department had shown itself to be far from incapable in the postwar years. It had lost responsibilities to other departments but it still saw its expenditure go from \$31,271,215 in 1946 to \$76,967,167 by 1950. (49) It was a period of the greatest expansion the Department had ever witnessed. And if certain departments tried to avoid using the facilities of Public Works, others still retained enough confidence in it to turn over some \$10 million in construction funds during 1950. (50) The Department that was unable to give a solid estimate for the conversion of the Edwards property was also the Department that had so capably handled the entry of Newfoundland the year before. The Government was by no means faced with a totally incapacitated organization.

A successful reorganization would have several interrelated results. In the first place, there would have to be a reorganization of departmental structure and an upgrading of the staff, which would both encourage greater efficiency and improve internal morale. This, in turn, would help to improve the image of the Department in the eyes of other civil servants and of the public. This alone would make such a reorganization worthwhile. More than that, St. Laurent hoped that, once reorganized, the Department could begin to bring the basic question of jurisdiction into sharper focus. A new, efficient and it was hoped, more determined department could plan to take back some of the construction activities that it had lost.

It was not long before St. Laurent was able to begin the process. In 1953 a general election provided a convenient occasion to appoint Fournier to a judicial post. (51) In his place, the former Minister of Resources and Development, Robert Winters, became Minister of Public Works after the election. Murphy was allowed to take his overdue retirement at the same time, and Winters' new Deputy Minister of Resources and Development, General Young, was appointed in his place. The Prime Minister had chosen well in his search for the leadership that could undertake a revamping of the Department.

Robert Winters was one of the younger Ministers in the Government. Born in 1910, he had first entered the Cabinet in 1948 as Minister of Reconstruction and Supply. In that and his later portfolio he had proved himself to be one of the more promising Liberal Members. Equally significant was the fact that Winters had a very good public image. The press felt that "youthful, athletic Bob Winters", as one paper described him, had the drive and ability to make something of his new portfolio. (52) The public image was in itself important. The belief was that in appointing Winters the Government had signalled an end to the spoilsman politics that had seemed all too much a part of Public Works in the past. This, in turn, helped to convince the officials of the Department over which he would be presiding that in fact there was soon to be a real change in the way things were done. Very few Ministers could have created such a positive reaction even before assuming a new portfolio, but Winters was one of them.

There was more to Winters' appointment than the suitability of his public image. St. Laurent evidently believed that Winters had the necessary abilities for such a task, and in this vein the press welcomed the new

Minister's background as an engineer. The Halifax Chronicle-Herald, for instance, stated that his background would allow him to bring "to his new duties qualifications and an experience which fit him admirably for the administration of those multitudinous and far-flung public affairs". (53) Once again it was Blair Fraser who put it most succinctly: "Normally the Minister of Public Works knows a great deal about politics. Now, for the first time in human memory, he knows something about public works." (54)

Winters' background as an engineer was probably not as important as the press felt it was. The time had long passed when a Minister could devote most or even much of his time to the detailed operations of the Department. Although his background cannot be altogether discounted, Winters would not in fact have much opportunity to apply his knowledge of engineering. If there was a single specific qualification beyond his general intelligence that qualified him for the job, it was his interest in the portfolio. Robert Winters was a young and ambitious man. He seems to have seen his position at Public Works as a crucial test of his abilities in terms of future career possibilities, and this gave an already capable man the energy to face the difficult task before him. It also meant that - as had perhaps not been the case with the last two Ministers - the portfolio was more than a means of gaining entrance to Cabinet meetings. It was indeed a challenging responsibility.

Winters was accompanied to Public Works by Gen. H.A. Young as Deputy Minister at the specific request of the Prime Minister. In many ways the new Deputy Minister contrasted sharply with the Minister. Whereas Winters was a prosperous businessman, Young was a self-made man who had risen from the ranks to become Quartermaster General by the end of the Second World War. (55) Where Winters was a politician known for his pleasant and suave manner, Young was noted for his ruthless efficiency and often brusque manner. Beneath these differences of personality they had two things in common. Both had established first-rate reputations in their respective professions and both came to Public Works with the intention of turning the Department into an efficient and respected organization.

It was the autumn of 1953 before Young moved into his new position and the task of reorganizing Public Works began. (56) It did not take long for the Deputy Minister and Minister to become involved in their new Department. Both Young and Winters made a point of trying to meet and talk to as many officials as possible to hear their complaints and suggestions. For the first time in several years the officers from the various districts were brought together in Ottawa for a discussion of "the whole range of problems with respect to the operations of the department within the scope of their jurisdiction". (57)

The sense of decisiveness emanating from new leadership was in itself important to the beginning of what was eventually to be a significant improvement of departmental morale and prestige. Both the staff and the public felt that more changes occurred in the first few weeks of the new administration than had taken place in the preceding decade. The sense of dynamism was important, for if the Minister and his deputy were to cut through the "red tape" and raise the low spirits of the Department they would have to begin at once. In such a situation even minor changes assumed importance as an indication to the staff as to what they might expect in the future. Young, for instance, made a point immediately upon his arrival of having the dingy entrance to the Hunter Building altered to make the building and the Department seem a little less forbidding. (58)

Such actions were only a prelude to more serious changes. Much of the Department's reputation for delay and inefficiency resulted from the existence of an internal structure designed for a budget one-fifth the size of the current one and adequate only for an era of Canadian history that was long past. This antiquated internal structure had unquestionably hampered the efforts of the men in the Department and to some extent created the image of a bureaucratic organization.

The first problem that called for solution was embedded in the general administration of the Department. Over the past few years an inefficient and uncoordinated set of procedures had developed in the top ranks. The Minister, for instance, directly supervised the preparation of the estimates, with the Deputy Minister taking little or no part. Thus, in this crucial area, planning and authority moved directly from the operational to the political level. The Deputy Minister evidently spent most of his time working on high-priority special projects and left routine matters of administration to the Departmental Secretary. (59) It was literally possible for one top official to be completely unaware of the activities of another. This problem was easy enough to correct. Winters and Young operated as a team to ensure that henceforth the line of procedure in the upper levels of the Department would be more clear-cut and rational.

There was also a serious question about the role of the Assistant Deputy Minister. That position had been created in 1907 to provide Hunter with a stepping stone on his way to the position of Deputy Minister. With Hunter's promotion the position had gone as a consolation prize to Arthur St. Laurent. And from that point on, the status of Assistant Deputy Minister seems to have declined in importance in the affairs of the Department. The position certainly had less staff at its disposal and less power than either the Chief Architect or Chief Engineer's office. The fact that St. Laurent took the Chief Engineer's position in the Department as a promotion after having been Assistant Deputy Minister tends to strengthen this assumption. (60) Moreover, salary levels are usually revealing in this respect. For most of the period between 1920 and 1953 the Assistant Deputy Minister could expect to receive less salary than either of the top professionals in the Department. In 1951, for instance the Assistant Deputy Minister of Public Works had a base salary of \$7,200, while the base for Chief Engineer and Chief Architect was \$8,000. For various reasons the position of Assistant Deputy Minister in Public Works had never really become the second permanent level of command as it had in many other departments.

Young was quite determined to upgrade the importance of the position. The workload occasioned by operations and reorganization would require a great deal of attention at upper levels and it would be impossible for the Deputy Minister to handle it all himself. Young also felt that the transition could only be accomplished by removing the current incumbent, W.P. Harrell. Harrell had been in the Department since 1912, and had risen through the ranks to the position of Assistant Deputy Minister. Since both his experience and his methods were those of an older, outdated Department, the Deputy Minister was unavoidably committed to the appointment of a new man. Deciding that Harrell "lacked the qualities essential to effect the drive necessary in a reorganization problem", (61) Young began to search for someone to take his place, and in the process of doing so, was able to persuade the Civil Service Commission to allow the creation of a new position for Harrell who was moved to a "special projects" post. (62)

Young found the man he was looking for in George T. Jackson. Jackson had previously been with the Civil Service Commission. He had a reputation as a good administrator, and, having been a top official in a regulatory body, was a man who could make unpopular decisions when they were necessary. He was given a degree of power and a level of responsibility that helped to transform the position of Assistant Deputy Minister. Harrell, unhappy in his new position, resigned upon hearing of the appointment of the new man. A certain degree of personal hardship and a number of harsh decisions were essential to the successful reorganization of the Department.

Harrell was not the only man to leave the Department over the next couple of years. Departmental stagnation and staffing problems in the preceding half-decade had made it possible for a number of men to reach positions of authority beyond their abilities. When, for instance, the regional staff was gathered in Ottawa, Young commented with his usual frankness that "it was obvious that there would have to be many changes". (63) In the months that followed, several employees (especially in the districts) were encouraged to retire; if necessary, they were dismissed. Winters, Young and Jackson had no intention of attempting a reorganization until they had confidence in their staff's ability to handle the results.

The basis of reorganization, however, was embodied in the creation of new positions and the restructuring of current ones rather than in a change in staff. In three areas the Department underwent an extensive alteration of structure and division of duties. When these changes were accomplished, the internal capability of the Department was more competent to handle the administrative and operational problems of the mid-twentieth century.

The transformation was completed in 1960 with the appointment of G.B. Williams to a second A.D.M. position with technical responsibilities. This tended to create a true "pyramid" of responsibilities and complete the second layer.

First, there was a realignment of the general administrative services of the Department. This was largely accomplished by the change in procedures at the top level of Public Works, and further definition of lines of procedure and authority. Two important new adjuncts to the Department were created, an Information Services Division and an Economics Branch, (64) valuable additions that were to make the administration of Public Works easier than had been the case up to now.

Second, it was deemed necessary to alter significantly the structure of the Chief Architect's Branch. This branch had experienced no major reorganization after its inception as a permanent part of the Department in the nineteenth century and changes were certainly needed. The branch had simply added sections or divisions, piece by piece, as required and this had resulted in a set of procedures and responsibilities more accurately reflecting a generation when existing buildings were few and maintenance was a minor adjunct to construction. For example, the cleaning staff for government buildings was still the responsibility of the Chief Architect. (65)

The way decided upon to restructure the branch to meet current needs was to divide it into two. A Building and Construction Branch, placed under the former Chief Architect, E.A. Gardener, retained the core of the original division. From now on Gardener and his staff would be able to concentrate on the details and problems of construction, without becoming bogged down in dozens of other responsibilities tacked on as the nature of the Depart-

ment had changed. In the process of gathering the remaining functions together, Young and Winters created a Property and Building Management Branch. This new group were to take responsibility for the maintenance and allocation of existing buildings and the acquisition and disposal of property under the control of Public Works. The central role that this branch played in the reorganization should be emphasized, for it was the first concrete recognition by the Department that it was no longer just a construction agency. A century of construction had created a large number of holdings and these holdings needed and deserved systematic attention. Indeed, the Property and Building Management Branch was the first step towards the recognition of the fact that Public Works was the landlord of a considerable amount of land and property. And since the maintenance of government buildings cost \$34,383,659 by 1955, it might be said that the change was long overdue. (66)

The Engineering Branch of Public Works was also divided into two as a part of the reorganization. This measure resulted not so much from changes in duties that had developed over the years - as had been the case with the Architect's Branch - as from a new responsibility that Winters and Young brought with them from the Department of Resources and Development.

In 1949, after years of discussing the matter, the federal Government passed an enabling statute that allowed it to commit up to \$150 million towards the construction of a Trans-Canada Highway. The Government agreed to pay 50 per cent of the construction costs of any province abiding by the terms of the agreement. By the spring of 1950, a series of federal-provincial meetings at both the ministerial and official levels had resulted in agreements being made with eight of the ten provinces. (67) It was an extremely ambitious undertaking. As of 1951, some 3,800 miles of construction would be necessary to complete the work, and even though the actual construction would be undertaken by the provinces, the federal Government had a major role to play: "The duties of the Federal Government's Engineers are to inspect, in co-operation with provincial engineers, all phases of construction of the Highway and to ensure that the terms of the Federal-Provincial Agreement are carried out with respect to plans, specifications and other matters." (68) It also fell directly on the federal Government to construct the sections of the road that traversed the two national parks of Banff and Yoho. The splendid rugged mountains contained within these parks made construction of those particular stretches of the Highway among the most difficult of all. It was an undertaking of the same magnitude as the St. Lawrence Seaway and the Canadian Pacific Railway.

Robert Winters and Hugh Young, as the heads of the Department of Resources and Development, had been the men largely responsible for the passage of the Act, the federal-provincial conference and the initial phases of construction. Thus, it was not at all surprising that, when they moved to Public Works, they brought the responsibility for the Trans-Canada Highway with them.

It was really this transfer that made it necessary to restructure the Engineering Branch of Public Works. The major functions of this branch as it had existed before the arrival of Winters and Young were grouped under a Harbours and Rivers Engineering Branch. Except for the retirement of some men and their replacement with younger personnel, this division was not appreciably altered. The main change was manifested in the creation of a

Development Engineering Branch, which indicated both the importance that Winters and Young attached to the Trans-Canada Highway and, equally significant, their intention to have the Department become "involved with numerous highway projects, as well as various bridges, both Interprovincial and International". (69) The branch also had charge of a Structures Division and a Testing Laboratory, at the time situated somewhat inappropriately in the West Block.

For a suitable person to head the new branch, the Department looked beyond the federal Civil Service. In the end G.B. Williams of the Manitoba Department of Public Works was chosen to become Chief Engineer of the new branch. Williams had been involved with the Trans-Canada Highway from the provincial point of view since its inception. His knowledge of both the highway and the various people across Canada involved with it was considered a valuable asset in an extremely difficult task.

It was not long before these organizational changes began to have their effect on the Department. In general, reaction was favourable. When Winters brought down the supply vote for his Department in 1955, he found himself being complimented on both sides of the House for his efforts. This admiration indicated the degree to which the changes had favourably affected opinion outside the Department. And the compliments were merited because, as Herbert Herridge, a C.C.F. Member from B.C. put it, "when the Minister and the Deputy took over this department they were faced with a very heavy task". Herridge felt that the work they had done to date was indeed worthy of praise:

The department was pretty much bogged down because of the urgencies of war and later a very large and extended building program with which the department's administrative staff was not able to deal effectively. The effects of the reorganization of the department under the Minister's direction and by the Deputy Minister and his senior officials is already beginning to show results in improved efficiency. (70)

The comment was typical of the response of several politicians, genuinely pleased and surprised at the improvements that the new leadership had been able to effect within a couple of years.

Everyone, however, was not inclined to be complimentary. William Hamilton, a Conservative M.P. from Quebec, felt that many of the Members of Parliament were unaware that the Department's expenditure had continued to grow at a rapid pace. He expressed in verse his thoughts as to what he felt might be the reason for the Minister's popularity:

Praise Bob from whom all blessings flow,
Praise him you Liberals row on row;
Great gifts to friends he doth award
While taxes grow across the board. (71)

It was not great verse but it did succinctly express one man's cynicism towards the Department's use of public money.

Hamilton's verse pointed out a very real problem faced by Winters and Young. Both knew that if the public image of the Department was to improve, people would have to believe that it had ceased being a vehicle for partisan political purposes. In comparison to the major problems of internal structure and staffing, patronage was probably not seriously damaging the efficiency of the Department. In the public mind, however, Public Works

and patronage were inextricably linked. The degree to which an attempt to end patronage would impress the public and press was clearly shown by the strong favourable reaction to a rather minor step taken by Winters shortly after he assumed the portfolio. He directed the new Information Services Division to release periodically to the press lists of contracts over \$50,000. Patronage had always been surrounded by an aura of deep secrets and covert deals; a Department willing to expose its laundry to the public eye could not be too soiled. (72) It was a brilliant and easily-accomplished public relations effort.

The actual containment of patronage was to be a much more difficult matter. In two areas, Members of Parliament had become quite accustomed to making frequent use of the Department. The first was in the planning and allocation of protection works. Here patronage had become pre-eminently systematic, and here it most needed to be stopped. In 1955, with the new organization more or less complete, Public Works moved to change its policy. From now on protection works would be built only if they met the strict guidelines that had originally existed for such works; that is to say, where a federal work needed protection or where a federal work was causing the erosion.

This policy also meant that local Members of Parliament were no longer able to get action for constituents who had no recourse to other levels of government. Thus it was the withdrawal of a federal service at the same time as the withdrawal of a partisan tool. Whatever grievances or hardships a Member could present, the Department would stand by its guidelines. The new policy was summed up in Winters' refusal to consider the request of a Social Credit Member from British Columbia: "As I see it, erosion at this point is essentially a question of protecting from the natural forces of the river, river bank property over which the Department of Public Works has no jurisdiction." (73) To end the practice of patronage the Government had to prevent the lax interpretation of the rules that had allowed it to develop in the first place.

As Young later related, the decision to end construction of non-federal protection works created a furor. Several members felt the change in policy to be arbitrary and unfair. In a good many cases, protection works already promised to supporters could not now be constructed. *Le Devoir* reported "violentes critiques dans les cercles parlementaires à Ottawa" in its reference to the controversy. (74) And since Winters was abroad on a trade mission, his Deputy Minister received most of the wrath of the politicians. One provincial group even sent a delegation to St. Laurent demanding the removal of Young. (75) The Prime Minister had, however, promised both his Minister and his deputy a free hand in the reorganization of the Department. He also sensed, as much as Winters and Young did, that the removal of patronage was essential if the Department was to regain the respect and trust of the public and the contractors. Young remained in his position and the new policy towards protection works remained in force. The disgruntlement that this caused among certain Members is aptly illustrated by the fact that three years later - with a new government and a new Minister - former colleagues of Winters were still urging a return to the old and looser definition of governmental responsibility for protection works. The benefits that resulted to the Department from the change in policy are implied by the fact that the new Minister was as insistent as Winters had been on retaining the new policy. (76)

The second area of political interference was not as well known to the public, but it did have a demoralizing effect on the Department. Public Works was unusual among government departments in that it had thousands of caretakers, repair staff and others who did not come under the regulations of the Civil Service Commission. This large group was a prime target for petty patronage. As a task force for a later Royal Commission was to put it, "It seems as if politicians, frustrated in most areas, have found a spot to let go their steam." (77) It was a last holdover from an earlier era of widespread patronage appointments. Winters did not deal with this problem immediately, perhaps because the more important reforms made this seem a trivial matter or perhaps because one could only go so far without risking a caucus revolt. On the other hand, nobody supported such interference strongly and under Howard Green, Winters' successor, the opportunity to take action came. Before the Members of the new government had time to accustom themselves to this luxury - or nuisance - Green abolished the practice. (78)

Two final points should be made about the practice of patronage in the Department. First, even before the reforms of 1953 through 1958, patronage had become a relatively trivial matter in comparison to that of the nineteenth century. It did not seriously distort the policies of the Department nor cause it to work solely for the benefit of supporters of the Government. What it did do was to give the Department a bad public image and demoralize the staff. The two results were related. An engineer who felt that his position was being used for the gratification of some Member of Parliament was not likely to be very energetic in carrying out his responsibilities. And if he felt that the public viewed his Department as a "dismal swamp" of patronage, his frustration was likely to increase. Without significantly affecting party fortunes, the petty patronage of the era significantly affected the morale of Departmental officials.

Also, it should be stated that patronage as a systematic weapon disappeared long before the 1950s. The rise of the protection works system was an anomaly and it is not surprising that it did not last. It was the reflection of a demoralized department and an unduly acquiescent permanent staff. At the same time, it would be naive to think that patronage on an occasional and petty basis is ever permanently and completely removed from government. It is up to the public servant, the public and the leadership of the party in power to ensure that political expediency does not get to the stage where the policies and morale of the permanent public service are impaired.

Reorganization means much more than a new set of flow charts and different formal structures. It also implies a more flexible approach to procedures, a greater willingness to innovate, and less of a tendency to continue old practices - not so much because they are old but because they are outworn. One of the striking things about the Department after 1954 was the way in which it refuted Fournier's previous pessimistic comment, "I cannot change the mentality of my staff." (79) Under new leadership Public Works showed a much greater ability than ever before to adopt techniques and procedures that enabled it to coordinate its many activities.

The effects of this intangible change were manifested in a number of specific ways. One of the most important was the increased use of committees. Committees, as anyone who has sat on one knows, are often frustrating and inefficient, and no doubt a good many public servants have

regretted the day committees became part of the administrative scene. Nevertheless, it is incontestable that the size and complexity both of individual departments and of the public service as a whole have made them indispensable to ensure that policies and procedures do not become confused and contradictory.

General Young and George Jackson both found the use of committees rewarding. Shortly after the reorganization of the various branches began to take shape, Young decided on the formation of one such committee at a senior level to provide standard procedures for planning of accommodation and construction. Writing to Jackson in May 1955 he made the comment, "It seems to me that in our procedure there is inadequate time and provision for preliminary study." He believed the remedy would be to set up "a small committee of senior Departmental officials who will review requirements in the light of the proposals put forward by the Property and Building Management Branch". (80)

By summer the committee had come into existence and assumed an active role in the Department. Largely as a result of the abilities of Jackson, it soon developed an efficient and standard set of procedures for evaluating the necessity of any construction project. The facts about a requested building would be brought forward with the concerned department often sending a representative. Requirements, future needs and alternatives and costs would then be discussed. Finally, the proposal would be accepted, modified or rejected and the recommendation forwarded to the Deputy Minister for approval. (81) It was not the highly personalized approach of earlier years, but it was efficient. The Department involved got what it needed and the committee ensured - or did its best to ensure - that it did not get an unnecessarily expensive or elaborate building. The process seems to have worked well. Along with such developments as the standardization of design for small post offices, the committee removed much of the arbitrary nature of the decision-making process and muted much of the interdepartmental politics that often went into the design of a new building.

The senior planning committee was only one of several developed both within and between departments over the next few years. Generally, their existence reflected two major concerns. First, that policies concerning more than one department, or more than one branch within Public Works, be designed with the other parts of the process in mind. Second, that procedures be developed to allow the Department to plan beyond the immediate future. The Department of Public Works, the Public Service and the property assets of the federal Government were growing at an unprecedented pace. If the long-range view was not taken into account, officials might very well find that a given project could be obsolete by the time it was completed. Committees were by no means miraculous in solving the problems commonly encountered in a complex bureaucracy, but their use in the later 1950s did help the Department to function more efficiently than in earlier days.

The Department would need all the efficiency and ability it could muster. The nation was in the midst of an economic and demographic boom. In dozens of large cities important new government buildings were called for to meet the growing demand for services. In the Far North, roads and buildings were being developed as the Department moved into a new and difficult area of the country. In thousands of small towns, especially those near urban centres, tremendous growth reflected the postwar movement to

the suburbs. Public Works had to respond with the requisite number of post offices and other government buildings. The projects were very numerous and so complex in design as to have been unbelievable a quarter of a century before. In the year that Winters and Young came to the Department its expenditures reached \$100 million. Over the next five years that figure more than doubled to \$238,668,168. (82) The figure for staff and salaries for that year was greater than the total departmental expenditure only eleven years earlier. The total expenditure was ten times greater than it had been at the end of World War II, twenty times what it had been ten years before that. Even though inflation accounted for some of the growth, this was an unprecedented rate of increase and one that required all the abilities and efficiency of organization that the Department could bring to bear.

Public Works would continue to have difficulties and sometimes fail to meet completely the requirements of various projects. In general, however, the Department seems to have confirmed its increased capability in handling the problems it undertook. Two major projects, one old and one new, serve as examples of the Department's success in facing the challenges inherent in complex and technically difficult projects of the postwar world.

The new project was the Trans-Canada Highway, which in 1955 did not seem to be progressing well. About the time that Williams was settling into his office, certain developments in the project were becoming apparent. Only a few of the provinces involved seemed to be making an honest effort to push the Trans-Canada towards a rapid completion. The Prairie Provinces, where the work had long been given high priority, were by far the most advanced in construction. In other provinces, the highway was not accorded such high priority, and work was progressing only on those sections that would be beneficial to the province involved. For instance, in Ontario reasonable progress was being made on the eastern sections of the road where there would be a significant amount of local traffic, whereas in that long and sparsely-populated stretch north of Lake Superior, a good many miles had not even been put out for tender and it did not look as if the situation was about to change. The great Canadian Shield was as discouraging to the province involved in the Trans-Canada Highway as it had been nearly a century ago to those who talked then of a transcontinental railroad.

The situation in Ontario was further complicated because in 1953 contract irregularities had been discovered on sections of the highway west of the Lakehead. The federal Government and the Department of Public Works were not directly involved but it was necessary to suspend payments to the province until the investigation was complete. (83) The scandal, which eventually took on major proportions and ruined the careers of many people, added to the problems of completing the highway within the time and money originally set out for the work. The rate of progress was, to say the least, unexciting. If the highway was ever going to become a reality, some means would have to be found to encourage the provinces to step up their efforts and begin work on all the sections within their jurisdiction.

In 1955, examining a map of the Trans-Canada Highway, Robert Winters came upon an idea to give the provinces the necessary encouragement. He noted that the sections where construction had not been started in any of several provinces amounted to approximately 10 per cent of the total mileage within these provinces. If the federal Government could provide an impetus for the provinces to tackle this 10 per cent of the highway there would be no real obstacle in the way of its completion. Once

the mileages and details were checked, the proposal made even more sense. In March 1956 it was moved that Parliament amend the Trans-Canada Highway Act. (84)

Winters' plan was relatively simple. The federal Government would offer to pay 90 per cent of the cost for 10 per cent of the mileage on the Trans-Canada Highway in any province. This would encourage the provinces to begin work on those sections of the highway that had little importance to them but were crucial links in the route. The Act, which came into force in June, stated that besides the 50 per cent payment of costs on approved mileage, "an additional forty per cent of the cost to the province of the construction of one-tenth of the highway" would come from the federal Government. (85)

If the principle behind the Act was straightforward, its implementation was not. The Act provided that "the particular portions to be taken into account for the purposes of paragraph (b) of subsection (2) (the additional forty per cent clause) shall be such as are approved by the Minister". (86) The federal Government wanted to make sure that the special provision was applied to the difficult sections of the road. Over the next several weeks it fell to Williams to travel to all the provinces concerned and work out what would and what would not be included under the new 90 per cent arrangement. The negotiations were difficult, as they usually are when different levels of government are involved, but give and take soon made possible a series of arrangements. With the approval of these measures, the Trans-Canada Highway could now move realistically towards completion.

There was still a long way to go. By 1958 the completed mileage still amounted to only a little more than half the total. In a good many of the incomplete sections however, contracts had been let and the work was well under way. Finally, in 1962 the Trans-Canada Highway became a reality. At a cost to the federal Government of over \$900 million, the most significant effort in land communications since the transcontinental railways was complete. The magnitude of the undertaking was unquestionably comparable to that of the transcontinental railway and the fact was not lost on the officials involved. In September a ceremony to mark the official opening of the Highway was held at Rogers Pass in the Rocky Mountains. The final report on the Trans-Canada Highway included the comment that "the site of the ceremony was not far from the site of another historic opening ceremony at Craigelachie, B.C., where in 1885 Sir Donald Smith drove the last spike in the Canadian Pacific Railways transcontinental line". (87) It had taken thirteen years, several inter-provincial conferences, three Acts of Parliament and a great deal of money, but Canadians could now drive coast to coast in their own country.

Another project successfully undertaken was the destruction of that longtime nuisance, Ripple Rock. For some years after World War II, the Department of Public Works and the National Research Council had been conducting research on the most satisfactory method of removing this obstinate physical obstacle. By early 1955 it looked as if they had found the right solution to the problem. Winters suggested a proposal initiated by explosives expert Victor Dolmage, which seemed feasible if ambitious. Dolmage proposed tunnelling under the channel to the rock from a nearby island. Once this was done, the interior of the rock would be partly hollowed out and loaded with explosives. As Winters pointed out, it would

take time and money, but it promised a better chance of success than had the earlier and more conventional methods: "It is estimated that it will require some six months to prepare plans and specifications and that the rock can be removed within a space of two years after the contract is awarded. It is estimated that the total cost involved will be in the vicinity of \$2.5 million." (88) It was one of the more unusual projects in the Department's history. Three years of work and a much longer period of planning would eventually narrow down to a few seconds, and one massive explosion would determine whether the time and money had been well spent.

Finally, the tunnelling and the positioning of explosives was completed. By the spring of 1958, just over three years since Winters announced the project in Parliament, everything was ready. As the day approached, a good many departmental officials became slightly nervous. Young and Howard Green, now Minister of Public Works, decided that the project was important enough for them to go to the West Coast to see what would happen. In Vancouver and throughout the southern part of British Columbia the impending blast aroused a great deal of attention. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation was even slated to carry the explosion live to interested citizens, partly in the hope that they would stay at home and thus avoid the massive traffic jams predicted by the Mounted Police.

By the evening of April 4, 1958 there was nothing to do but wait. Nearly 2-3/4 million pounds of explosive had been placed under the rock, and in the morning Victor Dolmage would have the honour of pressing the button that would determine whether his scheme had indeed been feasible. (89) As the Vancouver Province reported, it would be "the largest non-atomic peacetime blast set off by man". (90)

At 9:31 a.m. Dolmage pressed the button and saw that his plans and work of the past several years had been a complete success. The explosion lowered the two rocks sufficiently to give a 47-foot depth throughout the channel. In those few seconds, the most persistent obstacle to navigation in the experience of Public Works had disappeared. Few if any windows were shattered, and those spectators who came out to watch the event enjoyed a day of magnificent weather and a spectacular explosion. (91) The only failure of the day seems to have been the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's coverage of the event. A television critic complained that the program did not give enough sense of the magnitude of the blast or of the enormous noise it made. (92)

The successful destruction of Ripple Rock was almost symbolic to the Department of Public Works. The live television and nation-wide press coverage of the event demonstrated to the country the Department's ability to overcome a difficult obstacle successfully. It is perhaps not surprising then that if the failures of the 1930s and 1940s were regarded as reflections on the Department's capabilities, the success of 1958 could also be noted by officials as proof of actual and potential capabilities with Public Works.

As the examples of the Trans-Canada Highway and Ripple Rock indicate, both the image and the efficiency of the Department had significantly improved by the end of the decade. Howard Green, the man who had so often criticized the operations of the Department in earlier years, was impelled to comment on it in a very different vein by the time he left in 1959:

My experience with the Department of Public Works has convinced me that it is an extremely efficient department,

trying to do a job for the Canadian people. . . . I would like to repeat again today my great admiration for the work done by my predecessor, the Hon. Robert Winters, and the deputy he took with him from his former department, Major General Hugh Young, who is still the deputy of the department. They with other officials have built up an excellent team spirit, and it has been one of the most pleasant jobs I have undertaken in my life to work with them in this department. (93)

Of course, a Minister in the process of leaving a department is naturally inclined to comment on achievements, but at this time Green did not have to praise Robert Winters or refer specifically to the work done before he himself became Minister. And if the occasion perhaps led to a bit too much praise for a department that still had very real faults, it must be remembered that a decade before it would have been impossible for anyone to make such a speech without raising cries of scorn. The very fact that Green would wax eloquent about the virtues of the Department was testimony to the improvements that had taken place in the space of a few years.

For all that had been accomplished, the reorganization of the 1950s had not enabled the Department to reach one of its main goals - primary responsibility for construction. St. Laurent had told Young in 1953 that one of the reasons for the intended changes was that the "lack of centralization of construction was not desirable and the Government hoped that it would soon be corrected". (94) It was this aspect of the Department more than any other that the Prime Minister decided should be changed.

Winters and Young had approached the retrieval of sole construction responsibility as a two-stage process. First, the Department would have to be made into an effective organization, capable of handling such a mandate. If the reputation for inefficiency persisted, it was unlikely that other departments would willingly turn their construction functions over to it. But if this initial task could be accomplished, it was felt the rest would be relatively easy. With an efficient Department of Public Works and official government support behind centralization, other departments would naturally relinquish their construction activities to the Department. Winters summed up his general approach in a speech to Parliament during the process of reorganization, stating: "What we in the Department of Public Works would like is to have the Department in that degree of good shape that would make other departments feel we can carry out their construction work to better advantage for them than they can themselves." (95) It was the principle of the market place applied to inter-departmental relations.

There was some progress in the area. Soon after Winters took over from Fournier, Public Works began a series of negotiations with External Affairs that eventually led once again into overseas construction. (96) In the Far North the Department became more and more involved in construction projects with Northern Affairs and National Resources. Partly this was a logical consequence of Winters' and Young's earlier connection with that Department. There was also some validity to the thesis that items would be turned over to Public Works as the Department gained in efficiency and prestige. Whatever the reason, Public Works was definitely playing a major role as the Government's construction agent in many areas throughout the

Northwest Territories by the late 1950s. (97) These and other examples indicate that the reorganization did lead to some regrouping of construction under the Department in the years that followed.

The changes, real though they were, fell far short of a comprehensive reorganization of government construction. Moreover, they did not provide Public Works with an exclusive mandate in this area. Winters and Young underestimated the tenacity of other departments in their efforts to retain their construction responsibilities. Many of the departments had carried out these responsibilities for years and quite naturally felt that there was no reason why they should lose the flexibility and independence inherent in their own view of construction requirements.

The division of opinion on the matter was determined more by portfolio than by party. A Minister of Public Works was likely to have different views on the question than, say, a Minister of Transport, whatever party he belonged to. This was clearly revealed in an exchange in Parliament in 1959. Maurice Bourget, former Parliamentary Assistant to Robert Winters, reflected the attitudes of his old position in pressing George Hees, Minister of Transport, on the size of the construction estimates for his department. Bourget wondered if the Conservative government had abandoned the policy supported by Winters and St. Laurent as to reorganization of government construction. Hees, however, commented on Winters' attitudes: "I think the Minister of Public Works feels that way now." (98) The point was that the Conservative policy had not changed. Rather, in the same way that Winters and Bourget had faced determined opposition within the Cabinet, so too Green had to convince Ministers with a different point of view. Hees summed up this attitude:

We are very happy to have public works build for us structures about which we think they have the most knowledge. In the construction of air terminal buildings, lighthouses, radar stations and other structures of that kind, we feel we know more about it than they do and we like to do it ourselves. (99)

The exchange was not over. When Bourget pressed the matter he found himself refuted by a member of his own party and a former Minister of Transport. Lionel Chevrier commented: "Why will the Minister not say the reason is that the Department of Transport wants to keep its own construction work, as perhaps it should." (100) In the 1920s and 1930s the Civil Service accepted Public Works as the construction agent of the Government and would have acquiesced to any policy to assure that it remained so. The Department had, however, allowed the responsibility to become diffused among several other government bodies. By the time it attempted to regain sole control for construction, it faced departments that for years had taken on such works and now saw their interests as seriously threatened by any change affecting the status quo. On this question, portfolio rather than party lines now determined attitudes. George Hees' final comment to Bourget was that Chevrier had "summed up the situation very well indeed". (101) Each administration after 1953 supported in principle the return of construction works to Public Works, but each administration equally found that conflicting interests and ideas caused delay and hesitation. By the end of the decade the dispersal of construction activities had perhaps been halted. It certainly had not been totally reversed. In 1958, for instance, Howard Green admitted that problems of

jurisdiction still existed. He could only hope that in the future they "will be remedied". (102) As is often the case, correcting the problem had proved a much more difficult task than its prevention would have been.

The problems of the Department of Public Works, including the question of control of government construction, were just few of many that confronted the public service by the 1950s. The existence of such problems was not surprising. The public service had undergone a massive transformation since the 1930s. The fluctuations and growth dating from the beginning of the Second World War continued in the postwar world. Complex new structures, the acceptance of new responsibilities and an annual expenditure many times larger than before the war made the Government a very different type of organization from the one it had once been. And a good many of the procedures followed were either new ones developed quickly as an ad hoc response to an immediate new problem, or old ones that were antiquated by the changes that had taken place. The numerous problems and procedures were all part of a large and interrelated structure. The nature and organization of the public service would have to be dealt with, eventually, in a comprehensive manner.

The pressure for such a comprehensive review had existed for several years by the later 1950s. As early as 1950, George Drew, the leader of the Conservative Opposition, had called for the formation of a Royal Commission to undertake an investigation of government organization. (103) Drew's suggestion became a recurring theme of the Conservatives and over the years gained wide acceptance from those interested in the question. When the Conservative Party assumed power in 1957 the whole question was as alive as ever, and it was naturally assumed that the long sought-after Royal Commission would soon be appointed. It did not come as quickly as had been expected but by 1960 the Royal Commission was an established fact. J. Grant Glassco as Chairman, Watson Sellar and F.E. Therrien were appointed a Royal Commission to investigate Government Organization. (104) It was to be the most comprehensive investigation of the structure of the public service ever undertaken in Canada. And the conclusions that the Commissioners reached were to have a tremendous impact on the public service, including the Department of Public Works.

Among its many tasks the Commission was to suggest steps that might be taken for "eliminating duplication and overlapping of services". Connected to this responsibility was also the search for means of "achieving efficiency or economy through reallocation or regrouping of units of the public service". (105) Whenever such terms as "efficiency", "duplication" and "reallocation" had come up previously about the public service, the role of the Department of Public Works had been a consideration. Given the situation in 1960, it was not surprising that once again it became an important part of the investigations of the Royal Commission.

To give the problems with which Public Works was involved adequate consideration, the Commission set up a task force under a former Chief Engineer of the Department, Jean Carrière. The task force spent a great deal of time investigating the procedures of the Department itself, and the conclusions reached reaffirmed what had been said so often in the past years. The loss to other departments of construction activities had to be reversed. The logic behind that conclusion was fairly straightforward even if the implications were not. First, the Commissioners worked from the premise that interdepartmental rivalries had to take second place to

efficiency. The Commissioners pointed out that the officials of a department, "are not departmental employees but members of a public service". (106) If necessary, they should be willing to give up certain areas or to accept some, if the overall structure of the Civil Service were to be improved. In this way a pooling of services could be developed, and, it was hoped, a benefit from a concentration of expertise. (107) Construction was one area in which such logic could most obviously be applied.

History, the Public Works Act, and the organization of the Department of Public Works itself led the Commission to move from the general principle to the decision that that Department was the most natural body to undertake the role of construction agent for the Government. At the time of the Commission's investigations it was clearly not fulfilling such a role. The Commission report pointed out that only one quarter of government construction was carried out under the Department's budget, another 15 per cent being handled by Public Works for other departments. (108) As others had before them, the Commissioners concluded that this should not be allowed to continue. Rather, Public Works should "be made responsible for the planning and supervision of all construction required by civil departments and agencies and the employment of all professional, technical and supporting staffs needed for such purposes". (109) The position taken by Winters, Green and dozens of departmental officials had been vindicated. An independent commission agreed that the Department of Public Works was in fact the proper body to undertake government construction. It was also, indirectly, a vindication in another way. Had the reputation and prestige of the Department been as low in 1960 as in 1953, it is extremely unlikely that the recommendation would have been made.

The Royal Commission did far more than support the belief that construction activities should be repatriated to the Department of Public Works. Beginning with a belief in efficiency and the realization that the "service" department was now justified by the size of the public service, the Commission went much further. The word "construction" had for a long time been considered by Public Works as the adjective that would best describe the Department. The Glassco Commission, with the suggestions of contemporary and former Public Works employees, realized that construction was only a subset of a more general field of activity. The new basic concept within which the Department was to be discussed was clearly revealed by the organization of the Glassco Report itself. In it, construction was one chapter of a larger section dealing with "Real Property". (110)

From the time that Hamilton Killaly had been sent to Kingston to prepare suitable accommodation for the Government, the question of maintenance and repair of buildings had been one of the activities of the Department of Public Works. As the Department began to construct buildings and the property holdings of the Government increased, these activities had grown in importance. The Department itself had never given much attention to the problem. At first such activities had been considered a minor part of subsidiary duty, a byproduct of construction at a time when railways and canals were the real basis for the existence of Public Works. After 1879, such activities had still been considered as only a byproduct of construction. The Commission, pointing to the fact that the "federal government currently manages an investment in real property having an estimated worth of \$4 billion", decided that the time had come to give the whole question of property management greater importance. (111) In the

future it would be necessary to consider construction, acquisition, management and disposal of property as interrelated subsets of a whole. And once again, the Commissioners considered the Department of Public Works the natural body to undertake such a responsibility.

As might be expected, the jurisdictional trends of real property management had emerged in a pattern similar to that of the construction function. The Commission pointed out that, except for such things as national parks and Crown lands, Public Works had originally been the body responsible for real property. With the division of departments and the dispersal of former activities of Public Works, the functional responsibility, which it had never considered important, had been dispersed: "Over the years, real property operations have been assumed by other departments and grown to the point where today Public Works carries out only forty per cent of new construction and controls only a fraction of floor space in existing buildings." (112) As it had with construction, the Commission concluded that "real property management, in all its phases, should become the responsibility of a single body, the Department of Public Works". (113) If this recommendation was taken seriously by the Government and the Department of Public Works, it could lay a basis for a redefinition of the Department's mandate.

The decision that the Department should become the real property agency for the Government led logically to two other recommendations on the part of the Commission. First, the departments that relied on Public Works should somehow bear the financial burden for buildings they wanted constructed. This question of allocation of cost had been around for some time. At least as far back as 1935, Liberal Member of Parliament, Alexander Young, had challenged the system that forced Public Works to provide services to other departments without the services being represented in the estimates of these departments:

We are told on every hand that the post office is an outstanding example of efficient government ownership of a public institution. Now we find that it does not stand on its own feet. It pays no rent, no taxes, nothing for janitor service, fuel, light, water, repairs or equipment. Then we are told it is a self-sustaining department. (114)

The Post Office Department was perhaps the most obvious case, but the principle could be applied to all government departments that benefited from the service of Public Works. If user-departments were charged for such items as those listed by Young, Parliament and the public would be better able to ascertain the real burden of these departments on the public purse. Also, from the point of view of Public Works, such a system would make it much easier to convince departments to request only what was necessary. From now on they would each have to go to Treasury Board and Parliament to justify such requests. It was with these factors in mind that the Commission recommended that "departments and agencies be charged for accommodation and real property services rendered them by the Department of Public Works". (115) The implementation of such a system would be a completely new type of accounting for the Government of Canada.

The Department of Public Works was thus, in the minds of the Commissioners, to become the body charged with providing real property services to other departments of the federal Government. The Department

would meet the requests of "client" departments after suitable discussion and planning. The client would then be charged for services rendered. In all this Public Works was clearly envisaged as a department designed to meet the needs of other departments. In the terminology of the Commission, it would be a service department. When one remembers that the Department had begun as an agent to provide transportation services to the public, the extent of its evolution, if the Glassco recommendations were accepted, becomes apparent.

It was further felt that if the Department was to develop its role as a real property manager into a coherent and rational mandate, then it would have to drop those activities that were not a part of this concept. The Royal Commission felt that those functions designed directly to serve the public "lie beyond the functions properly to be carried out by a common service agency and consideration must therefore be given to the transfer of responsibility for their administration to other departments and agencies". (116) Essentially the Commission was saying that if the Department was to take on a new role, it must cease to deal with the existing remnants of a much older one.

Such a decision could affect traditional activities of the Department such as dredging and construction of wharves and piers. In terms of size, these areas had ceased to be an important part of the departmental budget. Dredging operations, for instance, amounted to only a little over \$7 million in 1960. This was less than 4 per cent of the Department's total expenditure as compared to the 10 to 15 per cent dredging had taken in the later 1920s. (117) Nevertheless there was a long tradition of operational responsibility behind the Department in this area. To act solely as an agent for some other body constituted a major alteration of departmental practice.

Two things emerge from the Commission's discussion of the Department of Public Works. First, its recommendations and recognition of the wider aspects of property management were an extension of the concepts held by Winters and Young in the 1950s. The formation of the Property and Building Management Branch was, on a less comprehensive scale, an adaptation of the Department's structure designed to meet the growing demands imposed by the Government's real property assets. Second, the Commission's conclusions on the relation of Public Works to real property were much more than just a recommendation to reverse the dispersal of such activities. If real property had been an activity of Public Works before 1953, it had not been the subject of much serious thought. Construction was seen as the Department's mandate. The management requirements for constructed property or the fact that there was also a great deal of rental and purchased property did not alter that fact. Even the reorganization in 1953-55, which gave recognition to the problems of management, did not give it primacy. So, although the Commission's recommendations were based on both history and logic, they were revolutionary in their implications for the role of the Department.

Public Works as envisaged by the Glassco Commission was a very different department in terms of mandate and responsibilities than the one headed by Hamilton Killaly, Alexander Mackenzie or even Israel Tarte. These recommendations were to have an important impact over the next years and were the logical culmination of historical trends. Within the guidelines set by the Glassco Commission, the Department of Public Works continued its process of evolution, contributing towards the evolution of Canada itself.

CONCLUSION

It is appropriate that this history should end not on a note of finality but one of change. The term bureaucracy, in its pejorative sense, conjures up many images. One of the most common is that of an organization where things are done in a particular way for no other reason than because they have always been done that way. Another is of the individual whose efforts sink beneath the weight of the larger institution. In other words, the bureaucracy is often associated with numbing rigidity. Certainly this stereotype is not completely lacking in reality, and as the period after the Second World War indicates, Public Works was not exempt from this tendency to rigidity. The interesting thing, however, is not that the department has on occasion exhibited symptoms of rigidity but that the general historical trend is quite different.

First, the history of the Department of Public Works is one of continued flux and evolution. Numerous changes in departmental organization, mandate and procedures were a part of the process that transformed the Board of Works of the 1840s into the department dealt with by the Glassco Commission. Some of these changes were dramatic and obvious, as with the 1879 split and creation of Railways and Canals. More often, however, change took place through a number of smaller steps. Orders-in-Council, jurisdictional encroachments, political necessities and financial capabilities have kept the Department in a nearly continuous process of alteration throughout its history. Some of these changes were beneficial and others detrimental but all have to be recognized in order to understand the nature of the department. Nor does the history of Public Works reveal an organization where the individual has had little effect. On the contrary, men like Hamilton Killaly, Hector Langevin, Israel Tarte, and J.B. Hunter had a great deal of influence in shaping the character of the department. Personal drive, whether for the public good or selfish ends, has been a crucial factor in the historical evolution of the department and its efficiency at any given point in time.

These contradictions of the stereotype were not always welcome to either the department or the government of day. Not all the changes that took place served to improve the department nor were the actions of

powerful individuals always in the best public interest. The influence of change and of the individuals who headed the organization could be negative as well as positive. Nevertheless, if the history of the department is any indication, two things are certain for the Department of Public Works in the decades after the Glassco Commission. It will continue to evolve in the future and, even in the complex structure of modern bureaucracy, the men who run it will do much to determine its character. The foresight of these men and the rationality of that evolution will determine how well this Department responds to the needs of the public and government in the future.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1

1. W.J. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier 1534-1760 (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 59.
2. Harold A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), discusses in detail the connection between physical features and the fur trade.
3. G.M. Craig, Upper Canada: The Formative Years, 1784-1841 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963), p. 23.
4. G.P. de T. Glazebrook, A History of Transportation in Canada, Vol. 1 (Toronto: Ryerson, 1938), has a summary of roads built by this period.
5. See ibid., pp. 98-101, for the system used in New France. Glazebrook also provides the main source for this discussion of the original system of road construction.
6. Ibid., p. 110.
7. Lord Durham had some acute comments on this practice. See John G. Durham, Lord Durham's Report on the Affairs of British North America, edited by C.P. Lucas, Vol. 2: The Text of the Report (London: Clarendon Press, 1912), pp. 190-191.
8. W.S. MacNutt, New Brunswick: a History 1784-1867 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1963) p. 364.
9. Glazebrook, Transportation in Canada, Vol. 1, p. 121.
10. Donald Creighton, The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence 1760-1850, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1937), gives the best detailed study of the planned commercial system.
11. Glazebrook, Transportation in Canada, Vol. 1, p. 86.
12. Goldwin Smith, Canada and the Canadian Question (Toronto: 1891). Smith was an annexationist who argued that economic forces indicated that Canada's rightful place was as a part of the United States.
13. J.P. Merritt, Biography of the Hon. William Hamilton Merritt, M.P. (St. Catharines, 1875), p. 43.

14. H.G. Aitken, The Welland Canal Company: A Study in Canadian Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 41-42.
15. Ibid., Chapter 2.
16. Public Archives of Ontario, Merritt Papers, "Subscription List of Welland for 1826".
17. Aitken, Welland Canal Company, p. 86.
18. Ibid., p. 106.
19. Creighton, Commercial Empire, p. 271.
20. P.A.O., Merritt Papers, "Report to Sir Francis Bond Head 1837".
21. Ibid., "Report of the Directors of the Welland Canal Company for 1836".
22. Ibid., "Report to Sir Francis Bond Head 1837".
23. Merritt, Hon. William Hamilton Merritt, M.P., p. 196.
24. Ibid., p. 98.
25. Public Archives of Canada, C.O. 42., No. 131, Sir George Arthur to Lord Normandy, June 8, 1839.
26. Creighton, Commercial Empire, p. 210.
27. P.A.C., C.O. 42, No. 131, Durham to Glenelg, June 16, 1838.
28. Ibid., Durham to Glenelg, July 16, 1838.
29. Ibid.
30. Durham's Report, Vol. 2: "Test", p. 191.
31. P.A.C., C.O. 42, No. 131, Sir George Arthur to Lord Normandy, June 8, 1839.

NOTES

CHAPTER 2

1. My article "Management by Enthusiasm: the first Board of Works of the Province of Canada 1841-1846", in Ontario History, Vol. LXX, No. 3 (September, 1978), pp. 171-188, is drawn from this chapter.
2. P.A.O., Merritt Papers, R.B. Sullivan to Merritt, April 2, 1840.
3. British Parliamentary Papers (Colonies Canada) Vol. 16, (Shannon Ireland, 1970), Sydenham to Russell, February 2, 1841, p. 221.
4. Ibid., Bagot to Stanley, April 28, 1842.
5. Ibid., Thomson to Russell, May 20, 1840.
6. Ibid., Report of the Executive Council of Upper Canada, June 16, 1840.
7. Ibid., Arthur to Sydenham, June 30, 1840.
8. Ibid., Russell to Sydenham, May 3, 1841, p. 226.
9. Journals, Legislative Assembly of Canada, June 13, 1841, p. 7. (hereafter referred to as Journals).
10. St. Catharines Journal, July 1, 1841.
11. Ibid.
12. British Colonist, July 21, 1841.
13. Debates of the Legislative Assembly of Canada, Vol. 1, July 20, 1841, p. 362 (hereafter referred to as Debates).
14. British Colonist, August 4, 1841.
15. Ibid., August 4, 1841.
16. Sydenham to his brother, August 28, 1841. Cited in Mason Wade, The French Canadians, 1760-1945, Vol. 1 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1955), p. 228.
17. Statutes of Canada, 1841, 4&5 Vict. CAP. XXXVIII, pp. 265-74.
18. Cited in British Colonist, August 18, 1841.

19. Ibid.
20. Journals, 1841, App. CC.
21. British Colonist, September 1, 1841.
22. Ibid.
23. Debates., Vol. 1, 1841, September 1, 1841, p. 773.
24. St. Catharines Journal, September 16, 1841.
25. Debates., September 2, 1841, p. 781.
26. Ibid., September 2, 1841, pp. 783-84.
27. St. Catharines Journal, September 16, 1841.
28. Statutes of Canada, 1841, 4&5 Vict. CAP. XXXVIII, Clause VI.
29. Ibid., Clause VIII.
30. J.E. Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service: An Administrative History of the United Canadas, 1841-1867 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955).
31. Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service.
32. Ibid., p. 176.
33. Journals 1841, App. CC.
34. British Colonist, September 1, 1841.
35. Ibid., September 15, 1841.
36. Cited in ibid., September 22, 1841.
37. Ibid., March 2, 1842.
38. Ibid., October 6, 1841.
39. For the Baldwin argument, see Debates, Vol. 1, September 1, 1841.
40. Public Archives of Canada, Records of the Department of Public Works, Series II, Vol. 47, August 12, 1841. (The Records will henceforth be referred to as P.A.C., R.G. 11.)
41. Merritt, Hon. William Hamilton Merritt, p. 232.
42. Cited in British Colonist, February 2, 1842.

43. Merritt, Hon. William Hamilton Merritt, p. 165.
44. P.A.C., Merritt Papers, Killaly to Merritt, February 1839.
45. Ibid., Killaly to Merritt, April 26, 1841.
46. See, for instance, ibid., Killaly to Merritt, January 12, 1843; Merritt to Killaly, January 18, 1843.
47. Ibid., Killaly to Merritt, November 30, 1842.
48. Aitken, Welland Canal Company, p. 119.
49. P.A.O., Merritt Papers, P.H.V. Harnot to Merritt, October 11, 1841.
50. Ludwik Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubowski and W.E. Greening, Sir Casimir Stanislaus Gzowski: A Biography (Toronto: Burns and MacEachern, 1959), p. 27, state that it was Bagot who obtained Gzowski his position. I have, however, been unable to confirm this.
51. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 292, June 1846.
52. British Colonist, September 1, 1841.
53. Cited in ibid., August 18, 1841.
54. Ibid., January 12, 1842.
55. London Inquirer, March 23, 1842.
56. British Colonist, March 23, 1842.
57. Ibid., September 14, 1842.
58. Ibid., September 28, 1842.
59. Ibid., October 12, 1842.
60. Ibid., October 19, 1842.
61. Ibid., October 10, 1842.
62. Ibid., October 19, 1842.
63. Ibid., September 14, 1842.
64. Cited in ibid., February 1, 1843.
65. Cited in ibid., November 9, 1842.
66. Kingston Chronicle, September 27, 1843.

67. Ibid., December 18, 1843.
68. British Colonist, December 28, 1842.
69. Kingston Chronicle, January 27, 1844.
70. Ibid., September 16, 1843.
71. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 41, Report of September 27, 1843.
72. Cited in Kingston Chronicle, November 15, 1843.
73. Ibid., December 23, 1843.
74. Ibid.
75. British Colonist., August 31, 1842.
76. P.A.C., Merritt Papers, Merritt to Charles Bagot, August 17, 1842.
77. British Colonist, August 31, 1842.
78. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 41, Report of September 27, 1843.
79. Ibid.
80. Montreal Herald, June 14, 1843.
81. This account of events comes mainly from the testimony of Walter Desautels before the coroner's jury investigation of the riots. Reprinted in the Kingston Chronicle, June 21, 1843.
82. Montreal Herald, June 14, 1843.
83. Ibid., June 16, 1843.
84. Ibid., July 19, 1843.
85. For sources on these incidents, see the Kingston Chronicle, November 22, 1843; and March 13, 1844, for reports of trouble on the Welland. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 47, April 22, 1844, gives the Board's reply in one instance. The Journals, 1845, App. Y, gives an official account of the raid on the Lachine Canal. H.C. Pentland, "The Lachine Strike of 1843", Canadian Historical Review, September, 1948, pp. 255-77, gives a good account of the disturbances on the Lachine earlier in the year.
86. British Colonist, February 25, 1845.
87. Statutes of Canada, 1845.
88. Kingston Chronicle, June 7, 1844.

89. British Colonist, June 14, 1844.
90. Kingston Chronicle, October 7, 1843.
91. See, for instance, the British Colonist, April 2, 1844.
92. Merritt, William Hamilton Merritt, pp. 273 and 280.
93. British Colonist, January 14, 1845.
94. Ibid., February 4, 1845.
95. P.A.C., Merritt Papers, Robinson to Merritt, January 20, 1846, indicates the former's displeasure with the activities of the Board.
96. British Colonist, March 4, 1845.
97. P.A.C., Merritt Papers, Killaly to Merritt, December 21, 1845.
98. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 41, July 26, 1845.
99. Ibid., Vol. 47, July 30, 1845.
100. Annual Report of Board of Works, 1843, p. 14.
101. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 41, August 8, 1843.
102. Ibid., Vol. 47, July 30, 1845.
103. P.A.C., Merritt Papers, Merritt to Killaly, June 7, 1844.
104. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 37, February 4, 1845.
105. British Colonist, December 5, 1845.
106. Ibid., December 12, 1845.
107. Ibid., December 5, 1845, with the announcement of the Government's intention that brought the issue before the public. See British Colonist of December 5, 9, 12 and 23, 1845.
108. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 47, October 20 and 22, 1845.
109. P.A.C., State Book E, November 6, 1845.
110. Ibid., December 31, 1845.
111. "The First Report of the Commission of Inquiry," p. 4, contained in P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 492.
112. Annual Report of the Board of Works, 1846, p. 14.

113. "The First Report of the Commission of Inquiry," p. 4.
114. Ibid., p. 9.
115. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 46, December 5, 1845.
116. "First Report of the Commission of Inquiry," p. 7.
117. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 41, July 15, 1845.
118. See Ibid., Vol. 41 to obtain an idea of the frequency of Board meetings.
119. B.P.P., Vol. 16, Bagot to Stanley, January 18, 1843, pp. 278-312.
120. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 41, February 7, 1846.
121. Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service, pp. 80-86, discusses the nature of the early Executive.
122. P.A.C., Merritt Papers, T.C. Keefer to Merritt, August 9, 1844.
123. Ibid., Killaly to Merritt, April 10, 1846.
124. British Colonist, April 10, 1846.

NOTES

CHAPTER 3

1. Cathcart to Gladstone, January 28, 1846. Reprinted in the Montreal Gazette, June 25, 1846.
2. Creighton, Commercial Empire, p. 368.
3. British Colonist, September 8, 1846.
4. Cathcart to Gladstone, January 28, 1846. Reprinted in the Montreal Gazette, June 25, 1846.
5. Statutes of Canada, 1846, 9 Vict. CAP XXXVIII.
6. Ibid., Clause II.
7. Statutes of Canada, 1847, 10-11 Vict. CAP XXIV.
8. Ibid., 1846, 9 Vict. CAP XXXVIII, Section VII.
9. Ibid., Section XV.
10. Toronto Globe, June 16, 1847, reporting a speech by Baldwin in the Assembly on June 12.
11. British Colonist, June 19, 1846. Moderate in politics and a supporter of the Government, the paper nevertheless expressed this fear.
12. Toronto Examiner, June 17, 1846.
13. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 292, June 8, 1846.
14. Ibid., June 8, 1846.
15. Ibid., April 21, 1847.
16. Toronto Examiner, June 17, 1846.
17. British Colonist, July 3, 1846.
18. Ibid., September 25, 1846.
19. Creighton, Commercial Empire, pp. 362-63.
20. Montreal Gazette, December 2, 1846.

21. Annual Report, 1847.
22. Toronto Examiner, June 9, 1847.
23. G.N. Tucker, The Canadian Commercial Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936), pp. 48-64.
24. Toronto Examiner, May 6, 1846.
25. Ibid., May 6, 1846.
26. Montreal Gazette, January 19, 1849.
27. Grey to Elgin, July 6, 1849. Reprinted in the Toronto Globe, August 7, 1849.
28. Toronto Examiner, May 20, 1846.
29. Tucker, Canadian Commercial Revolution, p. 112.
30. Toronto Globe, February 20, 1847.
31. Cited in the Toronto Examiner, September 30, 1846.
32. Toronto Globe, December 6, 1848.
33. Ibid., January 2, 1847.
34. Toronto Examiner, July 25, 1849.
35. P.A.C., Merritt Papers, Merritt to John Strachan, April 9, 1850.
36. Tucker, Canadian Commercial Revolution, p. 157.
37. Toronto Globe, June 23, 1847.
38. Ibid., August 18, 1847.
39. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 292, June 9, 1847.
40. Journals, June 7, 1847, pp. 7-8.
41. Toronto Globe, January 8, 1848.
42. Toronto Examiner, March 23, 1848.
43. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 292, January 24, 1847.
44. Journals, 1847, App. SS.
45. Creighton, Commercial Empire, p. 368.

46. Toronto Globe, December 22, 1849.
47. Annual Report, 1847.
48. Tucker, Canadian Commercial Revolution, p. 78.
49. Toronto Globe, July 8, 1848.
50. Tucker, Canadian Commercial Revolution, p. 82.
51. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 292, March and April 1848, have several replies of this nature.
52. Toronto Globe, July 8, 1848.
53. Montreal Gazette, March 29, 1848.
54. Toronto Globe, July 5, 10 and 28, 1849.
55. Ibid., December 4, 1849.
56. Toronto Examiner, December 26, 1849.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., December 19, 1849.
59. Journals, 1850, App. N. Testimony of July 31.
60. Toronto Examiner, March 3, 1847.
61. Ibid., March 17, 1847. See also the Patriot, February 19, 1847.
62. Ibid., March 24, 1847.
63. Toronto Globe, July 10, 1847.
64. Toronto Examiner, October 31, 1849.
65. P.A.O., Toronto City Council Papers, Cameron to George Gurnett, November 5, 1849.
66. Toronto Globe, November 17, 1849.
67. Ibid., July 18, 1850.
68. British Colonist, August 15, 1850.
69. Toronto Globe, August 22, 1850.
70. Ibid., October 17, 1850.

71. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 293, April 10, 1851.
72. Ibid., November 29, 1852.
73. Ibid., February 6, 1852.
74. Toronto Globe, October 17, 1850.
75. This exchange was reprinted in Montreal Gazette, June 21, 1848.
76. Toronto Globe, July 19, 1848.
77. St. Catharines Journal, October 5, 1848.
78. Toronto Globe, January 31, 1849.
79. St. Catharines Journal, January 4, 1849.
80. Ibid., December 21, 1848.
81. P.A.C., Merritt Papers, Killaly to Merritt, July 12, 1849.
82. Ibid., Taché to Merritt, August 1, 1849.
83. Ibid., Killaly to Merritt, March 9, 1848.
84. St. Catharines Journal, May 10, 1849.
85. Public Archives of Canada, Killaly Notebook. See Killaly to Keefer, December 20, 1848; March 16, 1849; April 17, 1849.
86. P.A.O., Merritt Papers, Killaly to Merritt, April 23, 1850.
87. P.A.C., Killaly Notebook, Killaly to Keefer, April 17, 1849.
88. P.A.C., Merritt Papers, Merritt to Strachan, April 9, 1850.
89. Montreal Gazette, October 19, 1847.
90. St. Catharines Journal, April 18, 1850.
91. P.A.O., Merritt Papers, Killaly to Merritt, February 16, 23, and March 1, 1850.
92. Ibid., Killaly to Merritt, July 6, 1850.
93. Tucker, Canadian Commercial Revolution, p. 82.
94. Toronto Globe, May 30, 1850.
95. St. Catharines Journal, June 6, 1850.

96. This account taken from Toronto Globe, June 8 and 11, 1850, and St. Catharines Journal, June 13, 1850.
97. Papineau's speech against the canal construction is given in the Toronto Globe, January 31, 1849. Jacques Monet, "The 1840s" in J.M.S. Careless, ed., Colonists and Canadiens 1760-1876 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 200-25, discusses the new commercial spirit that developed among French-Canadians in the 1840s.
98. St. Catharines Journal, June 13, 1850.
99. P.A.O., Merritt Papers, Killaly to Merritt, April 1, 1850.
100. Toronto Globe, July 30, 1850.
101. Journals, 1850, App. N.
102. Toronto Globe, December 24, 1850.
103. Ibid., February 27, 1851.
104. St. Catharines Journal, February 27, 1851.
105. Ibid., February 27, 1851.
106. G. Stevens, Canadian National Railways, Vol. I (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1960).
107. Tucker, Canadian Commercial Revolution, p. 85.
108. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 292, August 26, 1847.
109. Ibid., Vol. 293, September 18, 1852.
110. Ibid., Vol. 293, October 13, 1853.
111. Ibid.
112. From Annual Reports of 1846 and 1857. These figures are approximations only.
113. For debate on the subject, see Montreal Gazette, March and April 1848.
114. Ibid., July 26, 1849.
115. Ibid., July 28, 1849.
116. P.A.C., Buchanan Papers, Memorandum from Merritt to Chabot, October 20, 1852.
117. Toronto Globe, November 7, 1850.

118. St. Catharines Journal, November 4, 1852, gives Killaly's opinion; Merritt, Hon. William Hamilton Merritt, p. 373, tells of Merritt's support.
119. Annual Report, 1846, p. 1. Statement quoted and reaffirmed in 1847 Report.
120. J.M.S. Careless, The Union of the Canadas: The Growth of Canadian Institutions 1841-1857 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967), pp. 123-27, describes the riots of April 1849.
121. Annual Report, 1857, p. 41.
122. See for instance, P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 293, July 24 and August 19, 1855.
123. Ibid., Vol. 497, January 23, 1857.
124. Toronto Globe, March 14, 1850.
125. Journals, August 10, 1850, p. 285.
126. Toronto Globe, February 13, 1851.
127. See Journals, 1857, App. 2.
128. S. McKee, Jr., "Traffic of the Middle West", Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1940, pp. 26-53, p. 34.
129. Province of Canada, Journals of the Legislative Assembly, 1857, Appendix 17. See also on the development of expansionism generally, D.R. Owrn, "The Great North West: The Canadian Expansionist Movement and the Idea of the West in the Nineteenth Century", Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1976.
130. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 497, July 9, 1857.
131. Journals, 1859, App. 36. Also, for an account of the Hind expedition, see Henry Youle Hind, Narrative of the Canadian Red River Exploring Expedition of 1857 and of the Assiniboine and Saskatchewan Exploring Expedition of 1858 (1860; reprint ed., Hurtig: Edmonton, 1971).
132. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 293, July 8, 1856.
133. Annual Report, 1859.
134. Journals, 1857, App. 5.
135. Ibid.

NOTES

CHAPTER 4

1. P.A.C., State Book E, April 1846.
2. Ibid., May 25, 1846.
3. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 292, March 3, 1846.
4. See, for instance, ibid., Vol. 293, July 25, 1855.
5. Journals, 1850, App. B.B.
6. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 292, June 30, 1847.
7. Ibid., October 7, 1846.
8. Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service, p. viii.
9. See Careless, Union of the Canadas, pp. 75-95, on the Metcalfe controversy.
10. P.A.C., Killaly Notebook, Killaly to Smith, April 18, 1849.
11. Toronto Examiner, March 23, 1848.
12. Toronto Globe, March 25, 1848.
13. St. Catharines Journal, March 30, 1848.
14. D.C. Masters, "T.C. Keefer and the Development of Canadian Transportation", Canadian Historical Association Annual Report 1940, pp. 36-44, p. 36, says Keefer was dismissed "as a result of the change of Government in Canada". No other source has been found to prove or disprove this.
15. Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service, p. 46.
16. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 280, November 15, 1851.
17. See ibid., Vol. 287, December 13, 1858; Vol. 275, August 21, 1851.
18. Statutes of Canada 1857, 20 Vict. CAP XXXIV.
19. Cited in British Colonist, July 7, 1846.

20. Journals, 1847, App. S.S.
21. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 292, February 11, 1847.
22. Annual Report, 1846, p. 18.
23. Toronto Globe, September 8, 1849.
24. Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service, p. 63.
25. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 26, March 26, 1858.
26. Langton to his brother, November 9, 1856. Cited in Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service, p. 103.
27. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 497, April 1858.
28. Statutes of Canada, 1857, 20 Vict. CAP XXIV, Clause VII.
29. Ibid., Clause VIII.
30. P.A.C., State Book T, October 29, 1858.
31. P.A.C., Merritt Papers, Killaly to Merritt, December 11, 1858.
32. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 497, July 7, 1859.
33. P.A.C., State Book T, October 29, 1858.
34. Statutes of Canada 1859, 22 Vict. CAP III.
35. Ibid., Clause VII.
36. P.A.C., State Book U, May 6, 1859.
37. Journals, 1850, App. B.B.
38. P.A.C., State Book J, June 6, 1849.
39. Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service, pp. 90-105, discusses the need for and growth of such controls.
40. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 458, June 10, 1864.
41. Ibid., Vol. 459, August 1, 1864.
42. See ibid., Macdonald to Chapais, September 26, 1864; enclosure from George Brown, April 3, 1864.
43. Ibid., A. Walsh to Chapais, December 15, 1864.
44. P.A.C., R.G. 11, E. 7, Vol. 59a.

45. Journals, May 6, 1861.
46. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series II, Vol. 497, April 1858.
47. Canada Sessional Papers, No. 3, 1863, "Commission of Inquiry into the Parliament Buildings."
48. Ibid., Examination of Thomas Fuller, August 12, 1862.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service, p. 199.
53. P.A.C., State Book Z, March 17, 1864.
54. Ibid., March 9 and 15, 1864.

NOTES

CHAPTER 5

1. Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the Confederation of the British North American Provinces, (Quebec, 1865), February 7, 1865, p. 64, (hereafter cited as Confederation Debates).
2. Ibid., February 20, 1865, p. 354. Speech of Henri-Gustave Joly.
3. Donald Creighton, British North America at Confederation (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1963), provides the source for the statistics used in this description.
4. J.H. Perry, Taxes, Tariffs and Subsidies: A History of Canadian Fiscal Development (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955), Vol. 1, p. 20.
5. Creighton, British North America at Confederation, p. 24.
6. Ibid., p. 25.
7. Halifax Morning Chronicle, July 1, 1867.
8. Annual Report, 1867, App. 70, pp. 558-59.
9. Ibid., pp. 554-55.
10. Creighton, British North America at Confederation, p. 67.
11. Perry, Taxes, Tariffs and Subsidies, Vol. 1, p. 38.
12. Creighton, British North America at Confederation, p. 76.
13. Perry, Taxes, Tariffs and Subsidies, Vol. 1, p. 38.
14. W.L. Morton, The Critical Years: The Union of British North America 1857-1873 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964), p. 21.
15. Confederation Debates, February 3, 1865, p. 5.
16. Ibid., February 23, 1865, p. 430.
17. Ibid., February 7, 1865, p. 63.
18. Annual Report 1867, p. 4.

19. Ibid., p. 11.
20. Ibid., figures summarized from App. 70.
21. British North America Act, Schedule 3.
22. Confederation Debates, February 6, 1865, p. 40.
23. Statutes of Canada, 1867, 31 Vict. Cap. 12.
24. Ibid., Clause 12.
25. Orders-in-Council, February 28, 1870.
26. Statutes of Canada 1867, 31 Vict. Cap. 12, Clause 14.
27. Ibid., Clause 15.
28. Annual Report 1867, p. 5.
29. British North America Act, Section 145.
30. Stevens, Canadian National Railways, Vol. 1, pp. 172-74.
31. Confederation Debates, February 8, 1865, pp. 107-08.
32. Ibid., March 10, 1865, p. 901.
33. Stevens, Canadian National Railways, Vol. 1, pp. 184-85.
34. Buckingham to Monck, October 17, 1863. Cited in Sandford Fleming, The Intercolonial (Montreal, 1876), p. 66.
35. L.J. Burpee, Sandford Fleming: Empire Builder (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1915).
36. Stevens, Canadian National Railways, Vol. 1, p. 186.
37. Fleming, The Intercolonial, p. 68.
38. Fleming, The Intercolonial, pp. 70-72.
39. Ibid., p. 76.
40. Public Archives of Canada, Fleming Papers (Diaries), July 13, 1867.
41. Statutes of Canada 1867, 31 Vict. Cap. 13, pp. 177-83.
42. Ibid., Clause 5.
43. Ibid., Clause 4.

44. Debates, 1st Parliament, 1st Session, April 15, 1868, p. 494.
45. P.A.C., Fleming Papers (Diaries), July 3, 1868.
46. Canada Sessional Papers 1869, No. 5, I.G. Elliot to John Rose, July 22, 1868.
47. P.A.C., Fleming Papers (Diaries), August 31, 1868; September 3, 1868.
48. Fleming, Intercolonial, p. 97.
49. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 732, Fleming to John Rose, July 6, 1868.
50. Ibid., Fleming to Peter Mitchell, September 27, 1867.
51. Fleming, Intercolonial, pp. 100-04.
52. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 732, Fleming to Macdonald, January 27, 1869.
53. Ibid., January 26, 1869.
54. Burpee, Sandford Fleming, p. 97.
55. Fleming, The Intercolonial, p. 98.
56. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 732, Fleming to Ross, September 17, 1869.
57. Ibid., Vol. 733, Fleming to Jones, May 31, 1873.
58. This is the final figure given by Stevens, Canadian National Railways, Vol. 1, p. 173, and by Fleming, The Intercolonial, p. 234, but there was some minor drainage and other work left.
59. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 732, Fleming to T.C. Clarke, August 5, 1869.
60. Orders-in-Council, July 7, 1870.
61. Sandford Fleming, The Intercolonial, pp. 99-100.
62. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 732, Fleming to Langevin, January 18, 1871.
63. Orders-in-Council, December 28, 1870.
64. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 733, December 18, 1873.
65. Debates, 1st Parliament, 1st Session, December 17, 1867, pp. 304-05.

66. Sanford Fleming, The Intercolonial, p. 234.
67. Ibid., p. 239.
68. British Colonist, December 4, 1867.
69. A.C. Gluek, Minnesota and the Manifest Destiny of the Canadian Northwest: A Study in Canadian-American Relations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965) is the best study of the pull that the United States exerted on the Northwest.
70. Orders-in-Council, May 29, 1868.
71. Norman Shrive, Charles Mair: Literary Nationalist (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), pp. 52-82.
72. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 117, Dawson to McDougall, April 13, 1868.
73. Orders-in-Council, May 29, 1868.
74. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 117, July 21, 1868.
75. Orders-in-Council, September 18, 1868.
76. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 122, November 11, 1873.
77. Ibid., Vol. 117, January 12, 1869.
78. Ibid., Vol. 117, October 6, 1869.
79. A.J. Russell, The Red River Country, Hudson's Bay and the Northwest Territories Considered in Relation to Canada (Montreal, 1870), has Dawson's 1869 Report reprinted in it.
80. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 117, December 1, 1869.
81. Orders-in-Council, April 6, 1870.
82. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 117, December 18, 1869.
83. Ibid., Vol. 118, June 2, 1870. On the problems of transport and the difficulties of the trip from a soldier's perspective, see Captain G.L. Hayshe, The Red River Expedition (London, 1871).
84. Ibid., June 2, 1870.
85. Orders-in-Council, June 7, 1870.
86. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 118, June 29, 1870.
87. Ibid., Vol. 119, October 11, 1870.

88. Ibid., Vol. 119, January 12, 1871.
89. Ibid., Vol. 119, April 12, 1871.
90. Ibid., Vol. 120, June 7, 1871.
91. Ibid., August 19, 1871.
92. Ibid., March 6, 1872.
93. Ibid., August 19, 1871.
94. George M. Grant, Ocean to Ocean (Toronto, 1873), p. 64.
95. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 120, September 12, 1871.
96. Orders-in-Council, January 28, 1873.
97. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 121, July 1, 1872.
98. For a copy of the advertisement, see ibid., May 31, 1872, or any of several newspapers of the period.
99. Ibid., Vol. 122, February 13, 1873.
100. Debates, 3rd Parliament, 3rd Session, March 6, 1876, pp. 455-60.
101. Grant, Ocean to Ocean, p. 65.
102. P.A.C., Mackenzie Papers (Letterbooks), Mackenzie to A. Morris, June 12, 1874.
103. Stevens, Canadian National Railways, Vol. 1, pp. 223-34.
104. Margaret Ormsby, British Columbia: A History (Vancouver, 1958), pp. 187-88.
105. Musgrave to Crease, August 8, 1870. Cited in M. Ormsby, British Columbia, p. 248.
106. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 732, Fleming to A.L. Light, May 17, 1871.

NOTES

CHAPTER 6

1. Debates, 1st Parliament, 3rd Session, March 23, 1870, p. 674.
2. Ibid., p. 680.
3. Ibid., p. 687.
4. Ibid., p. 683.
5. Ibid., p. 682.
6. Creighton, British North America at Confederation, p. 14.
7. P.A.C., Buchanan Papers, Vol. 107, has a copy of the questions mailed out to such individuals.
8. Debates, 1st Parliament, 3rd Session, March 23, 1870, p. 681.
9. Confederation Debates, February 23, 1865, p. 430.
10. Canada Sessional Papers 1871, No. 54, "Report of the Commission on Canals".
11. Ibid., p. 29.
12. Ibid., p. 26.
13. Ibid., "Supplementary Return".
14. Orders-in-Council, July 23, 1870.
15. Annual Report, 1873, reprints a report by John Page dated December 10 of that year on events to date surrounding the project, and provides the basis for these comments.
16. Ibid., p. 15.
17. Ibid., p. 17.
18. Debates, 1st Parliament, 5th Session, April 11, 1872, p. 5.
19. Ibid., Speech of Isaac Burpee, May 17, 1872, p. 654.
20. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, Langevin to Macdonald, December 5, 1872.

21. Debates, 3rd Parliament, 2nd Session, March 2, 1875, p. 436.
22. Ibid., p. 444.
23. Ibid., 4th Session, 3rd Parliament, Speech from the Throne, February 8, 1877, p. 3.
24. Orders-in-Council, August 9, 1870.
25. Debates, 1st Parliament, 5th Session, April 11, 1872, p. 5.
26. Ibid., June 4, 1872, pp. 978-87.
27. Ibid., March 30, 1875, p. 987.
28. Q.U.L., Mackenzie Papers, Mackenzie to Brown, June 7, 1874.
29. Ibid., Brown to Mackenzie, June 11, 1874.
30. Debates, 3rd Parliament, 3rd Session, February 23, 1876, p. 214.
31. Canada Sessional Papers 1879, No. 30.
32. Annual Reports, 1866, 1873.
33. Orders-in-Council, June 30, 1871.
34. Ibid.
35. Debates, 1st Parliament, 1st Session, May 14, 1868, p. 705.
36. Orders-in-Council, February 15, 1872.
37. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 526 for 1870 list, Vol. 443 for 1875 list.
38. Ibid., Vol. 732, Fleming to A.L. Light, November 6, 1869.
39. Ibid., Fleming to the Commissioners, August 9, 1870.
40. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, Macdonald to Fleming, January 19, 1870.
41. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 732, Fleming to Macdonald, January 25, 1870.
42. A. Wilson, "Fleming and Tupper: The Fall of the Siamese Twins", pages 99-127 in J.S. Moir, ed., Character and Circumstance; Essays in Honour of D.G. Creighton (Toronto: MacMillan, 1970), indicates specifically the close relations between Tupper and Fleming, although his comment that the relations between Fleming and Macdonald were "never cordial" must, I feel, be modified to at least say that each accorded the other a good deal of respect.

43. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 733, Fleming to Walsh, March 8, 1872.
44. Journals of House of Commons, Appendix, "Report of the Select Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Present Condition of the Civil Service", p. 68, has Fleming's testimony on C.P.R. staffing.
45. J.E. Hodgetts, The Canadian Public Service: A Physiology of Government, 1867-1970 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), p. 19.
46. Andr  e D  silets, Hector-Louis Langevin: Un p  re de la Conf  d  ration Canadienne 1820-1906 (Qu  bec: Presses de l'Universit   Laval, 1969), gives these background details.
47. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, Macdonald to Trudeau, November 29, 1872.
48. A good example of this is in Debates, 4th Parliament, 1st Session, April 16, 1879, pp. 1244-46.
49. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 9, September 11, 1871.
50. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, Macdonald to S.A. MacVicar, October 5, 1871.
51. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 9, November 4, 1871.
52. Debates, 1st Parliament, 5th Session, June 4, 1872, pp. 878-980.
53. Canada Sessional Papers 1871, No. 54, p. 23.
54. Orders-in-Council, August 9, 1870.
55. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 9, May 4, 1872.
56. Ibid., Vol. 11, December 12, 1872.
57. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, Gzowski to Macdonald, November 16, 1872.
58. Ibid., Langevin to Macdonald, December 5, 1872.
59. Ibid., Langevin to Macdonald, December 19, 1872. Also P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 11, Gzowski to Langevin, January 10, 1873.
60. Montreal Gazette, February 8, 1873.
61. During the investigations of the Commission a lively public debate was carried on in the Toronto Mail in the first part of February 1873.
62. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 11, February 14, 1873.
63. Ibid., March 15, 1873.
64. General Report of the Minister of Public Works 1867-1882, p. 1063.

65. The map consulted was Lincoln and Welland by G.R. and G.M. Tremaine, in the Public Archives of Canada.
66. Montreal Gazette, February 8, 1873.
67. Pierre Berton, The National Dream: The Great Railway, 1871-1881 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), pp. 60-134, discusses the Pacific Scandal in some detail.
68. P.A.C., Brown Papers, Mackenzie to Brown, November 13, 1873.
69. Dale C. Thomson, Alexander Mackenzie: Clear Grit (Toronto: Macmillan, 1960).
70. P.A.C., Mackenzie Papers, Mackenzie to Mary Thompson, December 7, 1873.
71. Ibid.
72. Debates, 1st Session, 1st Parliament, April 15, 1868, p. 484.
73. P.A.C., Brown Papers, Mackenzie to Brown, November 13, 1873.
74. See Debates, 1st Parliament, 1st Session, May 14, 1868, p. 703; 1st Parliament, 3rd Session, February 28, 1870, p. 188.
75. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series III, Vol. 118, Trudeau to Dawson, May 31, 1870.
76. Ibid., Vol. 122, February 4, 1874.
77. Q.U.L., Mackenzie Papers, Dufferin to Mackenzie, January 3, 1874.
78. Ibid., Mackenzie to Black, November 10, 1873.
79. P.A.C., Mackenzie Papers, Mackenzie to Mary Thompson, December 7, 1873.
80. Ibid., Jones to Mackenzie, May 13, 1876.
81. Ibid. (Letterbooks), Mackenzie to A. Thompson, March 11, 1874.
82. Ibid., Mackenzie to A.G. Forbes, June 29, 1874.
83. Ibid., Mackenzie to B. Devlin, May 17, 1875.
84. Ibid., Mackenzie to Cameron, July 25, 1874.
85. Ibid., Mackenzie to Jones, November 18, 1874.
86. Ibid., Mackenzie to Trudeau (undated) 1876.
87. Ibid., Trudeau to Mackenzie, November 24, 1876.

88. Ibid., Mackenzie to Buckingham, July 5, 1876.
89. Berton, National Dream, pp. 147-48, and Thomson, Alexander Mackenzie, p. 219, imply respectively that Mackenzie was guilty and innocent of the charges.
90. P.A.C. Mackenzie Papers (Letterbooks), Mackenzie to Workman, October 15, 1875.
91. Ibid.
92. P.A.C., Brown Papers, Mackenzie to Brown, November 17, 1873.
93. Debates, 3rd Parliament, 4th Session, February 16, 1877, p. 91.
94. Ibid., April 17, 1877, p. 1545.
95. P.A.C., Mackenzie Papers (Letterbooks), Mackenzie to Cameron, July 8, 1874.
96. Ibid. (Letterbooks), Mackenzie to Cameron, July 14, 1874.
97. Hodgetts, Canadian Public Service, pp. 48-51.
98. P.A.C., Mackenzie Papers (Letterbooks), Buckingham to Bodwell, October 27, 1874.
99. Ibid. (Letterbooks), Mackenzie to Bodwell, June 24, 1874.
100. Statutes of Canada 1874, 37 Vict. Cap. 15, p. 115. Assented to May 26, 1874.
101. For instance, P.A.C., Mackenzie Papers, Mackenzie to Brydges, December 21, 1877.
102. P.A.C., Fleming Papers (Letterbooks), Fleming to Langevin, July 27, 1874.
103. Ibid. (Letterbooks), Fleming to F. Braun, March 25, 1872.
104. Berton, National Dream, and Thomson, Alexander Mackenzie, discuss these issues and events in some detail.
105. Sandford Fleming, Report on the Canadian Pacific Railway (Ottawa, 1877), p. 1.
106. P.A.C., Mackenzie Papers (Letterbooks), Mackenzie to Fleming, January 4, 1875.
107. Ibid. (Letterbooks), Mackenzie to Holton, October 13, 1876.
108. Ibid., Jones to Mackenzie, May 25, 1877.

109. Q.U.L., Mackenzie Papers, Holton to Mackenzie, February 21, 1874. Also, ibid., Dorion to Mackenzie, June 10, 1874.
110. Ibid., Holton to Mackenzie, February 21, 1874.
111. P.A.C., Brown Papers, Jones to Mackenzie, December 2, 1878.
112. Ibid., C.H. Pelletier to Mackenzie, December 14, 1878.
113. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, note on back of letter from Wilson to De Cosmos, April 8, 1880.
114. Ibid., Tupper to Macdonald, October 10, 1878.
115. Ibid., Brydges to Macdonald, January 25, 1879.
116. P.A.C., Mackenzie Papers (Letterbooks), Mackenzie to Burpee, August 12, 1876; Mackenzie to Brydges, December 21, 1877; A. Smith to Mackenzie, September 13, 1876.
117. Annual Report, 1879.
118. Canada Sessional Papers 1879, No. 43, pp. 126-36.
119. Debates, 4th Parliament, 1st Session, February 13, 1879, p. 5.
120. Ibid., February 17, 1879, p. 10.
121. Ibid., April 15, 1879, pp. 1241-42.
122. Hodgetts, Canadian Public Service, p. 49.
123. Debates, 4th Parliament, 1st Session, April 15, 1879, p. 1243.
124. Orders-in-Council, May 20, 1879.
125. Ibid., October 1, 1879.

NOTES

CHAPTER 7

1. Statutes of Canada, 1879, 42 Vict., CAP. 7, Clause 5.
2. Orders-in-Council, October 1, 1879.
3. Annual Reports, 1878, 1879.
4. Orders-in-Council, October 1, 1879.
5. Debates, 4th Parl't., 2nd Session, February 24, 1880, p. 182.
6. Ibid.
7. Annual Report, 1880, sets out the major responsibilities of the Department.
8. J. Spelt, The Urban Development of South-Central Ontario (Assen: Netherlands, 1955), discusses the growth of Toronto and the area in some detail.
9. See Debates, 4th Parl't., 2nd Session, March 3, 1880, p. 380.
10. Canada Sessional Papers, 1882, No. 144.
11. Annual Report, 1882, p. xxxv; 1884, p. xcvi.
12. Margaret Ormsby, British Columbia: A History (Vancouver: Macmillan, 1958), p. 284.
13. Orders-in-Council, January 11, 1885, reviews the history of the dock from the withdrawal of the first contractors.
14. Ibid., September 27, 1883.
15. Statutes of Canada, 1884, 47 Vict., CAP. 6.
16. Annual Report, 1884.
17. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, Langevin to Macdonald, November 6, 1884.
18. Annual Report, 1881.
19. Ibid., Appendix 35.

20. Orders-in-Council, May 17, 1883.
21. Debates, 5th Parl't., 1st Session, May 21, 1883, p. 1336.
22. Ibid., p. 1337.
23. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, Keefer to Macdonald, October 13, 1881 (also contains Fuller's letter of October 5, 1881, to Keefer).
24. Ibid., Macdonald to Langevin, October 14, 1881.
25. Orders-in-Council, October 31, 1881.
26. See Annual Reports, 1883 to 1885.
27. Debates, 5th Parl't., 4th Session, May 7, 1886, p. 1163.
28. Ibid.
29. Annual Reports for the 1880s list such expenditures in detail.
30. Orders-in-Council, April 8, 1880.
31. Debates, 4th Parl't., 2nd Session, May 3, 1880, p. 1950.
32. Ibid.
33. Orders-in-Council, February 25, 1880.
34. Ibid., July 5, 1882.
35. Annual Report, 1898, p. 10.
36. Annual Reports, 1882 to 1885.
37. Q.U.L., Mair Papers, A. Sproat to Charles Mair, November 9, 1883.
38. William Laurie, The Battle River Valley (Battleford, 1883), p. 15.
39. Millington H. Synge, Canada in 1848 (London, 1848).
40. Hind, Canadian Red River Exploring Expedition, Vol. 2, p. 261.
41. Canada Sessional Papers, 1885, No. 138, Brydges to Langevin, September 28, 1880.
42. Ibid., Brydges to Langevin, January 10, 1882.
43. Ibid., Brydges to Ennis, December 26, 1883.
44. Orders-in-Council, April 14, 1881.

45. Public Archives of Canada, Mackenzie Bowell Papers, Vol. 1, Langevin to Bowell, March 20, 1882.
46. Orders-in-Council, January 17, 1884.
47. Debates, 5th Parl't., 2nd Session, March 24, 1884, p. 1061.
48. Ibid., p. 1061.
49. Ibid., p. 1063.
50. Information from Appendix 1 of Annual Reports for 1884 to 1896. Note the declining over-all expenditure. This accentuates and to some extent qualifies the trend.
51. Debates, 5th Parl't., 1st Session, April 20, 1883, p. 749.
52. Annual Report, 1886, p. xix.
53. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IV, Vols. 185, 186, give a good many examples of this sort of minor requisition.
54. Ibid., Vol. 185, December 21, 1880.
55. Ibid., Vol. 2, December 23, 1880.
56. Debates, 10th Parl't., 1st Session, February 9, 1905, p. 774.
57. Orders-in-Council, April 23, 1886.
58. Hodgetts, Canadian Public Service, p. 33.
59. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IV, Vol. 401, gives several examples involving Public Works.
60. Ibid., Vol. 185, Memorandum to F.N. Gisborne, January 28, 1880.
61. Debates, 5th Parl't., 1st Session, April 30, 1883, p. 914.
62. Ibid., p. 914.
63. Ibid., 5th Parl't., 3rd Session, June 26, 1885, p. 2919.
64. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IV, Vol. 185. February 14, 1882, for example, shows that Indian Affairs was housed in a rented building.
65. Annual Report, 1882.
66. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IV, Vol. 185, January 20, 1883.
67. Ibid., June 14, 1883.

68. Debates, 5th Parl't., 1st Session, April 30, 1883, p. 907.
69. Annual Report, 1889, p. xxvi.
70. Debates, May 22, 1889, p. 799.
71. Richard Hofstadter, American Political Tradition: (New York: Knopf, 1948), pages 164-165: "The Spoilsmen: The Age of Cynicism".
72. For more on this subject, see Chapter 3.
73. P.A.C., Bowell Papers, Bowell to Langevin, September 27, 1879. The favour was returned; Langevin to Bowell, January 5, 1882.
74. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, H. Kranz to Macdonald, March 17, 1882.
75. Debates, 6th Parl't., 2nd Session, May 21, 1888, p. 1673.
76. Ibid., June 11, 1888, p. 919-20.
77. Ibid.
78. P. Baskerville, "J.C. Rykert and the Conservative Party", Canadian Historical Review, June, 1971, p. 144-64.
79. Debates, 5th Parl't., 2nd Session, March 28, 1884, p. 1195.
80. Ibid., April 11, 1882, p. 795.
81. For example, Orders-in-Council, May 28, 1883.
82. Desilets, Hector-Louis Langevin, p. 390.
83. Le Canadien, April 18, 1890.
84. Toronto Globe, March 19, 1891.
85. Ibid., May 11, 1891.
86. Ibid., May 12, 1891 has an account of the scene in Parliament.
87. Debates, 7th Parl't., 1st Session, May 11, 1891, p. 149-53.
88. Ibid., p. 152.
89. Report of the Select Committee 1891. Full report of the testimony given before the Committee appears in Journals, House of Commons, Canada, 1891, Appendix 1.
90. Toronto Globe, May 30, 1891.
91. Report of the Select Committee, 1891, p. ivc.

92. Ibid., p. ivmm.
93. Ibid.
94. Debates, 7th Parl't., 1st Session, September 25, 1891, p. 6125, 6126.
95. Ibid., September 24, 1891, p. 6050.
96. Report of the Select Committee, 1891, p. 1048.
97. Grip, August 22, 1891.
98. P.A.C., Israel Tarte Papers, Vol. 3, Langevin to Clement, January 25, 1887.
99. Debates, 7th Parl't., 1st Session, September 24, 1891, p. 6050.
100. Desilets, Hector-Louis Langevin, pp. 396-400.
101. Debates, 7th Parl't., 1st Session, May 11, 1891, p. 151.
102. Report of the Select Committee, 1891, p. 300.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid., pp. 330-31.
105. Ibid., p. 162.
106. Toronto Globe, July 10, 1891.
107. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IV, Vol. 180, Langevin to Perley, July 9, 1891.
108. Ibid., Gobeil to Langevin, July 16, 1891.
109. Ibid., Memorandum of October 21, 1891.
110. Orders-in-Council, December 1, 1891.
111. Grip, August 1, 1891.
112. Ottawa Citizen, July 27, 1891.
113. P.A.C., Sir John Thompson Papers, Vol. 132, Liberal-Conservative Association of Toronto to Thompson, July 1891.
114. Annual Reports, 1883, 1890, 1891.
115. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, Bowell to Macdonald, July 23, 1890.
116. Canada Sessional Papers, 1892, No. 16c, p. xx.
117. Ibid., p. 470, has Gobeil's testimony on the use of political influence.

NOTES

CHAPTER 8


1. Perry, Taxes, Tariffs and Subsidies, Vol. 1, p. 393.
2. Ibid., p. 94.
3. H.B. Neatby, Laurier and a Liberal Quebec: A Study in Political Management (Toronto, 1973), pp. 131-32.
4. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, "Open Letter to Wilfrid Laurier", by J.P. O'Hanley (undated).
5. Debates, 8th Parl't., 3rd Session, May 12, 1898, p. 5455.
6. P.A.C., Tarte Papers, A. Gobeil to Tarte, September 1, 1899.
7. Canada Sessional Papers, 1892, No. 16c, p. lxxxiv.
8. Ibid., Testimony of Gobeil before the Commission, p. 481.
9. Canada Sessional Papers, 1897, No. 57T.
10. P.A.C., Tarte Papers, statement of May 5, 1898.
11. Debates, 8th Parl't., 1st Session, September 17, 1896, p. 1430.
12. Annual Report, 1897, p. i.
13. Debates, 8th Parl't., 1st Session, September 17, 1896, pp. 1441-42.
14. Annual Reports, 1898, 1902.
15. Morris Zaslow, The Opening of the Canadian North (Toronto, 1971), p. 101.
16. Ibid., p. 99.
17. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IV, Vol. 437.
18. Ibid., St. Laurent to Department, April 28, 1898.
19. Zaslow, Opening of the Canadian North, p. 107.
20. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IV, Vol. 437, St. Laurent to Department, April 28, 1898.

21. P.A.C., Tarte Papers, Coste to Tarte, April 22, 1898.
22. Ibid., Coste to Tarte, April 9, 1898.
23. Ibid.
24. Canada Sessional Papers, 1899, No. 66a, Coste to Tarte, April 23, 1898.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IV, Vol. 437, February 18, 1899.
29. Ibid., Series IV, PARC Box 132255, #199923, "Memorandum of A. Gobeil", March 17, 1899.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., Gobeil to Charleson, September 20, 1899.
32. Ibid., Charleson to the Department, December 9, 1899. Also, PARC Box 132285, #219632.
33. Annual Report, 1900, pp. 27-28.
34. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IV, Vol. 437, April 23, 1904.
35. Zaslow, Opening of the Canadian North, p. 106.
36. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IV, Vol. 437, February 17, 1910.
37. Annual Reports, 1902, 1905.
38. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Tarte to Laurier, April 13, 1899.
39. Debates, 9th Parl't., 1st Session, March 8, 1901, p. 1179.
40. P.A.C., Tarte Papers, Vol. 8, Interview with the Montreal Herald (undated).
41. Annual Reports, 1899 to 1903, state amounts spent on various harbours.
42. P.A.C., Tarte Papers, Vol. 7, draft of a speech before the Montreal Board of Trade (undated).
43. Annual Report, 1900, p. 12.

44. Debates, 9th Parl't., 1st Session, March 8, 1901, p. 1186.
45. Ibid., February 14, 1900, pp. 442-68.
46. Annual Report, 1900, p. 12.
47. Annual Report, 1909, p. 7.
48. See the Annual Reports, 1898-1907.
49. Annual Report, 1909.
50. R.J. Morgan, "The Georgian Bay Canal", Canadian Geographical Journal, March 1969, pp. 90-97, gives an overview of the pressures from private concerns for the development of the canal.
51. Neatby, Laurier and a Liberal Quebec, p. 132.
52. Canada Sessional Papers, 1909, No. 19a, pp. 1-2.
53. Ibid., p. 2.
54. Frederick Garfield Goodspeed, "Autobiography of an Engineer", p. 22. Unpublished manuscript in Public Works library.
55. Ibid., p. 21.
56. Ibid.
57. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IV, PARC Box 132521, #329886, March 2, 1904.
58. Canada Sessional Papers, 1909, No. 19a, p. 395.
59. Ibid., p. 396.
60. Ibid., p. xix.
61. Ibid., p. xxi.
62. Annual Report, 1908, p. 5.
63. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Tarte to Laurier April 4, 1901. See also Ibid., Tarte to Mills (Minister of Justice), January 17, 1900.
64. Neatby, Laurier and a Liberal Quebec, pp. 137-40.
65. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Tarte to Laurier, October 20, 1902.
66. Debates, 8th Parl't., 3rd Session, May 6, 1898, p. 5067.
67. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Tarte to Laurier, March 20, 1901.

68. Orders-in-Council, March 11, 1904.
69. Annual Report, 1903, App. 1.
70. Ibid., 1904.
71. Orders-in-Council, March 11, 1904.
72. Statutes of Canada, 1903, 3 Edward VII, Chap. 53.
73. Debates, 9th Parl't., 3rd Session, May 7, 1903, p. 2650.
74. Ibid., p. 2634.
75. Ibid., p. 2659.
76. Ibid., p. 2664.
77. Ibid., February 9, 1905, p. 776.
78. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Préfontaine to Laurier, October 11, 1901; November 15, 1901.
79. Debates, 9th Parl't., 3rd Session, May 7, 1903, p. 2659.
80. Ibid., 9th Parl't., 4th Session, March 24, 1904 (speech of David Henderson), p. 437.
81. Annual Report, 1904, pp. 3-4.
82. Ibid., 1905, p. 3.
83. Ibid., 1900, 1904, 1905, 1909, App. 1.
84. Hodgetts, Canadian Public Service, p. 45, discusses the limitations on the size of Cabinet and thus the number of departments.
85. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IV, Vol. 402, July 31, 1895.
86. Ibid., Vol. 404, September 27, 1909.
87. Annual Report, 1885, App. 1.
88. Debates, 5th Parl't., 3rd Session, June 14, 1885, p. 982.
89. Ibid., 7th Parl't., 3rd Session, March 23, 1893, p. 2950.
90. Ibid., p. 2951.
91. Ibid., 7th Parl't., 4th Session, June 15, 1894, p. 4474.
92. Annual Report, 1910, p. 13.

93. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IV, Vol. 437.
94. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Cartwright to Laurier, July 27, 1907.
95. Debates, 9th Parl't., 3rd Session, May 7, 1903, p. 2658.
96. Ibid., December 11, 1906, pp. 839-42, contains a discussion of Hyman's illness and his inability to continue as Minister.
97. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Gobeil to Laurier, July 31, 1907.
98. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IV, Vol. 400. Hunter will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 9.
99. Ibid.
100. Statutes of Canada, 1908, 7-8 Edward VII, Chap. 15.
101. Debates, 10th Parl't., 4th Session, June 25, 1908, p. 11315.
102. Ibid., p. 11323.
103. Statutes of Canada, 1908, 7-8 Edward VII, Chap 15, Section 7.
104. Ibid., Sections 27-30.
105. Canada Sessional Papers, 1892, No. 16c, p. 470.
106. Civil Service List, 1891 and 1897, list 27 and 30 men on Public Works staff respectively.
107. Ibid., 1910.
108. Debates, 10th Parl't., 4th Session, June 25, 1908, p. 11392.



NOTES

CHAPTER 9

1. See W. Baker, "A Case Study of Anti-Americanism in English Speaking Canada: The Election Campaign of 1911", Canadian Historical Review, December, 1970, pp. 426-39.
2. Annual Report, 1912, p. 5.
3. Ibid., p. 13.
4. Orders-in-Council, February 27, 1912.
5. Debates, 12th Parl't., 5th Session, April 7, 1915, p. 2182. See also Annual Report 1912, Part II.
6. Annual Reports, 1913, 1914.
7. Perry, Taxes, Tariffs and Subsidies, Vol. 1, p. 139.
8. Orders-in-Council, August 11, 1914.
9. Perry, Taxes, Tariffs and Subsidies, Vol. 1, pp. 139-49.
10. The expenditure for 1915 was \$29,283,316.94; Annual Report, 1915, p. 3.
11. Debates, 12th Parl't., 5th Session, February 11, 1915, p. 81.
12. Annual Report, 1915, p. 4.
13. Ibid., 1916.
14. Ibid., 1914, 1918.
15. Debates, 12th Parl't., 6th Session, April 27, 1916, p. 3180.
16. P.A.C., Records of Parliament, unprinted Sessional Paper No. 104, 1921.
17. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 319. Horwood to Hunter, December 15, 1917.
18. Debates, 12th Parl't., 7th Session, August 4, 1917, p. 4149.
19. Annual Report, 1919: "Report of the Chief Accountant", pp. 78-79.

20. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 319, Hunter to Carvell, January 29, 1918.
21. Ibid., Wright to Hunter, May 16, 1918.
22. Orders-in-Council, June 3, 1918.
23. Debates, 13th Parl't., 7th Session, May 5, 1919, p. 2507.
24. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 319, Carvell to Wright, September 5, 1918.
25. This chain of events was pieced together from Debates, 12th Parl't., 6th Session, February 3, 1916; "Report of the Commission of Inquiry, May 15, 1916", a copy of which is in P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 13; and Borden Papers, Vol. 72, "Report of the Chief Commissioner of Police, February 4, 1916".
26. Robert Laird Borden, His Memoirs (introduction by Heath MacQuarrie), (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1969), Vol. 2, p. 3.
27. "Report of the Commission of Inquiry, May 15, 1916".
28. Debates, 12th Parl't., 6th Session, February 4, 1916, p. 581.
29. Borden, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 4.
30. Annual Report, 1916, p. xxvi.
31. Ottawa Citizen, February 5, 1916.
32. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 12, contains the file on the renovation.
33. Toronto Star, April 2, 1938.
34. Borden, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 5 fn.
35. Ibid., p. 5.
36. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 13, David Ewart to Hunter, June 20, 1916.
37. Debates, 12th Parl't., 6th Session, February 17, 1916.
38. Ottawa Citizen, February 24, 1916.
39. Debates, 12th Parl't., 6th Session, March 22, 1916, pp. 2102-2103.
40. Borden, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 5.
41. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 16, "Minutes of the Meeting of the Joint Committee on August 3, 1916".

42. Debates, 12th Parl't., 6th Session, April 25, 1916, p. 3050.
43. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 16, "Minutes of the Meeting of the Joint Committee on June 27, 1916".
44. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 16 contains a record of these events.
45. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Laurier to Lemieux, August 9, 1916.
46. Ibid.
47. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 16, "Minutes of the Meeting of the Joint Committee on August 21, 1916".
48. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Murphy to Lemieux, August 9, 1916.
49. Ibid., Laurier to Lemieux, August 9, 1916. See Montreal Star of same date.
50. Ibid., Watson to Laurier, August 23, 1916.
51. Ibid., Lemieux to Laurier, August 13, 1916; Laurier to Lemieux, August 15, 1916.
52. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 16, Lemieux to Hunter, September 1, 1916.
53. Toronto Globe, September 5, 1916.
54. Debates, 12th Parl't., 7th Session, August 6, 1917, p. 4183.
55. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 18, "Weekly Report of the Architects for December 19, 1917".
56. Debates, 13th Parl't., 1st Session, April 24, 1918, p. 1103.
57. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 19, "Weekly Report of the Architects for May 14, 1919".
58. Ibid., Vol. 18, Pearson to Hunter, February 27, 1919.
59. Ibid., "Weekly Report of the Architects for December 25, 1918".
60. Ibid., Vol. 19, "Weekly Report", for May 21, 1919; September 17, 1919; December 17, 1919; March 3, 1920.
61. Debates, 13th Parl't., 2nd Session, May 12, 1919, p. 2322.
62. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 19, Hunter to Pearson, June 18, 1919.
63. Debates, 13th Parl't., 4th Session, February 6, 1920, p. 5.

64. Ibid, March 2, 1920, p. 76.
65. Orders-in-Council, June 3, 1918.
66. Annual Report, 1919, "Report of the Chief Architect".
67. Orders-in-Council, June 3, 1918.
68. Ibid.
69. Records of Parliament, Vol. 78, unprinted Sessional Paper No. 79, 1921, Hunter to Carvell, June 4, 1918.
70. Ibid., Sifton to Hunter, October 15, 1919.
71. Debates, 13th Parl't., 2nd Session, February 26, 1919, p. 44.
72. Records of Parliament, unprinted Sessional Paper No. 79, 1921, Hunter to Reid, March 13, 1920.
73. Ibid., Reid to Hunter, March 16, 1920.
74. Ibid., Memorandum of April 9, 1920.
75. Debates, 13th Parl't., 5th Session, May 28, 1921, p. 4080.
76. Borden saw this as a serious pledge. See Borden Papers, Vol. 265, Borden to Perley, November 29, 1930.
77. Ibid., Vol. 229, Perley to Borden, February 5, 1912.
78. Canada Sessional Papers, 1913, No. 57a, "Sir George Murray's Report on the Organization of the Civil Service of Canada", p. 9.
79. Ibid., p. 9.
80. Ibid., p. 11.
81. Ibid., p. 13.
82. Ibid., p. 24.
83. P.A.C., Borden Papers, Vol. 265, "Memorandum Respecting R.M. Dawson's Work on the Civil Service" (written by Borden).
84. See, in particular, J.E. Hodgetts, W. McCloskey, R. Whitaker and V.S. Wilson, Biography of an Institution: The Civil Service Commission of Canada 1908-1967 (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972).
85. Ottawa Citizen, February 15, 1915.

86. R.M. Dawson, The Civil Service of Canada (London: Oxford University Press, 1929).
87. P.A.C., Borden Papers, Vol. 265, Borden to Maclean, February 17, 1931, and other documents in the same volume for the development of the critique. Also see R.L. Borden, "Problems of an Efficient Civil Service", Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1931, for its eventual form.
88. Ibid., Vol. 80, election pamphlet, "Winning the War, the Supreme Issue Confronting the Nation" (Ottawa, November 1917).
89. Orders-in-Council, February 13, 1918.
90. Debates, 13th Parl't., 2nd Session, April 12, 1919, p. 717.
91. Hodgetts et al., Biography of an Institution, p. 59.
92. P.A.C., Records of Parliament, Vol. 154, unprinted Sessional Paper No. 294a, 1919, "Report of Transmission to Accompany the Classification of the Civil Service of Canada," by Arthur Young & Co.
93. Ibid., No. 294, 1919, "The Classification of the Civil Service of Canada".
94. Debates, 13th Parl't., 5th Session, April 27, 1921, pp. 2682-83.
95. Debates, 13th Parl't., 1st Session, May 10, 1918, p. 1744.
96. Ibid., 13th Parl't., 4th Session, March 2, 1920, p. 557.
97. P.A.C., Borden Papers, Vol. 116, George Yates to Borden, April 19, 1920.
98. P.A.C., William Lyon Mackenzie King Papers, 4th Series, Vol. 61, "Report of the Committee of Deputy Ministers on Civil Service Matters, December, 1922."
99. P.A.C., Sir George Foster Diaries, March 12, 1918.
100. P.A.C., Arthur Meighen Papers, Vol. 42, B.K. Diblee to J.G. Mitchell, May 29, 1918.
101. P.A.C., Mackenzie King Papers, Reel C-2303, Harry Baldwin to W.P. Harrell, May 4, 1928.
102. Debates, 13th Parl't., 4th Session, April 20, 1920, p. 1433.
103. Ottawa Journal, December 4, 1941. This was an article by George Yates, Assistant Deputy Minister of Transport, in memory of Hunter. For other background on Hunter, see also P.A.C., Department of Public Works File 829-1 (at the time of writing this was not catalogued).

104. Debates, 13th Parl't., 4th Session, March 1, 1920, p. 14.
105. Ibid.
106. P.A.C., Mackenzie King Papers, 1st Series, Reel C-2266, King to J.H. King, August 30, 1924.
107. Ibid., J.H. King to Mackenzie King, September 2, 1924.
108. Debates, 14th Parl't., 4th Session, May 22, 1925, pp. 3426, 3445.
109. Ibid., 14th Parl't., 3rd Session, March 25, 1924, p. 685.
110. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 143, "Great Public Works of Canada", by J.H. King sometime in 1925.
111. Annual Report, 1923, p. 4.
112. Debates, 13th Parl't., 5th Session, March 11, 1921, pp. 833-834.
113. Ibid., 14th Parl't., 1st Session, April 4, 1922, p. 692.
114. Ibid., 14th Parl't., 4th Session, March 6, 1925, p. 838.
115. P.A.C., Mackenzie King Papers, fourth series, Vol. 61, "Conference Between Members of Government and Deputy Heads of Departments, February 1, 1924".
116. Ibid.
117. P.A.C., Civil Service Commission, Historical Personnel Files, Vol. 542, contains Fuller's file.
118. London Advertiser, January 28, 1927, contains a speech by the Minister, J.C. Elliott which outlines the functions and organization.
119. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 110 has a file on the organization of this branch.
120. See Debates, 16th Parl't., 3rd Session, April 25, 1929, pp. 1961-62.
121. Ibid., 16th Parl't., 2nd Session, May 3, 1928, p. 2628.
122. Ibid., p. 2631.
123. Ibid., p. 2641.
124. Annual Reports, 1927, 1928, 1929.

NOTES

CHAPTER 10

1. Debates, 16th Parl't., 3rd Session, February 11, 1929, p. 29.
2. Ibid., April 26, 1929, p. 2001.
3. Annual Report, 1929.
4. Ibid., Report of the Chief Accountant, 1930.
5. A.E. Safarian, The Canadian Economy in the Great Depression (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), gives a good account of the economic causes of the Canadian response to the world collapse.
6. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 122, J.C. Elliott to R. Kelley, December 28, 1929.
7. Safarian, Canadian Economy in the Great Depression, p. 77.
8. Debates, 16th Parl't., 4th Session, February 24, 1930, p. 18.
9. H.B. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos: Canada in the Thirties (Toronto: Macmillan, 1972), p. 75.
10. Debates, 16th Parl't., 4th Session, February 24, 1930, p. 33.
11. Ibid., March 21, 1933, Budget Speech, pp. 3209-15.
12. Ibid., April 30, 1931, p. 1156.
13. Ibid., March 22, 1935, Speech of Edgar Rhodes, p. 1798.
14. Ibid., February 8, 1932, p. 59.
15. Annual Reports, 1931, 1932, 1934.
16. Debates, 17th Parl't., 2nd Session, April 30, 1931, p. 1176.
17. Ibid., February 9, 1932, p. 74.
18. Ibid., March 1, 1932, p. 678.
19. P.A.C., R.B. Bennett Papers, Vol. 571, H.H. Smith to Bennett,
20. Ibid., Vol. 571, T.J. Locke to K.M. Cameron, May 9, 1931.

21. Ibid., W.G. Ernst to H.A. Stewart, July 28, 1931.
22. Debates, 17th Parl't., 2nd Session, May 1, 1931, p. 1182.
23. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 122, Hunter to Cameron, August 20, 1930.
24. Debates, 17th Parl't., 1st Session, September 10, 1930, pp. 60-61.
25. Statutes of Canada, 1930, 21 George V, Chap. 1.
26. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 122, Stewart to H. Boulay, September 26, 1930.
27. Debates, 17th Parl't., 2nd Session, April 30, 1931, p. 1138.
28. Ibid., p. 1156.
29. Statutes of Canada, 21-22 George V, Chap. 58, 1931.
30. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 135, Corriveau to District Engineers, August 26, 1931.
31. Ibid., Corriveau to Geoffrey Stead (District Engineer, New Brunswick), Oct. 16, 1931.
32. Ibid., T. Fuller to Hunter, September 15, 1931.
33. Ibid., J. Voyer to Bennett, November 9, 1931.
34. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 135, Cameron to District Engineers, Nov. 25, 1931.
35. Debates, 17th Parl't., 3rd Session, February 16, 1932, p. 268.
36. Ibid., p. 268.
37. Ibid., May 3, 1932, p. 2625.
38. Neatby, Politics of Chaos, p. 52.
39. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 135.
40. Annual Report, 1933, p. 5.
41. P.A.C., Bennett Papers, Vol. 572. Bennett to J. White, September 11, 1933.
42. Hodgetts et. al., Biography of an Institution, p. 141. See also pp. 137-58 on the rise of Treasury Board and the economy measures of the 1930s.

43. Ibid., p. 142.
44. Debates, 17th Parl't., 4th Session, April 6, 1933, p. 3783.
45. Ibid., pp. 3784-85.
46. P.A.C., Bennett Papers, Vol. 571, Bennett to Stewart, March 2, 1931.
47. Ibid., Stewart to Bennett, August 6, 1931.
48. Ibid.
49. These ages are taken largely from P.A.C., Civil Service Commission, Historical Personnel Files.
50. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 313, "Personnel File on K.M. Cameron".
51. P.A.C., Bennett Papers, Vol. 457, H. Southam to Stewart, December 4, 1934.
52. P.A.C., Mackenzie King Papers, 1st Series, Reel C-2288, King to Elliott, February 25, 1927. See also Ann Davis, "The Wembley Controversy in Canadian Art", Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 (March, 1973), pp. 48-74.
53. Ibid., Massey to Elliott, March 7, 1927.
54. P.A.C., Bennett Papers, Vol. 457, Arthur Hemming to Bennett, February 7, 1932.
55. Later Bennett (in Opposition) expressed sympathy with those who had petitioned against the Gallery. Debates, 18th Parl't., 3rd Session, June 7, 1938, p. 3632. If he felt this way while in office it further indicates the strength of the belief that the Gallery should have independence from politicians.
56. Annual Report, 1940, p. 12.
57. Debates, 17th Parl't., 1st Session, September 10, 1930, p. 95.
58. Ibid., March 29, 1932, p. 1429.
59. Ibid., April 6, 1933, p. 3782.
60. This example from Ibid., June 7, 1938, p. 3638.
61. P.A.C., Bennett Papers, Vol. 572, White to Bennett, September 5, 1933.
62. Ibid., Bennett to White, September 11, 1933.

63. See P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 124.
64. Debates, 17th Parl't., 5th Session, January 25, 1934, pp. 2-3.
65. P.A.C., Bennett Papers, Vol. 804, Gunn to Bennett, February 9, 1934.
66. Ibid., Stewart to Bennett, March 19, 1934.
67. Debates, 17th Parl't., 5th Session, May 16, 1934, p. 3094.
68. Statutes of Canada, 24-25 George V, 1934, Chap. 59.
69. P.A.C., Mackenzie King Papers, Vol. 204, File # 1938.
70. P.A.C., Bennett Papers, Vol. 804, R.B. Hanson to Bennett, February 22, 1934.
71. Statutes of Canada, 24-25 George V, 1934, Chap. 59, Clause 7.
72. Debates, 17th Parl't., 5th Session, June 26, 1934, p. 4341.
73. Ibid., p. 4434.
74. Ibid., June 30, 1934, p. 4552.
75. Ibid., June 26, 1934. See speech of Mackenzie King, p. 4305, and Agnes Macphail, p. 4307.
76. Montreal Gazette, June 20, 1934.
77. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 124, Hunter to Deputy Minister, D.N.D., May 3, 1935. See also Orders-in-Council, August 10, 1935, #2367.
78. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 124, Fuller to Hunter, June 21, 1934.
79. Ibid., Hunter to Fuller, June 21, 1934.
80. P.A.C., Bennett Papers, Bennett to H. Ferland, June 22, 1934.
81. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 123, Robertson to Stewart, August 17, 1931.
82. Ibid., Stewart to Robertson, August 19, 1931.
83. Debates, 17th Parl't., 5th Session, June 20, 1934, pp. 4138-39.
84. P.A.C., Bennett Papers, Vol. 575, C.A. Seguin to Bennett, January 11, 1935.

85. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 124, Fuller to Regional Architects, February 6, 1935.
86. P.A.C., Bennett Papers, Vol. 575, Bennett to Seguin, January 11, 1935.
87. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 124, Stewart to Humphrey Mitchell, October 13, 1934.
88. Ibid., Vol. 122, S.E. O'Brien to Cameron, May 30, 1931.
89. Debates, 17th Parl't., 6th Session, April 11, 1935, (speech of Thomas Donnelly), p. 2647.
90. Ibid., p. 2647.
91. Annual Report, 1935; Orders-in-Council, October 27, 1937.
92. Debates, 17th Parl't., 6th Session, April 11, 1935, p. 2646.
93. Daily Commercial News, May 30, 1935.
94. Annual Reports, 1935, 1936.
95. W.E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal 1932-1940 (New York: Harper, 1963), p. 71.
96. See Orders-in-Council, January 25, 1937, on the cancellation of the Toronto tunnel.
97. Debates, 18th Parl't., 1st Session, February 14, 1936, p. 196.
98. Ibid., May 8, 1936, p. 2661.
99. Annual Report, 1937, p. 5.
100. See, for instance, London Advertiser, January 28, 1927, for the speech of Elliott. In it he portrays the Department as the Government's construction agent.
101. Debates, 17th Parl't., 2nd Session, May 1, 1931, p. 1175.
102. Statutes of Canada, 24-25 George V, 1934, Chap. 59, Schedule A, Items 78, 79.
103. Debates, 17th Parl't., 2nd Session, May 1, 1931, p. 1175.
104. Ibid., February 28, 1935, pp. 1313-15.
105. Ibid., p. 1315.
106. Ibid., April 11, 1935, p. 2742.

107. Statutes of Canada, Edward VIII, Chap. 34, 1936.
108. P.A.C., Mackenzie King Papers, Reel C-3688, Howe to King, January 29, 1936.
109. Statutes of Canada, Edward VIII, 1936, Chap. 42.
110. See P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 283, Hunter to Stewart, January 7, 1933, for the Deputy Minister's comments on the Gibb report.

NOTES

CHAPTER 11

1. P.A.C., Mackenzie King Papers, 4th Series, Vol. 159, E.A. Pickering to King, July 28, 1938.
2. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 63, Somerville to Pope, May 11, 1938.
3. Ibid., Vol. 63, "File on Protection of Drydocks".
4. Ibid., Report of the Chief Accountant, 1930.
5. Annual Report, 1942, p. 6.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., "Report of the Chief Treasury Officer 1941-42", pp. 85 ff.
8. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 63, K.S. MacLachlan to Hunter, April 8, 1940.
9. Ibid., Vol. 69, Cameron to Hunter, June 10, 1941.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., Martin to Cameron, June 18, 1941.
12. Ibid., Cameron to Fairbairn, July 15, 1941.
13. Ibid., Gilbert to Corriveau, September 5, 1941.
14. Ibid., Vol. 70.
15. P.A.C., Records of Parliament, 2nd Series, Vol. 432, Sessional Papers No. 151, 151b, 1942-1943.
16. Debates, April 3, 1941, p. 2161.
17. P.A.C., Mackenzie King Papers, 4th Series, Vol. 159, "Synopsis of Reports Concerning the War Activities of the Department of Public Works from September to December 1939".
18. P.A.C., Records of Parliament, Vol. 437, Sessional Paper No. 296, 1942.
19. Annual Reports, 1939, 1942.

20. Ibid., 1943, 1944.
21. P.A.C., Records of Parliament, Vol. 487, Sessional Paper 91e, 1945.
22. Department of Transport Records, File 1500-8, Vol. 1, George Yates to Edwin Winfield, July 17, 1940.
23. Orders-in-Council, July 8, 1940.
24. Debates, 17th Parl't., 1st Session, July 8, 1940, p. 1398.
25. Ibid., 19th Parl't., 3rd Session, May 14, 1942, p. 2434.
26. Ibid., 19th Parl't., 4th Session, March 2, 1943, p. 883 (Appendix to Budget Speech).
27. From Records of Parliament, Vol. 432, Sessional Paper 151b, 1942-43; Debates, 20th Parl't., 1st Session, December 5, 1945, pp. 2955-2956. The figures given are only approximate.
28. Debates, 19th Parl't., 4th Session, March 4, 1943, p. 969.
29. Ibid., 19th Parl't., 1st Session, June 28, 1940, p. 1226.
30. Ibid., 19th Parl't., 1st Session, July 4, 1940, p. 1328.
31. Ibid., 19th Parl't., 3rd Session, June 22, 1942, p. 3534.
32. Ibid., 19th Parl't., 3rd Session, July 2, 1942, p. 3781.
33. Ibid., 19th Parl't., 1st Session, May 22, 1940, pp. 131-132.
34. P.A.C., Mackenzie King Papers, 4th Series, Vol. 159, "Synopsis of Reports Concerning the War Activities of the Department of Public Works from September to December 1943".
35. P.A.C., Records of Parliament, Vol. 511, Sessional Paper No. 97a, 1947.
36. Department of Transport Records, File 1500-8, Vol. 1, Yates to Winfield, July 7, 1940.
37. Cited in Debates, 19th Parl't., 3rd Session, May 11, 1942, p. 2280, Cardin to King, May 9, 1942.
38. J.W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, Vol. 1 (Toronto, 1960) pp. 369-371, describes the steps leading to Cardin's resignation.
39. Orders-in-Council, October 6, 1942.
40. Civil Service Review, December, 1941.

41. Montreal Gazette, December 1, 1941.
42. Ottawa Journal, December 3, 1941.
43. Orders-in-Council, October 6, 1942.
44. P.A.C., Records of the Civil Service Commission, Historical Personnel Files, Vol. 202, "File on E.P. Murphy".
45. Ibid., Vol. 278, File of W.P. Harrell, Murphy to Secretary of the Civil Service Commission, December 18, 1945, refers to the Deputy Minister's continued work for Munitions and Supply.
46. Debates, 19th Parl't., 4th Session, March 4, 1943, p. 971.
47. Ibid., February 1, 1943. pp. 39-40.
48. M.C. Urquhart and K.A.H. Buckley, Historical Statistics of Canada, (Toronto, 1965), p. 207.
49. Debates, 20th Parl't., 3rd Session, May 9, 1947, p. 2925.
50. Ibid., 19th Parl't., 5th Session, January 27, 1944, p. 2.
51. Ibid., January 31, 1944, p. 24.
52. Orders-in-Council, October 24, 1944.
53. Ottawa Citizen, October 14, 1944.
54. P.A.C., Records of Parliament, Vol. 480, Sessional Paper No. 90, 1945, "Employment and Income with Special Reference to the Initial Period of Reconstruction".
55. Ibid., p. 1.
56. Ibid., p. 14.
57. Ibid., p. 16.
58. Ibid., p. 21.
59. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 118, Corriveau to District Engineers, December 19, 1940.
60. Ibid., Cameron to District Engineers, June 26, 1942.
61. Ibid., Cameron to District Engineers, February 3, 1943.
62. P.A.C., Records of the Department of Finance, Vol. 3562, File E01, "Committee on Reconstruction - The Organization of a Public Works Programme". Undated.

63. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 71, N.A. Robertson to Murphy, May 7, 1949.
64. P.A.C., Records of the Department of Finance, Vol. 3562, File E01, "The Co-Ordination of Public Projects", 1944.
65. P.A.C., Records of Parliament, Vol. 480, Sessional Paper No. 90, 1945, "Employment and Income with Special Reference to the Initial Period of Reconstruction", p. 14.
66. Debates, 20th Parl't., 1st Session, November 29, 1945, p. 2671.
67. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series X, Vol. 11, File 144-39-1, has material on winter works.
68. Debates, 16th Parl't., 1st Session, 1927, pp. 387-390; 18th Parl't., 2nd Session, 1937, p. 1222.
69. Ibid., 20th Parl't., 2nd Session, June 27, 1946, (Budget Speech of Ilsley), pp. 2899-2951.
70. Ibid., 19th Parl't., 5th Session, May 16, 1944, p. 2965.
71. Ibid., 20th Parl't., 1st Session, November 29, 1945, p. 2661.
72. Annual Report, 1949, p. 145.
73. Ibid., 1945, "Report of the Chief Treasury Officer".
74. Orders-in-Council, April 14, 1913.
75. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 313, contains the various proposals for the area.
76. P.A.C., Mackenzie King Papers, 1st series, Reel C-22227, King to Hunter, October 12, 1925.
77. Orders-in-Council, May 31, 1922.
78. Statutes of Canada, 17 George V, 1927, Chapter 55.
79. Orders-in-Council, May 21, 1934.
80. P.A.C., Mackenzie King Papers, 1st Series, Reel C-3726, Rankin to Hunter, April 6, 1937.
81. Orders-in-Council, January 28, 1937.
82. Debates, 20th Parl't., 1st Session, October 1, 1945, p. 9.
83. Orders-in-Council, August 16, 1945.

84. Ibid., October 25, 1945.
85. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 271, C.D. Sutherland to W. Saunders, January 17, 1946.
86. Orders-in-Council, April 18, 1946, confirmed this by-law.
87. Jacques Greber, Plan for the National Capital: General report submitted to the National Capital Planning Committee (Ottawa, 1950), p. 2.
88. Orders-in-Council, March 31, 1947, gives an example of such an extension.
89. Jacques Greber, Plan for the National Capital, p. 92.
90. Statutes of Canada, 10 George VI, 1946, Chap. 51.
91. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series X, Vol. 10, Murphy to A.D.P. Heeney, April 28, 1945.
92. Debates, 21st Parl't., 4th Session, June 28, 1951, p. 4834, exchange between Fournier and Macdonnell.
93. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series X, Vol. 10, Federal District Commission Regulations.
94. Ibid., Murphy to Norman Robertson, July 27, 1950.
95. The Federal District Commission was succeeded by the National Capital Commission in 1958. See Statutes of Canada, 7 Elizabeth II, 1958, Chapter 37.
96. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series X, Vol. 23, "Draft Agreement", November 25, 1948.
97. Ibid., High Commissioner to Secretary of Public Works, Newfoundland, December 28, 1948.
98. Ibid., High Commissioner to Public Works (Canada), December 30, 1948.
99. St. John's Evening Telegram, March 16, 1949.
100. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series X, Vol. 23, "Department of External Affairs, Document B-46", April 12, 1949.
101. Annual Reports, 1947, 1948.
102. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series X, Vol. 3, W. O'Brien to F.G. Sims, June 5, 1939.

103. Ibid., Speech of A. McDonald to District Superintendents, April 14, 1947.
104. Ibid., Murphy to Heeney, April 26, 1947.
105. Department of Transport Records, File 1500-8, Vol. 1, Fournier to Howe, December 5, 1947.
106. Orders-in-Council, May 4, 1948.
107. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series X, Vol. 3, McDonald to R.G. Bishop, March 16, 1948.

NOTES

CHAPTER 12

1. Debates, 20th Parl't., 1st Session, November 19, 1945, p. 2675.
2. Ibid., 19th Parl't., 5th Session, May 16, 1944, p. 2962.
3. See Ibid., 20th Parl't., 1st Session, November 19, 1945, p. 2661.
4. Ibid., 20th Parl't., 3rd Session, June 20, 1947, p. 4443.
5. Canada Year Book, 1946, p. 863; 1947, p. 929; 1971, p. 1055.
6. P.A.C., Records of Parliament, Vol. 525, Sessional Paper No. 106A, 1949.
7. Debates, 20th Parl't., 2nd Session, June 10, 1946, p. 2331.
8. Annual Report of the Civil Service Commission, 1947, p. 6.
9. Debates, 20th Parl't., 4th Session, June 29, 1948, p. 6075.
10. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 283, Hunter to R.C. Wright, May 3, 1918.
11. P.A.C., Mackenzie King Papers, 1st Series, Reel C-2266, King to J.H. King, December 29, 1924.
12. Debates, 21st Parl't., 2nd Session, March 2, 1950, pp. 406-11.
13. Ibid., June 16, 1950, p. 3743.
14. Ibid., 21st Parl't., 4th Session, June 21, 1951, p. 4474.
15. Ibid., 20th Parl't., 2nd Session, August 12, 1946, p. 4652.
16. Ibid., 20th Parl't., 4th Session, June 1, 1948, p. 4605.
17. Ibid., June 29, 1948, p. 6060.
18. P.A.C., H.A. Young Papers, "Review of the Department of Public Works, 1954-1960". (Henceforth referred to as H.A. Young, "Review of the Department".)
19. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 283, Somerville to Murphy, March 9, 1946.

20. Statutes of Canada, George VI, 1951, 2nd Session, Chap. 12, pp. 15-16.
21. Debates, 21st Parl't., 5th Session, December 15, 1951, p. 2014.
22. Ibid., p. 2013.
23. Ibid., p. 2015.
24. Daily Commercial News, December 10, 1951.
25. Debates, 21st Parl't., 5th Session, December 15, 1951, p. 2022 (Speech by Stanley Knowles).
26. Ibid., December 19, 1951, pp. 2541-42. See also Statutes of Canada, George VI, 1951, 2nd Session, Chap. 33, pp. 15-16.
27. P.A.C., H.A. Young, "Review of the Department", p. 7.
28. Blair Fraser, "Backstage at Ottawa", Maclean's Magazine, November 1, 1953, p. 6.
29. Debates, 21st Parl't., 2nd Session, June 16, 1950, p. 3721.
30. Statutes of Canada, 1950, Chapt. 48.
31. Debates, 21st Parl't., 2nd Session, March 21, 1950, p. 984.
32. Ibid., p. 985.
33. Ibid., 17th Parl't., 2nd Session, May 1, 1931, p. 1136.
34. Ibid., 18th Parl't., 3rd Session, June 6, 1938, p. 3604.
35. P.A.C., Mackenzie King Papers, 4th series, Somerville to Walter Turnbull, December 4, 1941.
36. Annual Report, 1946.
37. Debates, 20th Parl't., 3rd Session, April 17, 1946, p. 953.
38. Ibid., August 10, 1946, p. 4619.
39. Ibid., p. 4620 (Speech of J.D. Reid).
40. Ibid., February 24, 1953, p. 2338. (Statistics cited by James Macdonnell.)
41. P.A.C., H.A. Young, "Review of the Department", p. 1.
42. Debates, 21st Parl't., 6th Session, May 12, 1952, p. 3722.

43. Ibid., May 12, 1952, p. 3722.
44. Ibid., 21st Parl't., 2nd Session, June 16, 1950, pp. 3729-30.
45. See, for instance, ibid., June 25, 1952, pp. 3720-21; April 7, 1953, p. 3586.
46. Journals of the Senate of Canada, June 24, 1952, p. 381.
47. Ibid., pp. 381-82.
48. Ibid., p. 382.
49. Annual Reports, 1946, 1950.
50. Ibid., 1950.
51. Maclean's Magazine, November 1, 1953.
52. St. John's Evening Telegram, December 11, 1953.
53. Halifax Chronicle-Herald, September 19, 1953.
54. Blair Fraser, "Backstage at Ottawa", Maclean's Magazine, November 1, 1953.
55. P.A.C., Records of the Civil Service Commission, Historical Personnel Files, Vol. 641, "File on H.A. Young".
56. Orders-in-Council, September 17, 1953.
57. Debates, 22nd Parl't., 1st Session, March 12, 1954, p. 2967.
58. P.A.C., H.A. Young, "Review of the Department", p. 2.
59. Ibid., p. 5.
60. See P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series IX, Vol. 283.
61. P.A.C., H.A. Young, "Review of the Department", p. 8.
62. P.A.C., Civil Service Commission, Historical Personnel Files, Vol. 278, "File on Harrell", D.M. Walters to H.A. Young, February 23, 1954.
63. P.A.C., H.A. Young, "Review of the Department", p. 8.
64. Annual Report, 1955, pp. 12-13.
65. H.A. Young, "Review of the Department", p. 11.
66. Annual Report, 1955.

67. Debates, 21st Parl't., 1st Session, November 18, 1949, p. 2329.
68. Annual Report of Proceedings Under the Trans-Canada Highway Act 1951, p. 8.
69. P.A.C., H.A. Young, "Review of the Department", p. 15.
70. Debates, 22nd Parl't., 2nd Session, July 1, 1955, p. 5574.
71. Ibid., p. 5600.
72. Maclean's Magazine, December 15, 1953; St. John's Evening Telegram, December 11, 1953.
73. Cited in Debates, 22nd Parl't., 2nd Session, July 19, 1955, p. 6425.
74. Le Devoir, June 1, 1954.
75. H.A. Young, "Review of the Department", p. 29.
76. Debates, 24th Parl't., 1st Session, June 6, 1958, p. 919.
77. P.A.C., Records of the Royal Commission on Government Organization, Vol. 49, File 56, "Manpower in the Government Services: Department of Public Works", p. 2.
78. Ibid.
79. Debates, 21st Parl't., 6th Session, June 25, 1952, p. 3722.
80. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series X, Vol. 13, Young to Jackson, May 26, 1955.
81. Ibid., Minutes of meetings contained in this volume give an idea of procedure.
82. Annual Reports, 1953, 1958.
83. Debates, 22nd Parl't., 1st Session, January 21, 1954, p. 1311.
84. Ibid., March 22, 1956, p. 2522. For the fact that it was originally the Minister's idea I am indebted to Mr. G.B. Williams.
85. Statutes of Canada, Elizabeth II, 1956, Chap. 12, Section 2, pp. 4-5.
86. Ibid., Section 2.
87. Annual Report: Proceedings under the Trans-Canada Highway Act for the period December 10, 1949 to May 31, 1971 (Ottawa: Department of Public Works, 1972), p. 12.
88. Debates, 22nd Parl't., 2nd Session, January 13, 1955, p. 133.

89. Annual Report, 1959, p. 9.
90. Vancouver Province, April 5, 1958.
91. Ibid., April 6, 1958.
92. Ibid., April 7, 1958.
93. Debates, 24th Parl't., 2nd Session, June 5, 1959, pp. 4384-85.
94. P.A.C., H.A. Young, "Review of the Department", p. 1.
95. Debates, 22nd Parl't., 1st Session, April 29, 1954, p. 4240.
96. Ibid.
97. P.A.C., R.G. 11, Series X, Vol. 13, "Minutes of Executive Accommodation Committee, July 9, 1957".
98. Debates, 24th Parl't., 2nd Session, June 11, 1959, p. 4617.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid. (emphasis added).
101. Ibid., p. 4618.
102. Ibid., 24th Parl't., 1st Session, June 13, 1958, p. 1136.
103. Ibid., 21st Parl't., 2nd Session, April 28, 1950, pp. 2015-16.
104. Orders-in-Council, September 16, 1960.
105. Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization, Vol. 1 (Ottawa, 1962), p. 8. (Henceforth referred to as Glassco Report.)
106. Ibid., p. 51.
107. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 58-59. In addition, Vol. 2, p. 47 gives an indication of the problems resulting from dispersed responsibility in the case of Port-Aux-Basques Harbour.
108. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 41.
109. Ibid., p. 47.
110. Ibid., Vol. 2. Carrière's task force was set up to investigate real property rather than just construction.
111. Ibid., p. 26.

- 112. Ibid., p. 26.
- 113. Ibid., p. 35.
- 114. Debates, 17th Parl't., 6th Session, June 28, 1935, p. 4075.
- 115. Glassco Report, Vol. 2, p. 59.
- 116. Ibid., p. 66.
- 117. Annual Reports, "Report of the Chief Accountant", 1927, 1928, 1929;
"Report of the Deputy Minister", 1960.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Annual Report - Annual Report of Board of Works; Annual Report of Department of Public Works

B.P.P. - British Parliamentary Papers

Confederation Debates - Parliamentary Debates on the subject of the Confederation of the British North American Provinces

Debates - Debates of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada

Journals - Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada

P.A.C. - Public Archives of Canada

P.A.C., R.G. 11 - Records of the Department of Public Works

P.A.O. - Public Archives of Ontario

Q.U.L. - Queen's University Library

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Manuscript Collections and Public Records

The manuscript sources consulted for this volume were varied. The largest and most important source was Records of the Department of Public Works (R.G. 11) at the Public Archives of Canada. Comprising ten series and thousands of volumes and ranging from the records of the Welland Canal Company to those of the present-day Department, these volumes constitute the basic source for anyone interested in Public Works Canada.

Other Public records, such as those of the Privy Council, Parliament, the Departments of Finance and Transport, The Royal Commission on Government Organization and the Civil Service Commission's Historical Personnel Files provided additional facts and helped to fill in many gaps. In addition to these records at the Public Archives of Canada, files at the Department of Public Works and the Department of Transport in Ottawa were consulted concerning specific questions.

Also of great importance were the manuscript collections of various individuals. Understandably, the Prime Ministers' papers at the Public Archives of Canada offered an opportunity to gain knowledge of the relations between Prime Ministers and the Department to the degree that a Prime Minister corresponded with the Minister and kept departmental memoranda. In some cases, as with the Macdonald Papers and the Bennett Papers, the relations were close and the correspondence was consequently rich. Other Prime Ministers had less interest in the activities of the Department, but in all cases the papers were useful.

Also of help when they existed were the collections of the Ministers of Public Works or other departmental officials. The Israel Tarte Papers were perhaps the best ministerial collection whereas the Sandford Fleming Papers and the Hamilton Killaly Papers provided insight into the problems and minds of two important permanent officials. Two collections should be especially mentioned. Alexander Mackenzie, both as Prime Minister and as Minister of Public Works, left a collection that provided a view from the top as well as a glimpse at the day-to-day correspondence of an often harassed Minister. Secondly, the William Hamilton Merritt Papers at the Public Archives of Canada and the Public Archives of Ontario were an indispensable source for the pre-Confederation period. Merritt was Commissioner of Public Works for only a few months but he remained interested in the Department throughout his political life.

Other collections, including the Charles Mair Papers at Queen's University, the George Brown Papers at the Public Archives of Canada, H.A. Young's memorandum on the Department, the Colonial Office Records and F.G. Goodspeed's unpublished autobiography were useful in certain contexts and time-frames.

Printed Government Collections

Annual Reports of the Civil Service Commission
Annual Reports of the Board of Works

Annual Reports of the Department of Public Works
Annual Reports of Proceedings under the Trans-Canada Highway Act
Canada. House of Commons. Sessional Papers
Canada Year Books
Civil Service List
Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada, and
Appendices
Journals of the Senate of Canada
Parliamentary Debates
Statutes of Canada

Newspapers and Periodicals

British Colonist, 1841-1850
Le Canadien, 1890-1891
Le Devoir, 1952-1955
Grip, 1874-1891
Kingston Chronicle, 1843-1846
Maclean's Magazine, 1950-1960
Montreal Gazette, 1846-1850, 1867-1873
Ottawa Citizen, 1915, 1920, 1940-1953
Ottawa Journal, 1916-1920, 1930-1945
St. Catharines Journal, 1841-1879
St. John's Evening Telegram, 1940-1943, 1949-1950
Toronto Examiner, 1846-1849
Toronto Globe, 1847-1859, 1890-1892, 1915-1917
Toronto Mail, 1873-1875
Vancouver Province, 1958

Selected Printed References

Only works that deal with a person or subject directly relevant to A History of Public Works are included. A good many sources used for individual facts or references are excluded here but may be found in the footnotes.

Aitken, Hugh J. The Welland Canal Company: A Study in Canadian Enterprise. Harvard Research Center Studies in Entrepreneurial History. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Berton, Pierre. The National Dream: The Great Railway, 1871-1881. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970.

Boggs, Jean S. The National Gallery of Canada. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Borden, Robert Laird. Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs. Ed. and with a preface by Henry Borden. Abridged edition, ed. and with introd. by Heath Macquarrie. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1969.

Burpee, L.J. Sandford Fleming: Empire Builder. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1915.

Cameron, K.M. Public Works in Canada under the Department of Public Works. Ottawa: King's Printer, 1939.

Cole, Taylor. The Canadian Bureaucracy: A Study of Canadian Civil Servants and Other Public Employees, 1939-1947. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1949.

Creighton, Donald G. British North America at Confederation. A study prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1963.

The Empire of the St. Lawrence. Toronto: Macmillan, 1956. Originally published as The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850, 1937.

Dawson, R. MacGregor. The Civil Service of Canada. London: Oxford University Press, 1929.

Désilets, Andrée. Hector-Louis Langevin: Un père de la Confédération canadienne, 1826-1906. Cahiers de l'Institut d'Histoire, 14. Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1969.

Durham, John G. Lord Durham's Report on the Affairs of British North America. Ed. and with an introd. by C.P. Lucas. 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912.

Fleming, Sandford. The Intercolonial: A Historical Sketch of the Inception, Location, Construction, and Completion of the Line of Railway Uniting the Inland and Atlantic Provinces of the Dominion, with Maps and Numerous Illustrations. Montreal: Dawson Bros.; London: Low, Marston, 1876.

Report on Surveys and Preliminary Operations of the Canadian Pacific Railway up to January 1877. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1877.

Fraser, Barbara. "The Political Career of Hector-Louis Langevin." Canadian Historical Review 42(2): 93-132, June 1961.

Glazebrook, G.P. deT. A History of Transportation in Canada. Foreword by H.A. Innis. Relations of Canada and the United States Series. Toronto: Ryerson for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1938.

Gréber, Jacques. Plan for the National Capital. General report submitted to the National Capital Planning Committee. Ottawa: National Capital Planning Service, 1950.

Hind, Henry Youle. Narrative of the Canadian Red River Exploring Expedition of 1857 and of the Assiniboine and Saskatchewan Exploring Expedition of 1858. Reprint of 1860 ed. Edmonton: Hurtig, 1971.

Hodgetts, J.E. The Canadian Public Service: A Physiology of Government, 1867-1970. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973.

Kingsford, William. The Canadian Canals: Their History and Cost, with an Inquiry into the Policy Necessary to Advance the Well-Being of the Province. Toronto: Rollo and Adam, 1865.

Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubkowski, Ludwik, and W.A. Greening. Sir Casimir Stanislaus Gzowski: A Biography. Toronto: Burns and MacEachern, 1959.

Masters, D.C. "T.C. Keefer and the Development of Canadian Transportation." Pages 36-44 in Canadian Historical Association, Report of the Annual Meeting Held at London May 22-24, 1940, with Historical Papers, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1940.

McKee, Samuel, Jr. "Canada's Bid for the Traffic of the Middle West: A Quarter-Century of the History of the St. Lawrence Waterway, 1849-1874." Pages 26-35 in Canadian Historical Association, Report of the Annual Meeting Held at London May 22-24, 1940, with Historical Papers, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1940.

Merritt, J.P. Biography of the Hon. W.H. Merritt, M.P., of Lincoln, District of Niagara, including an Account of the Origin, Progress and Completion of Some of the Most Important Public Works in Canada. Comp. principally from his original diary and correspondence. St. Catharines; Leavenworth, 1878.

Morgan, Robert J. "The Georgian Bay Canal." Canadian Geographical Journal 78(3): 90-97, March 1969.

Neatby, H. Blair. Laurier and a Liberal Quebec: A Study in Political Management. Ed. and with an introd. by R.T. Clippingdale. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973.

Pentland, H.C. "The Lachine Strike of 1843." Canadian Historical Review 29(3): 255-77, September 1948.

Perry, John H. Taxes, Tariffs and Subsidies: A History of Canadian Fiscal Development. 2 vols. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955.

Safarian, A.E. The Canadian Economy in the Great Depression. Canadian Studies in Economics, No. 11. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959.

Sage, Walter. "Sandford Fleming, Engineer." Queen's Quarterly, Autumn 1950.

Stevens, G.R. Canadian National Railways. With a foreword by Donald Gordon, 2 vols. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1960-62.

Thomson, Dale C. Alexander Mackenzie: Clear Grit. Toronto: Macmillan, 1960.

Tucker, G.N. The Canadian Commercial Revolution, 1845-1851. Yale Historical Publications Studies, 9. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936.

Wilson, Alan. "Fleming and Tupper: The Fall of the Siamese Twins, 1880." Page 99-127 in J.S. Moir, ed., Character and Circumstance: Essays in Honour of Donald Grant Creighton. Toronto: Macmillan, 1970.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

William Hamilton Merritt, builder of the Welland Canal

Lord Sydenham, Charles Edward Poulett Thomson, Baron,
Governor in Chief of Canada, 1839 - 1841

Samuel Keefer, first Chief Engineer of Public Works

Parliament Buildings under construction, seen from the East Block

The Right Honourable Alexander Mackenzie, Prime Minister of Canada,
1873 - 1878

Sir Sandford Fleming (map in hand) with Intercolonial Railway Survey Staff

Construction on the Intercolonial Railway

Tunnel at Morrissey Rock, International Railway

Sir Sandford Fleming in 1870

John Page, Chief Engineer of Public Works, 1853 - 1879

CPR survey near the elbow of the Saskatchewan, 1871

The Honourable Sir Hector-Louis Langevin, Minister of Public Works,
1869 - 1873, 1879 - 1891

The Honourable Joseph Israël Tarte, Minister of Public Works, 1896 - 1902
- the last of the old-style Ministers -

Dominion Government telegraph Office, Nakina River, B.C., around 1900

Moving Camp - the Yukon Gold Rush

New wharf facilities at the Lakehead

The Honourable Robert Rogers, Minister of Public Works, 1912 - 1917

Parliament Buildings on fire, night of February 3, 1916

"Where the Speaker sat", the morning after the fire

The House of Commons, sitting in the Royal Victoria Museum, 1916

After the old walls came down, in late 1916

James B. Hunter, Deputy Minister of Public Works, 1908 - 1941

Hugh A. Young, Deputy Minister of Public Works, 1953 - 1963

Symbol of success: the demolition of Ripple Rock, April 5, 1958



Public Works
Canada

Travaux publics
Canada